Archived operational intelligence briefing
TIME: 100045Z OCT 25 OPERATION: RF DEEP STRIKE CAMPAIGN (PHASE II - CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TARGETING - WAVE 2)
RF forces have initiated a confirmed second wave of rapid-fire ballistic strikes against Kyiv (00:04Z, 00:25Z, 00:27Z), reinforcing the previous hour's operational focus on crippling Critical Energy Infrastructure (CEI). The multi-axis UAV saturation campaign continues, maintaining pressure on PPO assets across the theater.
Clear conditions persist, favoring RF precision strike assets and ISR.
UAF PPO: The system is under severe strain, facing sequential, high-tempo ballistic attacks against fixed targets (CEI) while simultaneously tracking widespread, low-observable UAVs (Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava). The operational challenge is prioritizing interceptors for capital defense versus critical infrastructure protection outside Kyiv. RF: RF is demonstrating a disciplined execution of MLCOA 1 (Sustained CEI Degradation), utilizing ballistic redundancy to overwhelm PPO saturation efforts.
(CAPABILITY - Ballistic Saturation): RF has demonstrated the capability to conduct sequential, rapid-fire ballistic strikes (Wave 1 followed immediately by Wave 2), indicative of dedicated launch assets (likely Iskander or Kinzhal surrogates) positioned for immediate reloading/refiring. This maximizes the saturation effect over high-value targets. (INTENTION - Cripple the Capital): The intention has shifted from merely degrading CEI to achieving functional blackouts in key urban areas to impose significant humanitarian and governance costs, coinciding with the winter preparation window. (COA - PPO Fixation and Exploitation): RF continues to use the multi-axis UAV attack (Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Poltava) to fix mobile UAF PPO assets away from Kyiv, enabling ballistic penetration of the capital defense layers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
The confirmed second wave of ballistic strikes within 30 minutes of the first confirms a high-tempo, pre-planned saturation doctrine against CEI. This is a significant shift from previous, more spaced-out missile strikes.
The sustained expenditure of ballistic missiles remains high. Conversely, RF propaganda is leveraging the deployment of foreign volunteers (Sri Lanka) to the 137th Assault Brigade (00:33Z) to mask logistics challenges or reinforce morale narratives amidst the high cost of the deep strike campaign.
RF C2 remains assessed as highly effective, managing the complexity of simultaneous ballistic strikes on the capital and synchronized UAV attacks across four regions.
UAF PPO is operating at maximum sustained combat tempo. The confirmed power outages require immediate civil-military coordination to manage load shedding, emergency services, and C2 node sustainment.
Setback: Confirmed, successful degradation of the Kyiv power grid leading to outages across the capital (FACT). This represents a major operational setback. Success: Despite the high tempo and saturation, civilian casualties have been relatively contained (8 injured), suggesting early warning systems and civilian adherence to shelter procedures remain effective.
The immediate constraint is the availability of mobile power generation units and the rapid repair capacity for key CEI nodes. The high consumption rate of LRAD interceptors to counter the ballistic threat is unsustainable and demands a review of PPO asset allocation.
RF propaganda (TASS) attempts to bury the widespread kinetic strikes by focusing on unrelated domestic news (scam schemes, MiG-31 crash 00:26Z). Conversely, milblogger channels (НгП раZVедка 00:26Z) are actively confirming the operational effect ("Left bank Kyiv sits in darkness"), directly linking RF kinetic action to demonstrable results, enhancing psychological pressure.
Public morale is severely challenged by the sustained ballistic threat and the visible, immediate consequence of power outages in the capital. The confirmation of civilian casualties and a residential fire (00:31Z) will increase fear and potentially trigger large-scale temporary displacement from the city.
RF propaganda highlighting foreign fighters (Sri Lanka) serves an external information purpose, attempting to portray the conflict as internationally supported and ideologically driven, distracting from the humanitarian consequences of CEI strikes.
RF is successfully executing MLCOA 1 (Sustained CEI Degradation) and is likely to continue this campaign until significant national power grid instability is achieved or until PPO stocks are perceived as depleted.
MLCOA 1 (Continuation of CEI Campaign, T+0 to T+24 hours): RF will maintain the high-tempo, multi-wave ballistic targeting of critical energy infrastructure, shifting focus to high-value substations (transformer stations) in Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, and now confirmed Dnipro/Poltava, using the UAV saturation to cover the ballistic strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Consistent with confirmed kinetic activity and demonstrated capability for Wave 2.)
MLCOA 2 (Siversk Breakthrough Preparation): RF forces at Siversk (per previous report, MLCOA 2) will use the distraction of the CEI crisis to conduct final preparations (artillery density, force positioning) for the major VDV-led assault, expected to begin after 0600Z. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Consistent with RF synchronization doctrine.)
MDCOA 1 (Strategic Energy Isolation - Persistent): RF targets remaining key interconnectors and control centers (SCADA), while simultaneously launching a high-density attack on the Kaniv HPP/GES, aiming for widespread, long-term power grid collapse across Central Ukraine.
| Event | Estimated Timeline | Decision Point (DP) |
|---|---|---|
| Wave 3 Ballistic Strike (MLCOA 1) | T+2 to T+6 hours (until 0600Z 10 OCT) | DP 252 (PPO Asset Reallocation): Command must finalize the allocation of remaining LRAD/MRAD interceptors (e.g., Patriot, NASAMS) to the defense of essential grid control centers and pre-designated repair hubs, accepting the risk to non-critical government buildings. |
| Siversk Assault Initiation (MLCOA 2) | T+4 to T+10 hours (0400Z - 1000Z 10 OCT) | DP 253 (Counter-Assault Reserves): Commit ATGM-heavy reserve detachments to pre-selected blocking positions near Siversk to attrit the VDV advance upon initial contact, minimizing direct engagement with the main mechanized thrust. |
| HPP/SCADA Targeting (MDCOA 1) | T+6 to T+48 hours | DP 251 (Cyber/Physical Defense Integration - Reinforced): Initiate immediate deployment of C-UAS and SHORAD (MANPADS/Gepard) teams for 24/7 static defense of all major HPPs and SCADA centers outside Kyiv. |
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Affected Area | Confidence Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRIORITY 1 (CRITICAL - CEI Damage Assessment): | Precise damage assessment, including location and component damage (e.g., transformers, switching gear), for all struck CEI nodes in Kyiv/Zaporizhzhia. | TASK: TECHINT damage reports from Minenergo/Ukrenergo. Prioritize aerial ISR to confirm damage severity. | UAF Resilience, RF Targeting Precision | HIGH |
| PRIORITY 2 (CRITICAL - Siversk VDV Readiness): | Confirmation of timing and final composition of the RF VDV assault force (Order of Battle) at Siversk. Determine if air-burst Geran-2 UAVs are positioned for immediate tactical support. | TASK: SIGINT/HUMINT on VDV pre-assault communications. ISR close-look at forward positions. | RF Breakthrough Capability | HIGH |
| PRIORITY 3 (HIGH - Northern Ground Activity): | Verification of RF claims of expansion south of Vovchansk (Kharkiv). Is this a renewed limited offensive or local skirmishing? | TASK: ISR/HUMINT near Vovchansk and local UAF tactical reporting. | UAF Defensive Posture (North) | MEDIUM |
Enforce PPO Prioritization and Survivability (OPERATIONAL PRIORITY - IMMEDIATE):
Accelerate Siversk Counter-Preparation (STRATEGIC PRIORITY - URGENT):
Implement Immediate Civil-Military Energy Coordination (GOVERNANCE PRIORITY):
//END REPORT//
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