Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: CNI ATTACKS AND POKROVSK PRESSURE ESCALATE

DTG: 021100Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. Confidence is high regarding the confirmed escalation of RF kinetic strikes against CNI and the continued UAF deep strike efficacy. Ground claims by RF remain unverified but indicate high operational intent.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational geometry is defined by RF's synchronized multi-domain assault: strategic kinetic strikes on Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) concurrent with sustained ground pressure and Information Operations (IO).

• CNI Degradation (CRITICAL IMPACT): Confirmed: The entire Donetsk Oblast remains without power. Additional reports confirm partial power outages in Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv Oblasts. The Slaviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration is confirmed to be without power due to strikes on energy infrastructure (Sloviansk TPP and targets in Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, Kostyantynivka). This is a multi-axis attack aimed at regional paralysis. (Source: Minenergo, Operatyvnyi ZSU, Colonelcassad - HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Pokrovsk Axis Ground Pressure: RF sources claim the completion of "cleansing" of Hnatovka and Roha and further advances into urban blocks of Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmiysk). They also claim to have occupied 26 buildings in Myrnohrad (40km WSW of Pokrovsk). UAF General Staff reports intense clashes near Shakhove, Myrnohrad, Chervonyy Lyman, and Rodynske toward Pokrovsk and Hryshyne. This confirms the Pokrovsk axis remains the main effort. (Source: Alex Parker Returns, Liveuamap/General Staff UAF - LOW CONFIDENCE on RF gains, HIGH on confirmed combat intensity/location).
• Persistent Air/Ground Threats: RF aviation conducted confirmed airstrikes against multiple settlements in Zaporizhzhia (Hulyaypole, Nechayivka, Malynivka, Stepove) and Kherson Oblasts (Olhivka). UAF forces repelled five RF assaults in the Kursk and North Slobozhansky (Sumy) directions, indicating continued probing actions near the border. (Source: Liveuamap/General Staff UAF - HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Deep Strike Reciprocity: UAF Security Service (SBU) confirmed a successful strike on the Tuapse oil terminal, damaging a tanker and port infrastructure. This maintains pressure on RF strategic logistics and oil exports. (Source: Tsaplienko, RBK-Ukraine, Operatyvnyi ZSU - HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes. Muddy conditions persist in rural areas, potentially hindering off-road maneuver but aiding concealment (seen in RF vehicle camouflage).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are rapidly implementing contingency power plans in affected oblasts (Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia) to maintain C2 and logistics flow. The high intensity of combat is confirmed across major sectors: Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, Lyman, and Sloviansk axes, demanding high readiness and resource expenditure. Confirmed UAF tactical success via drone operations (e.g., thermal imagery of personnel strikes by 128th Brigade) demonstrates effective, localized attrition warfare. (Source: Silly Oborony Pivdnya Ukrainy - HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Hybrid Operational Synchronization (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF is executing coordinated, multi-axis kinetic (CNI strikes) and informational (TASS, Alex Parker, Colonelcassad claims) operations designed to maximize physical damage and psychological disruption simultaneously.
• Heavy Artillery Concealment (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Imagery confirms RF deployment of self-propelled artillery (likely 2S1 Gvozdika type) heavily camouflaged with natural materials near the FLOT, indicating an attempt to shield fire support assets from UAF counter-battery fire and ISR. (Source: Operatyvnyi ZSU, STERNENKO, Alex Parker Returns - HIGH CONFIDENCE on observation, MEDIUM on system ID).
• Deep Strike Vulnerability: RF infrastructure (Tuapse oil terminal) remains vulnerable to UAF deep strike capabilities, confirming a key vulnerability in RF strategic sustainment.

Intentions:

1. Achieve Regional Paralysis: The primary strategic intent is to paralyze the Donetsk/Eastern operational area by dismantling critical energy infrastructure, thereby degrading UAF C2, civilian support, and military logistics in preparation for a decisive ground push.
2. Force UAF Retreat/Collapse on Pokrovsk Axis: RF ground forces intend to exploit the power outages and alleged advances (Hnatovka/Roha/Myrnohrad) to force a localized collapse of UAF defenses around Pokrovsk.
3. IO Amplification: RF continues to amplify claims of combat success (e.g., alleged Black Hawk helicopter strike near Pokrovsk) and display captured equipment (Sumi region claim) to boost domestic morale and undermine UAF resilience.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Targeting Deep CNI: The successful strike on the Slaviansk TPP and widespread blackouts confirm RF prioritizes critical power generation/distribution assets over less impactful industrial sites.
• Enhanced Camouflage: Observed use of heavy, dense foliage camouflage on self-propelled artillery suggests RF is adapting to increased UAF counter-battery fire enabled by drones and Western fire systems.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are currently strained by the effective UAF deep strike against oil export infrastructure (Tuapse). However, the widespread power loss in Donetsk temporarily hinders UAF ability to rapidly counter RF forward logistics. RF reports of UAF drone strikes on civilian infrastructure in LNR (6,500 people without power) indicate reciprocal UAF pressure on occupied territories.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrated high effectiveness in synchronizing multi-oblast kinetic strikes. UAF C2 effectiveness is being tested severely by the power outages and must rely on decentralized command and resilient, non-grid-dependent communications.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF maintains a determined defensive posture, characterized by high-intensity combat on the main axes (Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, Lyman) and proactive deep strike operations (Tuapse). UAF special units (128th Brigade operators) continue to demonstrate high tactical proficiency in utilizing thermal/FPV drones for immediate attrition of enemy personnel.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes:
  • Confirmed successful SBU/Defense Forces strike on the Tuapse oil terminal, degrading RF strategic energy logistics.
  • Confirmed successful engagements and destruction of RF personnel via thermal drone strikes.
• Setbacks (CRITICAL):
  • Total power loss across Donetsk Oblast and partial loss in key supporting regions (Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Chernihiv). This complicates military C2, ISR, and logistics planning across the Eastern FLOT.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Distributed Power Generation (CRITICAL): Immediate deployment of specialized mobile power units (generators, solar/battery packs) for forward repair teams and critical C2/medical facilities in the Slaviansk-Kramatorsk and Pokrovsk areas.
2. Counter-Camouflage/ISR: Need for increased all-weather, high-resolution IMINT/SIGINT to rapidly locate and target RF artillery and armor utilizing sophisticated natural camouflage near the FLOT.
3. AD Augmentation: Continued urgent need for SHORAD systems in central and northern oblasts to counter the persistent, multi-axis UAV threat (confirmed UAV group movement toward Poltava).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Operational Overstatement - HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF sources are aggressively claiming major territorial gains (Hnatovka, Roha, 26 buildings in Myrnohrad) and extraordinary kills (alleged GUR liquidation via Black Hawk near Pokrovsk). These claims are designed to preemptively announce victory on the Pokrovsk axis and demoralize UAF forces currently fighting there.
• RF IO (Deep Strike Damage Control - MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Russian sources (e.g., Mash) are framing UAF strikes on occupied territories (LNR power outage) as attacks on civilians, likely attempting to divert attention from the successful UAF strike on the Tuapse military-economic target.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale in the Eastern combat zones is under severe strain due to the widespread and prolonged power outages across Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia. UAF confirmed deep strike successes (Tuapse) are vital counter-narratives to maintain the perception of reciprocal capability and military effectiveness.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The continued high-impact CNI attacks reinforce the necessity of advanced AD systems (Patriot, NASAMS) for international partners to supply. The UAF Tuapse strike demonstrates capability that warrants continued material support.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will continue the coordinated strategic air campaign targeting CNI in the Eastern and Central/Northern Oblasts (Poltava, Kharkiv, Dnipro) to expand the area of effect beyond Donetsk. Simultaneously, RF ground forces will launch local, high-intensity assaults on the Pokrovsk axis, attempting to verify and exploit their claimed gains in Hnatovka and Roha. RF will likely focus precision strikes on temporary UAF C2/logistics hubs identified during the power crisis.

• Indicators: Continued air raid warnings in Poltava/Kharkiv; increased volume of GAB strikes near Pokrovsk; RF attempts to introduce armored reserves near the claimed territory.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) Deep Penetration of UAF Defenses toward Kostyantynivka/Kramatorsk. Capitalizing on the logistical and C2 disruption caused by the CNI strikes, RF will commit a motorized/mechanized reserve force from the Pokrovsk axis to attempt a rapid, deep penetration (5-10km) toward the Kostyantynivka agglomeration, bypassing heavily contested strongpoints. Success here would threaten the entire Northern Donetsk FLOT.

• Indicators: Confirmed observation of a divisional or regimental-sized RF reserve moving north of Myrnohrad or east of Pokrovsk; spike in RF ISR over key UAF supply routes into Kramatorsk/Kostyantynivka.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J4/Engineers (CNI Response): IMMEDIATELY ESTABLISH POWER CORRIDORS. Prioritize engineering assets to restore minimum essential power to the Slaviansk-Kramatorsk rail junction and military maintenance facilities. Utilize prepositioned mobile power stations to create hardened islands of C2/logistics capability across the Donetsk black-out zone.
2. J3/Fire Support (Pokrovsk Defense): CONTEST RF CONSOLIDATION. If RF control of Hnatovka and Roha is confirmed, authorize saturation counter-battery and indirect fire on the settlements to prevent RF engineering units from reinforcing positions or staging subsequent advances toward Myrnohrad.
3. J7/J2 (Counter-IO): REFUTE RF CLAIMS WITH EVIDENCE. Task J7 to publicly release BDA confirming the successful Tuapse strike and UAF tactical successes (e.g., 128th Brigade thermal drone video) to counter the RF narrative of decisive ground victory and CNI saturation effectiveness.

//END SITREP//