INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: RF CNI DEGRADATION AND STRATEGIC IO AMPLIFICATION
DTG: 020700Z NOV 25
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. Continued RF focus on multi-domain pressure: kinetic strikes against Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) synchronized with strategic Information Operations (IO) targeting both domestic and international audiences.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
The operational geometry remains characterized by deep-strike attacks and counter-attacks, with significant RF focus on disrupting essential services far from the Fire Line of Contact (FLOC).
- Zaporizhzhia Oblast (CNI Targeting): Confirmed reports from the Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration (OVA) indicate 58,000 customers remain without power following the RF strike. This confirms the successful kinetic interdiction of a major power distribution node, a key CNI target. The rapid confirmation of this damage (02:33Z) indicates ongoing Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) by the OVA.
- RF Deep Rear (Lipetsk Oblast): A Red Level "UAV Threat" alert was announced for Yelets, Yeletsky MR, Dolgorukovsky MR, Stanovlyansky MO, and Izmalkovsky MO (02:41Z). This geographically dispersed alert indicates potential UAF deep strike activity targeting RF territory, likely in retaliation for CNI attacks, drawing RF AD resources away from the FLOC.
- Donetsk Axis (FLOC): Activity remains consistent with previous reporting: RF forces, specifically the 35th Army Grouping "Vostok" Special Forces, are confirmed operating (02:35Z), likely engaging in localized reconnaissance or precision attrition operations.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
No change. Night operations are facilitating deep strike activity. Approaching freezing temperatures remain a critical factor for the CNI damage effects and subsequent repair efforts.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
- RF Deep Strike C2: RF demonstrates sustained capability for coordinating large-scale, multi-platform strikes on CNI (Belief: Energy Supply Disruption in Zaporizhzhia - 0.076). The rapid operational shift from AD saturation (previous SITREP) to confirmed CNI degradation suggests a pre-planned phase of the winter campaign.
- UAF AD and CNI Response: UAF local administration is effectively tracking damage and communicating outages, but the persistent threat demands increased mobile AD deployment (as recommended in the previous SITREP).
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
- Nuclear-Themed IO (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF state media (TASS) and military experts are amplifying claims about "world-analogue-free" strategic systems (Poseidon, Burevestnik - 02:34Z). This narrative is designed to reinforce RF status as a great power and deter international interference, likely in response to increased UAF deep-strike success (e.g., Tuapse Port).
- Targeted CNI Degradation (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF has proven capability to induce significant, widespread power outages (58,000 customers) in key regional centers using a mix of precision munitions (Belief: Military Action: Airstrike by Russia on Energy Infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia - 0.064).
Intentions:
- Systemic Defeat of CNI: RF intent is to continue targeting CNI to create instability, degrade mobilization logistics, and apply maximum psychological pressure ahead of winter.
- Strategic Deterrence via IO: Use non-conventional system claims (Poseidon/Burevestnik) to manage the risk of international escalation while simultaneously distracting from UAF successes in the deep rear.
- Local Attrition: Maintain pressure on the FLOC using specialized units (35th Army Spetsnaz) to prevent UAF redeployment of reserves.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
RF is exhibiting increased synchronization between kinetic operations and strategic IO. The timing of the Zaporizhzhia CNI strike, followed immediately by nuclear deterrence messaging, suggests a calculated effort to define the operational environment and manage escalation risk.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
The UAF deep strike on the Tuapse Port (previous SITREP) places indirect pressure on RF strategic logistics. The announcement of UAV alerts in Lipetsk Oblast further indicates UAF effort to target RF internal logistics routes and airfields, constraining RF sustainment capacity.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 remains robust, successfully coordinating complex, dispersed kinetic strikes with high-level media messaging. The ability to manage these concurrent operations across multiple domains (air, kinetic, IO) demonstrates centralized control, likely at the Front or Group of Forces level.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
UAF posture remains defensive and adaptive. The Zaporizhzhia OVA's immediate reporting and damage assessment reflect high readiness in CNI recovery, which mitigates the long-term impact of RF strikes. UAF deep-strike forces continue to exert pressure on RF deep rear, as indicated by the Lipetsk UAV threat alert.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
- Setback (Strategic): RF successfully disrupted power for 58,000 users, confirming the vulnerability of major regional power hubs.
- Success (Operational): UAF deep strikes are confirmed to be penetrating deep into RF airspace, forcing RF to issue Red Level alerts for key industrial areas like Lipetsk, which hosts military-industrial complex facilities.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
The immediate requirement is for redundant CNI components (transformers, mobile substations) and specialized repair crews to rapidly address the systematic RF targeting campaign. AD assets remain the primary constraint against the multi-axis strike threat.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
- RF Strategic Deterrence (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The TASS/expert commentary on Poseidon and Burevestnik (02:34Z) is a classic Strategic Deterrence IO campaign. It attempts to overshadow UAF tactical successes (e.g., Tuapse) and remind Western partners of the theoretical escalation ceiling, aiming to constrain the type and volume of future Western aid.
- RF Morale Focusing: An internal RF post about children (02:33Z) is assessed as part of a low-grade domestic morale campaign, attempting to shift public focus from military losses to domestic issues or to subtly push the narrative of perceived Ukrainian domestic instability (Belief: Information Warfare: Disinformation Campaign by [Side] regarding domestic morale and demographic pressure in Ukraine - 0.021).
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
The confirmed power outages will negatively impact local morale in Zaporizhzhia, but the reciprocal nature of the deep strike war (UAF striking Lipetsk) maintains a perception of active response, which is crucial for overall national morale.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
RF's nuclear-themed IO aims to influence international support by raising the perceived risk. UAF must counter this narrative by continuing to demonstrate effective strategic cost imposition (e.g., targeting Russian oil export capabilities).
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will continue the coordinated CNI strikes, focusing next on railway electrification nodes or large substations critical to UAF military logistics in the Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts. This strategy maximizes military disruption while compounding civilian hardship. Ground operations on the FLOC will remain localized (e.g., 35th Army Spetsnaz activity) to fix UAF attention and prevent reserve redistribution.
- Indicators: Repeat RF Air Force alerts specifically targeting high-voltage infrastructure near rail hubs; increased imagery intelligence (IMINT) of RF reconnaissance UAVs tracking main railway lines; reduced RF artillery fire to conserve munitions for potential large-scale operation preparation.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours
(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF will launch a coordinated Electronic Warfare (EW) and kinetic strike package against a key UAF Command and Control (C2) or intelligence node in the deep rear (e.g., a known military HQ in Kyiv or Dnipro), aiming to temporarily disrupt senior leadership communications using integrated EW suppression followed immediately by a massed missile/glide bomb strike.
- Indicators: Sudden, widespread disruption of UAF secured communications (SIGINT); observed unusual patterns in RF strategic reconnaissance flights (e.g., Tu-22M3 or reconnaissance variants); simultaneous activation of multiple RF electronic attack platforms near the FLOC.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
| Timeframe | Event/Decision Point | Triggering Indicator |
|---|
| 0-12H (Immediate) | CNI Redundancy Implementation: J4 activates mobile generator and repair assets previously staged in Dnipro/Poltava (Recommendation 2 from previous SITREP). | Confirmed RF strike causes widespread power loss (50,000+ customers) in a second major regional hub (e.g., Kharkiv). |
| 12-36H | Deep Strike Tasking Review: GUR/J2 authorizes a retaliatory deep strike mission targeting a high-value RF military airbase or critical MRO (Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul) facility in response to continued CNI attacks. | Confirmed RF IO escalation (e.g., explicit nuclear threat or targeting of civilian rescue crews). |
| 36-48H | FLOC Alert Status Uplift: J3 orders a heightened state of readiness (AD and counter-battery) on the Kharkiv and Kupyansk axes, anticipating a shift from deep strikes back to concentrated FLOC pressure (MDCOA). | Observed withdrawal or significant reduction of RF deep strike assets, indicating resource reallocation to the FLOC. |
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) |
|---|
| CRITICAL | RF CNI Target Selection Criteria: Determine the specific targeting criteria RF is prioritizing (e.g., voltage level, proximity to rail, redundancy capacity) to accurately predict the next target location. | HUMINT/SIGINT: Intercepted RF targeting briefs or internal communications detailing target selection methodologies for the winter energy campaign. |
| HIGH | UAF Deep Strike BDA (Lipetsk Threat): Confirm the intended target and BDA of the UAF assets that triggered the Lipetsk UAV threat alert to assess UAF deep strike effectiveness and resource commitment. | IMINT: Satellite imagery focused on key industrial/military targets within the declared Red Zone (Yelets, Lipetsk) for damage confirmation. |
| MEDIUM | 35th Army Spetsnaz Mission Profile: Gain fidelity on the current mission and resource allocation of the confirmed 35th Army Special Forces element on the Eastern Front (Donetsk Axis). | ELINT/SIGINT: Focus on tactical communications patterns and frequency usage associated with confirmed Spetsnaz units to determine their operational intent (ISR, sabotage, or focused attrition). |
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
- J3 (Air Defense/C2): IMMEDIATE ACTION. Allocate dedicated, layered CNI protection to the main railway electrification substations connecting Eastern and Central Ukraine (e.g., near Pavlohrad and Kramatorsk sectors). This is a direct counter to the MLCOA of severing military logistics. Use highly mobile AD assets only.
- J7 (IO/Media): URGENT ACTION. Task J7/GUR to prepare and release a unified statement to Western media directly addressing RF nuclear rhetoric (Poseidon/Burevestnik). The message should emphasize that such rhetoric is an attempt to mask RF battlefield failures (Tuapse BDA) and will not deter Ukraine's right to defend its infrastructure and sovereignty.
- J4 (Logistics Security): ACTION. Immediately activate a dedicated security protocol for CNI repair crews and their equipment in Zaporizhzhia and high-risk oblasts, as these crews become secondary targets for RF precision fires (e.g., Krasnopol) seeking to delay recovery efforts. Use armed security and dedicated EW protection for repair sites.
//END SITREP//
