Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: RECIPROCAL DEEP STRIKE AND EW ADAPTATION

DTG: 020700Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The conflict is characterized by sustained reciprocal deep-strike operations against Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and logistics, coupled with a rapid technological adaptation by the Russian Federation (RF) in the Electronic Warfare (EW) domain.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational geometry remains focused on deep, non-linear pressure.

• RF Deep Rear (Lipetsk Oblast): Confirmed reporting indicates continued Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) deep strike operations. Reports from Ukrainian sources (RBC-Ukraine) and the previous SITREP's RF alerts confirm a high-intensity attack on a substation (electrical infrastructure) in Lipetsk Oblast. This confirms the expanded targeting of RF energy CNI deep in the interior.
• Eastern Ukraine (Occupied Territory): Reports confirm strikes on a substation in occupied Alchevsk (Luhansk Oblast), reinforcing UAF capability to target RF-controlled logistics and energy infrastructure near the Front Line of Troops (FLOT).
• RF Deep Rear (Kursk Oblast): New reports indicate additional strikes against substations in Kursk Oblast. This, combined with Lipetsk, signals a coordinated UAF campaign targeting RF electricity distribution across multiple adjacent oblasts.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change from previous reporting. Nighttime conditions continue to enable deep strike ingress and favor low-altitude UAV operations. Ground conditions (mud, snow observed in recent RF media) continue to complicate tactical casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) operations on the FLOT (see Enemy Analysis).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

Both sides are prioritizing CNI defense and attack. UAF continues to demonstrate effective deep strike capacity, forcing RF to commit significant EW and Air Defense (AD) assets to the interior. RF is displaying robust EW counter-adaptation (URS-680 deployment mentioned in previous SITREP) while maintaining aggressive ground pressure on the Kharkiv axis (evidenced by the 27th Brigade activities).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Sustained Ground Combat Effectiveness (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Despite logistical and environmental challenges (mud/snow), RF ground units (e.g., 27th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade, Kharkov Axis) maintain the capability to execute complex CASEVAC under fire, suggesting continued unit cohesion and operational resilience.
• Strategic Distraction via IO (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF uses non-military news (e.g., TASS reporting on US counter-narcotics ops in the Caribbean, celestial objects) to dilute the information environment and redirect attention away from domestic kinetic vulnerability (Lipetsk/Kursk strikes).

Intentions:

1. Maintain Operational Tempo (Kharkiv/Kupiansk Axis): RF units will continue localized, high-attrition ground engagement, supported by morale-boosting IO campaigns (stories of medical heroism).
2. Mitigate UAF Deep Strike: Rapidly implement C-UAS/EW defenses (URS-680) and publicly acknowledge localized defense failures (through "Red Level" alerts) to manage domestic expectations while seeking to suppress UAF drone effectiveness.
3. Project Strategic Deterrence/Capability: RF military channels continue to publicize advanced, non-operational strategic hardware (e.g., the conceptual "Korona" launch vehicle), likely aiming to reinforce the long-term technological narrative and deter Western intervention.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF Ground Morale Campaign: RF military bloggers are actively publishing "human interest" content (poetry, videos of medics) focused on the difficulties and heroism of frontline personnel (27th Brigade, Kharkov direction). This is a tactical IO effort aimed at sustaining frontline morale and volunteer support amidst high casualty rates and harsh conditions.
• RF Infrastructure Dispersion: UAF strikes confirm RF has not centralized its vulnerable CNI assets, forcing UAF to execute dispersed, multi-regional attacks (Lipetsk, Kursk, Alchevsk).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The imagery of difficult CASEVAC (using makeshift stretchers and wheeled carts in mud/snow) suggests RF logistics for frontline medical evacuation remain challenged by terrain and weather, often relying on semi-improvised solutions despite the presence of dedicated medical platoons. This highlights an ongoing vulnerability to UAF tactical interdiction and pressure.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating IO (military bloggers, state media) and managing internal security responses (alerts) to UAF deep strikes. The simultaneous targeting of CNI in Lipetsk and Kursk suggests RF C2 is being stretched to defend non-adjacent, critical infrastructure.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF maintains an aggressive, asymmetric deep-strike posture, evidenced by the confirmed kinetic damage to substations in Lipetsk and Kursk Oblasts and occupied Alchevsk. This validates UAF's intent to sustain reciprocal cost imposition and directly target the RF war economy.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Deep Strike Escalation): Confirmed successful strikes against CNI targets across three distinct regions (Lipetsk, Kursk, Alchevsk) within the operational window. This demonstrates operational reach and sustained capability.
• Setback (Information Environment): RF continues to deploy effective strategic IO (trophy exhibit, nuclear narratives) and tactical IO (medics' heroism) that require sustained, professional counter-messaging from UAF J7/IO components.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Primary constraint remains the protection of deep strike assets against the newly deployed, advanced RF C-UAS/EW systems (URS-680, detailed in the previous SITREP). Maintaining the technological advantage in the drone domain is paramount for sustaining the CNI pressure campaign.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Strategic Projection (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF channels (Colonelcassad) continue to use conceptual/developmental aerospace graphics ("Korona" rocket) to project technological prowess, diverting focus from tactical failures and reinforcing the image of Russia as a future high-technology power.
• RF Tactical Morale Boosting (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The widespread dissemination of videos and poems showcasing the heroism and suffering of frontline medics (27th Brigade) is a deliberate attempt to humanize the conflict for a domestic audience, justify the conflict's costs, and maintain the narrative of righteous struggle.
• RF Historical Revisionism (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): TASS reporting on the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory's decision regarding historical figures (Kutuzov) is an IO effort to portray Ukraine as engaged in irrational "historical revisionism," aiming to alienate traditionally Russian-sympathetic segments of the population.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The successful UAF strikes on power infrastructure deep within RF territory (Lipetsk/Kursk) are likely causing localized anxiety and internal security concerns for the RF government, potentially eroding support for the war among the civilian population.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

No immediate tactical or operational diplomatic shifts observed in the current window, though the ongoing RF strategic IO (trophy exhibit, nuclear rhetoric) continues to target the sustained political will of Western partners.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will intensify the deployment and operational testing of its newly introduced C-UAS/EW systems (URS-680 and similar) in the deep rear (Lipetsk, Kursk, Belgorod) in direct response to the successful UAF CNI strikes. Ground operations will maintain low-to-medium intensity along the Kharkiv/Kupiansk axis, leveraging morale-boosting IO to sustain combat effectiveness.

• Indicators: Increased anecdotal reports of drone losses due to jamming; RF official confirmations of "successful interception" of long-range drones; continued output of morale-focused media from frontline units.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF will exploit the dispersed AD posture required by the UAF CNI campaign to launch a concentrated saturation strike (missiles and glide bombs) against a single, critical UAF logistics or C2 facility (e.g., a strategic rail head or operational headquarters) in the Sumy or Poltava regions, assuming UAF AD resources have been pulled closer to the FLOT.

• Indicators: Significant, observable decrease in the RF multi-axis UAV strike pattern (resource consolidation); high volume of RF ISR activity (Orlan/Supercam) over central UAF logistics corridors.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J2/J7 (GUR/Technical): ADAPTIVE EW MEASURES. Implement an immediate testing and deployment cycle for anti-jamming navigation and decoy payload systems on all deep-strike UAV platforms. Assume the URS-680 (or equivalent) is fully operational in the deep rear and initiate alternate, lower-frequency communication relays to bypass RF-dominated C-UAS bands.
2. J3 (Air Defense): C-UAS TARGETING PRIORITY SHIFT. Re-task limited-range precision strike assets (e.g., FPVs, Lancet-countering systems) along the FLOT (Kharkiv/Zaporizhzhia axes) to actively hunt and attrit confirmed RF C-UAS/EW deployment teams, viewing them as critical force multipliers that must be neutralized before large-scale offensive operations.
3. J4 (Logistics/Engineers): IMPROVE FRONTLINE CASEVAC RESILIENCE. Analyze RF weaknesses observed in medical evacuation (mud/snow constraints) and prioritize the provision of all-terrain medical evacuation vehicles (e.g., tracked ATVs or specialized armored ambulances) to UAF units on the most challenging terrain axes (Kharkiv, Donbas FLOT) to ensure timely casualty extraction and maintain unit combat effectiveness.

//END SITREP//