Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: RF DEEP STRIKE ESCALATION AND COUNTER-LOGISTICS ATTACKS

DTG: 020600Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. New information strongly reinforces the assessment of a sustained, high-intensity RF AD saturation strategy coupled with continued UAF deep-strike operations against RF logistics infrastructure.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational axis is defined by persistent RF deep strikes against UAF rear areas, offset by successful UAF deep-strike operations against critical RF strategic logistics.

• Zaporizhzhia Oblast (RF Strike): Confirmed high-explosive strike damage in Zaporizhzhia city (UAF OMA, RBC-Ukraine, 02:18Z, 02:28Z). Initial reports of no casualties (previous SITREP) were revised; the attack resulted in two civilian casualties and widespread infrastructure damage, leaving 58,000 customers without power (02:28Z). This confirms RF targeting of critical energy infrastructure (CNI) as a primary objective.
• Donetsk Oblast (FLOT Activity): Confirmed launch of KAB/glide bombs directed toward Donetsk Oblast (02:23Z). This is consistent with the predicted use of precision glide munitions to exploit localized UAF AD vulnerabilities or target prepared defensive positions near the FLOT (e.g., Avdiivka or Pokrovsk axes).
• RF Deep Rear (Tuapse Port): Confirmed multiple simultaneous fires (at least three centers of combustion) at the Tuapse Maritime Port following a drone attack (ASTRA OSINT, 02:04Z). This high-value target is critical for RF Black Sea logistics and oil export, directly impacting RF long-term sustainment.
• RF Deep Rear (Rostov Oblast): Confirmed UAV attack resulting in two civilian casualties in Rostov Oblast (02:26Z). This reflects the continued, reciprocal nature of the deep strike war, drawing RF attention and resources to homeland security.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes to the immediate weather picture. Nighttime operations continue to facilitate deep strike operations for both sides. The anticipation of bitter frosts (see previous SITREP) remains a factor for logistics planning starting early November.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Deep Strike Platforms: RF is allocating significant resources to simultaneously strike civilian infrastructure (Zaporizhzhia energy) and military targets (Donetsk FLOT), confirming the strategic objective of AD saturation.
• UAF Deep Strike Platforms: UAF demonstrates continued effective reach into high-value RF strategic logistics targets (Tuapse Port), indicating successful long-range ISR and strike coordination.
• UAF CNI Protection: UAF utility services are actively engaged in immediate repair (Zaporizhzhia OMA, 02:13Z), indicating robust, rapid response CNI recovery protocols.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Targeted Energy Disruption (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF demonstrates the capability to precisely target and significantly disrupt CNI (electrical grid) within regional centers (58,000 customers affected in Zaporizhzhia).
• KAB/Glide Bomb Deployment (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF is utilizing KABs against the Donetsk operational area, confirming the capability to deploy precision-guided munitions where UAF AD is assessed as thin or suppressed.
• Precision Artillery (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF is utilizing precision-guided artillery (e.g., Krasnopol) to target UAF temporary deployment points (TASS claims, 02:19Z), indicating effective forward ISR and fires coordination.

Intentions:

1. Systemic Energy Degradation: RF intent is to systematically degrade UAF power generation and distribution capabilities ahead of winter, compounding the stress on civilian and military logistics.
2. Attrition and IO Amplification: Continue precision attrition against UAF tactical targets (e.g., logistics, deployment points) and immediately amplify successful strikes via state media (TASS/MOD claims) to reinforce the narrative of UAF losses.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF appears to be transitioning the AD saturation phase into the exploitation phase by immediately deploying KABs/glide bombs on the Donetsk sector following the coordinated deep strikes. This validates the assessment that the deep strike campaign's primary objective is resource fixation and AD degradation.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The confirmed damage to the Tuapse Maritime Port, a critical oil transit hub, represents a significant blow to RF strategic logistics. While the immediate impact on frontline fuel supply may be negligible, sustained interdiction of such ports will compromise RF long-term strategic reserve build-up and export revenue.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating both strategic deep strikes (Zaporizhzhia) and tactical precision fires (TASS footage), demonstrating integrated air/ground C2, likely centralized at the Army Group or Front level.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness remains high across the deep rear, demonstrated by the immediate and effective CNI recovery efforts in Zaporizhzhia. UAF deep strike capability is operationally mature and effectively targeting RF strategic weaknesses (Tuapse Port).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Strategic): Successful drone strike on Tuapse Port represents a significant kinetic success against RF strategic sustainment.
• Setback (Operational): The RF strike on Zaporizhzhia CNI successfully disrupted power for nearly 60,000 customers, demonstrating a vulnerability in infrastructure protection.
• Setback (Tactical/IO): RF continues to effectively exploit precision fires (Krasnopol claims) for internal propaganda, potentially impacting the perceived security of UAF rear area deployment points.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint remains AD munitions and platforms. The shift to KAB use on the Donetsk FLOT requires an urgent reassessment of SHORAD and counter-battery placement to mitigate the immediate threat of heavy guided munitions.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Narrative (Precision and Control): TASS is actively disseminating footage of claimed precision strikes using Krasnopol guided munitions against UAF temporary deployment points (02:19Z). The objective is to project RF superiority in targeting and fires control.
• RF Counter-IO: The report of two casualties in Rostov Oblast due to a UAV attack (02:26Z) will be immediately used to justify RF strikes as reciprocal action against "Ukrainian terrorism."

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The confirmed civilian casualties and large-scale power disruption in Zaporizhzhia will increase hardship but are unlikely to break resolve, instead reinforcing the justification for UAF deep-strike attacks against RF infrastructure like Tuapse.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

UAF success in striking Tuapse Port provides a crucial counter-narrative to the RF "trophy exhibit" IO campaign (previous SITREP), demonstrating UAF capability to impose strategic costs on the RF economy and military.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will sustain the kinetic exploitation of the Donetsk sector (KAB/glide bomb use) while conducting follow-up AD saturation strikes targeting CNI in the Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava/Sumy triangle. The objective is to further degrade energy infrastructure across multiple regions to maximize disruption as winter approaches. RF forces will also increase ISR efforts around key FLOT sectors (Kupyansk, Pokrovsk) to identify vulnerabilities for a localized ground attack.

• Indicators: Repeat Air Force alerts in Dnipro/Poltava; increased seismic/acoustic signatures from KAB impacts on the Donetsk FLOT; intensified RF ISR UAV activity near UAF reserve positions.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) Following the concentration of AD resources in the rear (to defend against CNI strikes), RF will initiate a mechanized assault (regiment-sized) on the Kupyansk/Svatove sector, utilizing massive artillery and air support (KABs) to suppress UAF static defenses, aiming to achieve a localized operational breakthrough and force a costly UAF counter-attack using limited reserves.

• Indicators: IMINT confirmation of RF bridging equipment mobilization near the Oskil River; confirmed use of Thermobaric weapons (TOS-1A) to clear defensive lines; significant reduction in RF IO chatter to conceal the preparation.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Air Defense/CNI Protection): IMMEDIATE ACTION. Initiate a priority movement of at least one battalion-sized mobile AD element (e.g., Gepard, Avenger, or equivalent SHORAD) to establish a protective umbrella over the key power generation/distribution nodes in the Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava Oblasts. This move directly counters the MLCOA of CNI degradation.
2. J4 (Logistics Security): ACTION. Given the confirmed loss of 58,000 customers due to the Zaporizhzhia strike, J4 must coordinate with regional military administrations (OVAs) to pre-position mobile generator assets and large-scale backup fuel reserves near critical infrastructure and hospitals across all high-risk oblasts (Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro) in anticipation of follow-on strikes.
3. J2/J3 (Counter-KAB Doctrine): ACTION. UAF Air Force Command must immediately review and disseminate updated tactical procedures for countering low-altitude KAB launches, focusing on aggressive Forward Air Controller (FAC) tasking and prioritizing the engagement of RF launch aircraft within 20km of the FLOT using medium-range systems where feasible.

//END SITREP//