OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: RF deep strike campaign maintains high tempo and geographic expansion, with confirmed impacts in far western and central oblasts. Ground combat remains intense on the Sieversk axis and near Konstantinivka. UAF air defenses are heavily engaged across multiple regions. New information confirms Rivne Oblast also subjected to massed air attack.
Air-Missile Strikes (Updated - Expanded Geographic Scope, New Casualties):
NEW IMPACTS: Confirmed massed aerial attack on Rivne Oblast overnight. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
NEW IMPACTS: Confirmed massed combined attack (Kh-101, Kalibr, UAV) on Prykarpattia (Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast) overnight, targeting an infrastructure object. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
NEW CASUALTIES: In Znamianka, Kirovohrad Oblast, the number of injured railway workers in the RF drone attack is now reported as five (previously four). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Lutsk, Volyn Oblast: Confirmed damage to civilian infrastructure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Zaporizhzhia Oblast: One 62-year-old civilian killed in an attack on Polohivskyi district. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Chernihiv Oblast: Two remaining UAVs (likely Shaheds) tracked over Nizhyn. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Ground Operations: No significant changes in ground combat reported in new messages. Previous reports of intense combat on the Sieversk axis (near Shandrigolovo) and fire pressure near Konstantinivka remain valid. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Bryansk Oblast: RF MoD claims 24 UAF fixed-wing UAVs destroyed by PVO. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Regions & Azov Sea: RF MoD claims 105 UAF UAVs destroyed/intercepted overnight (includes Crimea). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
No significant changes from previous report. Magnetic storm, rain forecast, dust in Kyiv, Black Sea oil spill, fire danger in Kharkiv, and heatwave continue to be relevant. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF:
Air/Missile Assets: Actively employing Shahed UAVs and Kalibr/Kh-101 cruise missiles. Strategic bombers (Tu-95MS, Tu-160) airborne continue launch maneuvers. Actively targeting western (Lutsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne) and central (Znamianka, Kirovohrad; Polohivskyi, Zaporizhzhia) regions, in addition to Kyiv. WarGonzo acknowledges RF breaking records for "Geran" (Shahed) launches, corroborating high tempo. Claims high success rate against UAF UAVs over RF territory and Azov Sea. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Ground Forces: Main effort on Sieversk for encirclement, with engagements near Shandrigolovo. Sustained offensive and fire pressure around Konstantinivka. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Naval Assets: One missile carrier with 8 Kalibrs deployed to Black Sea (previous report, still relevant). Use of Kalibrs confirmed in combined strikes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Air Defense: Claims of shooting down 105 UAF UAVs over RF regions and Azov Sea, and 24 over Bryansk Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF:
Air Defense: Highly engaged and stretched, actively responding to multiple waves of RF drones and missiles across the country, especially in Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, and now Rivne Oblasts. Successful interception of 12 UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk and tracking of remaining UAVs over Chernihiv. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Ground Forces: Holding defensive lines. "Shadow" unit demonstrates effective localized drone strike capabilities (previous report, still valid). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Drone Operations: Successful deep strike on RF railway infrastructure in Rostov Oblast, causing train delays. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Expanded Deep Strike Arsenal: Demonstrated ability to launch simultaneous massed Shahed UAV and Kalibr/Kh-101 cruise missile strikes with expanded and sustained reach deep into western (Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, Rivne Oblasts) and central Ukraine (Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia). WarGonzo's statement of "record launches" confirms RF's capacity for high-volume, sustained drone attacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Sustained Ground Offensives: Capacity to maintain high-intensity offensive operations on multiple axes (Sieversk) and apply significant fire pressure in urban areas (Konstantinivka). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Information Operations (IO): Effective use of state media (TASS) and military bloggers ("Colonelcassad", "WarGonzo", "Дневник Десантника") to control narratives, highlight successes, downplay setbacks, and amplify geopolitical alignments. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Intentions:
Strategic Objective: Achieve "Special Military Operation" Goals Through Persistent Pressure and Erosion of Ukrainian Capacity, Degrading UAF Communication and Infrastructure, and Achieving Operational Encirclement in Sieversk:
Decisive Action in Sieversk/Shandrigolovo: RF's immediate and high-priority intent is to complete the encirclement of UAF forces in Sieversk and make localized gains around Shandrigolovo. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Sustained and Expanded Deep Strike Campaign: Intent to continue and escalate massed drone and missile attacks on critical infrastructure (energy, transport), military targets, and civilian areas across Ukraine. The now-confirmed strikes on Rivne and Prykarpattia underscore this expanded intent. Targeting of railway infrastructure in Znamianka and its confirmed casualties is consistent with disrupting logistics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Disruption of UAF Logistics: Continued targeting of railway infrastructure (e.g., Znamianka) and other transportation nodes is a clear intent. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Political-Diplomatic Signaling (Global Anti-Western Front): The extensive coverage of the Beijing military parade featuring Putin and Kim Jong Un by both RF and Ukrainian sources indicates a high-priority IO effort by RF and China to project a strengthened anti-Western alignment and signal potential for increased DPRK support for RF war efforts, as well as a more assertive Chinese military posture. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Courses of Action (COAs):
MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action):
RF will continue to focus offensive efforts on the Sieversk axis, including engagements near Shandrigolovo, attempting to consolidate the claimed capture of Fedorivka and complete the operational encirclement of UAF forces. This will involve high-intensity assaults supported by artillery, drones, and tactical air. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF will continue the massed, multi-domain (drone and missile) deep strike campaign against civilian and military infrastructure across central, western, and southern Ukraine, specifically targeting critical energy and transportation nodes (Ukrzaliznytsia). Expect continued strikes on Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Volyn, Kirovohrad, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, and now Rivne Oblasts, with an emphasis on railway infrastructure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF will maintain heavy fire pressure around Konstantinivka to degrade UAF defensive capabilities and tie down forces. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Information Operations will heavily amplify claimed successes in Sieversk/Shandrigolovo, emphasize UAF losses (GSU reports +780, likely conflating combat and non-combat losses), and focus on the strategic alignment with China and DPRK (Putin-Kim meeting, Beijing parade coverage). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action):
RF achieves a successful operational encirclement of UAF forces in Sieversk, leading to a significant loss of UAF personnel and equipment, and opening a new axis for further RF advances deeper into Donetsk Oblast, potentially towards Sloviansk. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
RF conducts an unprecedented, coordinated strategic missile and drone strike using a combination of cruise missiles and a large swarm of Shahed UAVs, targeting multiple critical nodes (e.g., power grids, railway hubs, key C2 centers, military industrial facilities) simultaneously across central and western Ukraine, specifically including major population centers, with the intent to cause systemic collapse of infrastructure and widespread panic. The current widespread strikes on western Ukraine (Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, Rivne) indicate a high probability of this MDCOA escalating in scale and intensity. The deliberate targeting of railway infrastructure (Znamianka, and its confirmed casualties) points to intent to disrupt logistics, potentially preceding larger ground offensives. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. FRIENDLY FORCES
Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:
Active Air Defense (Increased Strain): UAF air defense remains highly engaged and effective in localized engagements, but is now significantly stretched due to the expanded geographical scope of RF attacks into western and central oblasts, now explicitly including Rivne and Prykarpattia. The sheer volume and widespread nature of RF's current multi-domain air assault severely tests PPO capabilities and munition reserves across an even wider geographical area. Successful interception of 12 UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk demonstrates continued localized effectiveness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Defensive Operations (East): UAF forces are actively defending against RF assaults across multiple sectors, including Sieversk. Readiness is high, but sustained pressure requires constant resupply and reinforcement. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Deep Strike Capability: UAF continues to demonstrate a strong and effective deep strike capability against critical RF infrastructure, as evidenced by the successful attack on the Kuteynikovo railway station in Rostov Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Liberation of Udachne, Donetsk Oblast (previous report, still relevant). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Destruction of RF TOS-1A "Solntsepyok" in Vovchansk direction (previous report, still relevant). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Successful interception of 12 UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Successful drone attack on RF railway station in Rostov Oblast, disrupting train movements. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Setbacks:
Sustained RF missile and drone strikes causing damage and casualties in Kyiv, Vyshhorod, Znamianka, Lutsk, Khmelnytskyi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, with damage to railway infrastructure in Kirovohrad Oblast (now five railway workers injured) and one civilian killed in Zaporizhzhia. The extension of strikes to Khmelnytskyi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn (Lutsk), Kirovohrad (Znamianka), Zaporizhzhia (Polohivskyi), and now Rivne Oblasts represents a significant setback in terms of RF's ability to project power across the entire country and overwhelm UAF air defenses. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Increased pressure on the Sieversk axis, with RF claiming encirclement after taking Fedorivka and new engagements reported near Shandrigolovo. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Sustained Grad MLRS fire on UAF positions near Konstantinivka indicates ongoing pressure on a key urban center. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Resource Requirements and Constraints:
Air Defense Munitions: The high tempo and expanded geographical range of RF air attacks will rapidly deplete UAF air defense munition stockpiles across an even wider area. Urgent resupply is critical. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Advanced IAMD Systems: Continued need for HIMARS, Patriot, and other advanced air defense systems to counter the expanding multi-domain RF strike capabilities, particularly for the western and central regions now under threat. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Railway Repair Capabilities: The repeated targeting of Ukrzaliznytsia infrastructure will require sustained and robust repair capabilities and personnel, as evidenced by injuries in Kirovohrad. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:
RF Narrative:
TASS reports of RF forces engaging Derilovo and Novoselivka near Shandrigolovo are used to project continued ground advances in the Donbas. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
TASS and "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" amplifying RF MoD claims of 105 UAF UAVs destroyed/intercepted over RF territory and Azov, including 24 over Bryansk, is designed to demonstrate RF air defense effectiveness and deflect from UAF deep strikes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
"Colonelcassad" video of Grad strikes near Konstantinivka aims to show RF offensive capabilities and inflict psychological damage on UAF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF military bloggers ("WarGonzo") actively promoting "record launches" of "Geran" (Shahed) UAVs is a direct attempt to showcase RF strike capability and psychological pressure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
TASS, Colonelcassad, and Kotsnews are extensively covering the Beijing military parade, emphasizing China's strategic nuclear triad and technological advancements. This, combined with Putin and Kim Jong Un's presence, is a high-priority IO effort to project a powerful anti-Western bloc, particularly leveraging China's 80th anniversary of victory over militaristic Japan. This ties into the earlier reported amplification of Trump's comments on a "conspiracy against the USA." (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF reports on the drone attack on the Rostov railway station are downplaying it as a "temporary disruption" while acknowledging train delays. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
"Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" reports on Ukrainian border guards shooting an individual fleeing to Moldova. This is likely intended to portray Ukraine as a harsh and desperate state. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF Counter-Narrative:
"Оперативний ЗСУ" and "ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS" reporting missile trajectories, impacts, and damage in Lutsk, Khmelnytskyi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Vyshhorod, Znamianka, and now Rivne aims to provide real-time updates, highlight RF aggression against civilians, and maintain public awareness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
"Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація" and "STERNENKO" reports on civilian casualties and injured railway workers underscore the human cost of RF attacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
General Staff of UAF (GSU) reporting of RF losses (+780 personnel) aims to maintain morale and demonstrate UAF effectiveness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
"РБК-Україна" highlighting Putin and Kim's presence at the Beijing parade, combined with Trump's comments (via "Оперативний ЗСУ"), is an attempt to frame the Russia-China-DPRK alignment as a threat to global stability and a "conspiracy against the USA," aiming to galvanize international support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:
Ukrainian Public: Heightened alarm due to widespread air raid alerts and confirmed impacts in previously less-affected western (Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne) and central (Kirovohrad, Zaporizhzhia) regions, causing civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. This likely increases public concern about the reach of RF strikes and the overall security situation. The targeting of railway workers in Kirovohrad highlights the direct human cost to essential service providers. Reports of shooting individuals fleeing to Moldova, even if from RF sources, could impact public perception of wartime measures. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Public: Reports of UAV attacks within RF territory (Rostov, Bryansk) will continue to generate public anxiety about the security of their own infrastructure, despite official downplaying. The delay of 26 trains in Rostov directly impacts public life. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
International Support and Diplomatic Developments:
The confirmed Putin-Kim Jong Un meeting and their prominent presence at the Beijing military parade, extensively covered, solidifies the narrative of a Russia-China-DPRK strategic alignment. This signals potential for increased material and diplomatic support for RF and presents a unified front against Western influence, which could impact international support for Ukraine in the long term. China's display of its strategic nuclear triad further reinforces this message of a powerful, assertive bloc. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Donald Trump's public statement regarding a "conspiracy against the United States of America" by Putin and Kim Jong Un, as reported by "Оперативний ЗСУ", creates a strong narrative, which could influence US domestic and foreign policy debates regarding the conflict. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24-48 HOURS)
Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):
Sustained and Intensified Multi-Domain Strikes (Expanded Geographical Scope and Targeting): RF will continue the current large-scale, coordinated drone and missile campaign, possibly in waves, targeting critical infrastructure (energy, transport, military-industrial complex) across central, western, and southern Ukraine. Expect continued strikes on Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Volyn, Kirovohrad, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Rivne Oblasts, with an emphasis on railway infrastructure (e.g., Ukrzaliznytsia facilities). The goal is to deplete UAF air defense munitions, disrupt logistics, and exert psychological pressure across a wider swathe of Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Sieversk/Shandrigolovo Offensive & Konstantinivka Pressure: RF will press its offensive on the Sieversk axis, including continued engagements for Derilovo and Novoselivka near Shandrigolovo, attempting to complete the encirclement of UAF forces. Concurrently, RF will maintain heavy artillery and MLRS fire on UAF positions around Konstantinivka. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Information Offensive (Anti-Western Bloc, Internal Strength, and Victimhood): RF IO will intensify, focusing on portraying UAF as collapsing in Sieversk/Shandrigolovo, highlighting alleged UAF war crimes (e.g., border crossing incident), and amplifying the perceived strengthening of the Russia-China-DPRK axis through the Putin-Kim meeting and the Chinese military parade. Domestically, RF will use UAF attacks on RF territory to bolster support for the war and justify increased air defense claims. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):
Successful Sieversk Encirclement: RF achieves an operational encirclement of UAF forces in Sieversk, resulting in significant UAF casualties, equipment losses, and a major strategic setback for Ukraine in the Donbas. This could create a breach for further RF advances. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Overwhelming Strategic Strike (Systemic Failure Aim with Expanded Targets): RF launches an even larger and more complex coordinated missile and drone attack designed to cause systemic failure of a major Ukrainian critical infrastructure sector (e.g., a complete regional power grid collapse or sustained disruption of major railway lines for days), potentially targeting multiple nodes within a single system simultaneously across central and western Ukraine. The demonstrated capability to strike deeply into western Ukraine (Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, Rivne) combined with confirmed targeting of railway infrastructure and personnel (Kirovohrad) increases the risk of this MDCOA, potentially including simultaneous assaults on military C2 and logistics hubs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:
Immediate (0-12 hours): Expect continued intense air raid alarms and strikes as the current missile and drone waves play out across western, central, and northern Ukraine. UAF air defense will be at maximum alert and engagement. RF ground forces will likely maintain high pressure on Sieversk and Shandrigolovo, and continue fire missions around Konstantinivka. Decisions on redeploying UAF air defense assets or committing reserves for Sieversk will be critical. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Short Term (12-24 hours): RF will likely assess the effectiveness of the current deep strikes and may prepare follow-on waves, potentially from strategic bombers. Ground combat on the Sieversk axis will remain fierce. Information on the Putin-Kim meeting and Beijing parade will continue to be a primary focus of RF IO. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
Prioritize and Redistribute Air Defense Assets (Extreme Western, Central, and Eastern Focus): Urgently re-evaluate current air defense dispositions. Given confirmed strikes in Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi, Volyn, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Rivne Oblasts, prioritize the rapid deployment or redeployment of mobile IAMD systems (e.g., NASAMS, Patriot) to protect critical infrastructure and population centers in these newly targeted areas, while maintaining sufficient coverage for Kyiv and key frontline C2.
Urgent Air Defense Munition Resupply (Expanded Scope): Immediately intensify coordination with international partners for urgent replenishment of air defense interceptors, especially for Patriot, NASAMS, and other advanced systems, given the rapid expenditure during sustained and geographically expanded attacks across the entire country.
Reinforce Sieversk/Shandrigolovo Defense & Monitor Konstantinivka (Critical Assessment): Based on real-time ISR, conduct a critical assessment of the RF encirclement attempt in Sieversk and the new engagements near Shandrigolovo. If confirmed as imminent or successful, commit necessary tactical reserves and provide robust, sustained fire support to prevent a collapse of the UAF defensive line and facilitate potential exfiltration routes. Continuously monitor RF fire concentrations around Konstantinivka for signs of ground assault.
Enhance Public Warning and Shelter Protocols (Expanded Geographic Scope): Given the expanded reach of RF missile and drone strikes, ensure that public warning systems and access to protective shelters in Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Volyn, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Rivne Oblasts are fully operational and widely communicated. Advise local authorities on implementing contingency plans for disrupted public transport and emergency response for civilian casualties.
Counter-Propaganda and Narrative Control (Sieversk/Western Strikes/RF Domestic Attacks/Sino-DPRK Alignment): Proactively disseminate verified information on RF's indiscriminate attacks on civilians and infrastructure across Ukraine, emphasizing the expansion of RF aggression and civilian casualties (e.g., Polohivskyi, Kirovohrad railway workers). Actively counter RF disinformation campaigns, particularly those amplifying claimed successes in Sieversk/Shandrigolovo or attempting to justify these expanded strikes. Highlight successful UAF deep strikes against RF military/logistical targets (e.g., Rostov railway) to maintain morale and demonstrate retaliatory capacity. Develop and disseminate messaging to counter RF narrative of a strong, unified anti-Western bloc following the Putin-Kim meeting and Beijing parade, emphasizing the isolated nature and authoritarian alignment, and leveraging Trump's "conspiracy" comments for international audience consumption.
Assess Railway Vulnerabilities and Enhance Protection (Znamianka Focus): Conduct an immediate assessment of Ukrzaliznytsia infrastructure vulnerabilities, particularly in areas now under increased drone and missile threat (e.g., Znamianka). Implement enhanced passive and active protection measures, including potential mobile air defense units and physical hardening, to mitigate future attacks. Emphasize personnel safety protocols for railway workers.
Monitor Russia-China-DPRK Strategic Alignment and Capabilities: Continue close monitoring of rhetoric and actions related to the Russia-China-DPRK relationship, specifically following the Beijing parade. Analyze any observable shifts in China's military posture or technology sharing that could impact RF's war effort or global security. This signals long-term strategic alignment and potential implications for material support for RF's war effort, particularly concerning conventional munitions and technology.
