Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: RF POWER GRID STRIKES AND POKROVSK ADVANCE

DTG: 021000Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM. Confidence is high regarding the confirmed RF air saturation campaign and the loss of power across Donetsk, but low regarding RF ground claims near Pokrovsk.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational geometry is currently dominated by two factors: the extensive RF kinetic campaign targeting critical infrastructure (CNI) across multiple oblasts, and continued high-intensity ground combat focused on the Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmiysk) axis.

• RF CNI Strike Campaign (CRITICAL IMPACT): Confirmed widespread power outages across the entire Donetsk Oblast (UAF ODA sources), attributed to recent Russian strikes on energy infrastructure. This represents a successful RF effort to degrade civilian and military sustainment capabilities in a primary combat region. (Source: OPERATYVNYI ZSU, STERNENKO - HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Air Saturation Persistence: RF continues multi-axis strikes across the Central and Eastern axes, specifically targeting Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Odesa Oblasts. UAVs are actively operating in northern regions (Koriyukivskyi and Novhorod-Siverskyi districts of Chernihiv Oblast), exhibiting flight patterns designed to constantly change direction, complicating AD intercept. (Source: UAF Air Force, ZELENSKIY - HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Pokrovsk Axis Ground Pressure: RF sources claim the completion of the "cleansing" of Hnatovka and Roha and further advancement into the urban blocks of Krasnoarmiysk (Pokrovsk). RF sources also claim the destruction of a UAF UAV control point and positions in Dimitrov (likely Dytytriv, near Pokrovsk). These claims, if verified, indicate continued RF penetration into the operational depth of the Pokrovsk axis. (Source: TASS, Colonelcassad, DNR Militia - LOW CONFIDENCE on fact, HIGH on IO intent)
• UAF Deep Strike Efficacy: The previous week's verified UAF strikes (maritime, rail) forced significant RF resource expenditure on retaliation, confirming the continued effectiveness of UAF long-range platforms to maintain reciprocal pressure.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes. Ground conditions remain conducive to mechanized maneuver, favoring the aggressor (RF) in areas of sustained pressure like the Pokrovsk axis.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are operating under immense strain due to the high tempo of RF kinetic strikes (approx. 1,500 drones, 1,170 GABs, 70+ missiles in the last week). The immediate loss of power across Donetsk requires urgent establishment of redundant C2 and logistics power sources (generators, UPS) for forward units. UAF Command is demonstrating proactive internal adaptation, with discussions confirmed regarding the formation of a UAF Command for Unmanned Aerial Defense Systems (ADS), suggesting a formalization of UAF counter-drone doctrine. (Source: RBK-Ukraine - MEDIUM CONFIDENCE on timeline, HIGH on intent)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Strategic CNI Targeting (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF has demonstrated the capability to effectively coordinate kinetic strikes to achieve widespread, regional-level degradation of critical infrastructure (e.g., total power loss in Donetsk).
• Air-Ground Synchronization (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF ground claims regarding advances near Pokrovsk are concurrent with multi-axis air strikes, suggesting continued, albeit imperfect, synchronization between the RF Air Force (VKS) and Ground Forces (VSRF) to create advantageous conditions on the ground.
• Psychological Operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF messaging continues to focus on the alleged destruction of NATO equipment and UAF casualties to undermine Western support and internal morale.

Intentions:

1. Achieve Tactical Breakthrough in Donetsk: The primary operational intent is to leverage the massed air campaign and CNI degradation (Donetsk power loss) to support a decisive advance on the ground, likely along the Pokrovsk axis, capitalizing on disrupted UAF logistics and C2.
2. Degrade UAF Resilience: Force UAF to expend finite AD resources defensively across five+ oblasts while simultaneously crippling essential services (power) in core combat zones.
3. Halt UAF Deep Strike: RF claims of striking UAF UAV control points (e.g., in Dimitrov) demonstrate explicit intent to degrade UAF deep strike and tactical reconnaissance capabilities at the source.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Shift to Strategic Power Grid Strikes: The success in de-energizing Donetsk Oblast signals a renewed focus on high-impact CNI targets over less critical industrial sites (e.g., the previously targeted Pokrovske Mining Administration).
• Adaptive UAV Ingress: UAV flight paths designed to constantly change direction (Chernihiv region) demonstrate RF adaptation to UAF SHORAD doctrines, seeking to exploit reaction delays and operational fatigue.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics benefit from temporary UAF disruption due to the strategic power outages in Donetsk. However, RF’s own logistics remain vulnerable to UAF deep strikes, as evidenced by the previous Murmansk rail derailment. RF is likely prioritizing resupply to Pokrovsk-axis ground units to capitalize on the current UAF disadvantage.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating complex kinetic operations (multi-axis air campaign). UAF C2 must now operate under degraded conditions in Donetsk, emphasizing the need for robust decentralized command authority and resilient communication systems (SATCOM, hardened relay points).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensive, focused on mitigating the effects of the air saturation campaign and stabilizing the FLOT, particularly near Pokrovsk. The high rate of RF kinetic expenditure (over 2,700 munitions in the last week) indicates high combat intensity. UAF tactical units, such as GUR and NGU units, continue to demonstrate high proficiency in FPV operations, confirming successful kinetic strikes against RF logistics convoys. (Source: BUTUSOV PLUS, OLEKSANDR VILKUL - HIGH CONFIDENCE)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Confirmed successful FPV strike on RF vehicle convoy, demonstrating continued tactical effectiveness in interdiction and attrition warfare.
• Setbacks (CRITICAL): Total power loss across Donetsk Oblast, severely impacting civilian life, logistics flow, and the functioning of military C2/ISR assets reliant on grid power or generators. Confirmed saturation of AD systems across five major oblasts.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Donetsk Power Resiliency: Immediate requirement for thousands of high-capacity mobile power generators (Diesel/Hybrid) and fuel supplies to sustain military operations and critical civilian services across Donetsk.
2. Counter-UAV Systems: Urgent need to accelerate the deployment and integration of specialized counter-UAV systems (EW, ADS, and interceptor platforms) in the Chernihiv/Sumy/Poltava corridors to counter adaptive RF UAV ingress.
3. UAV Command Development: Expedite the formal establishment and resourcing of the new UAF Command for Unmanned Aerial Defense Systems (ADS) to institutionalize counter-drone strategy.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO Vector (Operational Success Reinforcement - HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF sources are doubling down on claims of ground success, specifically "cleansing" Hnatovka/Roha and advancing in Krasnoarmiysk (Pokrovsk). This narrative aims to demoralize UAF defenders and inflate domestic support.
• RF IO Vector (Internal Division - MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF propaganda attempts to sow internal discord by claiming UAF Ministry of Defense is "pitting citizens against each other" through public art/signage, attempting to paint UAF security services as oppressive (Source: DVA MAYORA).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is deteriorating, particularly in Donetsk, due to the total power loss following recent strikes. The sustained high-volume kinetic attacks place immense pressure on the populace. Counter-narratives focusing on UAF tactical successes (FPV strikes) are vital for maintaining morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The RF's strategic IO campaign showcasing "trophy" NATO equipment continues to influence Western public opinion, making sustained and rapid delivery of new aid packages politically challenging for partner nations. The success of UAF FPV operations provides a necessary counter-narrative of effective localized warfare.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will maintain heavy kinetic pressure on the Pokrovsk axis (Krasnoarmiysk), attempting to exploit the CNI disruption and perceived UAF C2 degradation in Donetsk. This ground assault will be supported by continued, high-volume GAB strikes utilizing tactical aviation (Su-34/Su-35) in the operational depth (20-40km from FLOT) to suppress UAF reserve movement. RF UAVs will continue to probe northern and central oblasts (Chernihiv, Poltava) to keep AD fixed.

• Indicators: Continued RF claims of advances in Krasnoarmiysk; high-tempo RF tactical aviation sorties near the FLOT; continued drone activity in Chernihiv.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) Targeted Strike on a Regional AD/HIMARS Cluster. Having observed UAF AD dispersal and fixed assets via the multi-axis saturation, RF will use high-speed missiles (Iskander/Caliber) or coordinated GAB strikes to destroy a key concentration of UAF high-value AD or long-range fire systems (e.g., Patriot battery, HIMARS unit) previously forced to move or remain fixed due to the wide-area threat. Loss of such assets would severely compromise deep defense capabilities.

• Indicators: Significant spike in RF ISR activity (Orlan/Supercam) in a specific central/eastern sector, followed by a sudden cessation of low-level drone activity prior to the strike window.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J4/J6 (Donetsk Resiliency): PRIORITIZE FUEL AND POWER DISTRIBUTION. Immediately task the logistics command to establish temporary, fuel-secure logistics hubs with mobile generator banks within a 50km radius of the Donetsk FLOT. Prioritize power supply to medical facilities, C2 nodes, and ATGM/AD forward positions.
2. J3/Special Operations (Counter-ISR/Deep Strike): SUPPRESS RF GAB LAUNCH PLATFORMS. Increase kinetic interdiction efforts against RF tactical aviation airbases (e.g., Lipetsk, Morozovsk) and forward operating areas utilized for GAB launches, thereby increasing the operational cost of the saturation campaign. Utilize existing deep strike assets for this purpose.
3. J3/J2 (Ground Defense): VERIFY/DENY POKROVSK CLAIMS. Allocate high-priority ISR assets to the area of Hnatovka and Roha. If RF control is confirmed, immediately task artillery and rocket forces (HIMARS, ATACMS where available) to interdict RF consolidation efforts and prevent the rapid construction of defensive fortifications in newly captured positions.

//END SITREP//