Sitrep 2025-06-24 10:37:47

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 241037Z JUN 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

Donetsk Oblast: RUF MoD, Colonelcassad, and Poddubny |Z|О|V| edition continue to claim the "liberation" of Dyleyevka (Donetsk People's Republic), described as a "powerful fortified area" on the approaches to Konstantinovka. RUF claims this allows "fire control" over UAF logistics towards Konstantinovka. (HIGH CONFIDENCE – RUF claims on Dyleyevka; LOW CONFIDENCE – verification by UAF).
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Dnipro): RUF launched ballistic missiles against Dnipro city. WarGonzo claims 4 Iskander missiles struck targets in Dnipro. UAF Air Force (Повітряні Сили ЗС України / Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine) issued a missile threat warning for Mykolaiv Oblast. ASTRA reports 3 confirmed KIA and over 20 wounded due to the daytime shelling of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. RBC-Ukraine updated that the Mayor of Dnipro specified 19 schools, 10 kindergartens, a vocational school, and a music school were damaged. Video footage from RBC-Ukraine and Alex Parker Returns shows a damaged passenger train (No. 52 Odesa-Zaporizhzhia) and a large explosion in Dnipro. (HIGH CONFIDENCE – UAF/Independent sources on impacts, casualties, train damage, and damage to civilian infrastructure; HIGH CONFIDENCE – Civilian targeting).
Sumy Oblast: Basurin о главном posts photos and claims to be reporting from a "buffer zone" in Sumy Oblast, indicating RUF presence or claims of presence in Ukrainian territory. (LOW CONFIDENCE – RUF claim of "buffer zone" in Sumy, unverified).
Zaporizhzhia Oblast: Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration reports a Zaporizhzhiaoblenergo employee was wounded as a result of an enemy attack in Vasylivka District. Air raid alert was lifted. (HIGH CONFIDENCE – UAF official report).
RF Territory (Sheremetyevo Airport, Moscow): TASS and ASTRA report the detention of the Belarusian man who threw a 2-year-old child to the floor, with drugs found during a search. This continues to be amplified by RUF sources for domestic consumption. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
RF Territory (Kursk Oblast): Дневник Десантника🇷🇺 posts aerial footage (thermal/visual) of a wooded area in Kursk Oblast with text indicating "Navigation lights ON," suggesting RUF reconnaissance or observation of potential UAF activity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE – RUF internal reporting).
RF Territory (Crimea): Два майора posts videos of a building collapse and a building engulfed in flames, captioned "Crimea," suggesting damage from recent incidents. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE – RUF internal reporting, unclear cause of damage).
RF Territory (Shakhovo, Toretskoye): Operation Z and MoD Russia release videos claiming Geran-2 UAVs hit a UAF temporary deployment area near Shakhovo and an ammunition depot near Toretskoye. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE – RUF claims with video, unverified by UAF).
RF Territory (Various Regions): RUF MoD via TASS claims that Russian air defense forces destroyed 34 Ukrainian UAVs over various regions of Russia between 08:05 and 12:50 MSK. (HIGH CONFIDENCE – RUF claim).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors:

No significant changes to weather or environmental factors affecting operations in Ukraine. Visuals from Dnipro continue to show clear skies during ballistic missile impacts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF):
- Ground Forces: UAF 23rd Engineer-Positioning Regiment (✙DeepState✙🇺🇦) showed footage of building fortifications (IFS), indicating continued defensive preparations. UAF forces are on high alert for missile threats in Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblasts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
- Air Defense (AD): UAF Air Force continues to provide real-time warnings of RUF missile threats (Mykolaiv, Kherson). UAF AD is engaged in intercepting RUF attacks, but the volume of RUF strikes continues to cause significant civilian casualties and infrastructure damage, particularly from ballistic missiles. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
- Information Operations (IO): Ukrainian channels (RBC-Ukraine, Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration) continue to provide immediate assessments and photographic/video evidence of RUF attacks and their consequences, highlighting civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure (Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
Russian Forces (RUF):
- Ground Operations: RUF MoD claims "mopping up" Dyleyevka (Donetsk Oblast). Colonelcassad claims control over Petrovske (Hrekivka) and the "liberation of Luhansk People's Republic," which requires urgent verification. Basurin claims a "buffer zone" in Sumy Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE – RUF claims on Dyleyevka; LOW CONFIDENCE – Claims on Petrovske and Sumy "buffer zone," unverified).
- Artillery/Air Strikes: RUF employed ballistic missiles (claimed 4 Iskanders) on Dnipro, causing significant civilian infrastructure damage and casualties. RUF continues to use Geran-2 UAVs for precision strikes (Shakhovo, Toretskoye). RUF UAVs are also active in Kursk Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE – UAF reports on strikes; MEDIUM CONFIDENCE – RUF claims on specific targets/munition types).
- Logistics/Equipment: RUF continues to possess and employ advanced missile and UAV systems. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
- Information Operations (IO): RUF channels (TASS, Colonelcassad, Basurin, Poddubny, WarGonzo, Операция Z, MoD Russia, Два майора) continue to aggressively disseminate claims of tactical successes (Dyleyevka, Petrovske, Sumy "buffer zone"), amplify domestic narratives (Sheremetyevo incident), and promote military support efforts. They also comment on international relations (US drone defense based on SVO experience, US WhatsApp ban). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

1.4. Intelligence Gaps/Collection Requirements:

CRITICAL: Immediate and independent verification of RUF claims regarding capture of Dyleyevka (Donetsk Oblast) and Petrovske/Hrekivka (Luhansk Oblast). Assess tactical implications of any confirmed RUF gains in these areas, particularly regarding control over UAF logistics routes. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT).
CRITICAL: Verify RUF claims of a "buffer zone" presence in Sumy Oblast. Determine specific locations, force size, and intent. This is paramount given the previous MLCOA of a major northern offensive. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT).
HIGH: Conduct comprehensive BDA on ballistic missile strikes in Dnipro. Verify specific targets (e.g., impact zones near train station, schools, hospitals) and damage assessment (civilian infrastructure, train line), and confirm munition types (e.g., Iskander). (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: BDA teams, IMINT, OSINT).
HIGH: Assess the reported RUF Geran-2 strikes on Shakhovo (UAF temporary deployment) and Toretskoye (ammunition depot). Confirm targets and BDA. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: IMINT, SIGINT).
HIGH: Obtain more information on the incidents in Crimea. Determine the cause of the damage (UAF strike, internal incident, etc.) and assess the impact on RUF capabilities. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: IMINT, OSINT).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

Ground Capabilities: RUF continues to demonstrate capability for localized ground advances, particularly on the Donetsk axis, aiming to seize key UAF strongholds and logistical nodes (e.g., Dyleyevka near Konstantinovka). Claims of presence in Sumy "buffer zone" suggest a persistent northern threat. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
Artillery/Air Capabilities: RUF maintains a significant ballistic missile strike capability (evidenced by Dnipro strikes, claimed Iskander use) and extensive use of KABs and Shahed/Geran-2 UAVs. This capability is used for deep strikes against urban centers, civilian infrastructure, and increasingly, UAF force generation targets (training centers, temporary deployment areas) and logistics (ammunition depots). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
Information Warfare Capabilities: RUF's IO remains highly agile and adaptive, rapidly amplifying claims of tactical gains (Dyleyevka, Petrovske), domestic issues (Sheremetyevo), and attempting to project control by claiming "buffer zones" in Ukraine. They continue to use disinformation to justify internal crackdowns and maintain public support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
Intentions: RUF intends to:
- Sustain Offensive Pressure & Consolidate Gains: Continue high-intensity ground assaults on key axes (Donetsk) to achieve localized gains and attrit UAF forces, attempting to sever UAF logistics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
- Degrade UAF Morale and Capabilities: Through continued terror strikes against civilian targets and military-industrial/force generation infrastructure using ballistic missiles, KABs, and UAVs. This includes targeting critical transport infrastructure like train lines and training/deployment centers. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
- Reinforce Domestic Support & Legitimacy: Use claims of tactical gains, internal security actions (arrests of perceived threats), and publicize domestic support for the military to reinforce internal cohesion and project control. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
- Exert Control over Border Areas: The claim of a "buffer zone" in Sumy, even if aspirational, suggests a long-term intent to establish a physical presence in northern Ukraine or at least to destabilize the border regions. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

RUF: Continued high volume of ballistic missiles (claimed 4 Iskanders in Dnipro), KABs, and Shahed/Geran-2 UAVs for deep strikes and shaping operations. The claimed capture of Dyleyevka and Petrovske indicates persistent focus on expanding control in Donetsk/Luhansk Oblasts. Increased targeting of UAF training centers and temporary deployment areas indicates an adaptation to degrade UAF force generation. The claim of a "buffer zone" in Sumy, combined with previous heavy force concentrations, suggests RUF is actively exploring ways to expand operations in the north, either through direct incursion or creating contested zones. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
UAF: Continues to demonstrate effective AD responses to RUF UAVs in some areas, but struggles with the volume and type (ballistic) of deeper strikes. UAF is actively building fortifications. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

RUF continues to possess and employ ballistic missiles (Iskander), KABs, and Shahed/Geran-2 UAVs, indicating sustained production or external supply. RUF's ability to maintain offensive operations suggests adequate logistical support for ground forces, supplemented by significant domestic support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
UAF continues to require and receive significant international support for defense, including for drone and AD capabilities, as indicated in previous reports. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

RUF: Highly effective C2 over its air/missile operations, capable of multi-layered attacks on diverse targets (Dnipro, Shakhovo, Toretskoye). Tactical C2 for ground operations appears effective given claimed advances and coordinated air/UAV support. Their ability to conduct and report on internal security operations indicates effective C2 over domestic FSB/law enforcement elements. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
UAF: Effective C2 in rapid air threat warnings, particularly concerning missiles. Effective C2 for counter-UAV operations and ground defense, as evidenced by successful fortification building. Effective in managing the aftermath of missile strikes, including BDA and casualty reporting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

Ground Forces: UAF maintains a defensive posture, actively resisting RUF advances, particularly in Donetsk Oblast. UAF engineer units are actively building fortifications, indicating a focus on strengthening defensive lines. UAF units are vigilant on the northern front (Sumy, Mykolaiv, Kherson Oblasts) following missile threat warnings. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
Air Defense: UAF AD is on high alert, actively tracking and responding to missile and UAV threats to major cities, critical infrastructure, and military targets. The challenge remains significant given the volume and type of RUF strikes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
Defense Industry & Procurement: UAF is actively acquiring FPV drones (+300 purchased in 24 hours, per STERNENKO), indicating a continued focus on asymmetric capabilities. International support remains critical. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

Successes:
- UAV Procurement: UAF successfully acquired +300 FPV drones, enhancing tactical reconnaissance and strike capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
- Fortification Building: UAF engineer units are actively engaged in building fortifications, strengthening defensive positions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
Setbacks:
- Civilian Casualties/Infrastructure Damage: RUF ballistic missile strikes caused significant casualties (3 KIA, >20 wounded) and extensive damage to civilian infrastructure in Dnipro, including schools, kindergartens, vocational schools, a music school, and a passenger train. (HIGH CONFIDENCE – UAF official reports).
- Targeting of Energy Workers: An employee of Zaporizhzhiaoblenergo was wounded in Vasylivka, indicating continued RUF targeting of critical energy infrastructure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
- Alleged Positional Setbacks: RUF claims "liberation" of Dyleyevka (Donetsk Oblast) and Petrovske/Hrekivka (Luhansk Oblast), and presence in a "buffer zone" in Sumy Oblast. These claims require urgent verification but, if confirmed, would constitute significant tactical setbacks. (LOW CONFIDENCE - RUF claims).
- Strikes on UAF Deployment/Logistics: RUF claims successful Geran-2 strikes on a UAF temporary deployment area and an ammunition depot, which, if confirmed, would degrade UAF capabilities. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - RUF claims).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

Continued critical need for advanced AD systems to counter ballistic missile and KAB threats, especially for urban centers, critical infrastructure (including railways and energy), and UAF training/force generation facilities. The ongoing procurement of FPV drones is positive, but continuous supply chain and training are essential. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

Russian:
- Frontline Glorification/Claims: RUF channels (TASS, Colonelcassad, Kotsnews, MoD Russia, Poddubny, Basurin) aggressively disseminate claims of "liberating" Dyleyevka and Petrovske, showcasing military prowess and territorial gains. The "buffer zone" claim in Sumy aims to project offensive capability in the north. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
- Domestic Justification/Internal Security: RUF channels continue to amplify domestic incidents (Sheremetyevo airport child injury, TASS reporting detention and drug discovery) for internal political messaging, framing them as a focus on internal security and law enforcement. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
- Victim Blaming/Mockery: RUF channels like "Два майора" post videos of damage in Ukrainian cities with captions like "Dnipro. Still Ukraine," mocking the devastation caused by RUF strikes and implying future capture. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
- Countering Western Capabilities: "Старше Эдды" and "ППЦ" report on US intent to develop drone defense based on SVO experience, acknowledging UAF drone effectiveness while portraying RUF operations as a learning ground for adversaries.
Ukrainian:
- Situational Awareness/Transparency: UAF official channels continue to provide timely updates on air threats, missile/UAV/KAB strikes, and their devastating consequences, demonstrating transparency regarding RUF attacks on civilians and infrastructure (Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
- Highlighting Domestic Support/Capability: STERNENKO's report on FPV drone procurement showcases popular support and UAF's adaptive capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
- Countering RUF Claims: UAF channels are expected to respond to RUF claims of territorial gains as verification becomes available.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

Ukrainian: Civilian population continues to face high stress due to persistent ballistic missile threats and devastating impacts in urban centers (Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia). The extensive damage to civilian infrastructure (schools, hospitals, residences, railway) will further heighten public anger and resolve against RUF. However, news of domestic procurement efforts (FPV drones) and continued fortification building will provide a morale boost, demonstrating resilience. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
Russian: Domestic audiences are being saturated with claims of tactical successes and a controlled narrative of internal stability and robust military support. The continued focus on internal security incidents serves to reinforce state control and justify actions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

The "Старше Эдды" report on US intent to develop drone defense based on SVO experience implicitly acknowledges the impact of the conflict on global military doctrine and underscores the continuing relevance of Ukrainian experiences for international partners. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
TASS reporting on the US Congress WhatsApp ban and Iran's claims of victory over Israel continue to demonstrate RUF's focus on international political developments beyond Ukraine, likely to divert attention or find leverage. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

Consolidated Offensive on Donetsk Axis with Intensified Ballistic Missile/UAV/KAB Strikes on Urban Centers and Force Generation Targets; Continued Northern Reconnaissance with Localized Incursions: RUF will likely continue high-intensity ground assaults on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk, Konstantinovka), aiming to consolidate claimed gains (Dyleyevka, Petrovske) and exploit perceived UAF logistical vulnerabilities, supported by heavy air and artillery strikes. Concurrently, RUF will conduct intensified ballistic missile (e.g., Iskander), KAB, and Shahed/Geran-2 UAV strikes on major Ukrainian urban centers (Dnipro, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Kharkiv) and increasingly target UAF force generation facilities (training centers, temporary deployment areas) and critical infrastructure (railways, energy facilities) to degrade Ukraine's long-term combat power. In Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts, RUF will likely maintain or increase reconnaissance UAV activity, and conduct localized ground incursions or "buffer zone" expansion efforts in specific border communities, aiming to tie down UAF forces and create humanitarian crises. RUF will maintain its aggressive, multi-faceted internal IO campaign, focusing on justifying internal security measures and showcasing domestic support for the war, while mocking Ukrainian suffering. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

Coordinated Breakthrough on Donetsk/Luhansk Axes Paired with a Major Ground Offensive from Sumy Oblast, Under Cover of a Nationwide Ballistic Missile Saturation Campaign and False-Flag Operations: RUF will launch a highly coordinated, multi-wave ballistic missile (Iskander) and KAB saturation attack on critical UAF military and government command nodes, major urban centers, and key infrastructure across Ukraine (Kyiv, Dnipro, Poltava, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia), specifically targeting railway hubs and energy infrastructure, designed to overwhelm UAF AD and cause significant disruption and panic. Simultaneously, RUF will launch a major ground offensive aimed at achieving an operational breakthrough on the Donetsk and/or Luhansk axes, leveraging heavy air support and exploiting any UAF repositioning. Critically, this would be complemented by a major ground offensive launched from Sumy Oblast, aimed at seizing significant territory, creating a deep "buffer zone," or reaching key objectives, forcing Ukraine to commit substantial reserves to a new northern front. This entire operation would be conducted under the cover of a significantly escalated RUF internal IO campaign emphasizing the need for decisive action against "terrorists" and "abductors" from Ukraine, potentially accompanied by false-flag operations (e.g., attacks on border communities, critical infrastructure in RF) attributed to Ukraine to further justify the intensified war effort and mobilize domestic support. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

Immediate (Next 0-6 hours, starting from 241037Z JUN 25):
- RUF: Expect continued RUF ballistic missile/KAB/UAV threats/strikes in central, eastern, and southern Ukraine, with a focus on urban centers and potential military targets. RUF will continue to disseminate claims of tactical gains in Donetsk/Luhansk Oblast and use its IO to amplify domestic security narratives and mock Ukrainian casualties. Continued reconnaissance UAV activity in Sumy and Kursk Oblasts.
- UAF Decision Point: Maintain highest AD readiness across all threatened oblasts, prioritizing interception of ballistic missiles and KABs. Immediately verify RUF claims regarding Dyleyevka and Petrovske/Hrekivka, and assess the security of the surrounding defensive lines and logistical routes. Investigate claims of RUF presence in Sumy "buffer zone" urgently. Proactively monitor RUF IO channels for any new escalatory narratives or shifts in focus on domestic security and geopolitical events.
Short-term (Next 24-72 hours):
- RUF: RUF will likely maintain or increase ballistic missile/KAB/UAV strikes on Ukrainian urban centers and critically assess damage to claimed military-industrial/force generation/logistical targets. Ground pressure on the Donetsk axis will likely continue, potentially with increased special forces activity. Increased localized ground activity and/or shaping operations should be expected in specific border areas of Sumy Oblast, following continued reconnaissance UAV activity and "buffer zone" claims. RUF will maintain a dual-track IO strategy, attempting to keep international attention on other crises while escalating narratives justifying its war in Ukraine.
- UAF Decision Point: Sustain intensified AD operations and enhance force protection for civilian and critical infrastructure targets, including railways and energy facilities, and particularly for UAF training centers, temporary deployment areas, and logistics hubs. Continue to reinforce defensive lines on the Donetsk and Luhansk axes, and be prepared for continued RUF ground assaults, including attempts to cut logistical lines. Reinforce defensive posture and reconnaissance, particularly with EW and counter-drone systems, in Sumy Oblast border communities in anticipation of increased RUF activity or incursions. Prioritize integration and deployment of newly acquired FPV drones and any incoming international systems. Publicize UAF successes and international support to counter RUF narratives and boost morale, while acknowledging the severe impact of RUF terror strikes on civilians.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Intelligence & Special Operations:

IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Surge all-source ISR assets (IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT) to Dyleyevka (Donetsk Oblast), Petrovske/Hrekivka (Luhansk Oblast), and Sumy Oblast. Immediately verify RUF claims of capture/presence. Assess tactical implications, particularly regarding UAF logistical routes (Konstantinovka) and any northern incursions.
IMMEDIATE: Conduct urgent, detailed BDA on all ballistic missile strikes in Dnipro and reported Geran-2 strikes on Shakhovo/Toretskoye. Prioritize specific targets (e.g., railway lines, civilian institutions, UAF deployment areas, ammo depots) and the extent of damage to inform AD and force protection. Identify munition types (e.g., Iskander).
HIGH: Prioritize all-source ISR (IMINT, SIGINT, EWINT) on Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts. Focus on the border areas to confirm RUF "buffer zone" claims or any build-up for a larger offensive. Determine precise intent behind persistent RUF reconnaissance UAV activity.
HIGH: Conduct detailed SIGINT and HUMINT on RUF communication lines and troop movements on the Donetsk, Luhansk, and Sumy axes, specifically to identify any further attempts to cross rivers, establish new bridgeheads, or intensify special forces operations or larger ground movements.
HIGH: Monitor RUF and pro-RUF IO channels for any further shifts in narrative regarding domestic security and "pro-Ukrainian" activities in RF territory, as this indicates RUF's strategic intent to justify internal actions and frame the conflict. Pay close attention to mockery of civilian casualties and infrastructure damage.
MEDIUM: Investigate reported damage incidents in Crimea. Determine if they are results of UAF strikes, internal sabotage, or accidents, to inform future planning.

6.2. Air Defense & Force Protection:

URGENT: Maintain highest AD readiness across Kyiv, Dnipro, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Poltava, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. Prioritize assets capable of intercepting ballistic missiles (e.g., Iskander) and counter-UAV systems, given the recent surge in attacks. Ensure rapid re-engagement capabilities and saturation defense.
HIGH: Review and enhance force protection measures for all critical infrastructure, especially railway hubs and lines, energy facilities, military training facilities, temporary deployment areas, schools, and hospitals in central and eastern Ukraine, given the direct hits on civilian infrastructure and a train, and UAF facilities. Disperse valuable assets.
HIGH: Advise civilian populations in threatened areas to strictly adhere to air raid warnings and seek reinforced shelter. Communicate clearly why certain conventional shelters may no longer be sufficient against powerful ballistic strikes.

6.3. Ground Forces:

IMMEDIATE: Confirm or deny RUF claims of Dyleyevka and Petrovske/Hrekivka capture. If confirmed, immediately reinforce defensive positions in those sectors and establish counter-attack plans, particularly focusing on protecting logistics routes to Konstantinovka.
URGENT: Continue to reinforce defensive positions on the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia axes, specifically focusing on preventing further RUF breakthroughs and consolidating existing lines. Be prepared for increased special forces activity targeting logistics.
URGENT: Elevate readiness and reinforce defensive lines and fortifications in specific border areas of Sumy Oblast (including near any claimed "buffer zones"). Be prepared for intensified RUF ground activity or a limited new offensive, following the increased reconnaissance UAV activity and RUF claims. Prioritize defensive engineering efforts shown by 23rd Engineer Regiment.
HIGH: Continue accelerating training programs and recruitment efforts for drone units and EW teams, emphasizing their critical role in both ISR and offensive/defensive operations. Leverage newly acquired FPV drones effectively.
HIGH: Enhance protection against RUF special forces operating in rear areas, particularly around critical infrastructure, energy facilities, and military facilities.

6.4. Information Operations & Diplomatic:

IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Issue rapid, verifiable counter-narratives to RUF claims of Dyleyevka, Petrovske/Hrekivka, and Sumy "buffer zone" capture/presence. Provide transparent, evidence-based updates on UAF defensive operations.
URGENT: Launch a globally coordinated IO campaign to highlight Russia's deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, railways, and energy facilities. Expose RUF's continuous war crimes and its blatant disregard for international humanitarian law, particularly the "mockery" from RUF channels of civilian suffering.
HIGH: Publicize UAF successes in drone procurement and fortification building. Emphasize Ukraine's resilience, innovation, and growing self-sufficiency in defense.
HIGH: Counter RUF narratives that attempt to demoralize Ukrainian population or frame the conflict as an inevitable defeat. Reiterate Ukraine's principled stand for peace based on territorial integrity and sovereignty.
HIGH: Collaborate with international partners to fact-check and expose RUF's internal propaganda related to domestic security and "pro-Ukrainian" threats, demonstrating their use of these narratives to justify repression and sustained aggression.