Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 051130Z SEP 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: RF ground offensive in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts continues to be a primary concern, with RF forces reinforcing pressure on Velikomikhailovka and Orikhiv following claimed "liberations" of Novoselivka (Dnipropetrovsk) and Novoselovka (Zaporizhzhia). RF has also claimed the liberation of Markovo and Fedorovka in DNR, indicating continued ground pressure in the Donetsk sector. TASS further clarifies the RF advance from Markovo is "towards Kramatorsk." Intense ground operations persist on the Kupyansk-Sieversk axis, with RF pushing for control of Kupyansk. RF deep strikes continue to target Ukrainian energy and defense industries (Khmelnytskyi, Sumy, Lozova, Dnipro, Odesa), leading to civilian casualties and significant infrastructure damage. A ballistic missile strike in Chernihiv Oblast against a humanitarian demining mission has been confirmed. Air defense remains challenged by high-volume, multi-vector drone attacks, particularly in Dnipro, Sumy, and Chernihiv Oblasts. UAF is actively defending across all axes, launching deep strikes on RF territory (Ryazan oil refinery, Anapa radar, Luhansk oil depot), and conducting successful special operations in the Black Sea. Diplomatic activity remains high, with Ukraine seeking accelerated security guarantees and RF attempting to fracture Western unity through information operations. NATO ISR activity near Kaliningrad/Belarus border indicates heightened regional vigilance. The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (DPSU) warns of potential provocations during the upcoming "Zapad-2025" exercises.

• NEW DEVELOPMENTS (1100Z - 1130Z SEP 25):

  • RF Ground Operations (Donetsk Sector - Kramatorsk Direction): TASS, citing Russian security forces, reports that the RF Armed Forces, after liberating Markovo in DNR, "made a dash towards Kramatorsk." This significantly clarifies RF intent and direction of attack in the Donetsk region. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Air Attacks (Odesa Oblast): "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" claims RF strikes hit "UAF deployment locations, trained by foreign mercenaries, including from Britain and Romania, in Odesa Oblast." This indicates continued RF deep strikes targeting perceived foreign influence and military training, and points to ongoing engagement in Odesa region. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Air Threat (Kursk Ballistic Missile): Повітряні Сили ЗС України / Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine issued a ballistic missile threat from Kursk, which was later cancelled. This highlights the persistent threat of ballistic missile attacks from RF territory. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Air Threat (Sumy High-Speed Target): Повітряні Сили ЗС України / Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine also reported a high-speed target moving towards the Sumy border region. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Ground Operations (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast): "Операция Z" (Русской Весны) reports on RF drone operators "smoking out militants in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast," claiming successful targeting. This supports previous reports of RF advances and ongoing combat in the Dnipropetrovsk region. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Internal Security (Poland - Spy Arrest): TASS reports the Belarusian Foreign Ministry protested to the Polish Chargé d'Affaires after the detention of a "Polish spy." This is an RF/Belarusian IO effort to portray Poland as a hostile actor and undermine Polish credibility. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF IO (Poland - Trump): TASS reports Polish PM Tusk does not regret calling Trump a "Russian agent," though he finds him a "demanding and difficult partner." This reflects ongoing political tensions and divisions within the Western alliance, which RF IO will continue to exploit. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Air Operations (Buffer Zone - Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv): "Поддубный |Z|О|V| edition" publishes a video claiming RF drone operators are "systematically working to create a buffer zone" in border areas of Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts. Targets include UAV control points, mortars, temporary deployment points (PVDs), transport, and personnel. The report also highlights the impending loss of foliage as natural cover. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Drone Capabilities (Zaporizhzhia Front): 🇺🇦 Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація 🇺🇦 showcases a significant stockpile of FPV and reconnaissance drones, emphasizing their role in reconnaissance, attack, and effectiveness. This indicates continued UAF adaptation and investment in drone warfare. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Tactical Engagements (Pokrovsk Direction): STERNENKO posts video of 32nd Separate Mechanized Brigade (OMBR) "UMBRELLA" engaging enemy positions with drones in the Pokrovsk direction, showing explosions and incapacitated personnel. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Tactical Engagements (Malaya Tokmachka): ✙DeepState✙🇺🇦 publishes drone footage of the 118th Separate Mechanized Brigade (OMBR) destroying RF forces during an assault on Malaya Tokmachka, showing a tank being struck and exploding. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF State Border Guard Service (Sumy Oblast): Оперативний ЗСУ shares video of DPSU personnel in Sumy Oblast under apparent artillery fire, highlighting their continued active engagement in border defense. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Internal Affairs (Orenburg - FSB Detention): ASTRA reports FSB detained a store employee in Orenburg on suspicion of "sabotage." This indicates continued RF internal security crackdowns on perceived dissidents/saboteurs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Military Aid (Drones to Airborne Unit): "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" shows soldiers from the 8th Airborne Assault Regiment receiving two DJI Mavic drones, expressing gratitude. This highlights RF reliance on commercial drones and unofficial procurement channels. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF IO (Ukraine Casualty Figures): Басурин о главном circulates video footage of large military cemeteries in Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Lviv, with a caption "Died for Bandera's trash" and claiming the scale of burials "clearly does not correspond to Zelenskyy's statements about minimal losses." This is a significant RF IO effort to undermine Ukrainian morale and government credibility. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Civil Resilience (Zaporizhzhia Underground School): 🇺🇦 Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація 🇺🇦 showcases meal preparation and serving in a Zaporizhzhia "underground" school, highlighting efforts to maintain normalcy and safety for children amidst conflict. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • International Diplomacy (Ukraine-EU): РБК-Україна reports the President of the European Council stated EU accession talks for Ukraine must continue despite Hungary's blocking, reaffirming EU commitment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Drone Detection System: Colonelcassad reports that the ERA-GLONASS based UAV recognition system is ready to cover the entire Far East, indicating RF investment in domestic counter-UAS capabilities, albeit in a non-frontline region. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Internet Access (Restrictions): Colonelcassad reports that Russians will get access to popular internet services during restrictions, provided by operators in pilot mode (MinTsifry). This suggests ongoing state control over information access. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Weather: "Поддубный |Z|О|V| edition" notes that "greenery will soon fall," indicating the approach of autumn and winter, which will reduce natural concealment for forces in border areas and potentially alter drone operational conditions. The current ballistic missile threat and high-speed target in Sumy suggest conditions are permissive for such attacks.
• Environmental Impact:
  • Ongoing combat in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Pokrovsk directions, as well as artillery fire in Sumy, contributes to localized environmental degradation and potential long-term contamination.
  • The continued operation of "underground" schools in Zaporizhzhia highlights the necessity for adapted civilian infrastructure due to ongoing conflict and associated environmental risks.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF:
  • Ground Forces: Confirmed advance from Markovo "towards Kramatorsk" indicates a significant operational thrust. Active drone operations by RF in Dnipropetrovsk and border regions of Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts. 8th Airborne Assault Regiment receiving commercial drones for tactical use.
  • Air Assets: Continued use of ballistic missiles (from Kursk) and high-speed targets (Sumy border). Drone operations for reconnaissance and direct targeting, including in Dnipropetrovsk region and for "buffer zone" creation.
  • Internal Security & Mobilization: Ongoing FSB detentions (Orenburg) to counter perceived "sabotage." Belarus engaging in diplomatic protests regarding alleged Polish spies, aligning with RF narratives.
  • Control Measures: State control over internet access (MinTsifry) to manage information. Heavy use of IO to influence both domestic and international audiences (casualty figures, Polish "spy" claims).
• UAF:
  • Defensive Posture: Actively defending against RF ground assaults, as evidenced by successful drone engagements in Pokrovsk and Malaya Tokmachka. DPSU personnel actively engaged in border defense in Sumy Oblast under fire.
  • Air Assets: Continues to utilize FPV and reconnaissance drones extensively for targeting and surveillance on the Zaporizhzhia front. UAF Air Force actively monitoring ballistic missile and high-speed threats.
  • Diplomatic Engagement: President Zelenskyy reiterates commitment to peace talks while denying RF accusations of "unwillingness for peace." European Council President's statements reaffirm EU support for Ukraine's accession process.
  • Domestic Resilience: Efforts to maintain normal civilian life, such as "underground" schools in Zaporizhzhia, demonstrating resilience. Actively countering RF IO (implicitly, by continuing to operate and seeking international support).
• International:
  • Poland/Belarus: Heightened tensions following alleged Polish spy detention in Belarus, potentially linked to broader RF/Belarusian efforts to destabilize the region.
  • EU: Expressed commitment to continue Ukraine's EU accession talks despite Hungarian objections, demonstrating ongoing diplomatic support.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:

  • Localized Offensive Thrusts: RF maintains the capability to conduct focused ground offensives, demonstrated by the advance from Markovo towards Kramatorsk and sustained pressure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
  • Multi-Domain Strike Persistence: RF continues to employ ballistic missiles and a range of drones for deep strikes and tactical engagements, adapting tactics (e.g., "buffer zone" operations in border areas).
  • Robust Information Warfare: RF remains highly capable in deploying multi-faceted IO campaigns to exploit internal and external vulnerabilities (e.g., Ukrainian casualty figures, Western political divisions, alleged spy activities).
  • Internal Security Control: RF maintains a strong capacity for internal security operations to suppress dissent and perceived threats to the war effort.
  • Adaptive Drone Integration: RF continues to integrate commercial drones into its military forces, even for airborne units, leveraging available technology.

• Intentions:

  • Strategic Objective: Territorial Consolidation & Degrade Ukrainian Warfighting: RF intends to push further towards strategic objectives like Kramatorsk and consolidate control over claimed areas in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. They seek to degrade UAF combat power and critical infrastructure.
  • Force Ukraine into Negotiations on RF Terms: By maintaining military pressure and launching comprehensive IO campaigns, RF aims to create conditions where Ukraine is compelled to negotiate on terms favorable to Moscow.
  • Sow Discord and Undermine Support for Ukraine: RF will continue to use IO to highlight perceived Western disunity, question the legitimacy of Ukrainian government actions, and inflate Ukrainian casualty figures to erode international support and domestic morale.
  • Project Domestic Stability and Military Strength: RF will continue to use both military actions and internal messaging to project an image of a strong, stable state capable of achieving its objectives.
  • Establish "Buffer Zone": RF clearly intends to establish physical "buffer zones" along its borders with Ukraine, utilizing drone and artillery fire to prevent UAF cross-border operations.

• Courses of Action (COAs):

  • MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action):
    1. Accelerated Push towards Kramatorsk and Dnipro-Zaporizhzhia Front: RF will leverage its gains from Markovo and Novoselivka/Novoselovka to advance further towards Kramatorsk and deepen its salients in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. This will be supported by continued tactical drone use (including by airborne units) and artillery. Confidence: HIGH
    2. Intensified Multi-Domain Strikes and "Buffer Zone" Operations: RF will continue high-volume ballistic missile and drone strikes against UAF critical infrastructure and military targets. "Buffer zone" operations in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv border regions will intensify, utilizing drones and indirect fire to suppress UAF presence. Confidence: HIGH
    3. Aggressive Information Warfare and Internal Security: RF IO will escalate efforts to promote narratives of Ukrainian defeat, high casualties, and Western disunity (e.g., exploiting Tusk's statements, the Polish "spy" narrative). Internal security services will continue crackdowns on perceived dissidents, and efforts to control the information space will persist. Confidence: HIGH

• Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

  1. Chemical Weapons Use (Hypothetical Trigger): While highly speculative, the reported Yemeni Houthi chemical weapons production (Alex Parker Returns, Военкор Котенок) amplified by RF sources, could be a highly dangerous indicator if RF were to consider similar escalations or false-flag operations, especially in conjunction with advanced ground assaults. Confidence: LOW (but severe impact)
  2. Direct Hybrid Provocation against NATO: Building on the previous airspace violation and the current Belarusian "spy" incident, RF/Belarus could orchestrate a more significant, deniable hybrid provocation (e.g., cyber-attack, border incident with deniable actors, or a larger-scale airspace incursion) against a NATO member, particularly Poland, to test alliance resolve and deflect from battlefield setbacks. Confidence: MEDIUM

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

• Ukrainian force posture and readiness:
  • Defensive Resilience & Adaptation: UAF remains resilient and adaptable, effectively utilizing drones for tactical engagements against RF assaults (Pokrovsk, Malaya Tokmachka). The showcased drone stockpile in Zaporizhzhia highlights ongoing investment and readiness in this critical area.
  • Active Border Defense: DPSU units are actively engaged in defending border regions under artillery fire, demonstrating continued vigilance and combat readiness.
  • Strategic Communication: President Zelenskyy's statements underscore a continued commitment to peace while proactively countering RF disinformation regarding Ukraine's intentions.
  • Civilian Resilience: The operation of "underground" schools in Zaporizhzhia demonstrates the determination to maintain essential services and civil life under duress.
• Recent tactical successes or setbacks:
  • Successes:
    • Effective Drone Strikes: UAF 32nd OMBR (Pokrovsk) and 118th OMBR (Malaya Tokmachka) demonstrated successful drone-guided strikes against RF personnel and armor during assaults. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Continued Diplomatic Support: The European Council President's reaffirmation of Ukraine's EU accession talks despite Hungarian opposition is a significant diplomatic success. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Robust Drone Capabilities: The showcased drone stockpile in Zaporizhzhia indicates robust and growing UAF drone capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Setbacks:
    • RF Ground Gains (Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia): Continued RF advances, particularly the reported "dash towards Kramatorsk" from Markovo and previous "liberations" of Novoselivka/Novoselovka, represent territorial losses and increased pressure on UAF lines. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Persistent Air Threats: Recurrent ballistic missile threats from Kursk and high-speed targets in Sumy border regions highlight ongoing vulnerability to RF air strikes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Resource requirements and constraints:
  • Air Defense & Counter-UAS (CRITICAL): The persistent threat of ballistic missiles and pervasive drone activity necessitates an urgent increase in advanced air defense systems, especially for mobile units and critical infrastructure, as well as robust counter-UAS capabilities.
  • Ground Reinforcements (CRITICAL): The new RF axis towards Kramatorsk and continued pressure in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia demand immediate reinforcement of ground units with armored vehicles, artillery, and trained personnel.
  • ISR & Target Acquisition (HIGH): Real-time, high-fidelity ISR is critical to track RF advances (especially the Kramatorsk thrust) and effectively deploy UAF drone assets for counter-attacks.
  • Logistics & Sustainment (HIGH): Maintaining ammunition, fuel, and medical supplies for active combat operations across multiple fronts remains a constant challenge requiring robust logistical support.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

• Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:
  • RF Objectives:
    • Undermine Ukrainian Morale & Legitimacy: Basurin's video on "shocking images of military cemeteries" with the caption "Died for Bandera's trash" is a direct, brutal attempt to demoralize the Ukrainian public and discredit the government's narrative on casualties.
    • Discredit Allies/Sow Discord: The Belarusian protest over a "Polish spy" and RF amplification of Tusk's critical statements about Trump aim to fracture Western unity and portray key allies as hostile or unreliable.
    • Justify RF Aggression: Narratives of UAF deployment with "foreign mercenaries" in Odesa serve to legitimize RF strikes and portray Ukraine as a puppet state.
    • Project RF Strength and Control: Reports on RF advances "towards Kramatorsk" and "buffer zone" creation aim to demonstrate military effectiveness and territorial gains.
  • UAF Counter-Narratives:
    • Showcase Tactical Victories: DeepState and STERNENKO videos of successful drone strikes directly counter RF claims of unchallenged advances and demonstrate UAF combat effectiveness.
    • Highlight Resilience: The "underground" school in Zaporizhzhia and DPSU operations under fire exemplify Ukrainian societal and military resilience against aggression.
    • Reaffirm Diplomatic Support: The European Council President's statement on EU accession talks helps counter RF narratives of diminishing international support.
    • Transparency on Threats: UAF Air Force alerts regarding ballistic missiles and high-speed targets maintain transparency with the public while providing critical warnings.
• Public sentiment and morale factors:
  • Ukrainian Public (TESTED, but DETERMINED): The renewed RF offensive towards Kramatorsk and in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia will test public morale. However, continued UAF tactical successes, visible drone capabilities, and the unwavering diplomatic support from the EU provide vital morale boosters. Efforts to maintain civilian normalcy (underground schools) help mitigate psychological impacts. RF IO on high casualties aims to depress morale, requiring strong counter-messaging.
  • Russian Public (MANAGED, but Potentially Sensitive): RF IO is focused on demonstrating military success ("liberated" territories, "dash towards Kramatorsk"), showcasing drone equipment for airborne units, and projecting an image of effective governance (internet access). Internal security crackdowns (Orenburg) indicate continued efforts to suppress dissent, suggesting underlying potential for instability if battlefield narratives become harder to control.
• International support and diplomatic developments:
  • Sustained EU Support (HIGH): The European Council's commitment to Ukraine's EU accession talks, despite internal challenges, indicates strong, albeit complex, ongoing diplomatic support.
  • NATO Tensions (MEDIUM): The Belarusian "Polish spy" incident, coupled with previous drone airspace violations, keeps NATO-Russia/Belarus tensions elevated and necessitates continued vigilance and coordinated responses.
  • RF Bloc-Building (HIGH): The upcoming BRICS summit provides RF with a platform to continue fostering non-Western alliances and promote its vision of a multipolar world order, challenging Western diplomatic influence.
  • Western Political Divides (MEDIUM): Continued RF amplification of critical statements from Western political figures (Trump, Tusk) aims to highlight and exacerbate perceived divisions within the Western alliance, potentially impacting future support.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

• Most likely enemy courses of action (MLCOA):

  1. Sustained Offensive towards Kramatorsk and Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia: RF will continue to press its ground offensive from Markovo towards Kramatorsk and seek to expand its gains in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. This will involve combined arms tactics, heavy reliance on FPV and reconnaissance drones, and sustained artillery support. Confidence: HIGH
  2. Increased Border Region "Buffer Zone" Operations: RF will intensify drone and artillery strikes against UAF positions and infrastructure in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv border areas, aiming to degrade UAF defensive capabilities and establish a de facto "buffer zone" ahead of winter. Confidence: HIGH
  3. Expanded Psychological Operations and Internal Security Crackdowns: RF will escalate its IO campaign focusing on Ukrainian casualty figures, alleged Western hypocrisy, and internal Ukrainian divisions to demoralize the public and reduce international support. Internal security forces will continue actively suppressing dissent and perceived sabotage within Russia. Confidence: HIGH

• Most dangerous enemy courses of action (MDCOA):

  1. Escalated Cross-Border Provocations or Hybrid Warfare against NATO: Building on the previous drone violation and the "Polish spy" narrative, RF could orchestrate a more severe, deniable hybrid operation against a NATO border country (e.g., cyber-attack on critical infrastructure, or a larger-scale border incident involving special forces or proxy actors) to test alliance cohesion and divert attention from the main conflict. Confidence: MEDIUM
  2. Pretext for Chemical Weapon Use: While a low probability, RF's amplification of the Yemeni Houthi chemical weapon production claim could, in a highly escalated scenario, be used as a pretext or an indicator of RF considering a chemical weapons false-flag operation or even deployment, particularly if conventional advances stall significantly. Confidence: LOW (but severe impact)

• Timeline estimates and decision points:

  • Immediate (0-24 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Assess UAF defensive responses to the Markovo-Kramatorsk thrust and Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia gains. Adjust tactical exploitation efforts accordingly.
    • UAF Decision Point: Allocate immediate reserves and fire support to halt RF advances towards Kramatorsk and stabilize lines in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia. Implement enhanced air defense postures for ballistic missile threats from Kursk.
    • International Decision Point: NATO to increase ISR over border regions with Belarus/RF following the "Polish spy" incident and DPSU warnings about "Zapad-2025."
  • Short-Term (24-72 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Finalize preparations and intent for "Zapad-2025" exercises, including potential provocations against NATO borders as warned by DPSU.
    • UAF Decision Point: Publicly and diplomatically counter RF IO on Ukrainian casualty figures and narratives of Western disunity. Continue rapid deployment of advanced drones (like those showcased in Zaporizhzhia) to frontline units.
    • International Decision Point: EU leaders to issue strong, unified statements reaffirming support for Ukraine's EU accession process, directly countering Hungarian objections and RF IO.
  • Mid-Term (1-2 weeks):
    • RF Decision Point: Leverage the BRICS online summit (8 SEP) to promote its geopolitical narrative and solidify non-Western alliances, monitoring international reactions.
    • UAF Decision Point: Evaluate the cumulative impact of RF's multi-front offensive on UAF human and material resources, adjusting strategic defensive and offensive planning for the upcoming autumn/winter campaign. Prepare for increased RF activity along the border areas as foliage cover diminishes.
    • International Decision Point: Western allies to coordinate a unified response to RF's escalating IO campaigns and potential provocations during "Zapad-2025," reinforcing commitment to Ukraine and NATO's collective defense.

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Execute Emergency Reinforcement and Counter-Offensive Planning for Kramatorsk Axis: Immediately redirect available mobile reserves, heavy artillery, and anti-armor assets to establish layered defenses along the RF axis of advance from Markovo towards Kramatorsk. Simultaneously, initiate planning for localized counter-attacks to disrupt RF logistics and C2 in this critical sector.
2. Intensify Counter-Disinformation Campaign: Launch a robust, multi-platform, multi-language public information campaign to counter RF propaganda regarding Ukrainian casualties and the "Died for Bandera's trash" narrative. Utilize official channels and allied media to highlight RF war crimes, civilian suffering, and UAF heroism, providing verified information.
3. Enhance Border Security & Intelligence Sharing: Increase ISR assets (UAVs, ground patrols) along the entire border with Russia and Belarus, particularly in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts. Expedite intelligence sharing with NATO allies regarding potential provocations during "Zapad-2025," including specific RF unit movements and known hybrid warfare indicators.
4. Accelerate Domestic Drone Production & Fielding: Expedite the production and deployment of advanced FPV and reconnaissance drones, similar to those showcased in Zaporizhzhia, prioritizing units on critical axes (Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and border regions). Focus on EW-resistant designs and provide advanced operator training.
5. Strengthen Resilience of Civilian Infrastructure in Frontline Areas: Prioritize funding and technical assistance for the construction and maintenance of protected civilian infrastructure, such as "underground" schools in Zaporizhzhia. Implement enhanced civil defense measures and emergency preparedness in areas susceptible to RF strikes.

//END REPORT//