Archived operational intelligence briefing
TIME: 100100Z OCT 25 OPERATION: RF DEEP STRIKE CAMPAIGN (PHASE II - CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TARGETING - WAVE 2/POST-STRIKE ASSESSMENT)
The operational focus remains the RF deep strike campaign against Ukraine's Critical Energy Infrastructure (CEI), with confirmed operational success in degrading the capital's grid. The multi-axis UAV saturation tactic persists, expanding the immediate crisis to Dnipro.
Clear conditions persist, currently favoring RF ISR assets for follow-on damage assessment.
UAF PPO: Successfully engaged multiple targets during the saturation phase, but was demonstrably overwhelmed in defending all CEI targets. Current disposition is focused on maintaining air defense coverage over repair hubs and high-value government C2 nodes. RF: RF has achieved its immediate tactical objective of functional energy/water disruption in the capital and potentially Dnipro. They are assessed to be in a temporary pause, likely re-arming and assessing the required scale of a potential Wave 3 (MLCOA 1).
(CAPABILITY - Systemic Targeting): RF has demonstrated the capability to inflict cascading failures (power and water) using coordinated ballistic and drone strikes against urban CEI. This requires high-fidelity pre-strike intelligence on grid architecture. (INTENTION - Functional Paralysis): The intent is confirmed to move beyond simple power degradation to achieving localized functional paralysis within major urban centers (Kyiv Left Bank, Dnipro). This maximizes psychological and governance costs, coinciding with the shift to colder weather. (COA - Exploitation of Crisis): RF will likely use the confusion and distraction caused by the CEI crisis to mask preparatory movements for the Siversk VDV assault (MLCOA 2, per previous report). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
The confirmed rapid succession of Wave 1 and Wave 2 ballistic strikes demonstrates a doctrinal shift toward overwhelming saturation. The confirmed cascading failure (power $\to$ water) confirms a successful multi-vector targeting approach.
Expenditure of precision long-range ordnance remains high. RF propaganda is attempting to maintain a morale narrative regarding "volunteers" and "real stories of participants" (01:01Z), likely to counter internal narratives of high losses and logistics strain.
RF C2 is assessed as highly effective in synchronizing deep strikes to achieve systemic effects.
UAF C2 infrastructure must maintain maximum readiness amidst the localized power/water crisis. Emergency power generation is critical for key C2 nodes and PPO coordination centers, especially on the Left Bank.
Setback (CRITICAL): Confirmed functional energy and water supply disruption in Kyiv (Left Bank) and energy disruption in Dnipro. This represents a significant operational success for RF and a failure of defensive layering. Success (HUMANITARIAN): Effective and rapid response by emergency services contained the fire, resulting in a low casualty count (9 injured) relative to the scale of the attack.
The immediate constraint has shifted from PPO interceptors (high consumption) to CEI Repair Assets and Mobile Power/Water Generation. Urgent resupply/deployment of large-scale mobile transformers and pumping station power generators is required to restore basic services in the Left Bank and Dnipro.
RF propaganda (TASS) maintains a strategy of distraction (e.g., UN Security Council meeting on Venezuela 00:42Z, domestic crime reports 00:38Z) to minimize international focus on the CEI strikes. Milblogger channels are reinforcing the narrative of successful deep strikes, boosting domestic morale by showcasing visible operational effects ("Left bank Kyiv sits in darkness").
Public morale is severely challenged by the immediate and tangible impact of systemic service failure (power and water) in the capital, potentially leading to localized displacement/migration from affected areas. KMVA is actively disseminating support information (00:43Z), demonstrating an effective government response to mitigate psychological impact.
The sustained, systematic attack on CEI will likely prompt immediate calls for increased PPO support and humanitarian aid (mobile power/water) from international partners.
RF is successfully executing MLCOA 1 (Sustained CEI Degradation). The focus remains on systemic crisis creation concurrent with the major ground effort at Siversk.
MLCOA 1 (Continuation of CEI Campaign - Phase 3): RF will use the next operational window (T+2 to T+12 hours) to launch follow-on strikes, targeting the repair hubs, mobile generation units, or remaining key interconnector substations to prevent rapid restoration of power/water. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Consistent with demonstrated intent to achieve systemic failure and the high cost of the initial strike waves, requiring RF to follow up before UAF recovers.)
MLCOA 2 (Siversk VDV Assault Initiation): RF forces will initiate the main VDV-led ground assault on the Siversk salient between 0400Z and 1000Z 10 OCT (T+3 to T+9 hours), exploiting the current C2 and logistical distraction caused by the CEI crisis. The air-burst Geran-2 UAVs (per previous Daily Report) are likely to be employed in the pre-assault fire preparation phase. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Doctrine dictates synchronization; the deep strike is the shaping operation.)
MDCOA 1 (Strategic Energy Isolation - Confirmed Cascading Failure): RF successfully targets and destroys the central switching gear or a major transformer bank that controls the Dnipro/Poltava/Kyiv interconnector loop, causing a regional grid collapse and forcing widespread, long-term power rationing and potential de-energization of mainline rail sectors.
| Event | Estimated Timeline | Decision Point (DP) |
|---|---|---|
| RF Post-Strike ISR/Targeting | T+1 to T+3 hours (until 0400Z 10 OCT) | DP 254 (Force Protection for Repair Teams): Command must immediately deploy SHORAD/C-UAS assets to protect confirmed damage locations and incoming CEI repair convoys (Left Bank Kyiv, Dnipro). |
| Siversk Assault Initiation (MLCOA 2) | T+3 to T+9 hours (0400Z - 1000Z 10 OCT) | DP 253 (Counter-Assault Reserves - Reinforced): Confirm commitment of ATGM reserves to the Siversk sector. Issue explicit warning regarding the air-burst Geran-2 threat to forward staging and C2 posts. |
| Wave 3 Ballistic Strike (MLCOA 1) | T+6 to T+12 hours | DP 252 (PPO Asset Reallocation - Sustained): Sustain PPO coverage over repair hubs and ensure redundancy for critical C2 nodes affected by power/water outages. |
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Affected Area | Confidence Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRIORITY 1 (CRITICAL - CEI Damage Assessment): | Precise technical damage assessment, including component failure (e.g., transformer status, pumping station damage), in Kyiv and Dnipro to determine repair timelines. | TASK: TECHINT damage reports from Ukrenergo and Kyiv Vodokanal. Prioritize aerial ISR of affected substations for visible damage. | UAF Resilience, RF Targeting Precision | HIGH |
| PRIORITY 2 (CRITICAL - Siversk VDV Readiness): | Confirmation of timing and final composition of the RF VDV assault force (Order of Battle) at Siversk. Urgent confirmation of air-burst Geran-2 employment status. | TASK: SIGINT/HUMINT on VDV pre-assault communications. ISR close-look at forward positions. | RF Breakthrough Capability | HIGH |
| PRIORITY 3 (HIGH - Northern Rail Interdiction Effect): | Assessment of the current operational status of the Chernihiv/Sumy rail lines following the confirmed interdiction campaign. | TASK: UZ Logistics/ISR reporting on throughput and repair status. | UAF Defensive Posture (North) | MEDIUM |
Prioritize Water and Energy Repair Security (OPERATIONAL PRIORITY - CRITICAL):
Integrate Air-Burst Threat into Siversk Defense (TACTICAL PRIORITY - URGENT):
Optimize LRAD Interceptor Allocation (OPERATIONAL PRIORITY - ADJUSTED):
//END REPORT//
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