Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 051230Z SEP 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: RF ground offensive in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts continues to be a primary concern, with RF forces reinforcing pressure on Velikomikhailovka and Orikhiv following claimed "liberations" of Novoselivka (Dnipropetrovsk) and Novoselovka (Zaporizhzhia). RF has also claimed the liberation of Markovo and Fedorovka in DNR, indicating continued ground pressure in the Donetsk sector. TASS further clarifies the RF advance from Markovo is "towards Kramatorsk." Intense ground operations persist on the Kupyansk-Sieversk axis, with RF pushing for control of Kupyansk. RF deep strikes continue to target Ukrainian energy and defense industries (Khmelnytskyi, Sumy, Lozova, Dnipro, Odesa), leading to civilian casualties and significant infrastructure damage. A ballistic missile strike in Chernihiv Oblast against a humanitarian demining mission has been confirmed. Air defense remains challenged by high-volume, multi-vector drone attacks, particularly in Dnipro, Sumy, and Chernihiv Oblasts. UAF is actively defending across all axes, launching deep strikes on RF territory (Ryazan oil refinery, Anapa radar, Luhansk oil depot), and conducting successful special operations in the Black Sea. Diplomatic activity remains high, with Ukraine seeking accelerated security guarantees and RF attempting to fracture Western unity through information operations. NATO ISR activity near Kaliningrad/Belarus border indicates heightened regional vigilance. The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (DPSU) warns of potential provocations during the upcoming "Zapad-2025" exercises.

• NEW DEVELOPMENTS (1200Z - 1230Z SEP 25):

  • UAF Counter-Offensive (Zaporizhzhia - Mala Tokmachka): UAF 118th Separate Mechanized Brigade successfully repelled a Russian assault on Mala Tokmachka. Drone footage indicates damaged RF military vehicles and troop movements. This is a critical defensive success amidst RF pressure in Zaporizhzhia. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Deep Strike Confirmation (Ryazan Oil Refinery, Luhansk Ammunition Depot): UAF General Staff and ASTRA (RF source) confirm strikes on the Ryazan Oil Refinery and an ammunition depot in Luhansk. This corroborates previous UAF claims and signifies successful long-range targeting of RF logistics and strategic infrastructure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Drone Resupply (77th Separate Aeromobile Brigade): The 77th Separate Aeromobile Brigade received a DJI Mavic 3 Enterprise drone, expressing gratitude for its importance in combat missions and reconnaissance. This reinforces reliance on external support for critical drone assets. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Long-Range Missile Development: President Zelenskyy reiterates positive test results for Ukraine's long-range missile development. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Information Control (Telegram/WhatsApp): Peskov stated that Telegram and WhatsApp "must remain" in Russia, signaling an intent to maintain some communication channels while likely strengthening state control. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Response to Asset Seizure (UK): RF Embassy to UK stated that Britain's provision of funds to Ukraine from frozen Russian assets is "theft" and "will not remain unanswered." This signals potential for retaliatory actions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • International Diplomacy (Finland): Finnish President Stubb stated Finland will not send troops to Ukraine but is ready to provide support, similar to Croatia's stance. This indicates a consistent position among some EU/NATO members regarding direct military deployment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • International Diplomacy (India): India officially rejected Trump's demand to stop buying Russian oil. This indicates continued economic support for Russia from key non-Western partners. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • International Diplomacy (Fico/Costa Meeting): Slovak PM Fico met with European Council President Costa at the Ukrainian border. This could be related to regional cooperation, humanitarian aid, or security discussions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Poland "Special Measures" for Zapad-2025: TASS reports Polish PM Tusk stated Poland is preparing "special measures" for Belarus in case of provocations during "Zapad-2025" exercises. This highlights heightened tensions and preparedness on the NATO eastern flank. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF IO (Language Conflict): "Operation Z" amplified a video depicting a "language scandal" in Sloviansk, aiming to fuel internal divisions and portray UAF personnel negatively. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Internal Security (Kaliningrad): A court in Kaliningrad upheld the arrest of lawyer Maria Bontsler, indicating ongoing internal suppressive measures in RF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Humanitarian Appeal (Funds): "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" reported collecting funds, indicating ongoing reliance on public donations to support military efforts, possibly for specific units or needs. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Concealment: The ongoing transition to autumn, with reduced foliage, continues to impact concealment for ground forces and covert drone operations. RF's ability to detect UAF drone launch preparations (Chernihiv, previous report) is amplified by this.
• Visibility: Clearer skies, often associated with autumn weather, would favor air reconnaissance and drone operations for both sides. The successful drone operation by UAF's 77th Separate Aeromobile Brigade (receiving a Mavic 3) highlights continued reliance on visual ISR.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF:
  • Ground Forces: Continue offensive operations, with a significant repelled assault on Mala Tokmachka indicating ongoing pressure in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Maintaining pressure on multiple axes.
  • Air Assets: Sustained use of drones and missiles for deep strikes, targeting critical infrastructure and logistics.
  • Information Operations (IO): Intensifying efforts to control domestic narratives (Telegram/WhatsApp statements, internal arrests), project strength (fundraising appeals, "Zapad-2025" posturing), and sow division within Ukraine and among international partners (language scandal, blaming West for conflict stagnation).
  • Diplomacy/Sanctions: Asserting that frozen asset use is "theft" and will be met with "unanswered" actions, indicating potential for retaliatory measures against Western interests.
• UAF:
  • Defensive Posture: Successfully repelled a major RF assault on Mala Tokmachka (118th OMBR), demonstrating effective defensive capabilities and unit cohesion.
  • Offensive Capabilities: Confirmed deep strikes on Ryazan Oil Refinery and Luhansk ammunition depot, demonstrating continued long-range precision strike capabilities. Continued development of indigenous long-range missiles for future offensive depth.
  • Resource Management: Continues to rely on a mix of domestic production, international aid, and public donations for critical equipment like drones.
  • Diplomatic Strategy: Maintaining a firm stance on peace, while actively engaging in discussions regarding potential international troop deployments for security roles.
• International:
  • NATO/Poland: Heightened vigilance and preparations for "special measures" in response to potential provocations from "Zapad-2025" exercises underscore a hardening stance on the Eastern Flank.
  • EU/International Support: Finland's and Croatia's consistent stance against direct troop deployment highlights a nuanced approach within the international community, balancing support for Ukraine with avoidance of direct conflict with Russia.
  • Economic Front: India's continued purchase of RF oil mitigates the impact of Western sanctions, allowing RF to sustain its war economy.
  • Legal Front: The RF threat of "unanswered" actions regarding frozen assets signals a potential for further legal or economic retaliatory measures by Russia against Western nations.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:

  • Persistent Ground Offensive: RF maintains the capability to conduct sustained ground offensives across multiple axes, despite facing significant resistance, as evidenced by the assault on Mala Tokmachka.
  • Long-Range Strike & Logistics Interdiction: RF continues to conduct deep strikes using UAVs and missiles, targeting UAF defense industries and logistics.
  • Robust Information & Cyber Warfare: RF demonstrates sophisticated capabilities in controlling domestic information, generating diverse propaganda narratives, and potentially engaging in cyber-attacks (implied by "unanswered" actions rhetoric regarding frozen assets).
  • Economic Resilience: Continued oil sales to countries like India underscore RF's ability to sustain its war economy despite sanctions.
  • Escalatory Diplomacy/Threat Signaling: RF is adept at using diplomatic channels and official statements to signal potential for retaliation and raise tensions.

• Intentions:

  • Sustain Ground Pressure and Seize Key Terrain: RF intends to continue offensive operations, particularly in Zaporizhzhia, to consolidate control over claimed territories and achieve strategic objectives in the Donbas.
  • Degrade UAF Military & Economic Capacity: RF aims to disrupt UAF logistics, command & control, and defense industrial base through deep strikes.
  • Deter Western Support & Exploit Divisions: RF will intensify efforts to deter further Western military aid, particularly regarding the use of frozen assets, and exploit any perceived divisions within the Western alliance or within Ukraine (e.g., language issues).
  • Project Strength & Maintain Internal Control: RF seeks to project an image of strength and unwavering resolve both domestically and internationally, while maintaining tight control over information to prevent dissent.
  • Preempt & Retaliate: RF intends to take retaliatory measures against perceived Western aggression (e.g., asset seizure), although the nature and timing remain uncertain.

• Courses of Action (COAs):

  • MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action):
    1. Continued Multi-Axis Ground Offensives: RF will continue to probe and assault UAF defensive lines, particularly in Zaporizhzhia (e.g., Mala Tokmachka area) and on the Kramatorsk axis, seeking breakthroughs and attrition of UAF forces. Confidence: HIGH
    2. Increased IO Campaign to Delegitimize Ukraine & Divide Allies: RF will amplify narratives portraying Ukraine as internally divided and Western support as faltering (e.g., language scandal, differences on troop deployments, asset seizure "theft"), while simultaneously promoting the narrative of a strong, unified Russia. Confidence: HIGH
    3. Targeted Retaliatory Measures (Non-Military) Against Western Interests: In response to the UK's use of frozen assets, RF will likely implement economic, diplomatic, or cyber retaliatory measures against the UK or other perceived hostile Western nations, rather than immediate military action. Confidence: MEDIUM

• Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

  1. Escalated Hybrid Operations on NATO Eastern Flank (Zapad-2025): Capitalizing on the "Zapad-2025" exercises and the recent Polish airspace violation, RF/Belarus could conduct a significant, deniable hybrid operation (e.g., large-scale cyber-attack against critical infrastructure in Poland/Baltics, or a highly provocative border incident using proxy forces or irregulars) to test NATO's Article 5 resolve. Confidence: HIGH
  2. Direct Military Escalation in Black Sea/Arctic: Given the confirmed strikes on RF naval assets in Crimea and the ongoing naval modernization (icebreaker), RF could undertake a more aggressive naval maneuver in the Black Sea (e.g., against Ukrainian port infrastructure, shipping, or NATO vessels) or even a provocative show of force in the Arctic to assert dominance or probe responses. Confidence: MEDIUM

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

• Ukrainian force posture and readiness:
  • Defensively Resilient: UAF demonstrates strong defensive capabilities, successfully repelling RF assaults on key positions like Mala Tokmachka, indicating high morale and effective tactical execution at the unit level.
  • Strategic Offensive Development: Continued focus on long-range missile development signifies a commitment to building a robust, indigenous strategic strike capability.
  • Persistent Resource Challenges: While receiving crucial equipment like DJI drones (77th Aeromobile Brigade), the ongoing reliance on external support and the previously reported USD 6B deficit highlight critical resource gaps in maintaining and expanding vital capabilities.
  • Active Diplomacy: Engaging international partners on troop deployments and maintaining a firm diplomatic stance showcases a proactive approach to national security and sovereignty.
• Recent tactical successes or setbacks:
  • Successes:
    • Defensive Victory (Mala Tokmachka): The 118th OMBR's successful repulsion of an RF assault on Mala Tokmachka is a significant tactical success, preventing further RF gains in a critical sector. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Confirmed Deep Strikes: Confirmed strikes on Ryazan Oil Refinery and Luhansk ammunition depot demonstrate UAF's continued ability to disrupt RF logistics and strategic assets deep within enemy territory. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Indigenous Missile Development: Continued progress in long-range missile development is a strategic success, promising enhanced future offensive capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Setbacks:
    • Persistent RF Pressure: Despite defensive successes, RF maintains continuous ground pressure across multiple axes, stretching UAF resources and necessitating constant vigilance and redeployment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Resource Deficit: The ongoing USD 6B deficit for drones and rockets, coupled with reliance on donations for some critical equipment, indicates persistent resource constraints that could hinder offensive and defensive scalability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Resource requirements and constraints:
  • Artillery and Ammunition (CRITICAL): Sustained RF ground assaults necessitate a continuous and high volume of artillery fire for defense and counter-battery operations. Replenishment of ammunition remains paramount.
  • Air Defense and Counter-UAS (CRITICAL): Given the continued RF deep strikes and drone activity, advanced mobile air defense systems and integrated counter-UAS solutions are crucial to protect frontline units, critical infrastructure, and drone launch sites.
  • Indigenous DIB Funding (CRITICAL): Immediate and significant investment in Ukraine's defense industrial base, particularly for drone and long-range missile production, is required to move beyond reliance on external donations and build sustainable self-sufficiency.
  • ISR (CRITICAL): Enhanced ISR capabilities (Mavic 3s and similar systems) are vital for effective reconnaissance, target acquisition, and battle damage assessment, especially in dynamic sectors like Zaporizhzhia.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

• Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:
  • RF Objectives:
    • Internal Control & Legitimacy: Peskov's statements on Telegram/WhatsApp, and the Kaliningrad court decision, illustrate RF's intent to control its internal information space and suppress dissent, even under the guise of public good or national security.
    • External Blame & Division: RF is actively using the "theft" narrative regarding frozen assets and the "language scandal" in Sloviansk to undermine international support for Ukraine, shift blame, and portray Ukraine as internally fractured and oppressive.
    • Project Power: Polish "special measures" for "Zapad-2025" are framed by TASS to imply RF's ability to provoke and demand responses from NATO, projecting strength.
  • UAF Counter-Narratives:
    • Military Effectiveness: Official confirmations of deep strikes on RF logistics and successful defense of Mala Tokmachka directly counter RF narratives of dominance.
    • Indigenous Strength & Resolve: Zelenskyy's statements on long-range missile development project self-reliance and national capability.
    • Highlighting International Support (Moral/Material): Videos of drone donations, even if small scale, emphasize continued popular support for UAF efforts.
    • Humanitarian Focus: The Office of the Prosecutor General's focus on child protection (returning deported children) aims to rally international support and highlight RF atrocities.
• Public sentiment and morale factors:
  • Ukrainian Public (RESILIENT, but WARY): Defensive successes and progress in indigenous weapons development will boost morale. However, the ongoing RF ground pressure, humanitarian concerns (e.g., child protection), and the persistence of language-based internal friction (as exploited by RF IO) represent challenges to national unity. The narrative around foreign troop deployment could be a morale booster if it materializes positively.
  • Russian Public (MANAGED & STEERED): RF's tight control over information (Telegram/WhatsApp rhetoric, court decisions) is intended to maintain public support and suppress dissent. Fundraising appeals by military bloggers suggest underlying needs that may not be fully met by state resources, potentially revealing vulnerabilities in public perception if not managed carefully.
• International support and diplomatic developments:
  • Complex and Fragmented Approach (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The differing stances on troop deployment (Finland, Croatia) and the reported US DMZ plan (Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia) indicate a multilateral and potentially less unified approach to military support, which RF will seek to exploit.
  • Economic Resilience & Counter-Sanction Efforts (HIGH CONFIDENCE): India's rejection of oil sanctions demonstrates RF's success in mitigating Western economic pressure, which directly impacts RF's ability to fund its war machine.
  • Heightened Regional Tensions (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Poland's preparations for "special measures" against Belarus during "Zapad-2025" signal a significant escalation of vigilance and readiness on NATO's eastern flank.
  • Legal/Economic Retaliation (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF's clear threat of "unanswered" actions regarding frozen assets indicates a new dimension of potential conflict in the financial and legal spheres.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

• Most likely enemy courses of action (MLCOA):

  1. Sustained Ground Offensives with Emphasis on Attrition: RF will continue methodical, attritional ground assaults in Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk Oblasts, aiming to wear down UAF defenses and exploit any weaknesses. The repelled assault on Mala Tokmachka indicates this will be a persistent approach. Confidence: HIGH
  2. Increased Hybrid Actions Targeting NATO Border States during "Zapad-2025": Leveraging the "Zapad-2025" exercises, RF/Belarus will conduct increased probing actions, likely involving low-level airspace violations, cyber-attacks, or border provocations, to test NATO's response and cohesion, as indicated by Poland's "special measures" statement. Confidence: HIGH
  3. Escalated Non-Military Retaliation against Western Nations: RF will likely implement targeted economic, diplomatic, or cyber-retaliatory measures against Western nations, particularly the UK, in response to the use of frozen assets, as explicitly threatened by the RF Embassy. Confidence: MEDIUM

• Most dangerous enemy courses of action (MDCOA):

  1. Significant Border Incursion by RF/Belarus during "Zapad-2025": Instead of isolated provocations, RF/Belarus could stage a larger, more coordinated, but still deniable, ground incursion into a NATO border state (e.g., Lithuania, Latvia, Poland) using proxy forces or "little green men" to test Article 5 and create a major international crisis. Confidence: MEDIUM
  2. Direct RF Military Action Against Critical Western Infrastructure (Outside Ukraine): RF could conduct a high-impact, covert (or deniable) military strike (e.g., sabotage of underwater cables, energy infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, or a cyber-physical attack) against a Western nation's critical infrastructure, in response to asset seizures or perceived Western escalation, potentially avoiding direct kinetic engagement with NATO forces. Confidence: LOW (but extreme impact)

• Timeline estimates and decision points:

  • Immediate (0-24 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Assess the failure of the Mala Tokmachka assault; potentially re-evaluate tactics or reinforce efforts in the Zaporizhzhia sector. Decide on the nature and timing of initial "unanswered" responses to UK asset use.
    • UAF Decision Point: Fortify defenses in the Mala Tokmachka area. Continue exploiting degraded RF ISR in Crimea for further strikes. Publicly highlight defensive successes and progress in indigenous missile development.
    • International Decision Point: NATO states, especially Poland, to immediately increase readiness and intelligence sharing regarding "Zapad-2025" and potential border provocations.
  • Short-Term (24-72 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Ramp up propaganda efforts regarding the "language scandal" and perceived Western economic aggression to rally domestic support and sow international discord.
    • UAF Decision Point: Intensify diplomatic engagement on the feasibility of foreign troops for security roles, leveraging Finland's stance on support despite no troop deployment. Continue urgent advocacy for indigenous DIB funding.
    • International Decision Point: Western allies to coordinate a unified response to RF threats regarding asset seizure and strengthen diplomatic efforts to counter RF IO on Ukrainian internal divisions.
  • Mid-Term (1-2 weeks):
    • RF Decision Point: Execute initial "unanswered" actions against Western interests, likely non-military. Conduct "Zapad-2025" exercises with an emphasis on hybrid warfare scenarios and potential border provocations.
    • UAF Decision Point: Integrate new indigenous long-range missile capabilities into operational planning. Secure further international commitments for air defense and DIB funding.
    • International Decision Point: Global partners to assess the effectiveness of sanctions given India's stance. NATO to evaluate "Zapad-2025" activities and adjust defense posture on the Eastern Flank as required.

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Reinforce Zaporizhzhia Defenses and Counter-Offensive Preparation: Immediately allocate additional resources (personnel, ATGM systems, artillery, EW-resistant drones) to the 118th OMBR and adjacent units in the Mala Tokmachka-Orikhiv sector to consolidate defensive gains and prepare for potential counter-offensive operations. (CRITICAL)
2. Strengthen Air Defense and Counter-UAS in Deep Rear Areas: Prioritize the deployment of mobile air defense systems and advanced counter-UAS platforms to protect critical infrastructure, particularly energy and logistics hubs, in central and western Ukraine, in anticipation of continued RF deep strikes. (CRITICAL)
3. Launch Proactive Counter-IO Campaign on RF Aggression: Initiate a robust, multi-platform counter-information campaign highlighting RF's deliberate targeting of humanitarian missions, threats of retaliation against Western assets, and manipulation of internal Ukrainian issues. Emphasize RF's reliance on external economic support (e.g., India's oil purchases). (HIGH)
4. Accelerate Indigenous Missile Program and Secure DIB Funding: Prioritize the allocation of internal and international financial resources to rapidly scale up the production and deployment of Ukraine's confirmed long-range missile systems. Develop a dedicated funding mechanism for indigenous defense industrial base growth. (CRITICAL)
5. Enhance Border Security and Intelligence Sharing with NATO Eastern Flank: Proactively share intelligence with Poland and other NATO Eastern Flank members regarding "Zapad-2025" activities and potential hybrid threats. Coordinate joint ISR missions and establish rapid response protocols for border incidents. (HIGH)

//END REPORT//