Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 120500Z SEP 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (Confidence: HIGH)

RF forces maintain multi-axis pressure. The Pokrovsk axis remains the primary operational focus with ongoing urban combat in Muravka and Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk). RF forces of the "Vostok" Grouping have "liberated" Sosnovka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, aiming to enhance encirclement of a UAF grouping in Velykomykhailivka. Combat is reported south of Stepnohirsk with active RF aviation support. On the Lyman axis, RF claims to be assaulting Zarechnoye and reports activity near Kolodyazi. Intense combat continues near Krasny Liman, DPR, with the RF 103rd Regiment advancing towards Konstantinovka, now reportedly 7 km from the city. On the Siverske direction, RF forces claim control of approximately 50% of Pereyizne and advances in the Kremensky forests, taking control of approximately 3 km of the administrative border. RF UAVs are establishing "fire control" over UAF logistical routes near Krasny Liman and Izium-Barvinkove, and claim control of 1.5 km of a supply route in Kupyansk. RF claims "liberation" of Zelenyi Hai and fighting for Torske, indicating sustained offensive operations on the Lyman direction. RF forces have "expelled the enemy from Katerynivka" and continue to advance in the Konstantinovka direction, near Kleban-Byk and Pleshcheyevka, maintaining pressure on this critical UAF defensive axis. Offensive action near Chasiv Yar involves airborne units engaging enemy infantry.

GSU reports indicate a significant concentration of RF forces and 130 combat engagements over the past 24 hours on the Kupiansk, Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Marinka, and Shakhtarske directions, with UAF repelling numerous attacks. RF is attempting to advance near Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast, and claims to have repelled a UAF counterattack on the left bank of the Vovcha River, occupying four technical buildings. RF Special Forces (14th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, "Sida" detachment of AHMAT, "Anvar" detachment) are actively supporting ground assaults on the South Donetsk direction and conducting precision strikes against UAF artillery on the Sumy direction, with "Anvar" operating in buffer zones along the Kharkiv and Chernihiv borders. RF is reportedly bringing up reserves to Vovchansk. The Kherson-Mykolaiv highway is claimed to be under RF fire control. UAF forces successfully destroyed a bridge over the Siverskyi Donets river near Nova Tavolzhanka, Belgorod Oblast, Russia, using FPV drones and pre-planted mines, disrupting RF logistical movement. Widespread destruction in Vovchansk confirms heavy combat and significant damage. RF forces continue FPV drone operations targeting UAF logistics and personnel across multiple sectors. Drone footage indicates RF strikes on trenches, a command post, and a communications tower on the Rubtsovsk direction, with suggested electronic warfare activity against "STARLINK." RF forces are actively countering UAF attempts to regain Udachnoye, displaying a presence in previously contested structures. RF "Молния-2" UAVs reportedly struck a UAF temporary deployment point (PVD) in Sumy Oblast. RF UAV operators are disrupting UAF rotations in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. UAF reports one civilian killed in Polohy Raion due to enemy attacks.

Deep strikes persist on Ukrainian energy, industrial, and civilian infrastructure across 15 oblasts. Confirmed damage to the Sumy Oblast Administration (OVA) building, Ukrainian Government Headquarters in Kyiv, Sokil ice arena, Cabinet of Ministers building, and the Trypilska TPP. The death toll from the aviation bomb strike on Yarova, Donetsk Oblast, has risen to 25. Civilian casualties and damage from combined missile and drone attacks are confirmed in Vinnytsia (31 injured), Khmelnytskyi (sewing factory destroyed, 3 injured), Zhytomyr (1 killed, 5 injured), and Kramatorsk (central square, residential areas, market hit by drones). An energy object in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast has been hit by drones. Zaporizhzhia suffered a drone attack on a residential building, injuring two civilians, with four additional wounded reported from attacks on Prymorske and Zaporizhzhia. The 68-year-old man severely injured in a drone strike on Prymorske yesterday has died in hospital. Mykolaiv has experienced drone threats and explosions. Berdychiv (Zhytomyr Oblast) was hit by missile strikes. An enemy strike on an educational institution and the Holy Resurrection Cathedral in Sumy is confirmed. A "Shahed" drone hit one of Chernihiv's enterprises, causing a fire. Strikes on Nikopol region continued all day, affecting Nikopol, Marhanets, Pokrovsk, Myrove, and Chervonohryhorivka communities with artillery and drones. Acting Mayor of Sumy, Artem Kobzar, confirms two drone strikes on a non-residential building in Sumy, with casualty information being clarified. RBC-Ukraine reports RF struck a "promyslova zona" (industrial zone) on the outskirts of Sumy with drones. NEW: Explosions and a significant fire are reported at an oil depot in Smolensk Oblast and Primorsk port in Leningrad Oblast, attributed to UAF drone attacks.

Reports indicate at least eight explosions in occupied Donetsk, with TASS claiming UAF missile attacks repelled. Mash on Donbas reports power outages in Kyivskyi district of Donetsk and damaged windows in a traumatology hospital and nearby residential buildings, with a new video claiming a multi-apartment building in Donetsk was hit, "presumably by NATO MLRS." UAF FPV drones reportedly attacked a civilian vehicle near Polyana, Starodubsky Municipal District, Belgorod Oblast, Russia. ASTRA reports 6 people were injured in attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Belgorod Oblast, with a Pyaterochka supermarket among the affected targets. An ammunition depot in occupied Luhansk is also reported to be exploding due to UAF drone strikes. An attack by over 30 UAVs was repelled in three municipalities of Rostov Oblast, causing damage to a private house and two cars, but no casualties. A massive drone attack was launched on Leningrad Oblast overnight, with a fire reported on a vessel in Primorsk port, which has since been extinguished. ASTRA reports a fire on a pumping station in Primorsk was also extinguished, without casualties. TASS reports one person killed and 24 injured over two days in Belgorod Oblast from UAF attacks. Russian MoD claims to have shot down 221 Ukrainian UAVs over Russian regions overnight, with 9 of them over the Moscow region. NEW: Russian Governor Gladkov (Belgorod Oblast) reports 1 killed, 24 injured in Belgorod Oblast over two days from UAF attacks. NEW: Bryansk Oblast Governor reports UAF strikes on a passenger minibus, injuring 5 people, including 2 "Bars-Bryansk" fighters.

UAV activity remains extremely high. UAF Air Force reports 62 of 66 enemy UAV targets were shot down/suppressed overnight. Groups of enemy UAVs are entering southern Zaporizhzhia Oblast from Temporarily Occupied Territories (TOT), course - north/northwest, and additional KABs are launched on Sumy and Donetsk Oblasts. RF claims destruction of 225 Ukrainian UAVs, one Neptune guided missile, and three HIMARS MLRS rockets over the past day. RF reconnaissance UAVs are active in the Black Sea towards Odesa and in Sumy/Kharkiv Oblasts. RF drones are confirmed active across central, western, and northern Ukraine. UAF Air Force reports guided aerial bombs launched on Donetsk Oblast and Sumy Oblast. A RF kamikaze drone "Upyr" was reported engaging a UAF interceptor drone near Prykolotne, Kharkiv Oblast. UAF 'Lazar' unit utilized FPV drones to destroy a bridge near Nova Tavolzhanka. A Ukrainian "Yozhka" drone was reportedly shot down near Lyman. Reconnaissance UAVs are reported in central Chernihiv Oblast. A captured Ukrainian reconnaissance drone ("Shark") was showcased, claimed to be destroyed by RF "Fever" fighters. UAF thermal imaging drone video shows a series of artillery strikes impacting Russian military positions in Kharkiv direction. RF drone footage showcases identification and engagement of various enemy assets including a pickup truck, a Leopard-1 tank, artillery, an unknown vehicle, and an antenna, as well as a 'BABA-YAGA' drone. UAF General Staff reports RF combat losses over the last 24 hours include 890 personnel. NEW: UAF General Staff reports 890 RF personnel eliminated over the past 24 hours (Sept 11-12).

Ukrainian HUR (Main Intelligence Directorate) units successfully struck and disabled an RF Black Sea Fleet vessel (Project MPSV07) near Novorossiysk. Russian channels are circulating video of a missile attack on artillery depots of RF's "Dnipro" Grouping of Forces located in Sonyachna Dolyna near Sudak in occupied Crimea.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (Confidence: HIGH)

Conditions remained generally clear and favorable for air operations, including missile and UAV strikes across most of Ukraine. Localized heavy rainfall caused significant flooding in Kyiv. Expected thunderstorms in Kharkiv could temporarily impact local air operations. Storm weather is reported in Donetsk. RF tactical aviation is actively launching KABs on Sumy, Donetsk, and northern Kharkiv Oblasts. A ballistic missile threat from the northeast has been reported and subsequently lifted for Zaporizhzhia Oblast. RF reconnaissance UAVs are active over the Black Sea towards Odesa and in Sumy/Kharkiv Oblasts. RF drones are confirmed active across central, western, and northern Ukraine. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is under missile threat, with drone attacks confirmed on Synelnykove. A nationwide air raid alert was active due to the launch of an RF MiG-31K, a carrier of the "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missile, which was subsequently lifted. Fields and dry grass caught fire on the outskirts of Yenakiieve, potentially impacting visibility. Over 201 hectares of Kharkiv Oblast territory demined in a week. Krasnodar airport has reopened for civilian flights for the first time since the start of the war, indicating an improving logistical environment in southern RF. A Mi-8 helicopter made a hard landing in Kaliningrad due to bad weather. Poland has closed its border with Belarus, with military personnel deploying barricades and concertina wire. Air defense forces are active against UAVs over the southwestern part of Leningrad Oblast, and Pulkovo airport has implemented a "Carpet" plan (airspace closure). Enemy UAVs are detected in eastern Sumy Oblast, moving west. Additional UAVs heading towards Moscow have been destroyed. Pulkovo airport has warned of possible schedule adjustments. Launches of guided aerial bombs by enemy tactical aviation are reported in Sumy Oblast. Enemy strike UAVs are detected in the Kakhovka region (Kherson Oblast), moving towards Mykolaiv Oblast. Over 20 UAVs have been destroyed over Leningrad Oblast, with debris fall recorded in Tosno. Enemy drones are approaching Kharkiv from the east. Air defense is active in Kyiv Oblast. Restrictions have been imposed in the airports of Ivanovo, Pskov, Yaroslavl, and St. Petersburg overnight. Enemy UAVs are detected in the northeastern part of Sumy Oblast. An explosion has been heard in Sumy, followed by several more explosions amidst drone activity. A ballistic missile threat from Kursk Oblast has been issued and subsequently lifted. The fire on a vessel in Primorsk port has been extinguished. "West-2025" joint exercises of Belarusian and Russian armed forces have started on training grounds in both countries and in the Baltic and Barents Seas.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (Confidence: HIGH)

• RF:

  • Ground Forces: RF continues its multi-axis ground offensive, notably on the Pokrovsk axis (Chynyshyn, Muravka, Krasnoarmeysk), Novopavlivka, Lyman, Sieversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, South Slobozhansky (Vovchansk), and Kupyansk directions. The "Vostok" Grouping has liberated Sosnovka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, aiming to encircle UAF in Velykomykhailivka. Specific units involved include marine infantry, "Somali" battalion elements, and the RF 103rd Regiment. "Otvazhnye" units are heavily engaged near Pokrovsk. TASS reports RF forces have taken control of approximately 50% of Pereyizne, south of Siversk, DPR. RF has introduced 'Kur'er' robotic complexes and "Veterok" fiber-optic drones. "Anvar" special forces are active near the Sumy/Chernihiv border, clearing buffer zones. Rosgvardia has been armed with tank and anti-tank guns, self-propelled artillery, and MLRS, and has executed over 60,000 fire and tactical missions. The RF 238th Brigade claims to have destroyed a UAF UAV control post in Berestok. "Terminator" tank support fighting vehicles are training in a rear area. Rosgvardia has recreated tank units and significantly increased artillery firepower. Assault groups of the 20th Army are undergoing combat training. "West-AHMAT" battalion (RF MoD) and Russian Internal Affairs Ministry (OMVD) personnel, along with the RF 128th Brigade, are engaged in combat operations in the Vovchansk area, Kharkiv direction, using FPV drones. RF forces have "expelled the enemy from Katerynivka" and continue to advance in the Konstantinovka direction, near Kleban-Byk and Pleshcheyevka, and on the Borovskoe direction. Combat is confirmed in the vicinity of Konstantinovka. Airborne units are engaging enemy infantry near Chasiv Yar. RF forces are operating on the Rubtsovsk direction, conducting strikes on trenches, a command post, and a communications tower, with suggested electronic warfare activity. RF forces are actively engaging UAF attempts to regain Udachnoye, utilizing drone-guided strikes. "Молния-2" UAVs from Tula paratroopers reportedly hit a UAF temporary deployment point (PVD) in Sumy Oblast. The "Pyatnashka" International Brigade is active in reconnaissance and artillery roles. FPV drone crews of the RF 68th Motorized Rifle Division are conducting ambushes on UAF transport in Kharkiv Oblast. RF UAV operators are disrupting UAF rotations in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The RF 37th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (Vostok Grouping) is conducting reconnaissance operations in the South Donetsk direction. The 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment is reported to be advancing on the Sumy front, near Yunakovka, utilizing drones for reconnaissance and targeting.
  • Air/Missile Forces: RF executed a UAV-centric air attack, with UAF Air Force reporting a 94% interception rate (62 of 66 UAVs). Groups of enemy UAVs are entering southern Zaporizhzhia Oblast from TOT, course - north/northwest. Launches of KABs on Sumy, Northern Kharkiv, and Donetsk Oblasts. TASS reports 5 Ukrainian UAVs were destroyed over Belgorod Oblast. RF Air Force reports launches of guided aerial bombs on eastern Kharkiv Oblast, Donetsk Oblast, and Sumy Oblast. A RF kamikaze drone "Upyr" engaged a UAF interceptor drone near Prykolotne, Kharkiv Oblast. A Ukrainian "Yozhka" drone was reportedly shot down near Lyman. Reconnaissance UAVs are reported in central Chernihiv Oblast and south of Zaporizhzhia. RF drone footage showcases identification and engagement of various enemy assets including a 'BABA-YAGA' drone. A ballistic missile threat from the north was issued. Enemy UAVs are moving towards Zaporizhzhia city from the east. RF Air Defense Forces destroyed five enemy UAVs heading towards Moscow, with a total of seven destroyed. Air defense forces are active against UAVs over the southwestern part of Leningrad Oblast, and Pulkovo airport has implemented a "Carpet" plan (airspace closure). Enemy UAVs are detected in eastern Sumy Oblast, moving west. Two more UAVs heading towards Moscow have been destroyed. Launches of guided aerial bombs by enemy tactical aviation are reported in Sumy Oblast. Enemy strike UAVs are detected in the Kakhovka region (Kherson Oblast), moving towards Mykolaiv Oblast. Over 20 UAVs have been destroyed over Leningrad Oblast. Enemy drones are approaching Kharkiv from the east. An enemy UAV has been detected in Kyiv Oblast (Vyshhorod and Bucha districts), moving west, with PVO active. Restrictions have been imposed in the airports of Ivanovo, Pskov, Yaroslavl, and St. Petersburg overnight. Enemy UAVs are detected in the northeastern part of Sumy Oblast, followed by explosions in Sumy. A ballistic missile threat from Kursk Oblast has been issued. Over 30 UAVs were repelled in three municipalities of Rostov Oblast. A massive drone attack was launched on Leningrad Oblast overnight, with a fire reported on a vessel in Primorsk port. Drone footage from an Orlan-10 variant shows identification and targeting of Ukrainian military positions/vehicles on the Zaporizhzhia front, followed by a missile launch. The Russian MoD claims to have shot down 221 Ukrainian UAVs over Russian regions overnight, with 9 of them over the Moscow region.
  • Naval Forces: USV attack on Novorossiysk confirmed, disabling an RF Black Sea Fleet vessel (Project MPSV07).
  • Information Warfare (IO): RF is actively pushing narratives to discredit Ukraine, sow discord among allies, leveraging various diplomatic and internal events (e.g., Zelenskyy's statements, Hungarian FM's accusations, US internal issues like the Charlie Kirk assassination). RF media denies deliberate drone incursions into Poland while milbloggers promote narratives questioning their origin. RF leverages statements on Germany's need to increase Bundeswehr strength to portray NATO as weak. RF promotes narratives on Slovakia rejecting Western troops in Ukraine. RF IO also focuses on internal morale-boosting and patriotism, such as the increased military personnel salaries and celebrating military education bodies. RF claims UAF units on the Serebryansk direction received direct orders to shoot at civilians. RF continues to use child-centric propaganda. RF continues to amplify civilian casualties in Belgorod and Bryansk Oblasts, blaming UAF for "barbaric crimes."
  • Diplomatic/Economic: Japan has imposed sanctions on 14 individuals and 48 companies/organizations from RF, 3 companies from Seychelles and Marshall Islands, and export restrictions against 2 RF companies and 9 companies from UAE, Turkey, and China. Japan has lowered the price cap on Russian oil from $60 to $47.6 per barrel. Japan has excluded Karina Rotenberg from its sanctions list. Japan's MFA states Sakhalin-2 oil is exempt from price cap for energy security reasons.

• UAF:

  • Ground Forces: UAF repelled 130 RF attacks across all major axes in the last 24 hours. UAF drone operators are demonstrating tactical effectiveness against RF infantry, vehicles, and logistics. UAF 'Lazar' unit successfully destroyed a bridge near Nova Tavolzhanka, Belgorod Oblast, Russia. Ukrainian special forces destroyed an RF BMD-3 in the Zaporizhzhia direction. UAF 'UA_reg' special forces conducted successful strikes against enemy artillery and personnel in Kursk Oblast.
  • Air/Missile Forces: UAF Air Defenses achieved a 94% interception rate (62 of 66 UAVs) against a significant RF air attack. HUR MOD specialists shot down 20 enemy drones. Shahed drone debris was found in Odesa. UAF kamikaze drones cleared an RF roadblock. A ballistic missile threat from the north was lifted. Air raid alerts for Zaporizhzhia and Odesa Oblasts were lifted, indicating successful air defense. UAF drone attacks are reported to have caused explosions and fires at an oil depot in Smolensk Oblast and Primorsk port in Leningrad Oblast.
  • Naval Forces: Ukrainian HUR units successfully struck and disabled an RF Black Sea Fleet vessel (Project MPSV07) near Novorossiysk.
  • Information Warfare/Diplomacy: UAF continues to demonstrate asymmetric warfare capabilities through resistance movements like "ATESH." Poland has committed to cooperating with Ukraine on anti-drone systems. Sweden has provided its 20th package of military aid ($836M) and committed $4.276B annually for 2026-2027. Rheinmetall will deploy shell production in a safe region of Ukraine. President Zelenskyy met with US Special Representative General Keith Kellogg, as well as Danish, Finnish, and Estonian officials, confirming continued high-level support. UAF is actively engaged in diplomatic efforts to enhance international cooperation and air defense capabilities, including sharing expertise on countering Shaheds and training Polish military personnel on drone interception. UAF recognizes EW personnel day. UAF General Staff provides regular operational information and RF combat losses.
  • Casualties: One civilian killed in Polohy Raion due to enemy attacks. The death of a 15-year-old boy in Kharkiv due to RF shelling. The 68-year-old man severely injured in a drone strike on Prymorske yesterday has died in hospital. UAF General Staff reports RF combat losses over the last 24 hours include 890 personnel.

1.4. Intelligence Gaps (Confidence: HIGH)

• CRITICAL: What is the full BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) of the UAF drone strikes on the oil depot in Smolensk Oblast and Primorsk port in Leningrad Oblast? What specific types of facilities were hit (e.g., storage tanks, pumping stations, vessels), what is the estimated damage, and what is the operational impact on RF military/energy logistics? (Previous Critical for Smolensk, New for Primorsk Oil Depot)
• CRITICAL: What is the specific composition, strength, and immediate objectives of the RF 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment operating in the Sumy direction, particularly near Yunakovka? What is the current UAF force posture and defensive readiness in this sector?
• CRITICAL: What is the specific BDA of the alleged "liberation" of Sosnovka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, by the RF "Vostok" Grouping/Russian Army? What UAF units were defending it, and what is the current UAF posture in Velykomykhailivka, which RF claims to be encircling?
• CRITICAL: What specific RF air defense system or air-to-air asset was responsible for the downing of the UAF Su-27 in the Zaporizhzhia direction, and what is the operational impact on UAF air superiority in this sector?
• CRITICAL: What is the full scope and specific objectives of the "West-2025" exercises? What RF and Belarusian units are participating, what new capabilities are being tested, and what are the implications for potential future offensive operations against Ukraine or NATO?
• CRITICAL: What specific targets were hit in Smolensk, Russia, and what UAF assets were responsible for these strikes? What is the full BDA and operational impact on RF military/logistical infrastructure in the region? (Refined from previous)
• CRITICAL: What specific composition, deployment, and operational readiness of the recreated tank units within Rosgvardia, and how does this impact RF's overall ground combat capabilities and tactics?
• CRITICAL: What is the full BDA and specific details of the alleged RF strikes on the Lviv Armored Plant, Lviv Aviation Plant, and other DIB facilities in western Ukraine?
• CRITICAL: What is the full BDA and specific details of the alleged defection of a Russian soldier to the UAF after killing two officers and destroying his position, as reported by БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС? What unit was he from, and what actionable intelligence has he provided?
• CRITICAL: What is the specific impact and BDA of the new RF mechanized offensive on the Kostiantynivka direction, as reported by STERNENKO? What RF units are involved, and what UAF forces are counter-attacking?
• CRITICAL: What is the full BDA and verified location of the alleged "neutralization of a UAF UAV command post" by a T-90M tank in the Krasny Liman direction (MoD Russia)? What is the impact on UAF drone operations in the area?
• CRITICAL: What is the specific impact and BDA of the reported destruction of ~30% of UAF vehicles in DPR rear areas since early September (TASS)? What specific types of vehicles were targeted, and what is the estimated impact on UAF logistics and maneuverability in the region?
• CRITICAL: What is the verifiable BDA and source for the claim of 80% destruction of UAF assault groups near Andriyivka, Sumy Oblast (TASS)? What UAF units were involved, and what is the overall impact on UAF offensive capabilities in the Sumy region?
• HIGH: What is the exact damage assessment and long-term operational impact of the HUR strike on the RF Black Sea Fleet Project MPSV07 vessel near Novorossiysk? How long will repairs take, and how does this affect RF maritime operations in the Black Sea?
• HIGH: What is the specific BDA and the full impact of the RF assault groups using the "Potok" ("Kursk pipe") method for infiltration on the Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) direction? What are the defensive countermeasures required for such subterranean/culvert-based movements?
• HIGH: What are NATO's specific military Rules of Engagement (ROE) and force posture changes following the Article 4 consultation regarding future RF incursions? What are RF's strategic red lines for a direct NATO military response?
• HIGH: What is the strength, composition, and immediate objective of RF second-echelon forces positioned to exploit the Pokrovsk breakthrough?
• HIGH: What is the current operational status of the "Pyatnashka" International Brigade, their specific areas of operation, and their recent combat effectiveness, based on the personal testimony of "Gefest"? What actionable intelligence can be extracted from his experience and unit details?
• HIGH: What is the full context and strategic implication of the discussions by Leonid Slutsky (ТАСС) comparing the Polish drone situation to MH-17 and Skripal cases? What specific disinformation narratives is RF seeking to establish?
• HIGH: What is the specific military significance of the restrictions imposed at the airports of Ivanovo, Pskov, Yaroslavl, and St. Petersburg overnight? Are these linked to UAF deep strikes or internal RF security incidents, and what assets/operations are affected?
• HIGH: What is the specific target and BDA of the allegedly destroyed ammunition depot in occupied Luhansk, and what UAF assets were responsible for this strike?

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (Confidence: HIGH)

• Capabilities:

  • Sustained Ground Offensive with Massed Forces & Expanded Scope: RF demonstrates the capability for sustained, multi-axis ground offensives, achieving localized breakthroughs (Pokrovsk, Siversk, Lyman, Konstantinovka), urban combat, and deploying new robotic systems ('Kur'er'). Confirmed capability for new advances and "liberation" in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Sosnovka), a significant expansion of operational scope, with objectives to encircle UAF forces. Rosgvardia has been armed with tank/anti-tank guns, SPGs, and MLRS, enhancing RF's ground combat capability. RF has specialized armored units ("Terminator") and a T-90M Proryv tank capability against UAF UAV command posts. RF is proficient in FPV drone operations for close-quarters combat and strikes on urban positions. RF units can conduct integrated ISR and direct engagement on multiple fronts (e.g., South Donetsk). RF is capable of managing combat casualties and maintaining medical support. RF is also employing non-standard vehicles (buggies, ATVs) for tactical purposes. RF airborne units can conduct offensive actions. RF demonstrates enhanced homeland air defense capabilities against mass drone attacks, claiming 221 UAVs shot down overnight. RF demonstrates capability to conduct large-scale, multi-domain military training through the "West-2025" exercises.
  • Ballistic Missile Strike Capability (North and Kursk Oblast): RF has the capability to conduct long-range precision strikes from the north and from Kursk Oblast.
  • Drone Swarm Capability (Zaporizhzhia): RF maintains the capability to conduct persistent drone attacks, potentially in coordinated swarms, against key urban centers.
  • Adaptive FPV Drone Operations: RF is increasingly employing FPV drones for specialized tactical roles, demonstrating effective targeting against high-value assets and personnel.
  • Persistent IO and Cyber Operations (Highly Adaptive): RF maintains a robust capability for multi-layered information warfare, including rapid adaptation to new narratives, highly inflammatory accusations, and efforts to sow discord. RF is capable of immediate and coordinated IO, generating and disseminating narratives of Western weakness, exploiting US internal events, and attempting to discredit Western media. RF conducts internal IO to reinforce domestic support and justify the conflict, including youth indoctrination.
  • Overwhelming Long-Range Strike & Air Presence (Escalated Volume): RF maintains overwhelming long-range strike capability (Iskander-K, Shaheds, KABs, cruise missiles), capable of massed, multi-platform, and precision strikes against critical DIB, energy, and national C2 infrastructure.
  • Homeland Air Defense: RF demonstrates capability to defend its capital and critical infrastructure against aerial threats. RF has successfully repelled over 30 UAVs in Rostov Oblast and destroyed over 30 UAVs in Leningrad Oblast, demonstrating robust air defense against mass deep strikes. RF is also capable of rapid response and damage mitigation at critical naval infrastructure, as demonstrated at Primorsk port.

• Intentions:

  • Achieve Decisive Breakthrough on Pokrovsk Axis and Expand Dnipropetrovsk Offensive: RF's primary intent is to exploit current breakthroughs to gain significant operational depth on the Pokrovsk axis and to consolidate and expand the new salient at Sosnovka, threatening Velykomykhailivka. RF intends to maintain pressure on urban areas (e.g., Vovchansk, Chasiv Yar) and degrade UAF artillery. RF also intends to initiate or expand offensive actions on the Sumy direction.
  • Degrade Ukrainian Winter Resilience & Overwhelm Air Defenses: RF intends to continue systematic mass strikes against Ukrainian DIB, energy, industrial, and logistical infrastructure to weaken Ukraine's ability to sustain operations through winter and to saturate/overwhelm UAF air defenses. This includes persistent ballistic missile and drone pressure.
  • Undermine Western Support and Ukrainian Morale: RF will continue aggressive information operations to discredit UAF, sow distrust, amplify internal challenges, and exploit any perceived cracks in Western unity. This includes leveraging diplomatic incidents and internal US political events, as well as blaming UAF for civilian casualties in border regions.
  • Sustained Probing of NATO Air Defenses with Hybrid Warfare Elements: RF intends to continue launching UAVs into or towards NATO member states' airspace to test response thresholds and sow discord, escalating hybrid actions based on perceived successes. This is further reinforced by the "West-2025" exercises.
  • Maintain Internal Stability and Project Strength: RF will continue internal propaganda to maintain domestic stability, projecting military strength, accountability, and normalcy. This includes promoting military successes and leveraging major exercises for internal morale, while downplaying the impact of UAF deep strikes.
  • Leverage Diplomatic Openings: RF intends to exploit any perceived cracks in Western unity or new diplomatic initiatives to improve its international standing or secure concessions, including by leveraging sanctions relief and economic relations.

• Courses of Action (COA):

  • MLCOA 1 (Ground Offensive Reinforcement & Consolidation): RF will continue to reinforce offensive efforts on the Pokrovsk axis and actively consolidate/expand the new salient in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, aiming for the encirclement of Velykomykhailivka. Secondary efforts will target Lyman, Konstantinovka, Vovchansk, and initiate/expand operations on the Sumy direction (Yunakovka). (Confidence: HIGH)
  • MLCOA 2 (Sustained Air/Missile Campaign Targeting Critical Infrastructure & Homeland Defense): RF will launch multi-wave UAV attacks (50-100 drones) and guided aerial bomb (KAB) strikes targeting Ukrainian DIB, energy, and logistics, with continued ballistic missile threats from the north and Kursk Oblast. Simultaneously, RF will maintain and enhance its homeland air defense capabilities against UAF deep strikes. (Confidence: HIGH)
  • MLCOA 3 (Escalated Hybrid Operations/IO): RF will continue to probe NATO airspace with UAVs, while simultaneously engaging in a robust IO campaign to deny responsibility, blame Ukraine (including for civilian casualties in Russia), and amplify perceived NATO disunity. RF will leverage the "West-2025" exercises for a show of force and internal propaganda. (Confidence: HIGH)

2.2. Recent tactical changes or adaptations (Confidence: HIGH)

• Expanded Offensive Zones: RF is demonstrating an expanded scope of ground operations, with new claims of advances in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Sosnovka), a significant shift from traditional axes. This indicates an adaptation to probe new areas or divert UAF resources. New offensive directions are observed on the Rubtsovsk axis and now explicitly on the Sumy front (Yunakovka).
• Enhanced Tactical Air Defense: RF is adapting its short-range air defense to protect offensive axes and is improving counter-UAV capabilities through modernized systems and drone-on-drone combat. RF is also using armored vehicles for counter-UAV C2 strikes. RF homeland air defense is demonstrating reactive and intensified responses to deep strikes (e.g., Moscow, Leningrad, Rostov).
• Expanded Role for Internal Security Forces: Rosgvardia has been armed with tank/anti-tank guns, SPGs, and MLRS, and has executed over 60,000 fire missions, integrating these internal security forces into direct combat operations.
• Persistent Urban Combat Focus: RF continues to adapt to protracted, high-intensity urban warfare in areas like Pokrovsk and Vovchansk, employing specialized units and FPV drones.
• Increased Depth of Hybrid Operations into NATO: The deliberate, large-scale drone incursions into Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania demonstrate an adaptation in RF's hybrid warfare, testing NATO's response thresholds with greater audacity. This has led to reactive airspace and border closures by NATO members.
• Youth Military Indoctrination: RF is integrating military training and patriotic education at a young age to prepare a future cadre of soldiers.
• Intensified Blame-Shifting for Civilian Casualties: RF has adapted its IO to rapidly attribute civilian casualties in its border regions (Belgorod, Bryansk) to UAF "terrorist attacks," seeking to justify further aggression and rally internal support.
• Adapted Deep Strike Response: RF demonstrates a significantly adapted defensive response to UAF deep strikes, reporting a high number of downed UAVs (221 overnight) and rapid damage control at critical infrastructure (Primorsk port).
• Large-Scale Combined Arms Training: RF demonstrates a significant tactical adaptation for large-scale combined arms training through the "West-2025" exercises, indicating a focus on enhancing operational readiness and potentially showcasing new doctrine.

2.3. Logistics and sustainment status (Confidence: MEDIUM)

RF continues to demonstrate the ability to sustain multi-axis ground offensives and massed air attacks, suggesting sufficient, albeit strained, logistical capacity. The new Dnipropetrovsk salient and potential Sumy offensive will place additional demands. The call for drone donations from "Два майора" indicates a potential shortfall in organic drone supply for some units. High consumption of artillery ammunition by Rosgvardia requires robust logistical support. UAF's successful destruction of a bridge near Nova Tavolzhanka, Belgorod Oblast, represents a localized logistical disruption for RF. The re-opening of Krasnodar airport may improve civilian logistics, with indirect implications for military flow. Civilian/volunteer support for specific RF ground units (e.g., 135th Assault Battalion) indicates reliance on non-state supply chains. The Russian Central Bank raising the dollar exchange rate above ₽85 could indicate growing economic strain, impacting long-term sustainment. RF claims over half of UAF-supplied drones are defective, an IO narrative that also highlights the critical nature of drone logistics.

• NEW: The UAF drone attack on the oil depot in Smolensk Oblast and Primorsk port in Leningrad Oblast represents a potentially significant disruption to RF energy and naval logistics, especially if damage is extensive and prolonged.
• NEW: Over 30 flights cancelled/delayed at Pulkovo Airport indicate continued disruption to civilian air travel in Northwestern Russia, suggesting broader logistical impact due to security concerns.
• NEW: The "West-2025" exercises will place significant logistical demands on both RF and Belarusian forces, potentially straining existing supply chains for fuel, ammunition, and other consumables.

2.4. Command and control effectiveness (Confidence: HIGH)

RF Command and Control (C2) demonstrates high effectiveness in coordinating multi-domain operations. This includes multi-domain synchronization of air attacks, ground offensives (including new axes), and hybrid operations. RF C2 shows adaptive targeting capabilities, rapidly prioritizing high-value targets (e.g., UAF UAV command posts, critical infrastructure). Ground C2 is effective for offensive, defensive, and counter-offensive actions (e.g., Rubtsovsk, Udachnoye, Yunakovka). Tactical C2 is effective in directing drone assets for reconnaissance and precision strikes. Information Warfare (IO) is highly integrated into strategic and operational C2, allowing for rapid exploitation of events for propaganda and disinformation. RF C2 is effective in managing internal political processes and using them for IO. Emerging drone C2 capabilities are evident with special UAV detachments and control centers. RF also demonstrates decentralized tactical initiative under overall strategic guidance.

• NEW: Robust homeland air defense C2 is evident in the successful repulsion of mass drone attacks over Rostov and Leningrad Oblasts, indicating effective coordination of detection, tracking, and interception.
• NEW: Rapid response naval/industrial C2 was demonstrated in extinguishing the fire at Primorsk port, indicating effective emergency response protocols.
• NEW: RF C2 is effective in planning, coordinating, and executing complex military maneuvers across multiple domains and geographical areas, as seen in the "West-2025" exercises.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian force posture and readiness (Confidence: HIGH)

UAF maintains a resilient defensive posture, successfully repelling 130 RF attacks across all major axes in the last 24 hours. UAF drone operators are demonstrating tactical effectiveness against RF personnel, vehicles, and logistics. Ukrainian air defenses achieved a 94% interception rate (62 of 66 UAVs) against a significant RF air attack. UAF continues to demonstrate asymmetric warfare capabilities through resistance movements like "ATESH" and successful deep strikes on RF territory and naval assets (e.g., Project MPSV07 vessel, Smolensk oil depot, Luhansk ammunition depot, Primorsk port vessel). UAF is actively engaged in diplomatic efforts to enhance international cooperation and air defense capabilities, including sharing expertise on countering Shaheds and training Polish military personnel on drone interception. UAF is committed to internal transparency and anti-corruption efforts. Morale is boosted by public solidarity, recognition of valor ("Man in the Military" award), and official support for POW families. Rheinmetall's planned shell production in Ukraine significantly enhances long-term readiness. High-level US, Danish, Finnish, and Estonian diplomatic engagement confirms strong international support. UAF is also focused on protecting civilian life through initiatives like underground schools in Vilnyansk. UAF General Staff reports 890 RF combat losses over the last 24 hours. UAF is preparing for continued intense defensive operations on multiple fronts.

3.2. Recent tactical successes or setbacks (Confidence: HIGH)

• Successes:

  • High interception rate (94%) against RF UAV attack (62/66).
  • Successful repulsion of 130 RF attacks across multiple axes.
  • Effective drone operations by UAF units against RF personnel and equipment, particularly significant with 890 RF personnel eliminated in 24 hours.
  • Successful HUR strike on an RF Black Sea Fleet Project MPSV07 vessel, disabling a key support asset.
  • Successful destruction of a bridge near Nova Tavolzhanka, Belgorod Oblast, disrupting RF logistics.
  • Successful deep strikes into RF territory: explosions and fires at an oil depot in Smolensk Oblast and Primorsk port in Leningrad Oblast; Luhansk ammunition depot; and numerous UAV incursions in Leningrad Oblast, Rostov Oblast, and Moscow region.
  • US Congress approved $400 million in military aid, and Sweden committed $836M (20th package) and $4.276B annually for 2026-2027.
  • Effective counter-offensive drone operations against RF mechanized advances in Kostiantynivka direction.
  • UAF special forces destroyed an RF BMD-3 in the Zaporizhzhia direction and conducted successful strikes against RF artillery/personnel in Kursk Oblast.
  • Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania closed border airspace, and Poland closed all border crossings with Belarus, demonstrating a coordinated NATO response to RF hybrid operations.
  • Deployment of Rafale and Eurofighter jets by Britain and France to NATO's eastern flank.
  • UAF recognition of EW personnel day highlights commitment to critical capabilities.

• Setbacks:

  • RF exploitation of the Pokrovsk breakthrough, leading to urban combat within Pokrovsk city limits.
  • Continued significant damage to DIB, energy, and civilian infrastructure from RF deep strikes (e.g., Sumy, Kramatorsk, Trypilska TPP).
  • Civilian casualties from RF attacks remain high (Yarova, Polohy Raion, Prymorske, Sumy).
  • RF's "liberation" of Sosnovka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, represents a significant territorial setback for UAF and a new threat of encirclement to Velykomykhailivka.
  • The loss of UAF Major Oleksandr Borovyk and a Su-27 aircraft in Zaporizhzhia direction is a critical operational setback, impacting air defense and offensive air capabilities.
  • Localized territorial loss with RF claims of controlling 50% of Pereyizne (Siversk direction).
  • Persistent diplomatic friction with Hungary and Slovakia due to political statements, indicating challenges in maintaining international unity.
  • RF claims of destroying a UAF UAV control point and communication antenna in Konstantinovka direction, if verified, represents a setback for UAF drone operations and C2.
  • RF FPV drone ambushes are successfully targeting UAF transport in Kharkiv Oblast.
  • RF UAV operators are disrupting UAF rotations in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
  • RF claims of destroying ~30% of UAF vehicles in DPR rear areas represents a potential significant logistical setback (requires verification).
  • RF claims of up to 80% destruction of UAF assault groups near Andriyivka, Sumy Oblast, if accurate, represents a severe tactical setback in personnel and offensive capacity (requires verification).
  • RF 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment reportedly advancing on Sumy front, indicating new pressure on a previously stable sector.
  • Civilian casualties in Belgorod and Bryansk Oblasts, attributed to UAF by RF, present an IO challenge and potential for escalation.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

• Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:

  • RF Narratives (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF continues to push aggressive, multi-layered propaganda. Key narratives include: portraying UAF as targeting civilian infrastructure (e.g., ZNPP training center, Sumy non-residential building, Polohy Raion, Belgorod/Bryansk civilian casualties, Western Ukraine missile incident); blaming Ukraine for attacks on RF territory (e.g., Belgorod, Bryansk, and now Leningrad Oblast, Rostov Oblast, Smolensk) while claiming successful homeland air defense; denying responsibility for NATO airspace violations (e.g., Polish drone incident) while amplifying Trump's "could be a mistake" statement; framing NATO's response as escalatory (e.g., Poland's troop deployment, Rafale/Eurofighter deployment); dismissing Western support as ineffective; exploiting internal Western political issues (e.g., US internal divisions, Charlie Kirk murder, alleged LGBT/Antifa links to the weapon); and sowing discord (e.g., between Poland/Ukraine, critical of NATO's response). RF milbloggers are key amplifiers, mocking NATO's "slow" response to drone incursions and amplifying perceived Western disunity (e.g., Slovak FM statements). Lavrov's statement blaming the US for arming Ukraine is a core RF narrative. RF is leveraging the "West-2025" exercises to project military strength and unity. RF is conducting internal IO to boost morale (e.g., increased military salaries, celebrating educational work bodies, using children in propaganda). RF denies the existence or location of successful UAF deep strikes (e.g., initially for Smolensk/Primorsk). RF claims UAF units on the Serebryansk direction received direct orders to shoot at civilians. RF seeks to control historical narratives (e.g., Mannerheim). RF frames Japan's sanctions as aggressive economic warfare. RF also claims UAF is using "unprepared recruits" for assault groups (e.g., Poltava's "Skala" regiment), attempting to portray UAF as desperate and ineffective.
  • UAF Counter-Narratives (HIGH CONFIDENCE): UAF and allied media are countering RF narratives by: highlighting successful UAF operations (e.g., HUR naval strike, bridge destruction, drone interceptions, 890 RF personnel losses, deep strikes on RF territory); emphasizing continued international support (e.g., US aid, Swedish aid, Rheinmetall production, high-level diplomatic meetings); exposing RF lies and disinformation (e.g., challenging Smolensk location, countering false claims about UAF drones); bolstering domestic and military morale (e.g., recognizing EW personnel, support for POW families, public solidarity, commemorating liberations); framing RF actions as deliberate hybrid warfare (e.g., Zelenskyy on Polish drones); and emphasizing the human cost of the war due to RF aggression. UAF is actively engaging in diplomatic efforts to maintain and strengthen alliances and counter divisive narratives from Hungary and Slovakia.

• Public sentiment and morale factors:

  • Ukraine (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Public sentiment remains generally resilient, bolstered by military successes (HUR naval strike, successful drone interceptions, 890 RF personnel losses, successful deep strikes) and continued international support. However, sustained RF deep strikes on civilian infrastructure (Sumy, Kramatorsk, Dnipropetrovsk) and high civilian casualties (Yarova, Polohy Raion) will put pressure on civilian morale. The loss of UAF Major Borovyk and the Su-27 is a blow to military morale but will likely be framed heroically. Continued efforts to support POW families and recognize military valor are critical for sustaining morale.
  • Russia (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF public sentiment is largely controlled by state propaganda, which projects military strength, internal stability, and blames Ukraine/West for conflict. Increases in military salaries aim to boost morale and retention. However, RF drone attacks and claims of destruction of UAF vehicles aim to show effectiveness. Unverified reports of neglected soldiers' graves could pose a challenge to morale if widely disseminated internally. Economic strains (e.g., ruble depreciation, market volatility) could indirectly impact public sentiment. Regional and local elections will be used to project stability. Casualties in Belgorod and Bryansk Oblasts, amplified by governors, aim to rally patriotic sentiment and justify continued military action. The effectiveness of Russian homeland air defense (221 UAVs downed) will be used to reassure the public.
  • International (HIGH CONFIDENCE): International support for Ukraine remains strong, evidenced by continued military and financial aid, and diplomatic engagements. NATO's coordinated response to RF airspace incursions (Poland, Latvia, Lithuania border closures, fighter jet deployments) demonstrates resolve, although the crisis also reveals potential for diplomatic friction among allies (e.g., Hungary, Slovakia). Japanese sanctions indicate continued international pressure on RF.

• International support and diplomatic developments:

  • Support for Ukraine (HIGH CONFIDENCE): US approved $400 million in military aid. Sweden provided its 20th package ($836M) and committed $4.276B annually for 2026-2027. Rheinmetall will deploy shell production in Ukraine. High-level diplomatic engagement continues with US Special Representative General Keith Kellogg, Danish, Finnish, and Estonian officials. Poland and Ukraine will cooperate on anti-drone systems. Britain and France offered to send Rafale/Eurofighter jets to Poland. Japan imposed sanctions on RF and its allies and lowered the price cap on Russian oil.
  • Pressure on RF (HIGH CONFIDENCE): EU condemnation of RF airspace violations and calls for increased sanctions. Poland's full border closure with Belarus. NATO's coordinated air defense response in the Baltic states. Japan's sanctions and oil price cap reduction.
  • Challenges/Neutral (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Hungarian FM Szijjártó's accusations against Kyiv for worsening relations. Slovakian FM's "cynical statement" on Polish drones (as perceived by Ukraine). Lukashenko's release of 52 political prisoners, including Polish and Belarusian individuals, following US engagement, creates a complex diplomatic dynamic. Japan exempted Sakhalin-2 oil from price caps. The start of "West-2025" exercises between RF and Belarus strengthens their military-political alignment.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

5.1. Most likely enemy courses of action (MLCOA)

• MLCOA 1 (Ground Offensive Reinforcement and Consolidation - Pokrovsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy): RF will intensify ground offensives on the Pokrovsk axis, attempting to clear UAF from urban areas of Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk). Simultaneously, RF will commit significant forces to consolidate and expand the new salient in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Sosnovka area), aiming to complete the encirclement of Velykomykhailivka. RF's 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and other units will initiate or intensify offensive operations on the Sumy front (Yunakovka area) to draw UAF reserves. High-tempo probing attacks will continue on the Lyman, Kupyansk, and South Donetsk axes to fix UAF reserves and prevent redeployments. (Confidence: HIGH)
• MLCOA 2 (Sustained Air/Missile Campaign Targeting Critical Infrastructure & Probing Homeland Defense): RF will conduct multiple waves of UAV strikes (50-100 drones per wave) and widespread guided aerial bomb (KAB) attacks, prioritizing Ukrainian energy, industrial, and logistical infrastructure, with continued ballistic missile threats from the north and Kursk Oblast, to degrade Ukraine's winter resilience and overwhelm air defenses. RF will also continue to conduct UAV incursions into Russian territory, likely for reconnaissance and to test UAF deep strike capabilities, while showcasing its enhanced air defense responses. (Confidence: HIGH)
• MLCOA 3 (Escalated Hybrid Operations and Information Warfare with Border Provocations): RF will continue to probe NATO airspace with smaller, coordinated groups of UAVs to test response thresholds and identify vulnerabilities. This will be accompanied by an aggressive, multi-layered information campaign to deny responsibility for incursions, blame Ukraine (especially for civilian casualties in border regions), mock NATO's response, and amplify perceived disunity within the alliance. RF will leverage the "West-2025" exercises for a show of force and internal propaganda, potentially staging border provocations involving Belarusian forces to maintain pressure on Poland and Lithuania. (Confidence: HIGH)

5.2. Most dangerous enemy courses of action (MDCOA)

• MDCOA 1 (Breakthrough and Deep Encirclement - Dnipropetrovsk & Sumy): RF achieves a decisive breakthrough from the Sosnovka salient, successfully encircling and isolating a significant UAF grouping in Velykomykhailivka, and rapidly advancing deeper into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Concurrently, a successful multi-battalion RF offensive from the Sumy direction, leveraging the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment's advance, could breach UAF defensive lines, threatening Sumy city and critical supply routes, forcing UAF to make difficult choices regarding strategic withdrawals and resource allocation, potentially leading to a collapse of defensive lines in both regions. (Confidence: MEDIUM)
• MDCOA 2 (Coordinated Multi-National Hybrid Attack on NATO & Ukraine): RF orchestrates a large-scale, multi-national (RF/Belarus) hybrid attack targeting critical infrastructure in NATO border states (e.g., energy grids, transportation hubs, military installations) using a combination of drones, cyber attacks, and potentially special forces, aiming to overwhelm NATO's collective defense response and trigger an Article 5 scenario. This could coincide with a renewed, large-scale ground offensive in Ukraine, exploiting weakened UAF positions. (Confidence: MEDIUM)
• MDCOA 3 (Strategic Paralysis via Massed, Multi-Domain Strike with Chemical/Tactical Nuclear Threat): RF executes an even larger, highly coordinated multi-domain strike across Ukraine, combining an unprecedented number of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and UAVs (400+ targets) with simultaneous cyber attacks on Ukrainian C2 and critical infrastructure, aiming to achieve strategic paralysis. This could be accompanied by a credible threat of tactical chemical or nuclear weapon use against a non-combatant target to psychologically break Ukrainian resolve and force negotiations on RF terms. (Confidence: LOW)

5.3. Timeline estimates and decision points

• Next 24-48 Hours (Immediate Threat):

  • Pokrovsk/Dnipropetrovsk/Sumy: RF will likely attempt to consolidate gains in Sosnovka and intensify pressure on Velykomykhailivka, potentially attempting an encirclement. Increased RF activity on the Sumy front (Yunakovka) is expected. Decision point for UAF is immediate counter-deployment or tactical withdrawal from Velykomykhailivka/reinforcement of Sumy defenses.
  • Air Campaign: Continued high-volume UAV/KAB attacks on energy and critical infrastructure across Ukraine. Decision point for UAF is further dispersal of air defense assets or prioritization of targets.
  • NATO Border/RF Deep Strikes: Continued RF probing of NATO airspace, potentially with increased volume or more advanced drones. UAF deep strikes against RF territory are likely to continue, drawing further RF air defense responses. Decision point for NATO is escalation of ROE or direct defensive action against incursions.
  • Information Environment: RF will continue aggressive IO campaigns leveraging new battlefield developments (Sosnovka, Sumy), civilian casualties in Russia, and diplomatic incidents. Decision point for UAF is to proactively counter RF narratives and amplify its own successes (e.g., 890 RF losses, deep strikes).

• Next 72 Hours (Short-Term Escalation):

  • Ground: If successful in Velykomykhailivka or on the Sumy front, RF may attempt to exploit these salients further. If repelled, RF will likely reinforce and re-evaluate, but maintain pressure.
  • Air: RF could initiate another massed air strike (200+ targets) if previous attacks degrade UAF air defenses sufficiently or in response to UAF deep strikes.
  • Hybrid: Continued and potentially more overt hybrid operations against NATO, possibly using conventional forces in Belarus to apply pressure on Polish/Lithuanian borders, coinciding with "West-2025" exercises.
  • Diplomatic: Expect heightened diplomatic activity and potential for emergency NATO consultations if hybrid actions escalate significantly.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Prioritize Immediate Defensive Reinforcement for Velykomykhailivka and Sumy Front: Immediately redeploy available combat-effective reserves (manpower, artillery, armor) to establish a hardened defensive perimeter and counter-encirclement capability around Velykomykhailivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and reinforce UAF positions on the Sumy front, particularly in the Yunakovka area. Prioritize close air support and anti-armor assets for these critical sectors. (PIR 1.4: CRITICAL: Sosnovka BDA and UAF posture in Velykomykhailivka; CRITICAL: RF 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment strength and UAF posture in Sumy).
2. Expedite Advanced Air Defense Deployment to Critical Infrastructure and Western/Central Ukraine: Request immediate acceleration of Western air defense system deliveries (e.g., Patriot, NASAMS) and munitions, prioritizing deployment to critical energy, DIB, and national C2 nodes, particularly in Western and Central Ukraine. Coordinate with NATO for enhanced real-time intelligence sharing on RF strike packages. (PIR 1.4: CRITICAL: DIB facilities BDA).
3. Intensify Deep Strike Operations Against RF Logistical Hubs, Energy Infrastructure, and Airfields: Capitalize on recent successes (Smolensk, Primorsk) by planning and executing follow-on deep strike operations against known RF fuel and ammunition depots, energy infrastructure (refineries, ports), transportation hubs (rail, port), and airfields to disrupt RF's ability to sustain multi-axis offensives and air campaigns. (PIR 1.4: CRITICAL: Smolensk, Primorsk BDA).
4. Launch Coordinated IO Campaign to Counter RF Narratives on Civilian Casualties and NATO Disunity: Immediately task STRATCOM to develop and disseminate targeted information products. Highlight confirmed RF logistical vulnerabilities and casualties from UAF strikes (e.g., 890 RF personnel). Simultaneously, proactively counter RF narratives on UAF targeting civilians in Russia by providing evidence of RF targeting Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure, and emphasize allied military cooperation and mutual defense commitments to counter claims of NATO disunity. (PIR 1.4: CRITICAL: RF logistics, NATO ROE, RF IO narratives).
5. Conduct Comprehensive Review of Drone Combat Doctrine and Counter-UAV Capabilities and Procurement: Task UAF G6 and Air Force to immediately review current drone combat doctrine, particularly regarding drone-on-drone engagements and anti-drone defenses. Allocate resources for accelerated procurement and development of advanced counter-UAV systems, EW capabilities, and reactive drones to maintain air superiority in the tactical and operational domains against both RF kamikaze drones and reconnaissance UAVs. (PIR 1.4: HIGH: Drone-on-drone combat, reactive drones).
6. Enhance Border Surveillance and Interdiction Against Hybrid Incursions and RF Unit Movements: Increase all-source ISR (IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT) along the borders with Belarus and RF (Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv) to detect and interdict RF/Belarusian hybrid operations, including drone incursions and special forces activities. Specifically monitor for movements of RF units (e.g., 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment) and potential staging for cross-border ground operations. Coordinate with Polish, Latvian, and Lithuanian counterparts for real-time intelligence sharing and joint exercises. (PIR 1.4: CRITICAL: Poland border closure impact, Belarusian border reinforcement, RF UAVs Sumy/Kharkiv, CRITICAL: RF 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment).

//END REPORT//