Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: LOGISTICS INTERDICTION AND EW COUNTER-ADAPTATION

DTG: 020730Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The operational focus has shifted to deep logistics interdiction by UAF, complemented by RF sustained deep-strike campaigns against CNI, confirming a reciprocal attrition strategy focused on sustaining the war economy and disrupting opponent mobility.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational geometry remains characterized by deep kinetic exchanges and focused pressure on the Pokrovsk Axis logistics network.

• RF Deep Rear (Black Sea Coast): NEW UAF deep strike confirmation against the Tuapse Port Terminal, resulting in a major fire and claimed destruction of port infrastructure. This is a significant expansion of UAF targeting to naval logistics nodes critical for supplying the Southern Group of Forces and exporting war materiel.
• Operational Rear (Dnipropetrovsk/Donetsk): NEW UAF Air Force reports confirm continuous ingress of RF strike UAVs ("Shahed" type inferred) moving through eastern Dnipropetrovsk toward Donetsk Oblast, suggesting sustained pressure on the eastern FLOT CNI and operational centers.
• Logistics Interdiction (Pokrovsk Axis): NEW reports from ATESH partisans confirm the successful destruction by fire of an RF military cargo truck (marked with 'Z' and '163') intended for deployment near Pokrovsk. This indicates effective operational depth targeting of RF logistics by proxy forces.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change from previous reporting. Nighttime conditions favor deep strike operations. Ground conditions (mud/snow previously noted) continue to complicate ground movement and logistics, as highlighted by the target set (trucks and logistics hubs near Pokrovsk).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

Both sides are prioritizing interdiction. UAF's primary control measure is the sustainment of the deep-strike campaign, forcing RF to pull AD/EW assets from the FLOT to defend internal logistics (Tuapse) and energy infrastructure (Lipetsk/Kursk, confirmed in previous SITREP). RF control measures center on dispersed ground attack (Pokrovsk axis) supported by saturation strikes against UAF CNI (Zaporizhzhia, Poltava, Kharkiv).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Sustained Deep Strike Capacity (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF maintains the capacity to launch synchronized, multi-axis UAV and missile strikes (confirmed targeting Poltava, Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia in previous report), achieving localized overmatch of UAF AD and causing significant CNI damage (58,000 subscribers affected in Zaporizhzhia).
• Tactical Resilience (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF frontline units (e.g., 'O' Group in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as claimed in recent media) continue to execute localized FPV-supported attacks, indicating unit-level tactical adaptation despite high overall attrition (General Staff report estimates).

Intentions:

1. Systemic Disruption: RF will continue to target Ukrainian CNI (power, industrial sites, residential areas near FLOT) to degrade both the war economy and civilian morale.
2. Information Dominance: RF IO will continue to project strength (TASS reporting on "superweapons," Peskov discussing high-level diplomacy) to shape the domestic and international perception of RF strategic standing.
3. Logistics Protection: RF C2 will be forced to commit additional AD/EW resources to defend critical deep-rear assets (Ports, Railheads) now confirmed as vulnerable to UAF deep strike (Tuapse).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Targeting Priority: RF continues to prioritize high-impact industrial and logistical CNI near the FLOT (Pokrovske Mining Administration in previous report) and residential areas (Zaporizhzhia), signaling a shift toward combined military/economic attrition.
• IO Synchronization: RF media aggressively links conceptual strategic systems ("Poseidon," "Burevestnik") with Western reporting, demonstrating an attempt to leverage external sources to validate their strategic deterrence narrative.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The partisan action against the RF military truck near Pokrovsk highlights an ongoing vulnerability in RF logistical security, particularly within occupied territories or on main supply routes to heavily contested areas. The need to supply forward units on the critical Pokrovsk axis remains RF's primary logistical strain.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 successfully coordinates complex, simultaneous air strikes across multiple axes (Poltava, Zaporizhzhia, etc.). However, the successful UAF strikes deep into RF territory (Tuapse Port) expose a critical weakness in RF strategic AD coordination and defense of economic nodes.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF maintains an effective, aggressive asymmetric posture, successfully executing deep strikes against high-value logistics targets (Tuapse Port Terminal) and effectively utilizing proxy forces (ATESH) for targeted interdiction on critical axes (Pokrovsk).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Strategic Interdiction): The strike on the Tuapse Port Terminal is a significant success, directly disrupting RF logistics and imposing high economic cost far from the FLOT.
• Success (Tactical Interdiction): ATESH destruction of the RF truck near Pokrovsk demonstrates effective, low-signature tactical interdiction capability on a crucial supply route.
• Setback (AD Strain): The multi-axis RF air campaign is demonstrably straining UAF AD assets, leading to significant CNI damage and power outages (Zaporizhzhia).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate requirement is for increased mobile SHORAD capacity to counter the RF multi-axis saturation strikes, particularly defending logistics hubs in the operational rear (e.g., Poltava/Sumy) that are now confirmed RF targets.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Strategic Deterrence (HIGH CONFIDENCE): TASS aggressively promotes stories regarding conceptual or non-operational "superweapons" ("Poseidon," "Burevestnik"), likely aiming to deter Western aid escalation and reinforce a narrative of Russian technological supremacy.
• RF Diplomatic Influence (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Peskov's comments on the possibility of a Putin-Trump meeting are intended to signal RF influence over key Western political processes and create uncertainty among NATO partners.
• RF Tactical Morale (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Pro-Russian channels (Operation Z) continue to release high-quality FPV footage of successful strikes, specifically naming units ('O' Group) to boost morale and validate frontline actions for domestic consumption.

2.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The successful UAF strike on Tuapse will boost Ukrainian domestic morale and reinforce the UAF narrative of sustained reach and capability. Conversely, the high civilian CNI damage in Ukrainian cities (Zaporizhzhia) will negatively impact local public sentiment and increase demand for AD protection.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF diplomatic signaling (Peskov/Trump) is designed to exploit perceived political divisions in partner nations, particularly in the lead-up to the US election cycle. The RF "trophy exhibit" (noted in previous report) continues to serve as the kinetic anchor for this political IO campaign.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will sustain the synchronized deep-strike campaign, leveraging a mix of high-speed missiles and slow, saturating UAVs (Shahed variants) against the eastern and central Ukrainian CNI (e.g., Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv power grids) to force UAF AD dispersal. Simultaneously, RF ground forces will maintain pressure on the Pokrovsk Axis, attempting to leverage UAF logistical constraints created by CNI targeting and terrain.

• Indicators: Sustained Air Force alerts for UAVs moving toward Donbas/Central Ukraine; continued TASS/MoD reporting on "successful" interceptions over RF deep rear; local reports of power outages in targeted Ukrainian oblasts.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF, recognizing the vulnerability of its deep-rear logistics (Tuapse), will implement a rapid, concentrated EW defense package (URS-680 or similar) around remaining critical logistics hubs (e.g., Novorossiysk Port, major rail junctions). If successful, this could significantly degrade UAF deep-strike effectiveness, creating a window for a decisive RF ground push on the Pokrovsk axis while UAF drone resources are temporarily disrupted.

• Indicators: Immediate, sharp increase in UAF deep strike mission aborts or confirmed drone losses in proximity to Novorossiysk/Tuapse; confirmed RF ground force mobilization (e.g., vehicle columns) toward the Vovcha River crossing points.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/JFSOC (Deep Strike): EXPLOIT PORT VULNERABILITY. Capitalize on the successful Tuapse strike by rapidly developing follow-on kinetic missions targeting high-value fixed logistics nodes (rail yards, fuel storage) in the immediate vicinity of the Black Sea ports, forcing RF to commit limited AD assets away from the FLOT.
2. J3/Air Force (Air Defense): DECOY AND MANEUVER. Immediately implement the planned rotational re-posturing of mobile AD assets to the Poltava/Sumy axes. Introduce low-cost radar decoys and flares in primary threat corridors to dilute the effectiveness of RF saturation strikes and preserve high-value interceptors.
3. J4/J3 (Logistics/Tactical): COUNTER-INTERDICTION EMPHASIS. Increase ISR and dedicated counter-reconnaissance (electronic and kinetic) along all key supply routes feeding the Pokrovsk axis. Prioritize the immediate neutralization of any observed RF FPV teams, spotters, or partisan elements attempting to replicate the successful interdiction reported by ATESH.

//END SITREP//