Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - RF ATTRITION AND HYBRID PRESSURE SUSTAINED

TIME: 101430Z OCT 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture confirms RF is sustaining simultaneous pressure across four key vectors: Ground attrition (Eastern Axis), deep kinetic interdiction (Central/Southern Axis), air/drone harassment (Northern Axis), and information warfare (Cognitive Domain).

• Eastern Axis (Novovasilevskoye/Pokrovsk): RF claims the "liberation" of Novovasilevskoye (Zaporozhye region), suggesting localized tactical advances by the Vostok Group of Forces, primarily utilizing tank fire support (MoD Russia). Furthermore, the Pokrovsk direction is assessed as experiencing "fierce fighting" (Archangel Spetsnaz map), confirming high-intensity attritional combat as previously seen at Siversk.
• Central Axis (Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia): Reports of a powerful strike in Dnipropetrovsk, likely a FAB (Guided Aerial Bomb) with UMPK guidance kit (Colonelcassad), confirm the immediate follow-up to "Wave 3" targeting of the central logistical triangle remains active. The Zaporizhzhia air raid alert has been lifted (Zaporizhzhia ODA), indicating a temporary lull in kinetic activity but not a cessation of the threat.
• Northern Axis (Chernihiv/Kyiv): Confirmed continued UAV activity over Nizhyn and Borzna in Chernihiv Oblast (UAF Air Force). This confirms MLCOA 1—the use of persistent, low-cost drone harassment to impede CI repair and maintain the threat on Kyiv/Northern logistical hubs.
• Deep Rear/Naval (Black Sea): The GUR-attributed video showcasing specialized Naval (USV) and Aerial (UAV) drone operations against offshore structures (likely RF Black Sea rigs) signals an intensification of UAF/GUR deep-strike counter-operations, potentially targeting RF resource extraction or forward naval intelligence nodes.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Russian milbloggers (Starshye Eddy) are actively discussing the onset of bad weather (rain and mud).

• IMPACT: While heavy weather will likely reduce the total volume of FPV drone operations, it will give a disproportionate advantage to forces fielding highly capable, all-weather drones. The mud (Rasputitsa) will constrain movement of heavy armor and logistics, especially off-road, potentially favoring RF fixed-position defense or UAF deep fire interdiction.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Force Status (Kinetic/IO Synchronization): RF continues to effectively synchronize kinetic strikes (FAB/UMPK in Dnipropetrovsk) with Information Operations (Putin’s "new weapons" statements, IO amplification of Kyiv blackout threats). RF ground forces are advancing in localized sectors (Novovasilevskoye).
• Friendly Force Status (UAF): UAF demonstrates highly effective tactical defensive maneuver (FPV drone destruction of RF mechanized column near Novoolenivka, DeepState). UAF authorities (Kyiv/Klitschko) are actively communicating the threat of follow-on attacks while simultaneously reporting successful partial CI restoration (423,000 consumers reconnected in Kyiv). GUR signals expanded multi-domain resistance, including naval and aerial drone operations.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

(INTENTION - Coordinated Attrition): RF intentions are solidified on three synchronized fronts:

1. Kinetic Pressure: Sustain high-yield (FAB/KAB) and low-cost (Geran) strikes on critical infrastructure, specifically targeting repair/recovery efforts and the Central Axis rail/industrial heartland.
2. Ground Gain: Achieve local operational success in contested areas (e.g., Novovasilevskoye, Siversk/Pokrovsk) to apply maximum pressure during the UAF CI crisis.
3. IO Deterrence: Utilize high-level political statements (Putin on new weapons) and IO channels (RF milbloggers promoting "Kyiv blackout" rumors) to amplify the strategic effects of the kinetic strikes, deter Western commitment (e.g., Tomahawk agreement), and create internal panic.

(CAPABILITIES): RF retains the capability for sustained, multi-day strikes using guided aerial bombs (FAB/KAB with UMPK) and low-cost drones across Ukraine's deep rear. Confirmed UAF targeting of RF mechanized columns (Novoolenivka) suggests RF may accept high materiel losses for localized tactical advantage.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed use of FAB/UMPK in Dnipropetrovsk reinforces the shift toward high-yield, low-cost guided strikes from tactical aviation, likely mitigating some risks associated with deploying high-value ballistic missiles, while retaining devastating BDA capability against infrastructure.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are supporting localized ground offensives (Novovasilevskoye, Pokrovsk). UAF deep strikes (GUR USVs against offshore rigs) suggest UAF is actively targeting RF resource extraction and forward basing in the Black Sea/Crimean area to degrade long-term sustainment.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains synchronized, achieving tactical success (MoD video release of Novovasilevskoye) while maintaining the strategic IO narrative (Putin’s statements). Internal RF security focus (arrest of blogger Kamnev/Mal’kevich associates) continues in parallel with military operations, suggesting political consolidation unrelated to the FLOT.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking) (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is high on the tactical level, demonstrated by effective defensive fire and counter-strikes (DeepState FPV video, GUR naval operations). Strategic readiness is challenged by the need to balance front-line reinforcement (Pokrovsk/Siversk) with the immediate, critical requirement for CI protection and civil support in the rear (Kyiv, Lviv).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Confirmed successful FPV drone interdiction of an RF mechanized column near Novoolenivka (Zaporizhzhia region), demonstrating mastery of C-UAS tactics against ground armor. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• GUR confirmed the initiation of an expanded "anti-Kremlin resistance" phase, including multi-domain strikes (USV/UAV) on high-value RF maritime targets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Successful restoration of power to over 423,000 consumers in Kyiv, countering the RF objective of total grid collapse.

Setbacks:

• Confirmed RF use of FAB/UMPK against high-value targets in the central triangle (Dnipropetrovsk), sustaining the logistical threat.
• Confirmation from Kyiv authorities (Klitschko) that a new wave of attacks is anticipated, indicating the current air defense posture is insufficient to prevent pre-emptive Russian strategic targeting.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint remains the density and mobility of air defense assets required to protect both the FLOT and the rapidly expanding list of critical infrastructure and repair hubs (now including Dnipro/Dnipropetrovsk). UAF confirmation of active negotiations for ATACMS/Tomahawk missiles (RBC-Ukraine) highlights the urgent need for long-range strike capability to deter RF deep strikes by expanding the threat to RF launch platforms and supply hubs.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain) (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

RF IO is actively leveraging the kinetic escalation:

• FEAR Amplification: RF milbloggers (Operation Z, Dvva Mayora) are heavily promoting the narrative that a "new strike is coming" and that Kyiv will be "completely closed off," urging Ukrainians to evacuate cities. This is a direct psychological operation aimed at disrupting civil organization and diverting UAF military/police resources.
• Deterrence Signaling: Putin’s continued statements on "new successful weapons" (TASS) are synchronized to coincide with the escalation, aiming to dissuade Western military aid transfers (e.g., Tomahawk agreement).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment remains resilient, supported by official transparency (Kyiv authorities anticipating new strikes) and successful counter-IO (Zelenskyy confirming aid from Norway/Netherlands). UAF efforts to promote mental health support (Zaporizhzhia ODA exhibition) are critical for maintaining long-term societal resilience under sustained attack.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

International support is focused on CI restoration (Norway/Netherlands). The ongoing high-level negotiations for long-range US strike systems (Tomahawk/ATACMS) remain a key diplomatic effort, countering the RF deterrence narrative. Britain's confirmation of the early transfer of hundreds of missiles is a positive counter-signal.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

The immediate analysis confirms RF has successfully executed the transition from Wave 3 mass strikes to the predicted Wave 3.5 sustained interdiction campaign.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA 1 (Sustained Guided Bomb/Drone Campaign): RF tactical aviation will maintain high operational tempo, launching guided bombs (FAB/KAB) against military-industrial and logistical targets in the Dnipro/Kryvyi Rih/Kharkiv triangle. This will be reinforced by Geran swarms targeting mobile CI repair crews and localized power distribution infrastructure in the Northern and Central Oblasts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Justification: Confirmed activity in Chernihiv and Dnipropetrovsk.

MLCOA 2 (Attrition at Siversk/Pokrovsk): RF ground forces will sustain heavy, attritional attacks at the Siversk and Pokrovsk salients, attempting to capitalize on UAF logistical strain and resource diversion to the rear area. The commitment of VDV/Vostok units suggests an operational objective beyond just fixing UAF forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Justification: Confirmed fighting in Pokrovsk direction and Novovasilevskoye claims.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA 1 (Coordinated Winter Grid Collapse): RF intelligence identifies a systemic weak point in the inter-regional power transfer network, possibly in the Vinnytsia/Khmelnytskyi region, and strikes it with a massed ballistic salvo, synchronized with renewed ground pressure at Siversk. This failure, combined with the Lviv heating crisis, could trigger a cascading failure across multiple regions just as winter sets in, forcing UAF to divert operational combat units to civil protection and securing key cities.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Immediate Mobilization of Mobile Air Defense for CI Protection (TACTICAL URGENCY - DP 306):

   • Recommendation: Given the confirmed threat of FAB/KAB and Geran follow-up strikes in the Central Axis, prioritize the deployment of highly mobile SHORAD (e.g., Gepard or equivalent) to the designated recovery corridors linking Poltava, Dnipro, and Kryvyi Rih.
   • Action: Re-task one existing SHORAD battery from a currently lower-risk region (e.g., Sumy, if feasible) to secure the main repair convoy route currently active in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

2. Intensify Counter-IO and Morale Stabilization (STRATEGIC URGENCY - DP 308):

   • Recommendation: Directly counter RF propaganda regarding the "inevitable collapse of Kyiv" and the "coming winter crisis."
   • Action: Central government and regional leaders (Kyiv, Lviv) must hold daily, unified press briefings detailing successful CI recovery figures, winterization status, and explicitly frame the RF strikes as acts of terror designed to force negotiation. Use the confirmed UK missile delivery and Norway/Netherlands aid as proof of sustained international support.

3. Exploit RF Logistical Vulnerability on the FLOT (OPERATIONAL URGENCY):

   • Recommendation: Leverage the onset of Rasputitsa and UAF FPV superiority to impose prohibitive materiel costs on RF ground assaults, particularly against VDV and Vostok units at Siversk/Pokrovsk.
   • Action: Increase allocation of FPV drone packages and heavy ATGMs to UAF brigades holding the Siversk salient. Authorize immediate interdiction strikes against any observed RF armored resupply columns using deep artillery/HIMARS once mobility is reduced by mud.

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