Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 010633Z NOV 25

DTG: 010633Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH (High confidence in RF targeting priorities and logistics threats, constrained by the lack of confirmed tactical outcome from the Pokrovsk logistics interdiction.) PRIORITY FOCUS: Immediate defense of remaining Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) following coordinated RF strikes and stabilization of the Pokrovsk logistics axis to preempt immediate RF tactical exploitation.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational focus remains bifurcated:

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): This is the critical operational center of gravity. The confirmed destruction of the Vovcha River bridge has successfully fractured UAF logistics into the forward sector. RF is currently maintaining indirect fire interdiction against this area. UAF General Staff infographics confirm the Kostiantynivka Direction (Pokrovsk) remains a high-activity zone.
• Deep Rear (Poltava/Dnipro/Mykolaiv): RF continues coordinated multi-domain deep strikes. Confirmed strike and subsequent fire at a gas extraction facility in Poltava Oblast (DSNS, Operatyvnyi ZSU, RBK-Ukraina) and strikes causing damage to civilian infrastructure (education, transport) in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (ASTRA). This validates the analytical judgment that RF is prioritizing CNI attrition ahead of the winter season.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change from previous SITREP. Low visibility night operations facilitate RF UAV/drone usage against dispersed CNI.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Posture: UAF forces are heavily engaged in damage control and firefighting operations in Poltava, drawing resources from air defense and security details.
• RF Posture: RF IO sources (TASS) claim the destruction of 11 UAV control points and 30 personnel by the Southern Grouping in the Kostiantynivka direction (Pokrovsk area). This suggests persistent RF counter-UAS/EW operations are highly active in this critical sector.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

(RF CAPABILITIES):

• Integrated Logistics Disruption (Reinforced): RF has demonstrated the successful use of precision long-range or multi-domain assets (likely leveraging EW/ISR like FSTH-LD) to achieve a strategic kinetic effect (Vovcha bridge destruction). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Persistent CNI Strike Capability: RF possesses the ability to simultaneously target logistics (Pokrovsk) and strategically important, geographically dispersed CNI (Poltava gas facility).
• Counter-UAS/C2 Attrition: RF is actively and successfully targeting UAF drone control points and antennas (TASS footage), reinforcing their EW/ISR advantage.

(RF INTENTIONS):

1. Paralyze Pokrovsk Sustainment: Maintain precision pressure on the Vovcha River crossing points to ensure the logistics fracture persists for the next 48-72 hours.
2. Systematically Degrade Gas/Energy Infrastructure: Continue sequential strikes against non-redundant CNI (gas processing, power generation) to maximize economic disruption and civilian distress ahead of peak winter demand.
3. Reinforce Narrative of UAF Collapse: RF IO (TASS, WarGonzo) is synchronizing claims of large territorial gains (WarGonzo maps of Sumy, Kupyansk, Donetsk fronts) with claims of devastating attrition against UAF forces (TASS Sumy "meat assaults").

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• CNI Targeting Priority Shift: The confirmed hit on a gas extraction/processing facility (Poltava) indicates a strategic shift from mainly targeting electricity substations to attacking the upstream components of the energy network. This is a higher-value target for long-term economic impact. (ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT: HIGH)
• Immediate Tactical IO: RF is immediately capitalizing on the Vovcha bridge destruction and CNI strikes in IO, aiming to rapidly demoralize UAF forces on the front line.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains robust enough to execute high-volume artillery and deep-strike operations, reinforced by the confirmed ability to bypass sanctions for critical components (Swiwin engines in Shahed).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective, as demonstrated by the synchronized multi-domain attacks (Pokrovsk interdiction + Poltava CNI strike) and the rapid integration of the MoD with the defense-industrial base via Osmakov's appointment.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is highly defensive and resource-intensive due to the need for simultaneous CNI protection and front-line logistics recovery. The confirmed damage in Dnipropetrovsk (education/transport) suggests the density of UAF air defense remains insufficient to cover all HVTs effectively.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Logistics/CNI): The loss of the Vovcha River bridge and the damage to the Poltava gas facility are the most significant operational setbacks in the last 24 hours, directly impacting both combat readiness and national resilience.
• Success (IO): The UAF-associated counter-messaging featuring the captured Russian paratrooper, Oleg Sheripov, detailing low morale and poor command is an effective counter-narrative against RF claims of momentum.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is the urgent need for mobile bridging assets and dedicated, protected engineer teams on the Pokrovsk Axis. Secondary constraint is the immediate need for SHORAD and counter-UAS systems to protect remaining gas and energy CNI.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Narrative (Decisive Attrition): RF IO (TASS, WarGonzo) is aggressively promoting alleged UAF destruction on multiple fronts (Sumy "meat assaults," widespread map gains), attempting to manufacture the perception of a strategic operational collapse.
• UAF Counter-Narrative (RF Morale Crisis): UAF media (DSV) is deploying direct, high-impact counter-propaganda, featuring captured RF soldiers detailing their abandonment, lack of support, and poor command structure ("We are meat for Russians in DNR"). This targets RF domestic support and internal troop morale.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public concern will peak in central oblasts (Poltava, Dnipro) following the confirmed strikes on CNI and civilian infrastructure. UAF authorities must transparently address damage assessment and recovery timelines to stabilize public confidence ahead of winter.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The lack of immediate diplomatic response to the CNI strikes allows RF to maintain the initiative. UAF must rapidly leverage the intelligence regarding sanctions evasion (Swiwin engines) to pressure partners for decisive action, linking RF capabilities directly to continued Western supply chain vulnerabilities.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA 1 (Logistics Attrition and Exploitation): (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will maintain constant air and fire superiority over the Vovcha River crossing points near Pokrovsk for the next 72 hours, preventing UAF from establishing stable supply lines. This interdiction will be accompanied by limited, sustained ground probing attacks (squad/platoon level) to test UAF lines for supply-related weaknesses.

MLCOA 2 (Extended CNI Strike Campaign - Gas Focus): (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will prioritize the next sequence of strikes against remaining large gas processing, storage, or transit hubs in Central and Eastern Ukraine, aiming to cripple gas supply and heating capability before T+96 hours.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA 1 (Mechanized Breakthrough near Pokrovsk): (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM) RF Group Vostok will utilize the logistics paralysis to launch a coordinated, brigade-sized mechanized assault (supported by heavy EW/ISR) in the Pokrovsk sector (Kostiantynivka direction) within the next 48 hours. The objective is to achieve a 5-10 km penetration, establishing fire control over the main supply routes leading into the sector and forcing a disorderly UAF withdrawal. This operation will be masked by intense artillery and multi-domain strikes against UAF C2 nodes.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

• T+0 to T+48H (Pokrovsk Sustainment Crisis): Critical window for UAF to achieve localized air/EW superiority over the Vovcha River valley and secure dispersed, tertiary crossing points. If stable resupply routes are not operational by T+48H, forward units will face combat limitations. (DECISION POINT: J3/J4 - Decide on commitment of full engineer brigade and specialized air/EW assets to Pokrovsk axis.)
• T+24H (CNI Hardening Review): UAF Air Force and National Guard must complete the assessment of vulnerabilities at remaining Priority 1 Gas/Energy infrastructure and deploy supplemental protective assets. (DECISION POINT: J3/J7 - Finalize requisition request for partner nation counter-UAS systems.)

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Pokrovsk Logistics Emergency Action (J4/J3 Priority):
   • Recommendation: Implement the "Multi-Point Ferry/Pontoon Doctrine" immediately. Establish at least three separate, low-signature ferry or pontoon crossings on the Vovcha River outside the confirmed RF interdiction zone. These crossings must operate on an intermittent schedule to disrupt RF targeting cycles.
   • Action (J4): Pre-position critical Class V (Ammunition) and Class VIII (Medical) supplies within 5km of the forward line of troops via decentralized storage points to mitigate immediate supply shortages caused by the bridge loss.
2. CNI Hardening and Defense (J3 Priority):
   • Recommendation: Re-designate all major gas compression/extraction facilities (especially Poltava/Chernihiv region) as Priority 1 High-Value Targets (HVT) for air defense. Deploy one mobile air defense system (e.g., Gepard, Avenger, or equivalent SHORAD) to each of the top five identified CNI sites for immediate, point defense.
3. Counter-C2/UAS Offensive (J2/J3 Priority):
   • Recommendation: Utilize the intelligence on RF targeting of UAF drone control points (Kostiantynivka direction) as a guide to identify RF C-UAS operational patterns. Launch pre-emptive electronic attack (EA) operations combined with counter-battery fire against known or suspected RF EW/ISR deployment zones on the Pokrovsk axis.
   • Action (J6): Execute a 48-hour surge of dedicated SIGINT collection in the Kostiantynivka sector to pinpoint the location of the most active RF FSTH-LD/EW nodes for immediate kinetic action.

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CRITICAL FOCUS)

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