Archived operational intelligence briefing
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: RF continues multi-domain deep strikes, primarily targeting critical civilian infrastructure. UAF has demonstrated new deep strike capabilities against RF IAMD in Crimea and is now confirmed to have struck two RF Mi-8 helicopters and a tugboat. Ground engagements persist along the Donetsk axis, with RF claiming localized gains in Kamyshevakha. The information environment remains highly contested, with both sides actively employing propaganda and engaging in high-level diplomacy.
NEW: UAF GUR Strike BDA, Crimea (Mi-8 Helicopters, Tugboat) Confirmed: (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Multiple UAF sources (Оперативний ЗСУ, ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS, Два майора) publish thermal imaging video confirming UAF GUR drone strikes against two RF Mi-8 helicopters and an RF tugboat in occupied Crimea. This is significant BDA against high-value RF aviation and naval support assets. This confirms and elaborates on previous reporting.
NEW: RF FSB Arrest in Tambov Oblast (Internal Security): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Военкор Котенок (RF source) publishes video showing FSB apprehending a resident of Tambov Oblast for collaborating with Ukrainian special services via Telegram, including the display of electronic components. This confirms continued RF counter-intelligence operations against internal threats.
NEW: RF Air Threat Over Lipetsk Oblast (UAV Alert): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Igor Artamonov (Lipetsk Oblast Governor, RF source) reports a "red level" UAV attack threat for Yelets and Yeletsky MR, and a general air danger regime for the entire Lipetsk Oblast. This indicates persistent UAF deep strike attempts into RF territory.
NEW: RF Claim of Kamyshevakha Liberation (Donetsk Oblast): (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) TASS (RF source) reports RF troops have "liberated" Kamyshevakha in DNR, stating this has "straightened the front line on the border with Dnipropetrovsk Oblast." This is a significant RF claim of territorial gain.
NEW: RF IO – Beslan School Siege Anniversary: (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Басурин о главном (RF source) marks the anniversary of the 2004 Beslan school siege, leveraging the tragedy for a narrative of victimhood and struggle against terrorism. This is a clear information operation.
NEW: RF IO – Ukrainian Soldier Killed by Friendly Drone (Propaganda): (LOW CONFIDENCE) Операция Z (RF source) publishes drone video claiming a surrendering Ukrainian soldier was killed by a Ukrainian drone. This is a likely RF information operation aimed at discrediting UAF and demoralizing its troops. Immediate assessment suggests the video shows artillery impacts near a soldier, not a drone strike on a surrendering individual.
NEW: UAF Combined-Arms Defensive Success, Mala Tokmachka (Zaporizhzhia Oblast): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС (UAF source) publishes drone footage of a coordinated UAF defense against a large-scale RF armored assault near Mala Tokmachka, Zaporizhzhia Oblast. RF column leader tank hit mines, followed by drone, artillery, and anti-tank engagements destroying 2 tanks, 5 BMPs, motorcycles, and 1 Tigr armored vehicle. RF infantry casualties ongoing. This is a significant UAF tactical success.
NEW: Damage to British Council Building in Kyiv (RF Strike BDA): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) STERNENKO (UAF source) publishes video showing significant damage (shattered windows, debris) to the British Council building in Kyiv, stating the Russian Ambassador to the UK supported the strike. This confirms BDA against non-military, foreign-affiliated infrastructure.
NEW: RF Claim of D-30 Howitzer Destruction (Donetsk): (LOW CONFIDENCE) Народная милиция ДНР (RF source) publishes drone video claiming the destruction of a UAF D-30 howitzer and crew by the 56th Separate Special Purpose Brigade. Video quality degrades significantly, making verification difficult.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF:
UAF:
1.4. Intelligence Gaps from Previous Report Addressed/Updated:
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Intentions:
Courses of Action (COA) Currently Observed:
Ukrainian force posture and readiness:
Recent tactical successes or setbacks:
Resource requirements and constraints:
Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:
Public sentiment and morale factors:
International support and diplomatic developments:
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
Sustained Multi-Domain Deep Strikes and Frontline Pressure (with Focus on Civilian/Foreign Infrastructure): RF will continue massed drone and missile attacks on critical civilian infrastructure (energy, transport, water) in Southern, Central, and Northern Ukraine, particularly Odesa, Chornomorsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, and Kyiv Oblasts. This will likely extend to non-military foreign-affiliated infrastructure (as seen with the British Council). These will be augmented by tactical kinetic strikes (FPV drones, artillery, guided bombs like KABs) on UAF deployment points and frontline positions across the Donbas, Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, and Dnipropetrovsk axes. RF will continue to use MiG-31K launches as a psychological and strategic threat (even if brief). RF will likely attempt to exploit any IAMD gaps in Crimea created by UAF strikes to conduct its own counter-strikes or ISR, while also bolstering remaining AD assets. UAF deep strikes into RF territory will prompt continued RF air defense responses. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Localized Ground Probes and Consolidation with Persistent IO and Enhanced Internal Security: RF will maintain localized ground pressure along the Donetsk, Pokrovsk, and Kupiansk axes, focusing on consolidating recent gains (e.g., Zarichne, Pisciy coal mine, Siversk flanks, Kamyshevakha liberation claim) and conducting further reconnaissance-in-force. This will be accompanied by an intensified information operations campaign, leveraging the outcomes of the SCO summit and bilateral meetings to portray RF's international strength and Western decline, while continuing to discredit Ukrainian leadership and allies through PSYOP (e.g., "UAF drone killed surrendering soldier"). RF will also intensify internal security measures, targeting alleged collaborators and tightening information control (FSB arrests). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
CSTO Military Signaling and Border Pressure: RF will continue to use CSTO exercises in Belarus as a strategic signaling tool, maintaining a credible threat to Ukraine's northern border. RF will also continue localized border operations and drone/KAB strikes in Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts, aiming to fix UAF forces in the north and degrade civilian resilience in border regions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
Coordinated Strategic Escalation: Massed Combined-Arms Offensive and WMD Threat: RF initiates a large-scale, coordinated combined-arms offensive on one or more axes (e.g., a renewed push from the north, or a major breakthrough in Donbas/Zaporizhzhia), simultaneously launching a massive wave of precision-guided munitions and ballistic missiles (including Kinzhdal strikes) against Ukraine's remaining critical infrastructure, C2 nodes, and major troop concentrations. This offensive would be coupled with explicit and credible threats of tactical nuclear weapon use (potentially derived from CSTO exercise planning) if Western support for Ukraine continues or if UAF attempts to counter the offensive. The intention would be to overwhelm UAF defenses, force a collapse of international support, and impose a negotiated settlement on RF terms. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Hybrid Escalation: Targeted Assassinations, Cyberattacks on Civilian Infrastructure, and International Provocations: RF conducts a series of high-profile, targeted assassinations of key Ukrainian political or military figures (beyond the Parubiy incident), aimed at creating internal chaos and leadership vacuums. Simultaneously, RF launches sophisticated, widespread cyberattacks designed to cripple critical civilian infrastructure (e.g., power grid, communication networks, financial systems) across Ukraine, potentially extending to key Western support nations. This would be combined with overt acts of international provocation, such as naval blockades of Black Sea shipping or direct interference with humanitarian aid convoys, and aggressive diplomatic rhetoric to isolate Ukraine further. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Black Sea Domination and Economic Strangulation with NATO Provocation: RF significantly escalates its military presence in the Black Sea, effectively blockading all Ukrainian maritime trade (civilian and military) through intensified mine-laying and overt naval interdiction, potentially extending into international waters. This could be accompanied by direct provocations against NATO naval or air assets conducting ISR in the Black Sea, potentially leading to an incident designed to test NATO's resolve and unity. The goal would be to economically strangle Ukraine while simultaneously attempting to fracture NATO's response. (LOW CONFIDENCE)
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
//END REPORT//
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