Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 051300Z SEP 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: RF ground offensive in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts continues to be a primary concern, with RF forces reinforcing pressure on Velikomikhailovka and Orikhiv following claimed "liberations" of Novoselivka (Dnipropetrovsk) and Novoselovka (Zaporizhzhia). RF has also claimed the liberation of Markovo and Fedorovka in DNR, indicating continued ground pressure in the Donetsk sector. TASS further clarifies the RF advance from Markovo is "towards Kramatorsk." Intense ground operations persist on the Kupyansk-Sieversk axis, with RF pushing for control of Kupyansk. RF deep strikes continue to target Ukrainian energy and defense industries (Khmelnytskyi, Sumy, Lozova, Dnipro, Odesa), leading to civilian casualties and significant infrastructure damage. A ballistic missile strike in Chernihiv Oblast against a humanitarian demining mission has been confirmed. Air defense remains challenged by high-volume, multi-vector drone attacks, particularly in Dnipro, Sumy, and Chernihiv Oblasts. UAF is actively defending across all axes, launching deep strikes on RF territory (Ryazan oil refinery, Anapa radar, Luhansk oil depot), and conducting successful special operations in the Black Sea. Diplomatic activity remains high, with Ukraine seeking accelerated security guarantees and RF attempting to fracture Western unity through information operations. NATO ISR activity near Kaliningrad/Belarus border indicates heightened regional vigilance. The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (DPSU) warns of potential provocations during the upcoming "Zapad-2025" exercises.

• NEW DEVELOPMENTS (1230Z - 1300Z SEP 25):

  • RF Deep Strike (Black Sea): Footage from RF sources ("АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА") shows an RF naval drone (USV) engaging an unknown vessel in the Black Sea, which appears damaged and emitting smoke. This indicates continued RF counter-naval operations and potential for escalation in the Black Sea. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Information Operations (Nuclear Threat): RF Duma Deputy General Andrey Gurulyov has publicly threatened a nuclear strike on Ukraine, claiming it would kill hundreds of thousands and cause widespread catastrophe. This is a significant escalation of RF nuclear rhetoric, intended to deter Western support and demoralize Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Ground Operations (Siversk Direction): RF sources ("Дневник Десантника🇷🇺") post a map indicating operations in the Siversk direction. While details are scarce, this confirms ongoing RF pressure on this axis. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Ground Operations (Novopavlovka Direction): RF sources ("Z комитет + карта СВО") post a map for the Novopavlovka direction showing RF advances or contested areas. This indicates continued RF offensive efforts in the Donetsk Oblast. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Information Operations (Mobilization Propaganda): RF sources ("Colonelcassad") distribute videos purporting to show forced mobilization in Odesa, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Chernivtsi, framing it as "Mogilizatsiya" (burialization). This is a clear information operation to demoralize Ukrainian population and fuel anti-mobilization sentiment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Information Operations (Leopard 2 Destruction Claim): RF sources ("Colonelcassad") claim to have destroyed a German Leopard 2 tank in the Zaporizhzhia region, releasing drone footage of a burning vehicle. This is likely an attempt to project RF military effectiveness and undermine confidence in Western military aid. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Political Visit (Occupied Territories): Sergey Kirienko, First Deputy Head of the RF Presidential Administration, visited "liberated territories," including Hornyak in the Kurakhove municipal district and other settlements. This visit aims to legitimize RF control and integrate occupied territories. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Air Defense (Drone Intercepts): Ukrainian sources ("STERNENKO") claim the interception of 12 enemy drones. This indicates continued UAF effectiveness in air defense against UAVs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Internal Affairs (Corruption Inquiry): Ukrainian media ("РБК-Україна") reports an inquiry by the Rada into potentially inflated boiler procurement costs in Kyiv compared to Mykolaiv. This highlights internal governance challenges but is not directly military. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • International Diplomacy (Sweden): President Zelenskyy met with the Swedish Foreign Minister in Uzhhorod to discuss joint defense projects and military needs. This indicates continued bilateral military cooperation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • International Diplomacy (Slovenia): Slovenian Defense Minister Sajovic stated that Slovenia is ready to send troops to Ukraine only with UN approval or an EU agreement. This aligns with a cautious approach among some EU/NATO members. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • International Diplomacy (EU Sanctions): European Council President Costa announced that work has begun in Brussels on a new package of sanctions against RF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Cyber Control (Offline Services): RF media (RBC, ASTRA) published a "whitelist" of services (VK, Gosuslugi, Magnit website) that will be accessible in Russia even if the internet is disconnected. This signals preparation for potential internet shutdowns and enhanced information control. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF SBU Stance: SBU Head Vasyl Maliuk stated Ukraine will "stop only when the enemy stops aggression against Ukraine." This reaffirms Ukraine's unwavering resolve. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Concealment: The continued transition into autumn will further reduce foliage, making covert operations and concealment of assets more challenging for both sides. RF's drone operations, particularly for targeting, will benefit from clearer lines of sight.
• Visibility: Clearer skies generally favor air reconnaissance and drone operations. The documented use of drones by both sides (RF destroying Leopard 2, UAF intercepting 12 drones, RF naval drone engagement) indicates favorable conditions for UAV operations.
• Black Sea Operations: Current conditions in the Black Sea allowed for RF naval drone operations against a vessel, implying moderate to calm sea states.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF:
  • Ground Forces: Continuing offensive actions on multiple axes (Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Siversk, Novopavlovka), aiming for attrition and territorial gains. RF is actively consolidating control in occupied areas (Kirienko visit).
  • Air/Naval Assets: Sustained use of drones for reconnaissance, deep strikes, and naval engagements in the Black Sea.
  • Information Operations (IO): Intensified and highly aggressive IO campaign, including explicit nuclear threats, propaganda on forced mobilization, and claims of Western equipment destruction, all aimed at eroding Ukrainian morale and international support. Preparation for internal internet control underscores a desire to maintain narrative dominance domestically.
  • Diplomacy/Sanctions: Seeking to exploit divisions within the EU regarding sanctions and military aid, while reacting strongly to Western financial measures.
• UAF:
  • Defensive Posture: Continues effective air defense against RF drone attacks. Maintaining strong defensive lines on the ground (implied by persistent RF pressure and localized engagements).
  • Strategic Resolve: Leadership (Zelenskyy, Maliuk) continues to project unwavering resolve and commitment to defending sovereignty.
  • Diplomatic Engagement: Actively pursuing bilateral military support and discussing broader security guarantees with international partners.
  • Resource Management: Acknowledging financial challenges for military production while continuing to develop indigenous capabilities.
• International:
  • NATO/EU: Maintaining a nuanced approach to direct military intervention (Slovenia's stance). EU is pursuing further sanctions against RF, indicating continued economic pressure. Sweden is reaffirming bilateral defense cooperation with Ukraine.
  • Economic Front: EU's new sanctions package suggests ongoing economic pressure on RF, but internal EU divisions or differing stances (Hungary's open oil purchases) could present challenges.
  • Information Environment: RF's aggressive IO is putting pressure on the international community to respond, particularly regarding nuclear rhetoric.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:

  • Persistent Ground Offensive: RF retains the capability for sustained, multi-axis ground offensives, including localized breakthroughs and attritional warfare.
  • Long-Range Strike & Naval Operations: RF continues to conduct drone and missile strikes and is capable of employing naval drones effectively in the Black Sea.
  • Escalatory Information & Psychological Warfare: RF demonstrates a high capability for aggressive and inflammatory information operations, including explicit nuclear threats and demoralization campaigns.
  • Internal Information Control: RF is actively preparing for and implementing measures to control its internal information environment, including potential internet isolation.
  • Political-Military Integration: RF effectively integrates political figures (Kirienko) into "liberated territories" to legitimize occupation and reinforce control.

• Intentions:

  • Achieve Territorial Objectives: RF intends to continue offensive operations to secure and consolidate control over claimed and newly occupied territories, particularly in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts.
  • Degrade UAF Combat Effectiveness & Morale: RF aims to deplete UAF resources through attrition, disrupt logistics, and undermine public morale through propaganda and strikes.
  • Deter Western Intervention & Support: RF will continue to use escalatory rhetoric (e.g., nuclear threats) and IO campaigns to deter Western military aid and direct involvement, and to exploit perceived divisions within the international community.
  • Maintain Domestic Control & Legitimacy: RF will continue to tightly control its internal information space to maintain public support for the war and suppress dissent.
  • Counter UAF Naval Operations: RF intends to actively counter Ukrainian naval drone operations in the Black Sea to protect its assets.

• Courses of Action (COAs):

  • MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action):

    1. Sustained Ground Pressure & Consolidation: RF will maintain and potentially intensify ground offensives across current axes, focusing on attriting UAF forces and consolidating control over contested areas (e.g., Siversk, Novopavlovka directions), while simultaneously integrating occupied territories politically and administratively. Confidence: HIGH
    2. Escalated Information Warfare with Nuclear Signaling: RF will continue and likely increase its use of overt nuclear rhetoric and propaganda campaigns (e.g., "Mogilizatsiya" narrative, claims of Western equipment destruction) to pressure Ukraine and deter Western support. Confidence: HIGH
    3. Targeted Hybrid Operations and Naval Engagements: RF will continue using naval drones in the Black Sea to counter UAF operations and conduct limited, deniable hybrid actions (e.g., cyberattacks, border probes) against NATO's Eastern Flank during "Zapad-2025." Confidence: MEDIUM

  • MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action):

    1. Limited Tactical Nuclear Demonstration: In response to perceived UAF success or severe Western escalation (e.g., asset seizure), RF conducts a tactical nuclear weapons test or a limited, demonstrative strike in a non-critical area within Ukraine (e.g., a deserted training ground or remote forest) to force negotiations on RF terms and drastically alter the geopolitical landscape. Confidence: LOW (but extreme impact), due to Gurulyov's statement.
    2. Large-Scale Cyberattack & Internet Shutdown Against Ukraine or Critical Western Infrastructure: Leveraging its preparations for internet isolation, RF conducts a devastating cyberattack designed to collapse Ukraine's national internet infrastructure or a significant portion of critical infrastructure in a key Western supporting nation, seeking to cripple support and sow chaos without direct kinetic engagement. Confidence: MEDIUM

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

• Ukrainian force posture and readiness:
  • Resilient Defense & Adaptable Air Defense: UAF demonstrates continued resilience in defending against RF drone attacks, with successful intercepts reported. This indicates effective air defense capabilities and responsiveness.
  • Unwavering Political Will: Leadership statements from President Zelenskyy and SBU Head Maliuk reinforce a strong, determined stance against RF aggression, likely bolstering national morale and unity.
  • Active Diplomatic Outreach: Continued high-level diplomatic engagements (Sweden, EU) are crucial for securing ongoing military and financial support, demonstrating Ukraine's proactive approach to its defense needs.
  • Challenges in Domestic Production & Funding: The acknowledged $6B deficit for rockets highlights a significant resource constraint for scaling indigenous military production, which is critical for long-term self-sufficiency.
• Recent tactical successes or setbacks:
  • Successes:
    • Air Defense Effectiveness: Interception of 12 enemy drones (STERNENKO) indicates continued proficiency in defending against UAV threats. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Diplomatic Momentum: Productive discussions with Sweden on defense projects and the EU initiating new sanctions packages represent diplomatic successes in maintaining and expanding international support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Setbacks:
    • Persistent RF Pressure: Despite defensive successes, RF continues ground offensives on multiple axes (Siversk, Novopavlovka), requiring constant UAF commitment of resources. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Information Operations Effectiveness: RF's potent propaganda on "forced mobilization" and claims of Western equipment destruction pose challenges to Ukrainian public sentiment and international perceptions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Resource requirements and constraints:
  • Air Defense Systems & Ammunition (CRITICAL): Continued high-volume RF drone and missile attacks necessitate a constant supply of interceptor missiles and advanced short-range air defense systems to protect both frontline and deep rear areas.
  • Counter-Artillery Capabilities (CRITICAL): With RF maintaining ground pressure, sustained and effective counter-battery fire is essential. This requires consistent artillery ammunition supply and advanced targeting systems.
  • Indigenous DIB Funding (CRITICAL): The $6B deficit for rockets and the need for increased production of long-range missiles remain paramount. Dedicated international funding and technological transfer for Ukraine's defense industrial base are crucial to achieve self-reliance.
  • Anti-Naval Capabilities (HIGH): Given RF's use of naval drones, enhanced anti-naval capabilities are required to protect Black Sea assets and coastal areas. This includes more maritime drones, coastal defense systems, and ISR.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

• Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:
  • RF Objectives:
    • Psychological Deterrence (Nuclear): General Gurulyov's explicit nuclear threat is a high-impact psychological operation aimed at terrifying the Ukrainian population and deterring Western support by emphasizing existential risks.
    • Demoralization & Division (Mobilization): The "Mogilizatsiya" narrative propagated by RF sources ("Colonelcassad") is designed to sow fear, resentment, and division within Ukrainian society regarding mobilization efforts.
    • Undermining Western Aid (Leopard 2): Claims of destroying Western equipment like the Leopard 2 tank aim to reduce the perceived effectiveness of Western military aid and discourage further provisions.
    • Legitimizing Occupation: Kirienko's visit to "liberated territories" is a direct attempt to legitimize RF control and normalize occupation through narrative.
    • Internal Control (Internet Whitelist): The "whitelist" of internet services for offline access indicates RF's ongoing efforts to control information flow and prepare for potential internet isolation, limiting dissent.
  • UAF Counter-Narratives:
    • Resolve & Resilience: Statements from President Zelenskyy and SBU Head Maliuk actively counter RF's demoralization efforts by demonstrating unwavering determination and commitment to victory.
    • Highlighting International Support: Zelenskyy's meeting with the Swedish Foreign Minister and the EU's move towards new sanctions highlight continued international solidarity and material support, directly countering RF's attempts to fracture unity.
    • Military Effectiveness: Reports of successful drone intercepts reinforce UAF's operational effectiveness against RF threats.
• Public sentiment and morale factors:
  • Ukrainian Public (RESILIENT, but STRESSED): While UAF's defensive successes and leadership's firm stance will bolster morale, the explicit nuclear threats and continued RF ground pressure create significant stress and uncertainty. RF's mobilization propaganda is designed to exploit any existing anxieties. Internal issues like alleged corruption (Mykolaiv boilers) could erode public trust if not addressed transparently.
  • Russian Public (MANAGED, but POTENTIALLY STIRRED): RF's tight control over the internet and information flow is likely maintaining a managed level of support. However, extreme rhetoric (nuclear threats) could either galvanize hardliners or create unease among the broader population, depending on how it's perceived. The narrative of "liberated territories" aims to reinforce a sense of achievement and justification for the war.
• International support and diplomatic developments:
  • Continued, but Conditional, Support: While new EU sanctions are positive, statements like Slovenia's conditional troop deployment highlight the limits and conditions of some international military support. This fragmentation could be exploited by RF.
  • Increased Vigilance on Eastern Flank: Poland's "special measures" for Zapad-2025 and NATO ISR activities demonstrate heightened concern and readiness on the Eastern Flank in anticipation of RF provocations.
  • Focus on Hybrid Threats: The EU's work on sanctions and discussions on troop deployments suggest an international focus on both economic pressure and potential hybrid escalations from RF.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

• Most likely enemy courses of action (MLCOA):

  1. Sustained, Attritional Ground Offensives with Emphasis on New Axes: RF will continue methodical, attritional ground assaults in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts (e.g., area of Novoselivka/Novoselovka, Siversk, Novopavlovka), aiming to wear down UAF defenses and exploit any weaknesses. RF will simultaneously reinforce political-administrative control in newly seized territories. Confidence: HIGH
  2. Intensified Hybrid Warfare and Nuclear Coercion: RF will amplify highly escalatory rhetoric, including explicit nuclear threats, coupled with increased cyberattacks and border provocations against Ukraine and potentially NATO's Eastern Flank during the "Zapad-2025" exercises, designed to coerce and deter. Confidence: HIGH
  3. Expanded Naval Drone Operations in Black Sea: RF will increase its use of naval drones for reconnaissance and targeting in the Black Sea to counter UAF naval assets and disrupt maritime activity. Confidence: MEDIUM

• Most dangerous enemy courses of action (MDCOA):

  1. Tactical Nuclear Demonstration: Given the public statements by RF officials, a low-yield tactical nuclear demonstration (either a test or a strike in an unpopulated area of Ukraine) remains a low-probability, but extremely high-impact, MDCOA to fundamentally alter the conflict. Confidence: LOW (but extreme impact)
  2. Coordinated Hybrid Attack against NATO Critical Infrastructure: Leveraging the Zapad-2025 timeframe, RF orchestrates a significant, multi-domain hybrid attack (e.g., large-scale cyber-physical attack, sabotage against energy or communications infrastructure) against a NATO member state on the Eastern Flank, designed to test Article 5 and create severe disruption without direct kinetic military engagement. Confidence: MEDIUM

• Timeline estimates and decision points:

  • Immediate (0-24 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Continue probing attacks on newly opened axes in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia. Assess impact of nuclear rhetoric.
    • UAF Decision Point: Publicly condemn RF nuclear threats. Expedite defensive measures against naval drones in the Black Sea. Increase ISR on RF force movements in Siversk/Novopavlovka directions.
    • International Decision Point: NATO and EU states to issue strong, unified condemnations of RF nuclear rhetoric and coordinate a response.
  • Short-Term (24-72 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Evaluate Western response to nuclear threats; tailor further IO accordingly. Continue "Zapad-2025" preparations with potential for increased border incidents.
    • UAF Decision Point: Actively counter RF "Mogilizatsiya" narratives with transparent communication on mobilization. Intensify diplomatic efforts for DIB funding and air defense.
    • International Decision Point: EU to make progress on the new sanctions package. Member states to coordinate responses to potential Zapad-2025 provocations.
  • Mid-Term (1-2 weeks):
    • RF Decision Point: Execute "Zapad-2025" exercises, potentially incorporating more aggressive hybrid scenarios. Consolidate gains and administrative control in occupied Ukrainian territories.
    • UAF Decision Point: Implement enhanced anti-corruption measures to maintain public trust. Integrate new Western military aid (if secured) and indigenous production into operational planning.
    • International Decision Point: NATO to reassess its Eastern Flank posture post-Zapad-2025. Countries with conditional troop deployment stances (e.g., Slovenia) may engage in further discussions.

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Immediate Public Diplomacy to Counter Nuclear Coercion: Ukraine, supported by its allies, must immediately launch a robust, multi-channel public diplomacy campaign to unequivocally condemn RF's nuclear threats, highlight their irresponsibility, and reaffirm international resolve against nuclear blackmail. This should include direct engagement with key international partners to solidify a unified response. (CRITICAL)
2. Enhanced Air Defense for Frontline and Deep Rear: Prioritize the deployment of additional mobile air defense systems and anti-drone capabilities to units operating on the Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Siversk, and Novopavlovka axes, as well as to protect critical infrastructure in cities like Sumy and Odesa, anticipating continued RF air and drone attacks. (CRITICAL)
3. Proactive Information Counter-Narrative on Mobilization and Western Aid: Develop and widely disseminate clear, factual information on Ukrainian mobilization efforts, addressing RF disinformation campaigns directly. Simultaneously, highlight the proven effectiveness of Western military aid through verified battle damage assessments and operational successes. (HIGH)
4. Accelerate Black Sea Maritime Security: Expedite the acquisition and deployment of additional maritime drones, coastal defense systems, and enhanced ISR capabilities to detect and neutralize RF naval drone threats in the Black Sea, particularly around critical port infrastructure. (HIGH)
5. Strengthen Internal Governance and Transparency: Publicly commit to and actively pursue investigations into reported corruption (e.g., Mykolaiv boiler contracts). Transparently addressing internal challenges is vital for maintaining public trust and national unity amidst ongoing conflict and RF IO efforts. (MEDIUM)

//END REPORT//