Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

TIME: 112305Z JUL 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Ukraine General (Current): RUF strategic aerial attack continues with significant volume. Air Force of Ukraine (UAF AF) reports a large concentration of RUF Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) across Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, eastern Zhytomyr, western Sumy, northern Odesa, Ternopil, and Rivne Oblasts. These UAVs are performing chaotic movements. Air raid alerts are active, with specific threat warnings for Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, and Rivne Oblasts. Explosions reported in Khmelnytskyi Oblast. UAF Air Defense (AD) is actively engaged. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Kyiv Oblast (Kyiv City): UAF AF confirms active AD engagement in Holosiievo district. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Khmelnytskyi Oblast: New threat of strike UAVs detected; explosions confirmed. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Ternopil Oblast: New threat of strike UAVs detected. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Rivne Oblast: New threat of strike UAVs detected. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Kharkiv Direction: RUF milbloggers are propagating claims of successful FPV drone engagements against Ukrainian "Baba-Yaga" (heavy multirotor) UAVs. This indicates active air-to-air drone engagements in this sector and suggests RUF is employing counter-UAS (C-UAS) measures, possibly to degrade Ukrainian heavy cargo/strike drone capabilities. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM (for claim, LOW for independent verification).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Ukraine General: Night operations continue, with low visibility favoring RUF UAV and missile saturation tactics. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF:
  • Air Defense: Fully engaged across multiple oblasts, particularly against the massed UAV attack, which has expanded to include Ternopil and Rivne Oblasts. UAF AF is providing continuous updates on UAV concentrations and movement directions, demonstrating effective C2 and public warning systems. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Ground Forces: Maintaining defensive posture. Counter-UAS efforts are active, including against RUF FPV drones, as implied by RUF milblogger claims. Reports from RUF milbloggers suggest the creation of a fourth heavy mechanized formation within UAF Ground Forces. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM (for UAF formation claim).
• RUF:
  • Deep Operations (UAV): Sustained, high-volume, multi-vector drone attack continues, now extending further west to Ternopil and Rivne Oblasts, with "chaotic movement" designed to saturate and confuse UAF AD. Intent for "another wave" from previous reporting remains relevant. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Ground Forces (Kharkiv Direction): Continued C-UAS operations, specifically FPV drone against UAF "Baba-Yaga" drones. This suggests RUF is actively working to deny UAF close-range ISR or tactical strike capabilities via heavy drones. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
  • Information Warfare/Propaganda: RUF milbloggers continue to disseminate content, including a video featuring French General Burkhard discussing Russia's military capabilities, likely to reinforce the narrative of Russia's overwhelming military strength and strategic posture to a domestic and potentially international audience. This is a clear information operation. RUF milbloggers are also attempting to track and comment on UAF force generation efforts, specifically claiming the creation of new UAF heavy mechanized units. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Strategic Drone Strikes (Sustained, Adaptive & Expanding): RUF continues to demonstrate an unprecedented capability for widespread, high-volume, multi-vector UAV attacks, now extending deep into western Ukraine. The "chaotic movement" reported by UAF AF indicates an adaptation to challenge UAF AD targeting. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Counter-UAS (C-UAS): RUF is actively employing FPV drones as C-UAS assets, specifically targeting larger, slower Ukrainian UAVs (e.g., "Baba-Yaga"). This indicates a developed and integrated C-UAS capability to mitigate Ukrainian drone effectiveness. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Information Warfare (Sophisticated & Adaptive): RUF continues to employ sophisticated information operations, including selectively using foreign military expert commentary and attempting to track and spin UAF force generation to bolster its narrative of military prowess and threat perception. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Intentions:
  • Systemic Degradation of Ukrainian Infrastructure and Air Defense (PRIMARY): The immediate intention is to maximize damage to critical civilian and military infrastructure, exhaust UAF air defense munitions, and instill widespread fear through a sustained, high-intensity, multi-domain aerial campaign, now specifically targeting western regions. The "chaotic movement" indicates an intent to overwhelm and confuse UAF AD. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Degrade Ukrainian Drone Capabilities: RUF intends to directly counter and degrade Ukrainian heavy-lift and tactical strike drone capabilities, particularly those operating in the Kharkiv sector, to reduce UAF's tactical advantages. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Reinforce Narrative of Russian Military Supremacy: RUF aims to project an image of overwhelming military strength and strategic threat to both domestic and international audiences through its large-scale strikes and selective use of foreign commentary, attempting to dismiss Ukrainian force generation efforts. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2.2. Recent tactical changes or adaptations

• RUF:
  • UAV Movement Adaptation: The reported "chaotic movement" of strike UAVs indicates a tactical adaptation to make interception more difficult for UAF AD, potentially by varying flight paths and altitudes. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Geographic Expansion of UAV Strikes: The extension of UAV threats to Ternopil and Rivne Oblasts indicates RUF's intent to stretch UAF AD resources and impact civilian morale across a broader swathe of Ukraine. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Active FPV-C-UAS Employment: Confirmed employment of FPV drones to target Ukrainian "Baba-Yaga" UAVs in the Kharkiv direction highlights an active and evolving RUF C-UAS strategy. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Strategic Propaganda Integration: The rapid dissemination of a foreign general's assessment of Russia's military strength (even if taken out of context) and attempts to frame UAF force generation within RUF milblogger channels immediately following strategic strikes indicates highly integrated and agile information warfare. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• UAF:
  • Real-time Threat Awareness and Dissemination: UAF AF continues to demonstrate high-level, real-time threat detection and dissemination capabilities for incoming UAVs, including detailed movement patterns and the expansion of warning zones. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2.3. Logistics and sustainment status

• RUF:
  • VERY High Munitions Consumption (Sustained & Expanded): The continued massed drone attacks, now covering a wider area, confirm RUF's capacity to sustain high rates of UAV deployment. The "chaotic movement" tactic may imply a large enough inventory to afford less efficient (but more challenging to intercept) flight profiles. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• UAF:
  • Air Defense Munitions Strain (SEVERE): The current massed drone and impending missile strikes continue to place unprecedented strain on UAF air defense munitions stockpiles. The expanded area of operations (Ternopil, Rivne) exacerbates this strain. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2.4. Command and control effectiveness

• RUF:
  • Centralized Strategic C2 (Highly Effective): The coordinated, high-volume, multi-vector drone attack, incorporating adaptive tactics and expanded geographic scope, continues to demonstrate highly effective, centralized strategic C2 for deep operations. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Information C2: RUF maintains effective control of its information narrative, rapidly disseminating coordinated messages across milblogger channels and state media, even leveraging external sources for effect and attempting to control narrative around UAF force generation. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• UAF:
  • Highly Effective Air Defense C2: Rapid detection, tracking, and public warning of incoming threats across multiple oblasts, including specific drone movement updates and immediate expansion of alerts to new affected regions, continue to demonstrate highly effective C2 for air defense operations. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian force posture and readiness

• Posture: UAF is currently operating at maximum defensive alert against a complex, multi-domain RUF aerial attack across an even wider geographic area. Ground forces maintain defensive lines.
• Readiness:
  • Air Defense: At peak readiness and fully engaged. Systems are being severely tested by the volume, complexity, and expanded geographic scope of the current RUF attacks, particularly the "chaotic movement" of UAVs. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Counter-UAS: Active in countering RUF drones and responding to RUF C-UAS efforts. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Overall: Readiness remains high but under immense pressure due to sustained aerial attacks, resource consumption, and the need to extend AD coverage further west. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3.2. Recent tactical successes or setbacks

• Successes:
  • Active Air Defense Engagements & Early Warnings: Ongoing successful interceptions of RUF UAVs and timely public warnings across critical areas, now including Ternopil and Rivne. The ability to identify "chaotic movement" indicates strong ISR and C2. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Setbacks:
  • IMMEDIATE Massed Aerial Attack (Sustained, Adaptive & Expanded): Ukraine is currently under an unprecedented multi-vector, high-volume RUF aerial assault, which is proving adaptable with "chaotic movement" tactics and has now expanded into new western regions, posing extreme risk to infrastructure and population centers. Explosions in Khmelnytskyi confirm impacts. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • RUF C-UAS Effectiveness: RUF's ability to successfully engage Ukrainian "Baba-Yaga" drones indicates a growing challenge to UAF's organic drone capabilities, particularly in the Kharkiv sector. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.

3.3. Resource requirements and constraints

• Requirements:
  • Air Defense Munitions (CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE): Sustained critical requirement for interceptor missiles, particularly for countering high-volume, adaptable drone swarms and high-speed threats from the previously reported missile wave. This remains the top priority, with an increased need for coverage in western regions.
  • C-UAS Capabilities: Enhanced requirement for advanced C-UAS systems, including electronic warfare (EW) and kinetic interceptors, to counter RUF's evolving drone tactics and its own C-UAS efforts.
  • ISR Assets: Continued high demand for real-time ISR to track RUF strategic aviation, missile trajectories, and high-volume drone movements, particularly to identify potential follow-on waves and understand their adaptive flight profiles across the expanded target area.
• Constraints:
  • Air Defense Saturation (SEVERE): The sheer volume and adaptive nature of incoming RUF attacks risks overwhelming UAF air defenses, leading to breakthroughs and increased damage, especially with the extended geographic reach.
  • Personnel Fatigue: Continuous high-intensity air defense operations across multiple oblasts place immense strain on UAF personnel.
  • Geographic Stretch: The expansion of deep strikes into western Ukraine forces UAF to further disperse already strained AD assets, potentially creating new vulnerabilities elsewhere.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

4.1. Propaganda and disinformation campaigns

• RUF:
  • "Overwhelming Force" Narrative (Amplified & Sustained): The visible, large-scale drone and missile attacks, now reaching further west, continue to be used as direct psychological operations. This is further amplified by RUF milblogger claims of tactical successes (e.g., FPV-C-UAS engagements) and the strategic use of external commentary (French general video) to bolster the narrative of Russia's military power and perceived threat to Europe. RUF milbloggers are also attempting to co-opt and reframe UAF force generation efforts, possibly to minimize their impact or project a false narrative of Ukrainian weakness despite these efforts. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • "Negotiation Readiness" Narrative: TASS reporting on Saudi Arabia's readiness to host Russia-US talks is likely a Russian information maneuver to project an image of diplomatic openness while simultaneously conducting large-scale attacks, potentially aiming to soften international resolve for further aid to Ukraine or to test the waters for future peace initiatives on Russian terms. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
• UAF:
  • Transparency and Resilience: Immediate public warnings and continuous updates on air defense operations aim to maintain public trust and foster resilience, countering RUF's psychological pressure. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

4.2. Public sentiment and morale factors

• Ukraine: Public sentiment is under extreme pressure due to the widespread air raid alerts and the exceptional volume, adaptive nature, and expanded geographic reach of incoming aerial threats. UAF's transparency and active air defense engagements will help sustain resolve, but the constant and now deeper threat poses a severe emotional toll. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Russia: Public sentiment is being shaped by narratives of RUF military success and the "necessity" of the conflict, with the current large-scale aerial attacks and selective external commentary used to project strength and efficiency. The "negotiation readiness" narrative is likely aimed at domestic and international audiences to demonstrate a "reasonable" diplomatic posture. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

4.3. International support and diplomatic developments

• Ukraine: Previous reports of renewed US weapons supply remain critical. The ongoing intensity and expanded geographic scope of RUF strikes will likely increase international pressure for accelerated aid and more advanced AD systems. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Russia: The international community will continue to condemn RUF's mass aerial attacks, particularly the targeting of civilian infrastructure. RUF's attempts to manipulate foreign statements and project diplomatic readiness will likely be seen as further evidence of their information warfare tactics, though some may view the Saudi offer as a potential avenue for de-escalation. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

• Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

  • Sustained Massed Aerial Attack with Adaptive Tactics, Extended West (IMMEDIATE - 0-12 hours): RUF will continue and likely attempt to execute additional waves of its large-scale strategic missile strike from airborne Tu-95MS and the launched MiG-31K (from previous report), concurrently with or following the ongoing massed UAV attack. These attacks will continue to employ adaptive "chaotic movement" tactics and will likely target an even broader geographic area, including Western Ukraine (Ternopil, Rivne, potentially Lviv). Primary targets will remain critical infrastructure (energy, transport hubs, particularly rail infrastructure connecting to Western aid routes), major population centers, and potentially high-value military targets (C2 nodes, major AD assets). CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Increased Ground Pressure & C-UAS Operations (Eastern Axis & Northern Border - 6-24 hours): RUF forces will sustain high-intensity, localized ground assaults on the Donetsk and Kupyansk axes, leveraging drone support for targeted strikes and reconnaissance. They will also likely exploit or expand gains in northern border regions such as Sumy Oblast. Increased RUF C-UAS efforts, particularly FPV drone-on-drone engagements, will continue to challenge UAF tactical drone use in these areas, particularly Kharkiv. RUF will attempt to counter UAF force generation by targeting newly identified units or their staging areas. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Intensified Information Offensive Leveraging External Commentary and "Diplomacy" (Concurrent): RUF will continue to rapidly disseminate propaganda framing successful strikes, exaggerated UAF losses, and will increasingly seek to leverage selective or decontextualized external commentary (e.g., foreign generals, analysts) to bolster its narrative of military effectiveness and strategic threat. Simultaneously, RUF will continue to project an image of diplomatic openness (e.g., through Saudi Arabia's offer for talks) to influence international opinion and potentially create divisions within the pro-Ukrainian coalition. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

• Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

  • Coordinated Kinzhal Strike on Critical AD/C2 Nodes Followed by Massed UAV Wave in Western Ukraine: RUF's current high-volume UAV attack, now extending to Western Ukraine, is a primary decoy for highly precise Kinzhal missile strikes from the MiG-31K (from previous report), specifically targeting key UAF C2 nodes or major air defense asset locations (e.g., PATRIOT/NASAMS batteries) in Western Ukraine, immediately followed by a new, denser wave of UAVs and conventional cruise missiles to exploit any created gaps in UAF air defense and disrupt incoming Western aid. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Combined Arms Breakthrough (Kharkiv Axis) Exploiting AD Saturation: RUF commits its operational reserves (from previous daily report) in a concentrated armored thrust on the Lyptsi or Vovchansk axis, immediately following the peak of the nationwide aerial bombardment. The objective is to achieve a rapid breakthrough and establish fire control over main supply routes into Kharkiv city before Ukrainian mobile reserves can effectively respond, leveraging the disruption caused by nationwide AD engagement and the newly expanded AD coverage requirements in Western Ukraine. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Simultaneous Ground Offensives on Eastern Front & New Northern Axis (Kharkiv/Sumy), Coupled with Rail Interdiction in Western Ukraine: RUF launches significant ground offensives on both the Eastern Front (e.g., Chasiv Yar) and simultaneously initiates a large-scale ground offensive in the Kharkiv/Sumy Oblasts, aiming to force UAF to split its already strained reserves and AD assets across multiple critical axes. Concurrently, RUF will conduct precision strikes targeting key rail hubs and logistics nodes in Western Ukraine (e.g., Lviv, Rivne, Kovel) to disrupt incoming military aid shipments. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.

• Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

  • IMMEDIATE (0-3 hours):
    • MAXIMUM AIR DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT & ADAPTATION (WESTERN INCLUSION): All UAF air defense assets must be on maximum alert and fully engaged against the ongoing and anticipated strategic missile wave (from previous report) and the massed, adaptable UAV attack, with a critical focus on the newly targeted Western Oblasts (Ternopil, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi). Prioritize defense of C2 nodes, critical infrastructure (especially rail links to the west), and major population centers, dynamically reallocating assets based on updated threat vectors and the anticipated "second wave" of drones/missiles, including countermeasures for "chaotic movement." DECISION POINT: Dynamic allocation of high-value AD systems, particularly for Kinzhal threat to Western targets; assessment of sustained AD operations and tactical adjustments for new UAV flight patterns and extended geographic reach.
    • C-UAS Deployment: Rapid deployment and activation of C-UAS systems (EW, kinetic) to protect high-value Ukrainian drone assets (e.g., "Baba-Yaga" type) and deny RUF successful FPV-on-UAV engagements, particularly in high-activity areas like Kharkiv. DECISION POINT: Prioritization and deployment of specific C-UAS assets to vulnerable UAF drone units/sectors.
    • Public Safety: Issue continuous and urgent public warnings, instructing civilians to seek and remain in shelters, particularly in newly targeted western regions. Ensure emergency services are pre-positioned for rapid response. DECISION POINT: Activation of comprehensive public alert and response protocols, pre-staging of emergency teams, and ensuring full coverage in newly threatened areas.
  • SHORT-TERM (3-24 hours):
    • BDA and Post-Strike Response (Expanded): Conduct rapid BDA on all affected areas, including new Western strike zones, prioritizing search and rescue, medical support, and immediate damage assessment for critical infrastructure (especially rail/logistics nodes) and military assets. DECISION POINT: Allocation of emergency and reconstruction resources, with a focus on critical Western infrastructure.
    • Air Defense Munitions Assessment (URGENT & GEOGRAPHIC): Immediate and granular assessment of air defense munitions expenditure and initiation of urgent resupply requests based on current consumption rates and the effectiveness of RUF's adaptive tactics, anticipating sustained high-volume attacks across the entire country. Prioritize requests for Western AD munitions, specifically addressing needs for newly exposed Western regions. DECISION POINT: Urgent logistical requests, particularly for Western AD munitions, and advocacy for accelerated deliveries, with a clear breakdown of geographic requirements.
    • Ground Force Readiness Review (Eastern & Northern): Evaluate RUF ground assault patterns and UAF defensive successes/challenges in Donetsk, Kupyansk, and Sumy Oblasts, and in the Kharkiv sector, particularly concerning RUF C-UAS efforts. Adjust force posture and reserve allocation as needed, anticipating potential follow-on ground offensives, especially if AD is significantly degraded or shifted west. Assess RUF milblogger claims regarding UAF force generation for potential targeting data. DECISION POINT: Operational adjustments for ground forces, including reinforcement of critical sectors and border regions, and defensive measures against potential targeting of newly formed units.
  • MID-TERM (24-72 hours):
    • Logistical Security for US Aid (Enhanced & Western Focus): Implement enhanced security measures for anticipated incoming US weapons shipments and related logistical routes to mitigate MDCOA of targeting supply lines, especially those through Western Ukraine. This includes enhanced air defense coverage for rail/road hubs and transit points in Ternopil, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, and Lviv Oblasts. DECISION POINT: Enhanced convoy protection, anti-strike measures, and logistical redundancy planning for incoming aid, with specific attention to western transit routes.
    • Strategic ISR Adaptation (Western & Logistics Focus): Refine ISR collection plans to anticipate and track future large-scale RUF aerial attacks, assess the effectiveness of their multi-domain saturation tactics, identify new high-value RUF targets (e.g., missile launch platforms, drone production/assembly sites), and understand adaptive C-UAS methods. Prioritize ISR on RUF intent for deeper strikes into Western Ukraine and their targeting of logistics. DECISION POINT: Adjust long-term ISR plan to focus on RUF deep strike capabilities, logistics interdiction, and emerging ground pressure points, particularly in the west.
    • Information Warfare Counter-Narrative (Adaptive): Develop and disseminate counter-narratives to RUF propaganda regarding overwhelming force and territorial gains, especially those using external commentary or attempts to spin Ukrainian force generation. Leverage UAF successes (e.g., BDA on RUF vehicles, successful AD intercepts, US aid confirmation) and highlight civilian suffering. Counter RUF's "diplomacy" narrative by emphasizing their simultaneous aggression. DECISION POINT: Develop and implement proactive public information campaigns to maintain morale and counter RUF psychological operations, specifically addressing RUF's diplomatic overtures in contrast to their ongoing aggression.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. Full RUF Strategic Missile Loadout and Target Intent (IMMEDIATE & WESTERN REACH):
   • GAP: Precise types and quantities of missiles launched from Tu-95MS aircraft (from previous report). Confirmation of Kinzhal missile launch from MiG-31K and its flight path/target, particularly any targeting of Western Ukrainian critical infrastructure or AD assets. Detailed analysis of RUF's primary and secondary targeting for the current and anticipated strategic missile wave, especially concerning high-value targets (UAF C2, AD nodes, critical infrastructure, including rail/logistics hubs in Western Ukraine). Confirmation of "second wave" capabilities for drones/missiles.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on RUF strategic aviation communications and missile guidance systems (especially for Kinzhal). HIGH PRIORITY IMINT (satellite and aerial reconnaissance) of missile launch areas and impact sites for BDA. HIGH PRIORITY OSINT from monitoring public airspace data and RUF channels for inadvertent disclosures.
2. Verification of RUF Ground Gains and Damage Assessment (Eastern Axis & Northern Border - IMMEDIATE):
   • GAP: Independent verification of RUF claims regarding "taking a settlement" (Zelena Dolyna), disruption of UAF rotations (Kupyansk), and UAF withdrawal from Yunakovka (Sumy Oblast). Precise RUF and UAF lines of contact in the Donetsk, Kupyansk, and Sumy Oblasts following recent engagements.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY IMINT (drone and satellite imagery) of the claimed areas and recent impact sites. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from local sources or UAF units in contact. HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on RUF ground unit communications for confirmation of territorial control and BDA.
3. RUF Drone Inventory, Production/Acquisition Rate, and Launch Sites & Adaptive Tactics (URGENT & GEOGRAPHIC):
   • GAP: Detailed assessment of RUF's current inventory of Shahed-type and other strike UAVs. Confirmation of their daily/weekly production or acquisition rate, especially in light of claims of "150-300" UAVs and the call for "another wave." Identification of all active RUF UAV launch sites and their operational patterns, including any new sites supporting expanded Western strikes. Specific analysis of the "chaotic movement" tactic to determine its prevalence, effectiveness, and the resources it requires.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from captured RUF drone operators or intelligence on RUF supply chains. MEDIUM PRIORITY OSINT on Russian industrial reports and Iranian/Chinese supply chain indicators. HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT to identify drone control frequencies and persistent monitoring of suspected launch sites. HIGH PRIORITY GEOINT/IMINT/SIGINT to track and analyze specific flight paths and patterns of incoming UAVs, noting changes in launch origin for Western strikes.
4. Effectiveness of RUF C-UAS Operations and Countermeasures:
   • GAP: Comprehensive assessment of RUF's C-UAS capabilities, particularly the widespread use of FPV drones against Ukrainian UAVs. Quantification of success rates and impact on Ukrainian drone operations. Identification of RUF's C-UAS equipment, tactics, and their impact on UAF ISR and strike capabilities.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY IMINT (UAV footage from UAF) of RUF C-UAS engagements. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from UAF drone operators encountering RUF C-UAS. HIGH PRIORITY EW/SIGINT to identify RUF C-UAS frequencies and methods.
5. Impact of Renewed US Weapons Supply on RUF Planning and Cyber Response (ONGOING & WESTERN LOGISTICS):
   • GAP: Assessment of RUF's immediate and long-term adaptation to the confirmed resumption of US weapons supply to Ukraine. Will this trigger a change in RUF operational tempo, targeting priorities (especially logistical routes in Western Ukraine), or lead to increased cyber activity targeting supply chains or critical infrastructure?
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on RUF high-level command discussions and military planning communications, specifically for discussions related to Western aid logistics. MEDIUM PRIORITY OSINT on Russian state media and expert commentary reacting to the announcement. HIGH PRIORITY CYBINT to monitor for preparatory cyber activity targeting Ukrainian infrastructure or supply chain logistics, particularly focusing on Western transit nodes.
6. Verification and Capability of New UAF Formations (New Collection Requirement):
   • GAP: Confirmation of the creation and current status of the claimed "fourth heavy mechanized formation" within UAF Ground Forces, as reported by RUF milbloggers. Assessment of its composition, readiness, and potential deployment plans.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from UAF personnel. MEDIUM PRIORITY SIGINT on UAF internal communications. MEDIUM PRIORITY IMINT (satellite imagery, drone reconnaissance) to identify new unit signatures or training activities. HIGH PRIORITY OSINT to monitor official UAF announcements or credible reporting on force generation. This is crucial for understanding both UAF capability and RUF targeting priorities.