Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 010600Z NOV 25

DTG: 010600Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM (Continued high confidence in RF technological focus, but immediate operational picture remains obscured by rapid RF strikes against UAF rear and logistics.) PRIORITY FOCUS: Immediate defense of critical infrastructure (Energy/Gas) and rapid stabilization of the Pokrovsk logistics axis to prevent a localized operational collapse.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The situation remains defined by two major axes of conflict:

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): The destruction of the Vovcha River bridge remains the critical limiting factor. RF forces are actively exploiting this logistics deficit.
• Southern/Deep Rear Axis (Mykolaiv, Poltava, Dnipro): RF multi-domain pressure is confirmed via persistent drone/missile strikes. Confirmed Rocket Strike on Mykolaiv (OVA Head Kym) resulting in casualties, and confirmed drone/missile strikes on Gas Infrastructure in Poltava Oblast (DSNS). This validates the RF strategy of paralyzing UAF logistics while simultaneously attriting vital rear-area CNI.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Night operations are characterized by intense RF UAV/drone activity (Poltava, Kropyvnytskyi threats confirmed).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Air Defense: Air Force reporting the interception of 23 enemy UAVs in Dnipro region. This high attrition rate indicates successful defense but signifies the continued volume of RF aerial assaults.
• RF Deep Strike: Confirmed engagement of a hostile reconnaissance UAV near Kherson-Mykolaiv border and confirmed strikes on Mykolaiv and Poltava gas infrastructure. This confirms RF is maintaining the operational reach to target critical national infrastructure (CNI) far from the front.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

(RF CAPABILITIES):

• Integrated Multi-Domain Strike (Reinforced): RF demonstrates the capability to synchronize logistics interdiction (Pokrovsk) with precision strikes against high-value energy CNI (Poltava gas facility confirmed). This forces UAF to divide already strained air defense resources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Persistent ISR/Strike Loop (Zaporizhzhia): Video evidence from RF sources (Dva Mayora) shows successful thermal targeting and lock-on against a UAF radar station near Svoboda, northeast of Orikhiv. This confirms persistent RF C-UAS/EW capability on the Southern Front targeting UAF sensors. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• High-Volume Deep Attrition: Over 720 strikes reported in 25 settlements in Zaporizhzhia Oblast in the last 24 hours, maintaining immense pressure on the line of contact.

(RF INTENTIONS):

1. Systemic Attrition of CNI: Target key energy/gas infrastructure (Poltava) to degrade UAF economic and logistical resilience ahead of winter.
2. Exploit Logistics Fracture (Pokrovsk): Prevent immediate UAF response to the Vovcha River bridge loss via persistent ISR/precision strike interdiction against engineer and logistics teams.
3. Maintain Information Dominance: Continue promoting tactical successes (591 km² claimed gains in October, Su-35S delivery) and utilizing IO (Spetsnaz imagery) to reinforce the narrative of inevitable RF victory.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Shift to Energy CNI: The confirmed strike on the Poltava gas facility represents a renewed emphasis on strategic infrastructure targets beyond traditional military installations, likely in preparation for winter.
• Demonstration of Air Power (IO): TASS reporting on the delivery of new Su-35S fighter jets to the Russian MoD is a strategic IO push to counter claims of RF aircraft attrition and project long-term air superiority.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are adequate to sustain high-volume strikes (720 strikes/24h in Zaporizhzhia) and precision deep strikes (Poltava, Mykolaiv). The previous intelligence regarding the use of US-made Swiwin engines in Shahed UAVs indicates long-term sustainment of deep-strike capability remains viable.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrated by the synchronized multi-domain strikes and the immediate integration of these operational successes into strategic IO.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is stressed by the requirement to defend highly dispersed CNI (gas facilities in Poltava, urban centers in Mykolaiv, front line in Zaporizhzhia) while simultaneously managing the logistics crisis on the Pokrovsk Axis. The successful destruction of 23 UAVs in Dnipro provides a measure of success but highlights the sheer volume of threats.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (CNI): Confirmed attacks on Mykolaiv (rocket strike/casualties) and Poltava (gas infrastructure fire) represent significant setbacks requiring immediate resource allocation for damage control and defensive re-posturing.
• Success (Air Defense): High-volume drone interceptions over Dnipro demonstrate successful layered air defense operation in the central region.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate constraint is the critical lack of localized, deployable EW/SHORAD systems required to protect mobile engineer units (Pokrovsk) and dispersed CNI (Poltava/Central Ukraine).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Narrative (Territorial Gains): Colonelcassad and other RF sources heavily promote the claim of liberating over 591 km² in October 2025, aimed at establishing momentum and undermining international support for UAF. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Narrative (Internal Western Weakness): RF sources (Operation Z) are promoting minor Western incidents (drones in Berlin airport, Estonian energy tax) to portray Western partners as internally distracted and incapable of sustained support for Ukraine.
• UAF Counter-Narrative: UAF media reports on Russian-launched drone wreckage in Tula and power outages in Russia, aiming to project continued UAF strike capability into Russian territory.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Confirmed strikes on population centers (Mykolaiv casualties) and critical services (Poltava gas) will likely increase public demand for improved air defense protection, particularly in central and southern oblasts. Local reports of UAF successful drone defense (Dnipro) help stabilize regional morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The reported unannounced meeting between the CIA Director and EU diplomats/intelligence structures in Brussels (Operatyvnyi ZSU) suggests high-level engagement and coordination continue, likely focused on addressing emerging crises like the technological threat posed by RF EW/UAV integration and logistics constraints.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA 1 (Logistics Strangulation and Interdiction): (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to concentrate ISR/Strike assets (FSTH-LD enabled drones/precision artillery) on the Pokrovsk Axis. Primary targets will be UAF engineer efforts to repair the Vovcha River bridge or establish pontoon crossings, extending the logistics deficit over the next 48-72 hours.

MLCOA 2 (Extended CNI Attrition): (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will employ further long-range missile and drone strikes (potentially Kinzhals, S-300 derivatives, or Shahed-series UAVs) against other high-value CNI targets (e.g., electricity substations, thermal power plants, major transport hubs) in the Central and Southern Oblasts (Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv) to preempt UAF winter defensive posture.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA 1 (Tactical Penetration on Pokrovsk): (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM) Exploiting the current logistics paralysis, RF will launch a concentrated, mechanized assault using Group Vostok forces in the Pokrovsk sector within the next 48 hours. The attack will be preceded by intense EW/ISR jamming and aim to achieve a deep penetration, capitalizing on ammunition and sustainment shortages in isolated UAF forward units.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

• T+0 to T+24H (CNI Damage Control): UAF must secure and stabilize the gas infrastructure site in Poltava and reinforce air defense systems around other major CNI sites. (DECISION POINT: J3/J4 - Immediate assessment of CNI redundancy and deployment of security/air defense assets to priority 1/2 sites.)
• T+24H to T+72H (Pokrovsk Logistics Recovery): Critical window to establish alternative logistics routes on the Pokrovsk Axis. If not achieved by T+72H, forward UAF units will face critical combat sustainment shortages. (DECISION POINT: J4/J6 - Commitment of emergency logistics packages and dedicated EW support to engineer teams.)

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Defend Critical Gas Infrastructure (J3/J4 Priority):
   • Recommendation: Immediately assign dedicated SHORAD/EW protection packages to all major remaining gas and energy facilities in Poltava and adjacent Central Oblasts. These are confirmed HPTs.
   • Action (J3): Direct UAF Air Defense Command to prioritize the defense of energy infrastructure over general urban area protection until the immediate CNI threat subsides.
2. Expedite EW/Engineer Synchronization (J6/J4 Priority):
   • Recommendation: Mandate that all engineer reconnaissance and bridge repair efforts on the Vovcha River are conducted exclusively under dedicated EW jamming umbrellas (man-portable or vehicle-mounted) to defeat RF FPV and ISR assets.
   • Action (J6): Allocate high-power jammers specifically designed to counter ZALA/Orlan-10 frequencies for immediate deployment with engineer brigades near Pokrovsk.
3. Reinforce Southern Front Sensor Protection (J2/J3 Priority):
   • Recommendation: Review and adjust the deployment of UAF radar/sensor assets on the Zaporizhzhia front (Orikhiv sector) to utilize passive detection methods and hardened positions, minimizing signatures in response to confirmed RF thermal targeting capability (Dva Mayora video).
   • Action (J2/J6): Issue technical guidelines for minimizing active radar time and maximizing sensor concealment.

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CRITICAL FOCUS)

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