OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: RF deep strike campaign maintains high tempo and geographic expansion, with confirmed impacts in far western and central oblasts. Ground combat remains intense on the Sieversk axis and near Konstantinivka. UAF air defenses are heavily engaged across multiple regions.
Air-Missile Strikes (Updated - Continued Western/Central Impacts, new civilian casualties):
NEW IMPACTS: Confirmed damage to civilian infrastructure in Lutsk, Volyn Oblast, due to RF attack. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
NEW IMPACTS: RF drones attacked Ukrzaliznytsia facilities in Znamianka, Kirovohrad Oblast, injuring four railway workers. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
NEW IMPACTS: Residential building damaged by debris from a downed RF drone in Vyshhorod, Kyiv Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Zaporizhzhia Oblast: One 62-year-old civilian killed in an attack on Polohivskyi district. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Khmelnytskyi and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts: Missile strikes confirmed at 06:11 and 06:25 respectively. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast: UAF PPO shot down 12 UAVs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Chernihiv Oblast: Two remaining UAVs (likely Shaheds) tracked over Nizhyn. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Ground Operations (Updated):
Konstantinivka (Donetsk Oblast): Video evidence from RF sources (Colonelcassad) confirms Grad MLRS strikes by RF forces on UAF positions in a forested area on the north bank of Kleban-Byk Reservoir, near Konstantinivka city infrastructure. This indicates sustained RF fire pressure in this critical urban area. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Sieversk Direction (DNR - Sieversk/Shandrigolovo): RF continues to claim engagements for Derilovo and Novoselivka near Shandrigolovo, consistent with encirclement efforts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Eastern Front (General): UAF "Shadow" unit successfully engaged enemy targets in a wooded area via FPV drone, indicative of ongoing localized combat. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Bryansk Oblast: RF MoD claims 24 UAF fixed-wing UAVs destroyed by PVO. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Regions & Azov Sea: RF MoD claims 105 UAF UAVs destroyed/intercepted overnight (includes Crimea). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
No significant changes from previous report. Magnetic storm, rain forecast, dust in Kyiv, Black Sea oil spill, fire danger in Kharkiv, and heatwave continue to be relevant. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF:
Air/Missile Assets: Actively employing Shahed UAVs and Kalibr cruise missiles. Strategic bombers (Tu-95MS, Tu-160) airborne continue launch maneuvers. Actively targeting western (Lutsk, Ivano-Frankivsk) and central (Znamianka, Kirovohrad; Polohivskyi, Zaporizhzhia) regions, in addition to Kyiv. Claims high success rate against UAF UAVs over RF territory and Azov Sea. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Ground Forces: Main effort on Sieversk for encirclement, with engagements near Shandrigolovo. Sustained offensive and fire pressure around Konstantinivka. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Naval Assets: One missile carrier with 8 Kalibrs deployed to Black Sea (previous report, still relevant). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Air Defense: Claims of shooting down 105 UAF UAVs over RF regions and Azov Sea, and 24 over Bryansk Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF:
Air Defense: Highly engaged, actively responding to multiple waves of RF drones and missiles across the country, especially in Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kyiv Oblasts. Successful interception of 12 UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk and tracking of remaining UAVs over Chernihiv. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Drone Operations: Successful deep strike on RF railway infrastructure in Rostov Oblast, causing train delays. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Expanded Deep Strike Arsenal: Demonstrated ability to launch simultaneous massed Shahed UAV and Kalibr cruise missile strikes with expanded reach deep into western Ukraine (Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn Oblasts) and central Ukraine (Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Sustained Ground Offensives: Capacity to maintain high-intensity offensive operations on multiple axes (Sieversk) and apply significant fire pressure in urban areas (Konstantinivka). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Information Operations (IO): Effective use of state media (TASS) and military bloggers ("Colonelcassad", "Дневник Десантника") to control narratives, highlight successes, and downplay setbacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Intentions:
Strategic Objective: Achieve "Special Military Operation" Goals Through Persistent Pressure and Erosion of Ukrainian Capacity, Degrading UAF Communication and Infrastructure, and Achieving Operational Encirclement in Sieversk:
Decisive Action in Sieversk/Shandrigolovo: RF's immediate and high-priority intent is to complete the encirclement of UAF forces in Sieversk and make localized gains around Shandrigolovo. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Sustained and Expanded Deep Strike Campaign: Intent to continue and escalate massed drone and missile attacks on critical infrastructure (energy, transport), military targets, and civilian areas across Ukraine, now definitively including western regions (Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn Oblasts) and central regions (Kirovohrad, Zaporizhzhia). The targeting of railway infrastructure in Znamianka is consistent with this. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Disruption of UAF Logistics: Continued targeting of railway infrastructure (e.g., Znamianka) and other transportation nodes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Political-Diplomatic Signaling: Putin's meeting with Kim Jong Un, as reported by TASS, aims to project a strengthened anti-Western alignment and signal a potential for increased DPRK support for RF war efforts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Courses of Action (COAs):
MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action):
RF will continue to focus offensive efforts on the Sieversk axis, including engagements near Shandrigolovo, attempting to consolidate the claimed capture of Fedorivka and complete the operational encirclement of UAF forces. This will involve high-intensity assaults supported by artillery, drones, and tactical air. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF will continue the massed, multi-domain (drone and missile) deep strike campaign against civilian and military infrastructure across central, western, and southern Ukraine, specifically targeting critical energy and transportation nodes (Ukrzaliznytsia). Expect continued strikes on Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Volyn, Kirovohrad, Chernihiv, Kyiv, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF will maintain heavy fire pressure around Konstantinivka to degrade UAF defensive capabilities and tie down forces. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Information Operations will heavily amplify claimed successes in Sieversk/Shandrigolovo, emphasize UAF losses (GSU reports +780, likely conflating combat and non-combat losses), and focus on the strategic alignment with China and DPRK (Putin-Kim meeting). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action):
RF achieves a successful operational encirclement of UAF forces in Sieversk, leading to a significant loss of UAF personnel and equipment, and opening a new axis for further RF advances deeper into Donetsk Oblast, potentially towards Sloviansk. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
RF conducts an unprecedented, coordinated strategic missile and drone strike using a combination of cruise missiles and a large swarm of Shahed UAVs, targeting multiple critical nodes (e.g., power grids, railway hubs, key C2 centers, military industrial facilities) simultaneously across central and western Ukraine, specifically including major population centers, with the intent to cause systemic collapse of infrastructure and widespread panic. The current widespread strikes on western Ukraine (Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn) indicate a high probability of this MDCOA escalating in scale and intensity. The deliberate targeting of railway infrastructure (Znamianka) points to intent to disrupt logistics, potentially preceding larger ground offensives. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. FRIENDLY FORCES
Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:
Active Air Defense: UAF air defense remains highly engaged and effective, but is now significantly stretched due to the expanded geographical scope of RF attacks into western and central oblasts. The sheer volume and widespread nature of RF's current multi-domain air assault severely tests PPO capabilities and munition reserves across an even wider geographical area. Successful interception of 12 UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk demonstrates continued localized effectiveness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Defensive Operations (East): UAF forces are actively defending against RF assaults across multiple sectors, including Sieversk. Readiness is high, but sustained pressure requires constant resupply and reinforcement. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Deep Strike Capability: UAF continues to demonstrate a strong and effective deep strike capability against critical RF infrastructure, as evidenced by the successful attack on the Kuteynikovo railway station in Rostov Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Liberation of Udachne, Donetsk Oblast (previous report, still relevant). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Destruction of RF TOS-1A "Solntsepyok" in Vovchansk direction (previous report, still relevant). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Successful interception of 12 UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Successful drone attack on RF railway station in Rostov Oblast, disrupting train movements. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Effective FPV drone strike by "Shadow" unit. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Setbacks:
Sustained RF missile and drone strikes causing damage and casualties in Kyiv, Vyshhorod, Znamianka, Lutsk, Khmelnytskyi, Ivano-Frankivsk, with damage to railway infrastructure in Kirovohrad Oblast (4 railway workers injured) and one civilian killed in Zaporizhzhia. The extension of strikes to Khmelnytskyi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn (Lutsk), Kirovohrad (Znamianka), and Zaporizhzhia (Polohivskyi) Oblasts represents a significant setback in terms of RF's ability to project power across the entire country. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Increased pressure on the Sieversk axis, with RF claiming encirclement after taking Fedorivka and new engagements reported near Shandrigolovo. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Sustained Grad MLRS fire on UAF positions near Konstantinivka indicates ongoing pressure on a key urban center. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Resource Requirements and Constraints:
Air Defense Munitions: The high tempo and expanded geographical range of RF air attacks will rapidly deplete UAF air defense munition stockpiles across an even wider area. Urgent resupply is critical. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Advanced IAMD Systems: Continued need for HIMARS, Patriot, and other advanced air defense systems to counter the expanding multi-domain RF strike capabilities, particularly for the western and central regions now under threat. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Railway Repair Capabilities: The repeated targeting of Ukrzaliznytsia infrastructure will require sustained and robust repair capabilities and personnel, as evidenced by injuries in Kirovohrad. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:
RF Narrative:
TASS reports of RF forces engaging Derilovo and Novoselivka near Shandrigolovo are used to project continued ground advances in the Donbas. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
TASS and "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" amplifying RF MoD claims of 105 UAF UAVs destroyed/intercepted over RF territory and Azov, including 24 over Bryansk, is designed to demonstrate RF air defense effectiveness and deflect from UAF deep strikes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
"Colonelcassad" video of Grad strikes near Konstantinivka aims to show RF offensive capabilities and inflict psychological damage on UAF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
TASS reports of Putin-Kim Jong Un meeting in Diao Yutai State Guesthouse, with photos, is a high-priority IO effort to project a powerful anti-Western bloc, particularly leveraging China's 80th anniversary of victory over militaristic Japan. This ties into the earlier reported amplification of Trump's comments on a "conspiracy against the USA." (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF reports on the drone attack on the Rostov railway station are downplaying it as a "temporary disruption" while acknowledging train delays. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF Counter-Narrative:
"Оперативний ЗСУ" and "ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS" reporting missile trajectories, impacts, and damage in Lutsk, Khmelnytskyi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Vyshhorod, and Znamianka aims to provide real-time updates, highlight RF aggression against civilians, and maintain public awareness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
"Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація" reports on civilian casualties underscore the human cost of RF attacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
General Staff of UAF (GSU) reporting of RF losses (+780 personnel) aims to maintain morale and demonstrate UAF effectiveness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
"Підрозділ Shadow" video with QR code to support the unit combines demonstrating combat effectiveness with fundraising. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:
Ukrainian Public: Heightened alarm due to widespread air raid alerts and confirmed impacts in previously less-affected western (Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk) and central (Kirovohrad, Zaporizhzhia) regions, causing civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. This likely increases public concern about the reach of RF strikes and the overall security situation. The targeting of railway workers in Kirovohrad highlights the direct human cost to essential service providers. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Public: Reports of UAV attacks within RF territory (Rostov, Bryansk) will continue to generate public anxiety about the security of their own infrastructure, despite official downplaying. The delay of 26 trains in Rostov directly impacts public life. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
International Support and Diplomatic Developments:
The confirmed Putin-Kim Jong Un meeting, amplified by TASS, solidifies the narrative of a Russia-China-DPRK strategic alignment. This signals potential for increased material and diplomatic support for RF and presents a unified front against Western influence, which could impact international support for Ukraine in the long term. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24-48 HOURS)
Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):
Sustained and Intensified Multi-Domain Strikes (Expanded Geographical Scope and Targeting): RF will continue the current large-scale, coordinated drone and missile campaign, possibly in waves, targeting critical infrastructure (energy, transport, military-industrial complex) across central, western, and southern Ukraine. Expect continued strikes on Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Volyn, Kirovohrad, Chernihiv, Kyiv, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, with an emphasis on railway infrastructure. The goal is to deplete UAF air defense munitions, disrupt logistics, and exert psychological pressure across a wider swathe of Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Sieversk/Shandrigolovo Offensive & Konstantinivka Pressure: RF will press its offensive on the Sieversk axis, including continued engagements for Derilovo and Novoselivka near Shandrigolovo, attempting to complete the encirclement of UAF forces. Concurrently, RF will maintain heavy artillery and MLRS fire on UAF positions around Konstantinivka. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Information Offensive (Anti-Western Bloc & Internal Strength): RF IO will intensify, focusing on portraying UAF as collapsing in Sieversk/Shandrigolovo, highlighting alleged UAF war crimes, and amplifying the perceived strengthening of the Russia-China-DPRK axis through the Putin-Kim meeting and the Chinese military parade. Domestically, RF will use UAF attacks on RF territory to bolster support for the war and justify increased air defense claims. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):
Successful Sieversk Encirclement: RF achieves an operational encirclement of UAF forces in Sieversk, resulting in significant UAF casualties, equipment losses, and a major strategic setback for Ukraine in the Donbas. This could create a breach for further RF advances. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Overwhelming Strategic Strike (Systemic Failure Aim with Expanded Targets): RF launches an even larger and more complex coordinated missile and drone attack designed to cause systemic failure of a major Ukrainian critical infrastructure sector (e.g., a complete regional power grid collapse or sustained disruption of major railway lines for days), potentially targeting multiple nodes within a single system simultaneously across central and western Ukraine. The demonstrated capability to strike deeply into western Ukraine (Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn) combined with targeting of railway personnel (Kirovohrad) increases the risk of this MDCOA, potentially including simultaneous assaults on military C2 and logistics hubs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:
Immediate (0-12 hours): Expect continued intense air raid alarms and strikes as the current missile and drone waves play out across western, central, and northern Ukraine. UAF air defense will be at maximum alert and engagement. RF ground forces will likely maintain high pressure on Sieversk and Shandrigolovo, and continue fire missions around Konstantinivka. Decisions on redeploying UAF air defense assets or committing reserves for Sieversk will be critical. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Short Term (12-24 hours): RF will likely assess the effectiveness of the current deep strikes and may prepare follow-on waves, potentially from strategic bombers. Ground combat on the Sieversk axis will remain fierce. Information on the Putin-Kim meeting will continue to be a primary focus of RF IO. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
Prioritize and Redistribute Air Defense Assets (Extreme Western, Central, and Eastern Focus): Urgently re-evaluate current air defense dispositions. Given confirmed strikes in Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi, Volyn, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, prioritize the rapid deployment or redeployment of mobile IAMD systems (e.g., NASAMS, Patriot) to protect critical infrastructure and population centers in these newly targeted areas, while maintaining sufficient coverage for Kyiv and key frontline C2.
Urgent Air Defense Munition Resupply (Expanded Scope): Immediately intensify coordination with international partners for urgent replenishment of air defense interceptors, especially for Patriot, NASAMS, and other advanced systems, given the rapid expenditure during sustained and geographically expanded attacks across the entire country.
Reinforce Sieversk/Shandrigolovo Defense & Monitor Konstantinivka (Critical Assessment): Based on real-time ISR, conduct a critical assessment of the RF encirclement attempt in Sieversk and the new engagements near Shandrigolovo. If confirmed as imminent or successful, commit necessary tactical reserves and provide robust, sustained fire support to prevent a collapse of the UAF defensive line and facilitate potential exfiltration routes. Continuously monitor RF fire concentrations around Konstantinivka for signs of ground assault.
Enhance Public Warning and Shelter Protocols (Expanded Geographic Scope): Given the expanded reach of RF missile and drone strikes, ensure that public warning systems and access to protective shelters in Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Volyn, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts are fully operational and widely communicated. Advise local authorities on implementing contingency plans for disrupted public transport and emergency response for civilian casualties.
Counter-Propaganda and Narrative Control (Sieversk/Western Strikes/RF Domestic Attacks/Sino-DPRK Alignment): Proactively disseminate verified information on RF's indiscriminate attacks on civilians and infrastructure across Ukraine, emphasizing the expansion of RF aggression and civilian casualties (e.g., Polohivskyi, Kirovohrad railway workers). Actively counter RF disinformation campaigns, particularly those amplifying claimed successes in Sieversk/Shandrigolovo or attempting to justify these expanded strikes. Highlight successful UAF deep strikes against RF military/logistical targets (e.g., Rostov railway) to maintain morale and demonstrate retaliatory capacity. Develop and disseminate messaging to counter RF narrative of a strong, unified anti-Western bloc following the Putin-Kim meeting, emphasizing the isolated nature and authoritarian alignment.
Assess Railway Vulnerabilities and Enhance Protection (Znamianka Focus): Conduct an immediate assessment of Ukrzaliznytsia infrastructure vulnerabilities, particularly in areas now under increased drone and missile threat (e.g., Znamianka). Implement enhanced passive and active protection measures, including potential mobile air defense units and physical hardening, to mitigate future attacks. Emphasize personnel safety protocols for railway workers.
Monitor Russia-China-DPRK Strategic Alignment: Continue close monitoring of rhetoric and actions related to the Russia-China-DPRK relationship, as this signals long-term strategic alignment and potential implications for material support for RF's war effort, particularly concerning conventional munitions and technology.
