Archived operational intelligence briefing
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: RF continues multi-domain deep strikes, primarily targeting critical civilian infrastructure. UAF has demonstrated new deep strike capabilities against RF IAMD in Crimea and is now confirmed to have struck two RF Mi-8 helicopters and a tugboat. Ground engagements persist along the Donetsk axis, with RF claiming localized gains in Kamyshevakha and a new claim of cutting a UAF grouping in Shandryholove. The information environment remains highly contested, with both sides actively employing propaganda and engaging in high-level diplomacy. RF is making public relations efforts regarding the "Day of Knowledge."
NEW: RF Claim of Cutting UAF Grouping, Shandryholove (Krasny Lyman Direction): (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) TASS (RF source) reports Igor Kimakovsky, advisor to the DNR head, claimed RF forces "cut" a Ukrainian grouping near Shandryholove on the Krasny Lyman direction. This is a significant RF claim of a tactical breakthrough.
NEW: RF Production of AM-17 Submachine Gun (Kalashnikov): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Два майора (RF source) reports Kalashnikov has produced the first experimental batch of the 5.45mm AM-17 compact assault rifle. This indicates continued RF defense industrial base activity focusing on light infantry weapons.
NEW: RF Air Threat Over Chernihiv Oblast (UAV Alert): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Повітряні Сили ЗС України reports enemy UAVs in the central part of Chernihiv Oblast. This indicates persistent RF deep strike attempts into Ukrainian territory.
NEW: RF Air Threat Over Sumy Oblast (UAV Alert): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Повітряні Сили ЗС України reports enemy UAVs in Sumy Oblast. This indicates persistent RF deep strike attempts into Ukrainian territory.
NEW: UAF General Staff Summary (010824Z SEP 25): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Liveuamap Source reports UAF General Staff summary of clashes and RF airstrikes:
NEW: RF IO – Beslan School Siege Anniversary (Propaganda): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Воин DV (RF source) marks the anniversary of the 2004 Beslan school siege, leveraging the tragedy for a narrative of victimhood and struggle against terrorism. This is a clear information operation. (Repeat of previous report, indicating sustained narrative)
NEW: Kyiv Air Quality Deterioration (Environmental): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Оперативний ЗСУ and РБК-Україна report increased concentration of suspended particles (dust) and worsened air quality in Kyiv. This could be a result of recent kinetic activity or environmental factors.
NEW: RF IO - "Day of Knowledge" in Bryansk Oblast (Propaganda): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) AV БогомаZ (RF source) publishes multiple photo messages showcasing new/renovated schools and "Day of Knowledge" celebrations in Bryansk Oblast, emphasizing a return to normalcy and educational development. This is a clear information operation.
NEW: UAF IO - "Day of Knowledge" (Human Cost Narrative): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Генеральний штаб ЗСУ and КМВА (Київська міська військова адміністрація) publish video messages juxtaposing children starting school with images of Ukrainian soldiers, emphasizing that education is possible thanks to the sacrifices of Ukrainian defenders and remembering fallen heroes. Anatoliy Shtefan "Shtirlitz" reinforces this with a drawing of a soldier protecting a student. This is a strong UAF information operation highlighting the human cost and the role of the military.
NEW: UAF IO - "Day of Knowledge" in Zaporizhzhia (Resilience Narrative): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація (UAF source) reports on the first school bell for 49 first-graders in Zaporizhzhia Sanatorium School-Boarding School № 7, focusing on resilience and continuity of education. This counters RF narratives of disruption.
NEW: RF IO - Mobile Phones in Schools (Social Control): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) ТАСС (RF source) reports that Russian Presidential aide Medinsky believes mobile phones distract students and parents should not hinder school decisions on this matter. This indicates RF efforts to increase social control and discipline, potentially with a long-term impact on information access.
NEW: SCO Tianjin Declaration Content (RF Diplomatic Success): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Kotsnews and ASTRA (RF sources) report that the Tianjin Declaration of the SCO did not mention Ukraine and condemned Israel and the USA. This indicates RF's success in shaping the SCO agenda and leveraging it for its anti-Western narrative.
NEW: RF-Turkey Relations (Diplomatic Engagement): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Colonelcassad and Операция Z (RF sources) publish videos of Putin and Erdogan's meeting, with TASS reporting Putin stating Russians are number one tourists in Turkey, and Erdogan inviting Putin to Turkey. Putin explicitly noted Turkey's "special role" in Ukrainian settlement. This confirms continued strong bilateral engagement.
NEW: China's Global Governance Initiative (RF Diplomatic Success): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) ТАСС (RF source) reports Xi Jinping proposed a global governance initiative at the SCO+ meeting in Tianjin. This reinforces RF's narrative of a multipolar world.
UPDATE: Lipetsk Oblast UAV Alert Lifted: (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Игорь Артамонов (Lipetsk Oblast Governor, RF source) reports "yellow level" UAV attack threat lifted for Lipetsk Oblast. This suggests a temporary lull in UAF deep strike activity in this specific region.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF:
UAF:
1.4. Intelligence Gaps from Previous Report Addressed/Updated:
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Intentions:
Courses of Action (COA) Currently Observed:
Ukrainian force posture and readiness:
Recent tactical successes or setbacks:
Resource requirements and constraints:
Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:
Public sentiment and morale factors:
International support and diplomatic developments:
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
Sustained Multi-Domain Deep Strikes and Frontline Pressure (with Focus on Civilian/Foreign Infrastructure and Persistent UAVs): RF will continue massed drone and missile attacks on critical civilian infrastructure (energy, transport, water) in Southern, Central, and Northern Ukraine, particularly Odesa, Chornomorsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, and Kyiv Oblasts. This will likely extend to non-military foreign-affiliated infrastructure (as seen with the British Council). These will be augmented by tactical kinetic strikes (FPV drones, artillery, guided bombs like KABs) on UAF deployment points and frontline positions across the Donbas, Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, Lyman, Siversk, and Dnipropetrovsk axes. RF will continue to use MiG-31K launches as a psychological and strategic threat (even if brief). RF will likely attempt to exploit any IAMD gaps in Crimea created by UAF strikes to conduct its own counter-strikes or ISR, while also bolstering remaining AD assets. UAF deep strikes into RF territory will prompt continued RF air defense responses. New UAV alerts in Chernihiv and Sumy Oblasts indicate this is an ongoing, widespread tactic. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Localized Ground Probes and Consolidation with Persistent IO and Enhanced Internal Security: RF will maintain localized ground pressure along the Donetsk, Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, and Lyman axes, focusing on consolidating recent gains (e.g., Zarichne, Pisciy coal mine, Siversk flanks, Kamyshevakha liberation claim, Shandryholove "cutting") and conducting further reconnaissance-in-force. This will be accompanied by an intensified information operations campaign, leveraging the outcomes of the SCO summit and bilateral meetings to portray RF's international strength and Western decline (Tianjin Declaration), while continuing to discredit Ukrainian leadership and allies through PSYOP (e.g., "UAF drone killed surrendering soldier"). RF will also intensify internal security measures, targeting alleged collaborators and tightening information control (FSB arrests, discussion on mobile phones in schools). RF will continue to promote narratives of domestic stability ("Day of Knowledge"). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
CSTO Military Signaling and Border Pressure: RF will continue to use CSTO exercises in Belarus as a strategic signaling tool, maintaining a credible threat to Ukraine's northern border. RF will also continue localized border operations and drone/KAB strikes in Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts (as evidenced by new UAV alerts), aiming to fix UAF forces in the north and degrade civilian resilience in border regions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
Coordinated Strategic Escalation: Massed Combined-Arms Offensive and WMD Threat: RF initiates a large-scale, coordinated combined-arms offensive on one or more axes (e.g., a renewed push from the north, or a major breakthrough in Donbas/Zaporizhzhia), simultaneously launching a massive wave of precision-guided munitions and ballistic missiles (including Kinzhdal strikes) against Ukraine's remaining critical infrastructure, C2 nodes, and major troop concentrations. This offensive would be coupled with explicit and credible threats of tactical nuclear weapon use (potentially derived from CSTO exercise planning) if Western support for Ukraine continues or if UAF attempts to counter the offensive. The intention would be to overwhelm UAF defenses, force a collapse of international support, and impose a negotiated settlement on RF terms. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Hybrid Escalation: Targeted Assassinations, Cyberattacks on Civilian Infrastructure, and International Provocations: RF conducts a series of high-profile, targeted assassinations of key Ukrainian political or military figures (beyond the Parubiy incident), aimed at creating internal chaos and leadership vacuums. Simultaneously, RF launches sophisticated, widespread cyberattacks designed to cripple critical civilian infrastructure (e.g., power grid, communication networks, financial systems) across Ukraine, potentially extending to key Western support nations. This would be combined with overt acts of international provocation, such as naval blockades of Black Sea shipping or direct interference with humanitarian aid convoys, and aggressive diplomatic rhetoric to isolate Ukraine further. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Black Sea Domination and Economic Strangulation with NATO Provocation: RF significantly escalates its military presence in the Black Sea, effectively blockading all Ukrainian maritime trade (civilian and military) through intensified mine-laying and overt naval interdiction, potentially extending into international waters. This could be accompanied by direct provocations against NATO naval or air assets conducting ISR in the Black Sea, potentially leading to an incident designed to test NATO's resolve and unity. The goal would be to economically strangle Ukraine while simultaneously attempting to fracture NATO's response. (LOW CONFIDENCE)
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
//END REPORT//
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