Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 051200Z SEP 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: RF ground offensive in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts continues to be a primary concern, with RF forces reinforcing pressure on Velikomikhailovka and Orikhiv following claimed "liberations" of Novoselivka (Dnipropetrovsk) and Novoselovka (Zaporizhzhia). RF has also claimed the liberation of Markovo and Fedorovka in DNR, indicating continued ground pressure in the Donetsk sector. TASS further clarifies the RF advance from Markovo is "towards Kramatorsk." Intense ground operations persist on the Kupyansk-Sieversk axis, with RF pushing for control of Kupyansk. RF deep strikes continue to target Ukrainian energy and defense industries (Khmelnytskyi, Sumy, Lozova, Dnipro, Odesa), leading to civilian casualties and significant infrastructure damage. A ballistic missile strike in Chernihiv Oblast against a humanitarian demining mission has been confirmed. Air defense remains challenged by high-volume, multi-vector drone attacks, particularly in Dnipro, Sumy, and Chernihiv Oblasts. UAF is actively defending across all axes, launching deep strikes on RF territory (Ryazan oil refinery, Anapa radar, Luhansk oil depot), and conducting successful special operations in the Black Sea. Diplomatic activity remains high, with Ukraine seeking accelerated security guarantees and RF attempting to fracture Western unity through information operations. NATO ISR activity near Kaliningrad/Belarus border indicates heightened regional vigilance. The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (DPSU) warns of potential provocations during the upcoming "Zapad-2025" exercises.

• NEW DEVELOPMENTS (1130Z - 1200Z SEP 25):

  • UAF Deep Strike (Crimea - Radar Systems): GUR MOD's Department of Active Actions successfully targeted two RF radar systems, 48Ya6-K1 "Podlyot" and 55Zh6M "NEBO-M," in occupied Crimea. Thermal imaging video evidence shows a mobile radar system being targeted. This is a significant UAF success against RF air defense and ISR capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Long-Range Missile Development: President Zelenskyy confirms Ukraine is developing long-range missiles with positive test results, signaling future offensive capabilities. He also notes a USD 6B deficit for drones and rockets, highlighting ongoing resource needs for domestic production. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Counter-Battery Fire (60th OMBR): UAF 60th Separate Mechanized Brigade "Vidarr" FPV drone operators are shown effectively engaging RF personnel and vehicles, with explosions visible. This highlights continued UAF tactical effectiveness using drones. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Deep Strike (Ryazan Oil Refinery): The Ukrainian General Staff reports successful strikes on the Ryazan Oil Refinery and other RF aggressor targets. This confirms continued UAF long-range drone/missile attacks on RF strategic infrastructure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Counter-Battery Claim (305th Guards Brigade): RF "Voin DV" posts video claiming successful counter-battery fire by the 305th Guards Brigade, showing drone footage of an engagement near a treeline. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Drone Interception Claim (Chernihiv Oblast): RF "Voin DV" claims RF air reconnaissance in Chernihiv Oblast detected UAF preparing to launch long-range attack drones from a dirt airstrip into Russian airspace. Video shows a drone strike on what appear to be UAF transport vehicles. This suggests RF is actively monitoring and preempting UAF cross-border drone operations. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Recruitment (Special Forces): Kotsnews shares a recruitment advertisement for the Russian special forces unit "Vityaz," offering 5.5 million rubles for the first year of service. This indicates ongoing RF efforts to attract and retain specialized military personnel. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Internal Affairs (Internet Control): ASTRA reports that the Russian Ministry of Digital Development (MinTsifry) presented a preliminary "white list" of online resources that will function even if the internet is shut down. This confirms continued state control over information access and resilience measures. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Narrative (Ukraine Peace Efforts): "Operation Z" amplifies CNN report claiming Putin and Trump agree Europe is to blame for the stagnation in peace efforts on Ukraine. This is an RF IO effort to sow discord and shift blame. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Demographics (Natalist Policy): TASS reports a 1 million ruble payment for a third child is included in a "demographic menu" for regions with low birth rates. This indicates long-term RF demographic concerns and attempts to stimulate population growth, likely to replenish human resources. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Naval Development: Kotsnews reports the icebreaker "Ivan Papanin" has been delivered to the fleet. While not directly conflict-related, this indicates ongoing RF naval modernization and Arctic capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Diplomatic Stance (Zelenskyy on Peace): President Zelenskyy reiterates he will not give Putin "any percentage" to accuse Ukraine of unwillingness to make peace, maintaining a firm diplomatic stance. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Diplomacy (Foreign Troops): President Zelenskyy discusses the potential for "thousands" of foreign troops to be deployed to Ukraine for security, signaling a potential shift in international military assistance. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • US DMZ Plan (Reported): NBC News, amplified by "Tsapliyenko_Ukraine Fights" and "Operation Z," reports the US is considering a plan for a demilitarized zone in Ukraine monitored by US intelligence assets, with Saudi or Bangladeshi troops potentially acting as stabilization forces. This is a speculative but significant diplomatic development. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  • Croatia Troops (Rejection): TASS reports Croatian Defense Minister Ivan Anusic states Croatia will not send troops to Ukraine, even in case of a ceasefire. This indicates limits to direct military involvement from some NATO/EU members. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Treatment of Wounded UAF: Colonelcassad posts a video from RF "West" group assault troops in Kharkiv Oblast, claiming they provided aid to a wounded UAF 43rd Brigade soldier abandoned by comrades. This is an RF IO attempt to portray humanitarianism and discredit UAF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Social Support (Children to Montenegro): The Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reports 18 Ukrainian children from Zaporizhzhia Oblast visited Montenegro as part of the "People of the Future" project. This highlights ongoing efforts to support war-affected civilians. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Drone Resupply: Colonelcassad shares a video of four masked Ukrainian soldiers from the 80th Separate Air Assault Brigade and "Katyusha" territorial defense battalion receiving DJI drones and aid, expressing gratitude. This confirms continued reliance on and resupply of commercial drones for UAF units. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Weather: Previous reports indicate the impending loss of foliage, which will reduce natural concealment for ground forces. The current RF claims of detecting UAF drone launch preparations in Chernihiv Oblast further emphasize the impact of reduced cover on covert operations.
• Environmental Impact: Continued combat operations, including drone strikes and artillery (as evidenced by RF counter-battery claims and UAF FPV engagements), contribute to localized environmental degradation. The destruction of radar systems in Crimea, while a military success, creates localized debris and potential hazardous waste.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF:
  • Ground Forces: Continue offensive operations in Donetsk (Kramatorsk axis), Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia. Demonstrated counter-battery capabilities (305th Guards Brigade) and active monitoring/interdiction of UAF drone activities in border regions (Chernihiv). Paratrooper units continue to be a visible part of the force (recruitment ads, training videos).
  • Air Assets: Ongoing use of reconnaissance and strike drones, evidenced by pre-emptive strikes against UAF drone launch sites.
  • Naval Assets: Icebreaker "Ivan Papanin" delivered to the fleet, indicating long-term naval development.
  • Internal Security & Mobilization: Actively recruiting special forces personnel, possibly to address manpower shortfalls and specialized needs. Intensifying internet controls (MinTsifry whitelist) to manage information. Implementing natalist policies to address long-term demographic decline.
  • Control Measures: High reliance on IO to influence narratives (e.g., blaming Europe for peace stagnation, portraying humanitarian treatment of UAF wounded) and justify actions.
• UAF:
  • Offensive & Defensive Posture: Conducting successful deep strikes against RF ISR in Crimea and strategic infrastructure (Ryazan oil refinery). Actively engaging RF ground forces with FPV drones (60th OMBR). Maintaining a firm diplomatic stance on peace negotiations.
  • Indigenous Capabilities: Confirmed development of long-range missiles, a significant enhancement to future offensive capabilities. Continued reliance on and resupply of commercial drones for frontline units (80th Air Assault Brigade).
  • Diplomatic Engagement: President Zelenskyy discussing potential for foreign troop deployment signals proactive diplomatic efforts to bolster security. Actively countering RF narratives.
  • Civilian Support: Ongoing efforts to support war-affected children (Zaporizhzhia children to Montenegro).
• International:
  • US DMZ Plan (Reported): Discussion of a potential DMZ with non-NATO stabilization forces (Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh) indicates a complex, evolving diplomatic landscape for post-conflict or de-escalation scenarios. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  • Croatia: Rejection of troop deployment to Ukraine highlights potential divisions within NATO/EU regarding direct military intervention. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:

  • Integrated Multi-Domain Operations: RF continues to demonstrate capabilities in integrating ground offensives, multi-domain strikes (drones, missiles), and preemptive interdiction (e.g., against UAF drone launches).
  • Adaptive C-UAS: RF is actively using aerial reconnaissance to detect and disrupt UAF drone launch preparations, indicating an evolving counter-UAS strategy.
  • Persistent Information Warfare: RF maintains a highly active and sophisticated IO apparatus, capable of generating diverse narratives to influence both domestic and international audiences, exploiting existing divisions.
  • Long-Term Demographic/Force Generation: RF is implementing policies to address long-term demographic challenges and actively recruiting for specialized units, indicating a sustained commitment to military modernization and manpower.
  • Naval Modernization: Continued delivery of specialized vessels (icebreakers) reflects broader strategic naval development.

• Intentions:

  • Maintain Offensive Momentum & Secure Key Terrain: RF intends to continue its ground offensives, particularly towards Kramatorsk and in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia, aiming for territorial gains and consolidation of control.
  • Degrade UAF Offensive & ISR Capabilities: RF aims to disrupt UAF deep strike capabilities (as seen in Chernihiv Oblast against drone launches) and degrade overall ISR.
  • Shape International Narrative & Exploit Divisions: RF will intensify efforts to blame Western actors for conflict stagnation and exploit any perceived divisions within the Western alliance to weaken support for Ukraine.
  • Reinforce Domestic Support & Long-Term Sustainment: RF will continue to project strength through recruitment campaigns and address long-term demographic challenges to ensure sustained military capacity.
  • Assert Sovereignty Over Claimed Territories: Continued strikes and operations in areas like Crimea reinforce RF claims and attempt to deter UAF counter-offensives.

• Courses of Action (COAs):

  • MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action):
    1. Continued Ground Assaults and Consolidation: RF will sustain pressure on the Kramatorsk axis and in the Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia regions, aiming to consolidate recent gains and force UAF into a defensive posture. This will be supported by tactical drone use and artillery. Confidence: HIGH
    2. Intensified Counter-UAS and Preemptive Strikes in Border Regions: RF will increase ISR and preemptive strikes against UAF drone launch sites, particularly in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts, to disrupt UAF cross-border operations as foliage cover diminishes. Confidence: HIGH
    3. Aggressive Information Warfare & Recruitment Drives: RF will amplify narratives blaming Western actors for the conflict and promote recruitment campaigns for specialized military personnel (e.g., "Vityaz" special forces) to sustain its war effort and manage public perception. Confidence: HIGH

• Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

  1. Escalated Hybrid Operations Targeting US/NATO Allies: Capitalizing on the reported US DMZ plan (even if speculative), RF could conduct a significant, deniable hybrid operation (e.g., large-scale cyber-attack, sabotage on critical infrastructure, or a highly provocative border incident with a NATO ally) to test alliance cohesion and sow further discord, potentially linked to the upcoming "Zapad-2025" exercises. Confidence: MEDIUM
  2. Direct Naval Action in Black Sea/Baltic: Given the icebreaker delivery and ongoing naval modernization, RF could undertake a more aggressive naval maneuver in the Black Sea (against Ukrainian port infrastructure or shipping) or Baltic Sea (against NATO maritime assets) to assert dominance or probe responses. Confidence: LOW (but severe impact)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

• Ukrainian force posture and readiness:
  • Adaptive Offensive & Defensive: UAF demonstrates continued adaptation and offensive capability through successful deep strikes against RF radar in Crimea and strategic targets like the Ryazan oil refinery. Tactical drone units (60th OMBR) are effectively engaging RF ground forces.
  • Long-Term Strategic Development: President Zelenskyy's confirmation of long-range missile development highlights Ukraine's commitment to enhancing its indigenous defense industrial base and long-range strike capabilities.
  • Robust Diplomatic Stance: Zelenskyy's firm stance on peace negotiations and his discussions on foreign troop deployments showcase an active and determined diplomatic posture.
  • Challenges: The USD 6B deficit for drones and rockets indicates a critical resource constraint for maintaining and expanding these vital capabilities. UAF units continue to rely on external and non-governmental drone procurement.
• Recent tactical successes or setbacks:
  • Successes:
    • High-Value Target Neutralization (Crimea): GUR's successful strike on two advanced RF radar systems (48Ya6-K1 "Podlyot" and 55Zh6M "NEBO-M") in Crimea significantly degrades RF air defense and ISR in the region. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Effective Deep Strikes: Successful strikes on the Ryazan Oil Refinery demonstrate UAF's ability to project force deep into RF territory, disrupting logistics and oil refining capacity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Tactical Drone Dominance: UAF 60th OMBR's effective use of FPV drones against RF personnel and vehicles highlights continued tactical proficiency. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Strategic Capability Development: Confirmation of long-range missile development is a major strategic success for Ukraine's long-term defense. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Setbacks:
    • Continued RF Ground Pressure: RF's sustained offensive towards Kramatorsk and in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia continues to exert pressure on UAF defensive lines and may necessitate strategic withdrawals or redeployments. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Resource Deficit for DIB: The USD 6B deficit for drones and rockets highlights a significant funding gap for critical indigenous defense capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Preemptive Actions: RF claims of interdicting UAF drone launch preparations in Chernihiv indicate UAF's cross-border strike capabilities are under observation and at risk of preemption. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• Resource requirements and constraints:
  • Air Defense & Counter-UAS (CRITICAL): Continued RF missile and drone activity (and preemptive actions) necessitate further, sophisticated air defense assets and advanced counter-UAS systems, especially for mobile and border units.
  • Indigenous DIB Funding (CRITICAL): The USD 6B deficit for drones and rockets requires immediate attention to ensure the sustainable development and mass production of critical indigenous systems.
  • Ground Reinforcements (CRITICAL): Maintaining defense against RF's multi-axis offensive requires continuous reinforcement of ground units with armored vehicles, artillery, and trained personnel, particularly on the Kramatorsk and Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia axes.
  • ISR & EW Capabilities (HIGH): Enhanced ISR is needed to detect and counter RF preemptive actions against UAF drone launches. Advanced EW capabilities are vital to counter RF counter-UAS efforts.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

• Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:
  • RF Objectives:
    • Shift Blame & Create Divisions: The narrative of Putin and Trump agreeing to blame Europe for peace stagnation is a clear attempt to fracture Western unity and deflect from RF's own role.
    • Portray Humanitarianism & Discredit UAF: The video claiming RF aid to a wounded UAF soldier abandoned by comrades is designed to undermine UAF morale and portray RF forces as humane.
    • Boost Domestic Morale & Recruitment: Recruitment ads for special forces with attractive salaries and showcasing naval modernization aim to boost internal morale and attract volunteers.
    • Control Information Space: MinTsifry's "whitelist" for internet access during shutdowns reinforces state control over information.
    • Long-term Demographic Sustainment: Natalist policies demonstrate a strategic outlook to ensure future manpower for conflicts.
  • UAF Counter-Narratives:
    • Demonstrate Military Effectiveness: Videos of successful GUR strikes on radar systems and 60th OMBR drone engagements directly counter RF claims of dominance.
    • Highlight Indigenous Capability: Zelenskyy's statements on long-range missile development project strength and self-reliance.
    • Maintain Diplomatic Resolve: Zelenskyy's firm stance on peace negotiations counters RF accusations of unwillingness.
    • Showcase Resilience & Support: News of Zaporizhzhia children visiting Montenegro highlights humanitarian efforts and international support for Ukrainian civilians.
• Public sentiment and morale factors:
  • Ukrainian Public (RESILIENT, but under pressure): News of successful deep strikes and long-range missile development will boost morale. However, ongoing RF ground offensives and resource deficits remain concerns. The potential for large-scale foreign troop presence (if it materializes) could significantly impact public confidence.
  • Russian Public (MANAGED, but with undercurrents): RF IO efforts aim to project success, humanitarianism, and strength. Recruitment campaigns with high salaries indicate a need to incentivize service, potentially masking underlying public reluctance or demographic challenges. Internet controls reflect an ongoing need to manage public sentiment and prevent dissent.
• International support and diplomatic developments:
  • Complex Diplomatic Landscape (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The reported US DMZ plan, involving non-NATO troops, suggests an evolving, multi-faceted approach to de-escalation or post-conflict scenarios, with potential for both international cooperation and new complexities.
  • Divisions on Direct Intervention (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Croatia's refusal to send troops underscores that not all Western allies are aligned on direct military intervention, creating potential fissures for RF to exploit.
  • Continued Western Alignment vs. RF Blame Games: While RF attempts to blame Europe for peace stagnation, the broader international community largely remains aligned in support of Ukraine. However, RF's IO aims to erode this.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

• Most likely enemy courses of action (MLCOA):

  1. Sustained Multi-Front Ground Offensives: RF will maintain offensive pressure on the Kramatorsk axis and in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia, aiming to expand territorial control. Counter-battery fire and tactical drone usage will be integral to these operations. Confidence: HIGH
  2. Increased Preemptive Strikes against UAF Deep Strike Capabilities: RF will intensify aerial reconnaissance and strikes against identified UAF drone launch sites and logistics hubs, particularly those facilitating cross-border attacks or operations in contested areas, as seen in Chernihiv Oblast. Confidence: HIGH
  3. Aggressive Information Operations Targeting International Unity and Ukrainian Morale: RF will amplify narratives blaming the West for the conflict, highlight perceived UAF weaknesses or atrocities (e.g., abandoning wounded), and continue robust recruitment campaigns to bolster its forces. Confidence: HIGH

• Most dangerous enemy courses of action (MDCOA):

  1. Escalated Hybrid Operations on NATO Eastern Flank: Leveraging the upcoming "Zapad-2025" exercises, and building on the Polish airspace violation and Belarusian "spy" incident, RF/Belarus could stage a significant, deniable hybrid operation (e.g., large-scale cyber-attack, sabotage of critical infrastructure, or a larger border incursion using proxy forces) against a NATO member to test alliance resolve and create significant regional instability. Confidence: MEDIUM
  2. Provocation Leading to Direct Engagement in Black Sea: Given the confirmed strikes on RF naval assets in Crimea, RF could react with a highly aggressive naval maneuver, potentially engaging UAF or international shipping in the Black Sea, escalating maritime tensions. Confidence: LOW (but severe impact)

• Timeline estimates and decision points:

  • Immediate (0-24 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Assess the impact of UAF deep strikes on Crimean radar systems and Ryazan oil refinery. Adjust air defense and counter-UAS posture accordingly, potentially initiating retaliatory strikes.
    • UAF Decision Point: Capitalize on the success of radar strikes in Crimea to enable further offensive operations or reconnaissance missions in the Black Sea. Prioritize defense against anticipated RF retaliatory strikes.
    • International Decision Point: NATO to maintain high vigilance over Black Sea and Eastern Flank due to potential RF retaliation and "Zapad-2025" exercises.
  • Short-Term (24-72 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Continue exploiting ground gains, particularly on the Kramatorsk axis. Intensify "buffer zone" operations in border areas as foliage disappears.
    • UAF Decision Point: Publicly articulate the significance of long-range missile development, potentially seeking accelerated international support for its indigenous DIB to address the USD 6B deficit.
    • International Decision Point: Diplomatic discussions regarding the reported US DMZ plan may intensify, requiring coordinated responses from allies on the feasibility and implications.
  • Mid-Term (1-2 weeks):
    • RF Decision Point: Integrate new recruits from ongoing special forces campaigns and assess the effectiveness of natalist policies on long-term force generation. Fully utilize "Zapad-2025" for training and potential limited provocations.
    • UAF Decision Point: Continue developing and fielding indigenous long-range strike capabilities. Prepare for more direct diplomatic engagement on the deployment of foreign troops to bolster Ukraine's security.
    • International Decision Point: Western allies to consider concrete measures to support Ukraine's indigenous defense industry, including financial aid and technology transfer, particularly for drone and missile production, to counter RF's sustained military efforts.

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Leverage Crimean Radar Strikes for Offensive Advantage: Immediately task UAF Air Force and GUR to exploit the degraded RF ISR and air defense capabilities in Crimea. Plan and execute follow-on deep strikes against high-value targets in the region or prepare for potential air/sea operations with reduced RF detection capability.
2. Expedite Funding and Support for Indigenous Long-Range Capabilities: Work with international partners to secure immediate funding and technical assistance to address the USD 6B deficit for drone and rocket production. Prioritize scaling up manufacturing of confirmed long-range missile systems and EW-resistant drones.
3. Publicly Counter RF Demographic and Recruitment Narratives: Launch a comprehensive counter-information campaign highlighting the human cost of RF's war and the exploitation of its own population (e.g., recruitment of individuals with health issues, high casualty rates). Contrast this with UAF's professional development and international support.
4. Enhance Multi-Domain Protection for UAF Drone Assets: Implement enhanced camouflage, hardened shelters, and mobile air defense/counter-UAS systems for UAF drone launch and control sites, particularly in border regions, to mitigate RF preemptive strike capabilities.
5. Diplomatic Outreach on Foreign Troop Deployment: Intensify diplomatic efforts to formalize discussions and secure commitments from willing international partners for the deployment of foreign troops, focusing on air defense, training, and logistical support roles to free up UAF combat units for frontline operations.

//END REPORT//