Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

TIME: 112345Z JUL 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Ukraine General (Current): RUF strategic aerial attack continues with significant volume, now exhibiting a clear westward thrust. UAF Air Force (AF) reports active UAV threats in Rivne Oblast (moving west towards Volyn and Lutsk) and new threats in Volyn, Lviv, and Chernivtsi Oblasts. This represents a significant expansion of the deep strike area into southwestern Ukraine. One UAV reported flying south towards/through Vyshneve/Kyiv. Air raid alerts are active across all newly identified western threat zones. Explosions reported in Khmelnytskyi Oblast remain confirmed from previous reporting. UAF Air Defense (AD) remains actively engaged. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Kyiv Oblast (Kyiv City): Active AD engagement in Holosiievo district from previous reporting. New report of a single UAV on a southern course towards/through Vyshneve/Kyiv. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Khmelnytskyi Oblast: Explosions confirmed from previous reporting. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Ternopil Oblast: Continues to be under UAV threat from previous reporting. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Rivne Oblast: New reports of UAVs over Western Rivne Oblast moving towards Lutsk. Threat of strike UAVs confirmed. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Volyn Oblast: New threat of strike UAVs detected, with specific UAVs tracked from Rivne Oblast moving towards Volyn. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Lviv Oblast: New threat of strike UAVs detected. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Chernivtsi Oblast: New threat of strike UAVs detected. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Kharkiv Direction: RUF milbloggers continue to propagate claims of successful FPV drone engagements against Ukrainian "Baba-Yaga" UAVs. This indicates active air-to-air drone engagements and continued RUF counter-UAS (C-UAS) efforts. New RUF video claims a Ka-52 helicopter shot down a Ukrainian UAV over a border region using its 30mm cannon. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM (for claim, LOW for independent verification).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Ukraine General: Night operations continue, with low visibility favoring RUF UAV and missile saturation tactics. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF:
  • Air Defense: Fully engaged across an expanding number of oblasts, now specifically including Volyn, Lviv, and Chernivtsi in addition to Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Odesa, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, and Rivne. UAF AF continues to provide continuous updates on UAV concentrations and movement directions, demonstrating effective C2 and public warning systems. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Ground Forces: Maintaining defensive posture. Counter-UAS efforts are active, including against RUF FPV drones. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• RUF:
  • Deep Operations (UAV): Sustained, high-volume, multi-vector drone attack continues, now extending even further west into Volyn, Lviv, and Chernivtsi Oblasts. "Chaotic movements" are ongoing, designed to saturate and confuse UAF AD. Intent for "another wave" from previous reporting remains highly relevant. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Ground Forces (Kharkiv Direction): Continued C-UAS operations, specifically FPV drone against UAF "Baba-Yaga" drones. Claims of Ka-52 aerial engagements against Ukrainian UAVs further indicate active RUF C-UAS efforts. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
  • Information Warfare/Propaganda: RUF milbloggers continue to disseminate content, including a video of a cultural event (likely unrelated to military operations) and the Ka-52 drone shootdown video, likely to reinforce the narrative of Russia's overwhelming military strength. TASS reports on RF government plans to take "damaged property" from Donbas and Novorossiya regions onto its balance sheet, indicating a continued focus on administrative annexation and reinforcing their claim over occupied territories. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Strategic Drone Strikes (Sustained, Adaptive & Deepening Western Reach): RUF continues to demonstrate an unprecedented capability for widespread, high-volume, multi-vector UAV attacks, now penetrating even deeper into western Ukraine, including Volyn, Lviv, and Chernivtsi Oblasts. The "chaotic movement" reported indicates an adaptation to challenge UAF AD targeting. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Counter-UAS (C-UAS): RUF actively employs FPV drones as C-UAS assets, and new claims of Ka-52 aerial engagements indicate a multi-layered and integrated C-UAS capability to mitigate Ukrainian drone effectiveness, particularly near border regions. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Information Warfare (Sophisticated & Adaptive): RUF continues to employ sophisticated information operations, including selectively using tactical video claims (Ka-52) and administrative actions (property nationalization) to bolster its narrative of military prowess and territorial control. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Intentions:
  • Systemic Degradation of Ukrainian Infrastructure and Air Defense (PRIMARY - Deepening): The immediate intention is to maximize damage to critical civilian and military infrastructure, exhaust UAF air defense munitions, and instill widespread fear through a sustained, high-intensity, multi-domain aerial campaign. The expansion to Volyn, Lviv, and Chernivtsi Oblasts specifically aims to stretch UAF AD assets to their absolute limit and directly threaten critical logistics routes for Western aid. The "chaotic movement" indicates an intent to overwhelm and confuse UAF AD. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Degrade Ukrainian Drone Capabilities: RUF intends to directly counter and degrade Ukrainian heavy-lift and tactical strike drone capabilities, particularly those operating in the Kharkiv sector and near border regions. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Consolidate Narrative of Territorial Control and Military Supremacy: RUF aims to project an image of overwhelming military strength and legitimate control over occupied territories, both domestically and internationally, through its large-scale strikes and administrative actions. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2.2. Recent tactical changes or adaptations

• RUF:
  • Geographic Expansion of UAV Strikes (CRITICAL): The further extension of UAV threats to Volyn, Lviv, and Chernivtsi Oblasts indicates RUF's intent to stretch UAF AD resources to their breaking point, isolate Western aid routes, and impact civilian morale across the entire breadth of Ukraine. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Multi-Platform C-UAS: Confirmed employment of FPV drones and claimed Ka-52 helicopter engagement against Ukrainian UAVs highlights RUF's evolving and diversifying C-UAS strategy. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Administrative Actions as Information Warfare: The rapid announcement by TASS regarding taking "damaged property" from Donbas/Novorossiya onto RF balance sheets, while a bureaucratic step, serves as a strong signal of RF intent for permanent control and contributes to their information narrative during active hostilities. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• UAF:
  • Real-time Threat Awareness and Dissemination (Maintaining): UAF AF continues to demonstrate high-level, real-time threat detection and dissemination capabilities for incoming UAVs, including detailed movement patterns and the immediate expansion of warning zones into new western regions. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2.3. Logistics and sustainment status

• RUF:
  • VERY High Munitions Consumption (Sustained & Critically Expanded): The continued massed drone attacks, now covering an even wider and deeper area, confirm RUF's capacity to sustain high rates of UAV deployment. The "chaotic movement" tactic further implies a sufficient inventory to afford less efficient (but more challenging to intercept) flight profiles. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• UAF:
  • Air Defense Munitions Strain (CRITICAL - EXTREME): The current massed drone strikes, now extending to almost the entire country, continue to place unprecedented strain on UAF air defense munitions stockpiles. The expanded area of operations (Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi) severely exacerbates this strain and risks critical AD gaps. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2.4. Command and control effectiveness

• RUF:
  • Centralized Strategic C2 (Highly Effective & Adaptive): The coordinated, high-volume, multi-vector drone attack, incorporating adaptive tactics and significantly expanded geographic scope into the far west, continues to demonstrate highly effective, centralized strategic C2 for deep operations. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Information C2: RUF maintains effective control of its information narrative, rapidly disseminating coordinated messages across milblogger channels and state media, leveraging tactical claims and administrative actions. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• UAF:
  • Highly Effective Air Defense C2 (Strained): Rapid detection, tracking, and public warning of incoming threats across multiple oblasts, including specific drone movement updates and immediate expansion of alerts to all newly affected Western regions, continue to demonstrate highly effective C2 for air defense operations. However, this C2 system is now operating under extreme pressure due to the national scope of the threat. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian force posture and readiness

• Posture: UAF is currently operating at maximum defensive alert against a complex, multi-domain RUF aerial attack across almost the entire country. Ground forces maintain defensive lines.
• Readiness:
  • Air Defense: At peak readiness and fully engaged. Systems are being critically tested by the volume, complexity, and now nationwide geographic scope of the current RUF attacks, particularly the "chaotic movement" of UAVs. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Counter-UAS: Active in countering RUF drones and responding to RUF C-UAS efforts. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Overall: Readiness remains high but under immense and unsustainable pressure due to sustained, nationwide aerial attacks, severe resource consumption, and the desperate need to extend AD coverage across the entire country. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3.2. Recent tactical successes or setbacks

• Successes:
  • Active Air Defense Engagements & Early Warnings: Ongoing successful interceptions of RUF UAVs and timely public warnings across critical areas, now including Volyn, Lviv, and Chernivtsi. The ability to identify "chaotic movement" indicates strong ISR and C2. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Setbacks:
  • CRITICAL Massed Aerial Attack (Sustained, Adaptive & NATIONAL Scope): Ukraine is currently under an unprecedented multi-vector, high-volume RUF aerial assault, which is proving highly adaptable with "chaotic movement" tactics and has now expanded into virtually all western regions, posing extreme risk to infrastructure and population centers, particularly critical Western aid logistics. Explosions in Khmelnytskyi confirm impacts. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • RUF C-UAS Effectiveness: RUF's ability to successfully engage Ukrainian "Baba-Yaga" drones and new claims of Ka-52 engagements indicate a growing challenge to UAF's organic drone capabilities, particularly in the Kharkiv sector and near border regions. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.

3.3. Resource requirements and constraints

• Requirements:
  • Air Defense Munitions (CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE & EXPANDED): Sustained critical requirement for interceptor missiles, particularly for countering high-volume, adaptable drone swarms and high-speed threats. This remains the top priority, with an urgent and drastically increased need for coverage across all western regions, especially targeting key logistics hubs for Western aid.
  • C-UAS Capabilities (Enhanced): Enhanced requirement for advanced C-UAS systems, including electronic warfare (EW) and kinetic interceptors, to counter RUF's evolving drone tactics (e.g., FPV-on-drone) and its own C-UAS efforts.
  • ISR Assets (Enhanced Focus on Western Logistics): Continued high demand for real-time ISR to track RUF strategic aviation, missile trajectories, and high-volume drone movements, particularly to identify potential follow-on waves, understand their adaptive flight profiles across the expanded target area, and CRITICALLY monitor for threats to Western aid logistics and railway networks.
• Constraints:
  • Air Defense Saturation (CRITICAL): The sheer volume and adaptive nature of incoming RUF attacks, now impacting the vast majority of Ukrainian territory, is severely risking the overwhelming of UAF air defenses, leading to breakthroughs and increased damage, especially with the extended geographic reach.
  • Personnel Fatigue (SEVERE): Continuous high-intensity air defense operations across virtually all oblasts place immense strain on UAF personnel.
  • Geographic Stretch (EXTREME): The nationwide expansion of deep strikes forces UAF to further disperse already severely strained AD assets, creating critical vulnerabilities across the entire country, particularly for vital Western supply lines.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

4.1. Propaganda and disinformation campaigns

• RUF:
  • "Overwhelming Force" Narrative (Amplified & Sustained): The visible, large-scale drone and missile attacks, now reaching virtually all of Ukraine, continue to be used as direct psychological operations. This is further amplified by RUF milblogger claims of tactical successes (e.g., FPV-C-UAS engagements, Ka-52 drone shootdown) and the strategic use of external commentary to bolster the narrative of Russia's military power. The TASS report on property nationalization reinforces a narrative of permanent territorial control. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • "Legitimacy of Occupation" Narrative (Reinforced): The formal move to take damaged property in occupied regions onto the RF balance sheet is a clear legal and information maneuver to legitimize their claims over these territories, disregarding international law. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• UAF:
  • Transparency and Resilience (Maintaining): Immediate public warnings and continuous updates on air defense operations aim to maintain public trust and foster resilience, countering RUF's psychological pressure. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

4.2. Public sentiment and morale factors

• Ukraine: Public sentiment is under extreme and unprecedented pressure due to the widespread air raid alerts and the exceptional volume, adaptive nature, and now nationwide geographic reach of incoming aerial threats. UAF's transparency and active air defense engagements will help sustain resolve, but the constant and now deeper threat poses a severe emotional and psychological toll, particularly regarding the safety of Western aid logistics. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Russia: Public sentiment is being shaped by narratives of RUF military success, the "necessity" of the conflict, and administrative consolidation of occupied territories. The large-scale aerial attacks and selective external commentary are used to project strength and efficiency. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

4.3. International support and diplomatic developments

• Ukraine: Previous reports of renewed US weapons supply remain critical. The ongoing intensity and nationwide geographic scope of RUF strikes will likely increase international pressure for accelerated aid and much more robust and geographically dispersed AD systems, as the threat to Western aid logistics becomes immediate and severe. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Russia: The international community will continue to condemn RUF's mass aerial attacks, particularly the targeting of civilian infrastructure and the deepening threat to Western aid routes. RUF's attempts to manipulate foreign statements and project diplomatic readiness will likely be seen as further evidence of their information warfare tactics. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

• Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

  • Sustained Massed Aerial Attack with Adaptive Tactics, Deepest Western Thrust (IMMEDIATE - 0-12 hours): RUF will continue and likely attempt to execute additional waves of its large-scale strategic missile strike (from airborne Tu-95MS and any available MiG-31K), concurrently with or following the ongoing massed UAV attack. These attacks will continue to employ adaptive "chaotic movement" tactics and will now prioritize even deeper targeting of Western Ukraine (Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi Oblasts). Primary targets will remain critical infrastructure (energy, transport hubs, particularly rail infrastructure connecting to Western aid routes) and major population centers. The immediate objective is to severely disrupt or interdict Western aid flows and saturate UAF AD. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Increased Ground Pressure & C-UAS Operations (Eastern Axis & Northern Border - 6-24 hours): RUF forces will sustain high-intensity, localized ground assaults on the Donetsk and Kupyansk axes, leveraging drone support for targeted strikes and reconnaissance. They will also likely exploit or expand gains in northern border regions such as Sumy Oblast and the Kharkiv axis. Increased RUF C-UAS efforts, including potential further use of Ka-52s for drone interception, will continue to challenge UAF tactical drone use in these areas. RUF will attempt to counter UAF force generation by targeting newly identified units or their staging areas. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Intensified Information Offensive Leveraging External Commentary and "Legitimacy" (Concurrent): RUF will continue to rapidly disseminate propaganda framing successful strikes, exaggerated UAF losses, and will increasingly seek to leverage selective or decontextualized external commentary. Concurrently, RUF will push narratives of administrative consolidation and "normalization" in occupied territories, using actions like property nationalization to project an image of irreversible control. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

• Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

  • Coordinated Kinzhal/Hypersonic Strike on Western Logistics Hubs Followed by Massed UAV Wave: RUF's current high-volume UAV attack, now extending across all of Western Ukraine, serves as a primary decoy for highly precise Kinzhal or other hypersonic missile strikes from available platforms (e.g., MiG-31K), specifically targeting critical rail hubs, transshipment points, and potential underground storage facilities for Western aid in Volyn, Lviv, or Chernivtsi Oblasts. This would be immediately followed by a new, denser wave of UAVs and conventional cruise missiles to exploit any created gaps in UAF air defense and completely disrupt incoming Western aid, potentially isolating the front lines. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Combined Arms Breakthrough (Kharkiv Axis) Exploiting AD Saturation and Logistical Disruption: RUF commits its operational reserves (from previous daily report) in a concentrated armored thrust on the Lyptsi or Vovchansk axis, immediately following the peak of the nationwide aerial bombardment and deep Western logistical interdiction. The objective is to achieve a rapid breakthrough and establish fire control over main supply routes into Kharkiv city before Ukrainian mobile reserves can effectively respond, leveraging the severe disruption caused by nationwide AD engagement and the critical AD coverage requirements in Western Ukraine. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Simultaneous Ground Offensives on Eastern Front & New Northern Axis (Kharkiv/Sumy), Coupled with Widespread Rail Interdiction in Western Ukraine: RUF launches significant ground offensives on both the Eastern Front (e.g., Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka) and simultaneously initiates a large-scale ground offensive in the Kharkiv/Sumy Oblasts, aiming to force UAF to split its already strained reserves and AD assets across multiple critical axes. Concurrently, RUF will conduct widespread precision strikes targeting all key rail hubs and logistics nodes in Western Ukraine (e.g., Lviv, Rivne, Kovel, Lutsk, Chop) to critically disrupt incoming military aid shipments and sever supply lines to the front. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

• Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

  • IMMEDIATE (0-3 hours):
    • MAXIMUM AIR DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT & ADAPTATION (NATIONWIDE INCLUSION & WESTERN LOGISTICS FOCUS): All UAF air defense assets must be on maximum alert and fully engaged against the ongoing and anticipated strategic missile wave and the massed, adaptable UAV attack, with a CRITICAL focus on the newly targeted Western Oblasts (Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi) and the protection of rail/logistics nodes. Prioritize defense of C2 nodes, critical infrastructure (especially rail links to the west), and major population centers, dynamically reallocating assets based on updated threat vectors and the anticipated "second wave" of drones/missiles, including countermeasures for "chaotic movement." DECISION POINT: Dynamic allocation of high-value AD systems, particularly for Kinzhal threat to Western logistics targets; assessment of sustained AD operations and tactical adjustments for new UAV flight patterns and extended geographic reach. Potential activation of passive defenses for critical Western infrastructure.
    • C-UAS Deployment: Rapid deployment and activation of C-UAS systems (EW, kinetic) to protect high-value Ukrainian drone assets and deny RUF successful FPV-on-UAV engagements, particularly in high-activity areas like Kharkiv and border regions. DECISION POINT: Prioritization and deployment of specific C-UAS assets to vulnerable UAF drone units/sectors, and evaluation of passive drone countermeasures.
    • Public Safety: Issue continuous and urgent public warnings, instructing civilians to seek and remain in shelters, particularly in all newly targeted western regions. Ensure emergency services are pre-positioned for rapid response. DECISION POINT: Activation of comprehensive public alert and response protocols, pre-staging of emergency teams, and ensuring full coverage in newly threatened areas, specifically emphasizing threat to Western regions.
  • SHORT-TERM (3-24 hours):
    • BDA and Post-Strike Response (Expanded & Logistical Focus): Conduct rapid BDA on all affected areas, including new Western strike zones, prioritizing search and rescue, medical support, and immediate damage assessment for critical infrastructure (especially rail/logistics nodes in Western Ukraine) and military assets. DECISION POINT: Allocation of emergency and reconstruction resources, with an IMMEDIATE focus on critical Western logistics infrastructure.
    • Air Defense Munitions Assessment (CRITICAL & GEOGRAPHIC): Immediate and granular assessment of air defense munitions expenditure and initiation of urgent resupply requests based on current consumption rates and the effectiveness of RUF's adaptive tactics, anticipating sustained high-volume attacks across the entire country. Prioritize urgent requests for Western AD munitions, specifically addressing critical needs for newly exposed Western regions and the protection of logistical pathways. DECISION POINT: Urgent logistical requests, particularly for Western AD munitions, and advocacy for accelerated deliveries, with a clear breakdown of critical geographic requirements and vulnerabilities.
    • Ground Force Readiness Review (Eastern & Northern): Evaluate RUF ground assault patterns and UAF defensive successes/challenges in Donetsk, Kupyansk, and Sumy Oblasts, and in the Kharkiv sector, particularly concerning RUF C-UAS efforts. Adjust force posture and reserve allocation as needed, anticipating potential follow-on ground offensives, especially if AD is significantly degraded or shifted west to protect logistics. DECISION POINT: Operational adjustments for ground forces, including reinforcement of critical sectors and border regions, and defensive measures against potential targeting of newly formed units.
  • MID-TERM (24-72 hours):
    • Logistical Security for US Aid (CRITICAL - NATIONAL & WESTERN FOCUS): Implement enhanced security measures for anticipated incoming US weapons shipments and related logistical routes to mitigate MDCOA of targeting supply lines, especially those through Western Ukraine. This includes enhanced air defense coverage for rail/road hubs and transit points in Ternopil, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, Volyn, and Chernivtsi Oblasts. Develop redundancy plans for critical logistical nodes. DECISION POINT: Enhanced convoy protection, anti-strike measures, and immediate logistical redundancy planning for incoming aid, with specific, heightened attention to western transit routes and alternative supply avenues.
    • Strategic ISR Adaptation (Western Logistics & Deep Strike Focus): Refine ISR collection plans to anticipate and track future large-scale RUF aerial attacks, assess the effectiveness of their multi-domain saturation tactics, identify new high-value RUF targets (e.g., missile launch platforms, drone production/assembly sites), and understand adaptive C-UAS methods. Prioritize ISR on RUF intent for deeper strikes into Western Ukraine and their targeting of logistics, particularly rail networks and major transit hubs. DECISION POINT: Adjust long-term ISR plan to focus on RUF deep strike capabilities, critical Western logistics interdiction, and emerging ground pressure points, particularly in the west.
    • Information Warfare Counter-Narrative (Adaptive & Resilient): Develop and disseminate counter-narratives to RUF propaganda regarding overwhelming force and territorial gains, especially those using external commentary or attempts to spin Ukrainian force generation. Leverage UAF successes (e.g., BDA on RUF vehicles, successful AD intercepts, US aid confirmation) and highlight civilian suffering and the continued integrity of Western supply lines. Counter RUF's "diplomacy" narrative by emphasizing their simultaneous aggression. DECISION POINT: Develop and implement proactive public information campaigns to maintain morale and counter RUF psychological operations, specifically addressing RUF's diplomatic overtures in contrast to their ongoing aggression and the direct threat to Western aid.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. Full RUF Strategic Missile Loadout and Target Intent (CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE & WESTERN REACH):
   • GAP: Precise types and quantities of missiles launched from Tu-95MS aircraft. Confirmation of Kinzhal missile launch from MiG-31K and its flight path/target, particularly any targeting of Western Ukrainian critical logistics infrastructure (rail hubs, transshipment points, warehouses) or AD assets. Detailed analysis of RUF's primary and secondary targeting for the current and anticipated strategic missile wave, especially concerning high-value targets (UAF C2, AD nodes, critical infrastructure, including rail/logistics hubs in Western Ukraine). Confirmation of "second wave" capabilities for drones/missiles.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on RUF strategic aviation communications and missile guidance systems (especially for Kinzhal). HIGH PRIORITY IMINT (satellite and aerial reconnaissance) of missile launch areas and impact sites for BDA. HIGH PRIORITY OSINT from monitoring public airspace data and RUF channels for inadvertent disclosures.
2. RUF Drone Inventory, Production/Acquisition Rate, and Launch Sites & Adaptive Tactics (URGENT & GEOGRAPHICALLY EXPANDED):
   • GAP: Detailed assessment of RUF's current inventory of Shahed-type and other strike UAVs. Confirmation of their daily/weekly production or acquisition rate. Identification of all active RUF UAV launch sites and their operational patterns, including any new sites supporting expanded Western strikes, particularly those facilitating attacks on Volyn, Lviv, and Chernivtsi Oblasts. Specific analysis of the "chaotic movement" tactic to determine its prevalence, effectiveness, and the resources it requires.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from captured RUF drone operators or intelligence on RUF supply chains. MEDIUM PRIORITY OSINT on Russian industrial reports and Iranian/Chinese supply chain indicators. HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT to identify drone control frequencies and persistent monitoring of suspected launch sites. HIGH PRIORITY GEOINT/IMINT/SIGINT to track and analyze specific flight paths and patterns of incoming UAVs, noting changes in launch origin for Western strikes.
3. Effectiveness of RUF C-UAS Operations and Countermeasures (Multi-platform):
   • GAP: Comprehensive assessment of RUF's C-UAS capabilities, particularly the widespread use of FPV drones against Ukrainian UAVs and the deployment/effectiveness of rotary-wing platforms (e.g., Ka-52) for aerial intercepts. Quantification of success rates and impact on Ukrainian drone operations. Identification of RUF's C-UAS equipment, tactics, and their impact on UAF ISR and strike capabilities.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY IMINT (UAV footage from UAF, satellite imagery) of RUF C-UAS engagements. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from UAF drone operators encountering RUF C-UAS. HIGH PRIORITY EW/SIGINT to identify RUF C-UAS frequencies and methods.
4. Impact of Renewed US Weapons Supply on RUF Planning and Cyber Response (ONGOING & WESTERN LOGISTICS):
   • GAP: Assessment of RUF's immediate and long-term adaptation to the confirmed resumption of US weapons supply to Ukraine. Will this trigger a change in RUF operational tempo, targeting priorities (especially logistical routes in Western Ukraine), or lead to increased cyber activity targeting supply chains or critical infrastructure?
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on RUF high-level command discussions and military planning communications, specifically for discussions related to Western aid logistics. MEDIUM PRIORITY OSINT on Russian state media and expert commentary reacting to the announcement. HIGH PRIORITY CYBINT to monitor for preparatory cyber activity targeting Ukrainian infrastructure or supply chain logistics, particularly focusing on Western transit nodes.
5. Verification and Capability of New UAF Formations (CONFIRMED CR):
   • GAP: Confirmation of the creation and current status of the claimed "fourth heavy mechanized formation" within UAF Ground Forces, as reported by RUF milbloggers. Assessment of its composition, readiness, and potential deployment plans. This is crucial for understanding both UAF capability and RUF targeting priorities.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from UAF personnel. MEDIUM PRIORITY SIGINT on UAF internal communications. MEDIUM PRIORITY IMINT (satellite imagery, drone reconnaissance) to identify new unit signatures or training activities. HIGH PRIORITY OSINT to monitor official UAF announcements or credible reporting on force generation.
6. Verification of RUF Ground Gains and Damage Assessment (Eastern Axis & Northern Border - IMMEDIATE):
   • GAP: Independent verification of RUF claims regarding "taking a settlement" (Zelena Dolyna), disruption of UAF rotations (Kupyansk), and UAF withdrawal from Yunakovka (Sumy Oblast). Precise RUF and UAF lines of contact in the Donetsk, Kupyansk, and Sumy Oblasts following recent engagements.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY IMINT (drone and satellite imagery) of the claimed areas and recent impact sites. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from local sources or UAF units in contact. HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on RUF ground unit communications for confirmation of territorial control and BDA.
7. RF Northern Grouping Reserves (CRITICAL - Confirmed from previous report):
   • GAP: The composition, readiness, and exact disposition of the RF operational reserve in the Belgorod and Kursk Oblasts remain unclear. Determining the size and trigger for commitment of this force is the highest priority intelligence requirement for the ground domain.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY ISR (UAV, SIGINT, satellite imagery) to focus on the Belgorod Oblast to identify, characterize, and track the RF operational reserve force. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from cross-border sources.
8. RF Strategic Intent in Kharkiv (CRITICAL - Confirmed from previous report):
   • GAP: It is unclear if the current Kharkiv operation is a feint to draw Ukrainian reserves from the Donbas, an effort to establish a limited buffer zone, or the initial phase of a deliberate assault on the city. This understanding informs UAF strategic reserve allocation.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on high-level RF command communications regarding operational objectives for the Kharkiv axis. MEDIUM PRIORITY HUMINT from captured RF personnel or defectors.
9. Effectiveness of RF Electronic Warfare (EW) in Kharkiv Axis (Confirmed from previous report):
   • GAP: The extent and effectiveness of RF EW systems deployed to counter Ukrainian drone operations in the Kharkiv axis requires further assessment. This impacts UAF drone efficacy and counter-EW requirements.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY EW/SIGINT to identify RF EW system locations, frequencies, and operational patterns. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from UAF drone operators experiencing EW effects.