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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-06-24 10:07:47Z
8 months ago
Previous (2025-06-24 09:37:44Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 241007Z JUN 25


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

  • Donetsk Oblast: RUF MoD and RUF sources (TASS, Colonelcassad, Kotsnews) continue to claim the "liberation" of Dyleyevka (Donetsk People's Republic). The previous claim of RUF 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade "Vostok" crossing the Mokri Yaly river and establishing a bridgehead at Perebudova (Donetsk Oblast) remains unverified by UAF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE – RUF claims on Dyleyevka; MEDIUM CONFIDENCE – RUF claims on Perebudova and river crossing, unverified by UAF).
  • Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Dnipro): RUF launched ballistic missiles against Dnipro city. UAF and Ukrainian media (Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦, ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS, РБК-Україна, Сергій Лисак / Дніпропетровська ОДА (ОВА)) confirm multiple impacts, resulting in casualties (at least 1 confirmed KIA, over 20 wounded, including children) and significant damage to civilian infrastructure. Damaged include schools, kindergartens, a city hospital, a polyclinic, private residences, and a passenger train (No. 52 Odesa-Zaporizhzhia). Video footage shows the moment of impact and extensive destruction. (HIGH CONFIDENCE – UAF/Independent sources on impacts, casualties, train damage, and damage to civilian infrastructure; HIGH CONFIDENCE – Civilian targeting).
  • Sumy Oblast: UAF Air Force (Повітряні Сили ЗС України) reports continued RUF reconnaissance UAV activity ("high-speed target") in the southwestern direction. The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (ДПСУ) reports a decrease in RUF ground activity in Sumy Oblast, except for the areas near Yunakivska and Khotinska communities. RUF also attacked a UAF training center with Shahed UAVs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE – UAF Air Force reports, UAF State Border Guard Service; HIGH CONFIDENCE – UAF training center attack).
  • Zaporizhzhia Oblast: UAF Air Force reports launches of RUF Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) by enemy tactical aviation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Kharkiv Oblast (Eastern): UAF Air Force reports launches of RUF KABs by enemy tactical aviation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Serebryansky Forest: UAF 63rd Mechanized Brigade (✙DeepState✙🇺🇦) reports that Serebryansky Forest is "full of fiber optics," suggesting the presence of RUF communications infrastructure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE – UAF source).
  • RF Territory (Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai): TASS reports the detention of a resident attempting to join Ukrainian formations and participate in hostilities against RUF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • RF Territory (Kursk Oblast): Poddubny |Z|О|V| edition claims UAF commanders responsible for "abducting civilians" from Kursk Oblast have been identified. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE – RUF claim, unverified).
  • RF Territory (Sheremetyevo Airport, Moscow): Multiple RUF sources (Новости Москвы, Операция Z, TASS) continue to report on the incident where a 2-year-old child was severely injured (skull fractures, medically induced coma) after being thrown to the floor by a Belarusian man. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • RF Territory (Chelyabinsk Oblast): МОБИЛИЗАЦИЯ | Новости | Срочники reports the collection of lice spray and bandages for the front, indicating ongoing logistical support efforts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Donetsk People's Republic (Selidovo): Басурин о главном reports FSB discovery of a "mined UAF cache" near Selidovo, containing weapons and ammunition. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE – RUF claim, unverified).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors:

  • No significant changes to weather or environmental factors affecting operations in Ukraine. Visuals from Dnipro show clear skies during ballistic missile impacts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

  • Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF):
    • Ground Forces: UAF 63rd Brigade active in Serebryansky Forest, identifying RUF fiber optics. UAF units continue defensive actions against RUF assaults. Border Guard Service notes decreased RUF ground activity in most of Sumy Oblast, but increased activity near certain communities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Air Defense (AD): UAF Air Force continues to provide real-time warnings of RUF reconnaissance UAVs and KAB launches. UAF units (e.g., border guards from "Gart" brigade) are actively using ZSU-23-2 to shoot down RUF ZALA and Supercam UAVs in Vovchansk area. Ukrainian officials confirm casualties and extensive damage from RUF ballistic missile strikes in Dnipro, highlighting continued AD challenges against powerful, deep strikes. UAF training center in Sumy Oblast was struck by Shahed UAVs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • International Support: Netherlands PM (ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS) states NATO is preparing a "powerful statement" on large-scale support for Ukraine concerning drones and air defense. Netherlands MoD (Оперативний ЗСУ, ASTRA) announced a new €175 million aid package. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Information Operations (IO): Ukrainian channels continue to provide immediate assessments and photographic/video evidence of RUF attacks and their consequences, highlighting civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure (Dnipro). They also publicize international support and UAF counter-UAV successes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Russian Forces (RUF):
    • Ground Operations: RUF MoD claims "liberation" of Dyleyevka (Donetsk Oblast). RUF continues high-intensity FAB-1500 strikes (Дневник Десантника🇷🇺). RUF FSB claims discovery of UAF weapon caches and identification of UAF commanders in Kursk region. (HIGH CONFIDENCE – RUF claims on Dyleyevka, FAB-1500 use; MEDIUM CONFIDENCE – RUF claims on caches and commanders, unverified).
    • Artillery/Air Strikes: RUF employed ballistic missiles on Dnipro, causing significant civilian infrastructure damage and casualties. RUF continues KAB launches on Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv Oblasts. RUF also struck a UAF training center in Sumy Oblast with Shahed UAVs. RUF drones are used for targeting, including claimed destruction of UAF UAV crews. (HIGH CONFIDENCE – UAF reports on strikes; MEDIUM CONFIDENCE – RUF claims on specific targets/munition types).
    • Logistics/Equipment: RUF units are receiving continued domestic support, including medical supplies (lice spray, bandages) in Chelyabinsk Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Information Operations (IO): RUF channels continue to disseminate claims of tactical successes (Dyleyevka), amplify domestic narratives (Sheremetyevo incident, "abducted civilians" from Kursk, counter-terror operations against pro-Ukrainian individuals in RF), and promote military support efforts (Chelyabinsk donations). They also comment on international relations (US/Qatar contact with Iran regarding ceasefire). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

1.4. Intelligence Gaps/Collection Requirements:

  • CRITICAL: Immediate and independent verification of RUF claims regarding capture of Dyleyevka (Donetsk Oblast). Assess tactical implications of any confirmed RUF gains in this area. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT).
  • HIGH: Conduct comprehensive BDA on ballistic missile strikes in Dnipro. Verify specific targets and damage assessment (civilian infrastructure, train line), and confirm munition types. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: BDA teams, IMINT, OSINT).
  • HIGH: Assess the significance and specific location of "fiber optics" in Serebryansky Forest. Is this new RUF command/communications infrastructure, or a defensive measure? (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: IMINT, SIGINT, ELINT).
  • HIGH: Evaluate the reported decrease in RUF ground activity in Sumy Oblast (except specific areas) in conjunction with continued UAV reconnaissance. Does this indicate a pause for regrouping, a shift in focus, or a feint? (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT).
  • HIGH: Assess the impact of Shahed UAV strikes on the UAF training center in Sumy Oblast. Determine casualty figures and damage to training facilities to understand RUF's force generation degradation strategy. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: HUMINT, IMINT, BDA).
  • MEDIUM: Verify RUF claims of discovering a UAF weapon cache near Selidovo and identifying UAF commanders in Kursk Oblast. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: OSINT, IMINT).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

  • Ground Capabilities: RUF continues to demonstrate capability for localized ground advances, particularly on the Donetsk axis. The continued use of FAB-1500s indicates heavy air support for ground operations. RUF also continues to conduct internal security operations against perceived threats within RF territory. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Artillery/Air Capabilities: RUF maintains a significant ballistic missile strike capability (evidenced by Dnipro strikes) and extensive use of KABs and Shahed UAVs. This capability is used for deep strikes against urban centers, civilian infrastructure, and increasingly, UAF force generation targets (training centers). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Information Warfare Capabilities: RUF maintains highly agile and adaptive IO, able to rapidly pivot and amplify narratives (e.g., domestic incidents, "abducted civilians," "Ukrainian saboteurs") while pushing its core messages of tactical success (Dyleyevka) and reinforcing domestic support. They continue to use disinformation to justify internal crackdowns. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Intentions: RUF intends to:
    • Sustain Offensive Pressure: Continue high-intensity ground assaults on key axes (Donetsk, possibly Sumy/Kharkiv) to achieve localized gains and attrit UAF forces. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Degrade UAF Morale and Capabilities: Through continued terror strikes against civilian targets and military-industrial/force generation infrastructure using ballistic missiles, KABs, and UAVs. This includes targeting critical transport infrastructure like train lines and training centers. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Reinforce Domestic Support & Legitimacy: Use claims of tactical gains, internal security actions (arrests of perceived collaborators, Sheremetyevo incident), and publicize domestic support for the military to reinforce internal cohesion and project control. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Control Global Narrative: While not as prominent in this update, RUF will continue to use global events to its advantage, as indicated by TASS reporting on US/Qatar contact with Iran.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

  • RUF: Continued high volume of ballistic missiles (Dnipro), KABs (Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv), and Shahed UAVs (Sumy training center) for deep strikes and shaping operations. The claimed capture of Dyleyevka indicates a persistent focus on expanding control in Donetsk Oblast. Increased targeting of UAF training centers indicates an adaptation to degrade UAF force generation. The reported decrease in ground activity in most of Sumy Oblast, combined with continued UAV reconnaissance, could be a tactical pause or a feint. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • UAF: Continues to demonstrate effective AD responses to RUF UAVs (ZSU-23-2 effectiveness). UAF is actively securing international support for drones and AD, indicating a focus on capability enhancement and adaptation to RUF air threats. UAF continues to operate effectively in contested areas (Serebryansky Forest). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

  • RUF continues to possess and employ ballistic missiles, KABs, and Shahed UAVs, indicating sustained production or external supply. RUF's ability to maintain offensive operations suggests adequate logistical support for ground forces, supplemented by significant domestic support (donations of various supplies). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • UAF continues to receive significant international support (Netherlands €175 million package, NATO statement on drones/AD), which is critical for sustainment and capability enhancement. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

  • RUF: Highly effective C2 over its air/missile operations, capable of multi-layered attacks on diverse targets (Dnipro, Sumy training center). Tactical C2 for ground operations appears effective given claimed advances and coordinated air support. Their ability to conduct and report on internal security operations indicates effective C2 over domestic FSB/law enforcement elements. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • UAF: Effective C2 in rapid air threat warnings, particularly concerning UAVs and KABs. Effective C2 for counter-UAV operations and ground defense, as evidenced by successful destruction of RUF UAVs and border guard observations. Effective in managing the aftermath of missile strikes, including BDA and casualty reporting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

  • Ground Forces: UAF maintains a defensive posture, actively resisting RUF advances, particularly in Donetsk Oblast. UAF 63rd Brigade is deployed and operating in contested areas (Serebryansky Forest). UAF units are vigilant on the northern front (Sumy Oblast) despite reported decreased RUF ground activity, indicating readiness to respond to changes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Air Defense: UAF AD is on high alert, actively tracking and responding to UAV, KAB, and ballistic missile threats to major cities, critical infrastructure, and military targets (training centers). UAF air defense units demonstrate effectiveness against reconnaissance UAVs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Defense Industry & Procurement: UAF is actively enhancing its domestic defense industrial base (previous reports on Sapsan). Reports of NATO preparing large-scale support for drones and AD, coupled with the new €175 million Dutch aid package, indicate continued and robust international collaboration and procurement. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

  • Successes:
    • International Support: NATO is preparing a powerful statement on large-scale support for Ukraine concerning drones and air defense. Netherlands announced a new €175 million aid package. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Counter-UAV Operations: UAF border guards successfully shooting down RUF ZALA and Supercam UAVs in Vovchansk area. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Setbacks:
    • Civilian Casualties/Infrastructure Damage: RUF ballistic missile strikes caused multiple powerful explosions in Dnipro, resulting in at least one fatality, over 20 wounded (including children), and extensive damage to schools, kindergartens, a city hospital, a polyclinic, private residences, and a passenger train. (HIGH CONFIDENCE – UAF official reports).
    • UAF Training Center Strike: RUF attacked a UAF training center in Sumy Oblast with Shahed UAVs, posing a threat to force generation capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE – UAF official reports).
    • Alleged Positional Setbacks: RUF claims "liberation" of Dyleyevka (Donetsk Oblast). This requires urgent verification as it would constitute a tactical setback. (LOW CONFIDENCE - RUF claims).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

  • Continued critical need for advanced AD systems to counter ballistic missile and KAB threats, especially for urban centers and UAF training/force generation facilities. The anticipated NATO support for drones and AD is crucial to augment existing capabilities and address the increasing use of UAVs and precision-guided munitions by RUF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

  • Russian:
    • Frontline Glorification/Claims: RUF channels (TASS, Colonelcassad, Kotsnews, MoD Russia) aggressively disseminate claims of "liberating" Dyleyevka, alongside videos promoting RUF military prowess (e.g., FAB-1500 strikes). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Domestic Justification/Internal Security: RUF channels continue to amplify domestic incidents (Sheremetyevo airport child injury) for internal political messaging, framing them as a focus on internal security and law enforcement. Claims of "abducted civilians" in Kursk and arrests of "pro-Ukrainian" individuals in RF territory serve to justify internal crackdowns and demonize Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Military Support Propaganda: Public display of supply collections (e.g., Chelyabinsk for lice spray, bandages) aims to showcase domestic support for the military and normalize the conflict. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • "De-Ukrainization": While less direct, narratives of "liberation" and "Ukrainian saboteurs/kidnappers" serve to delegitimize Ukrainian sovereignty and resistance, dehumanizing the adversary.
  • Ukrainian:
    • Situational Awareness/Transparency: UAF official channels continue to provide timely updates on air threats, missile/UAV/KAB strikes, and their devastating consequences, demonstrating transparency regarding RUF attacks on civilians and infrastructure (Dnipro). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Highlighting International Support: The announcement regarding NATO's large-scale support for drones and AD, and the new Dutch aid package, aims to boost morale and demonstrate continued global solidarity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Showcasing UAF Capabilities: Reports on successful counter-UAV operations (ZSU-23-2 in Vovchansk) highlight UAF's defensive effectiveness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Countering RUF Claims: UAF channels are expected to respond to RUF claims of territorial gains as verification becomes available, but no direct counter-narrative on Dyleyevka yet.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

  • Ukrainian: Civilian population continues to face high stress due to persistent ballistic missile threats and devastating impacts in urban centers (Dnipro). The extensive damage to civilian infrastructure (schools, hospitals, residences, railway) and the attack on a UAF training center will further heighten public anger and resolve against RUF. However, news of NATO's large-scale support for drones and AD, and direct aid from the Netherlands, will provide a significant boost to morale and confidence in Ukraine's long-term defense capabilities and international backing. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Russian: Domestic audiences are being saturated with claims of tactical successes and a controlled narrative of internal stability and robust military support. The continued focus on internal security incidents serves to reinforce state control and justify actions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

  • NATO's anticipated statement on large-scale support for Ukraine concerning drones and air defense (ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS) and the confirmed €175 million aid package from the Netherlands (Оперативний ЗСУ, ASTRA) are critical positive diplomatic developments, signaling robust and increasing international security cooperation. This directly counters RUF's attempts to isolate Ukraine.
  • The US asking Qatar to contact Iran regarding a ceasefire (TASS) indicates ongoing diplomatic efforts regarding Middle East tensions, which RUF continues to monitor and potentially exploit for its own strategic interests. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • RUF's continued focus on domestic incidents (Sheremetyevo) and internal security (Tuapse arrest, Kursk claims, Selidovo cache) are primarily for internal consumption but reflect the regime's focus on maintaining control.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

  • Continued Attritional Ground Operations on Donetsk Axis with Persistent Ballistic Missile/KAB/UAV Strikes on Urban Centers and Force Generation Targets, While Maintaining Northern Reconnaissance and Intensifying Internal IO: RUF will likely continue high-intensity ground assaults on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk, Dyleyevka), aiming to consolidate claimed gains and expand control, supported by heavy FAB and artillery strikes. Concurrently, RUF will conduct persistent ballistic missile, KAB, and Shahed UAV strikes on major Ukrainian urban centers (Dnipro, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia) and increasingly target UAF force generation facilities (training centers, logistics hubs) to degrade Ukraine's long-term combat power. Despite a reported decrease in overall ground activity in Sumy Oblast, RUF will maintain or intensify reconnaissance UAV activity in Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts, potentially conducting localized shaping operations (e.g., small-scale incursions, artillery strikes) in specific border communities, keeping UAF forces tied down. RUF will maintain its aggressive, multi-faceted internal IO campaign, focusing on justifying internal security measures (arrests, counter-sabotage claims) and showcasing domestic support for the war, while downplaying Ukrainian successes and civilian casualties. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

  • Coordinated Ballistic Missile/KAB Saturation Campaign Paired with Breakthrough Attempt on Donetsk/Luhansk Axes and a Limited Ground Offensive from Sumy Oblast, Under Cover of Heightened Internal Propaganda: RUF will launch a highly coordinated, multi-wave ballistic missile and KAB saturation attack on critical UAF military and government command nodes, major urban centers, and key infrastructure across Ukraine (Kyiv, Dnipro, Poltava, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia), designed to overwhelm UAF AD and cause significant disruption. Simultaneously, RUF will launch a major ground offensive aimed at achieving an operational breakthrough on the Donetsk and/or Luhansk axes, leveraging heavy air support and exploiting any UAF repositioning. Critically, this would be complemented by a limited, but aggressive, ground offensive launched from Sumy Oblast, specifically targeting the Yunakivska and Khotinska communities to establish a small buffer zone or divert UAF attention and resources, forcing Ukraine to commit reserves to a new northern front. This entire operation would be conducted under the cover of a significantly escalated RUF internal IO campaign emphasizing the need for decisive action against "terrorists" and "abductors" from Ukraine, mobilizing domestic support for the intensified war effort. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

  • Immediate (Next 0-6 hours, starting from 241007Z JUN 25):
    • RUF: Expect continued RUF ballistic missile/KAB/UAV threats/strikes in central and eastern Ukraine, with a focus on urban centers and potential military targets. RUF will continue to disseminate claims of tactical gains in Donetsk Oblast (Dyleyevka) and use its IO to amplify domestic security narratives. Continued reconnaissance UAV activity in Sumy Oblast.
    • UAF Decision Point: Maintain highest AD readiness across all threatened oblasts, prioritizing interception of ballistic missiles and KABs. Immediately verify RUF claims regarding Dyleyevka and assess the security of the surrounding defensive lines. Proactively monitor RUF IO channels for any new escalatory narratives or shifts in focus on domestic security.
  • Short-term (Next 24-72 hours):
    • RUF: RUF will likely maintain or increase ballistic missile/KAB/UAV strikes on Ukrainian urban centers and critically assess damage to claimed military-industrial/force generation targets. Ground pressure on the Donetsk axis will likely continue, potentially with increased special forces activity. Increased localized ground activity and/or shaping operations should be expected in specific border areas of Sumy Oblast (Yunakivska, Khotinska communities), following continued reconnaissance UAV activity. RUF will maintain a dual-track IO strategy, attempting to keep international attention on other crises while escalating narratives justifying its war in Ukraine.
    • UAF Decision Point: Sustain intensified AD operations and enhance force protection for civilian and critical infrastructure targets, including railways, and particularly for UAF training centers and logistics hubs. Continue to reinforce defensive lines on the Donetsk axis, and be prepared for continued RUF ground assaults. Reinforce defensive posture and reconnaissance, particularly with EW and counter-drone systems, in Sumy Oblast border communities in anticipation of increased RUF activity. Prioritize integration and deployment of newly arrived NATO-provided drone and AD systems. Publicize UAF successes and international support to counter RUF narratives and boost morale, while acknowledging the severe impact of RUF terror strikes on civilians.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Intelligence & Special Operations:

  1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Surge ISR assets (IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT) to Dyleyevka (Donetsk Oblast) to immediately verify RUF claims of capture. Assess the tactical implications for UAF defensive operations in that sector.
  2. IMMEDIATE: Conduct urgent, detailed BDA on all ballistic missile strikes in Dnipro and the Shahed strike on the UAF training center in Sumy Oblast. Prioritize specific targets (e.g., "Yuzhmash," civilian infrastructure, railway, UAF training facilities) and the extent of damage to inform AD and force protection. Identify munition types.
  3. HIGH: Prioritize all-source ISR (IMINT, SIGINT, EWINT) on Sumy Oblast. Focus on the Yunakivska and Khotinska communities and surrounding areas. Determine the precise intent behind persistent RUF reconnaissance UAV activity despite reported reduced ground activity elsewhere. Is this preparatory to a localized ground offensive, or for sustained border operations?
  4. HIGH: Conduct detailed SIGINT and HUMINT on RUF communication lines and troop movements on the Donetsk and Sumy axes, specifically to identify any further attempts to cross rivers, establish new bridgeheads, or intensify special forces operations or larger ground movements.
  5. HIGH: Gather intelligence on the "fiber optics" in Serebryansky Forest. Determine if this represents new RUF C2 infrastructure or other military developments, and assess their vulnerability.
  6. HIGH: Monitor RUF and pro-RUF IO channels for any further shifts in narrative regarding domestic security and "pro-Ukrainian" activities in RF territory, as this indicates RUF's strategic intent to justify internal actions and frame the conflict. Pay close attention to mockery of civilian casualties and infrastructure damage.

6.2. Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. URGENT: Maintain highest AD readiness across Kyiv, Dnipro, Poltava, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. Prioritize assets capable of intercepting ballistic missiles and counter-UAV systems, given the recent Iskander-M strikes, KAB launches, and increased UAV activity. Ensure rapid re-engagement capabilities and saturation defense.
  2. HIGH: Review and enhance force protection measures for all critical infrastructure, especially railway hubs and lines, military training facilities, schools, and hospitals in central and eastern Ukraine, given the direct hits on civilian infrastructure and a train, and the UAF training center. Disperse valuable assets.
  3. HIGH: Advise civilian populations in threatened areas to strictly adhere to air raid warnings and seek reinforced shelter. Communicate clearly why certain conventional shelters may no longer be sufficient against powerful ballistic strikes.

6.3. Ground Forces:

  1. IMMEDIATE: Confirm or deny RUF claims of Dyleyevka capture. If confirmed, immediately reinforce defensive positions in that sector and establish counter-attack plans.
  2. URGENT: Continue to reinforce defensive positions on the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia axes, specifically focusing on preventing further RUF breakthroughs and consolidating existing lines. Be prepared for increased special forces activity.
  3. URGENT: Elevate readiness and reinforce defensive lines in specific border areas of Sumy Oblast (Yunakivska and Khotinska communities). Be prepared for intensified RUF ground activity or a limited new offensive, following the increased reconnaissance UAV activity.
  4. HIGH: Address the demand for drone operators and counter-UAV specialists. Accelerate training programs and recruitment efforts for drone units and EW teams, emphasizing their critical role in both ISR and offensive/defensive operations.
  5. HIGH: Integrate and deploy new incoming NATO-provided AD/drone systems for strategic targeting of RUF assets and C2 nodes where appropriate, once operational.
  6. HIGH: Enhance protection against RUF special forces operating in rear areas, particularly around critical infrastructure and military facilities.

6.4. Information Operations & Diplomatic:

  1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Issue rapid, verifiable counter-narratives to RUF claims of Dyleyevka capture and any false claims regarding UAF operations. Provide transparent, evidence-based updates on UAF defensive operations.
  2. URGENT: Launch a globally coordinated IO campaign to highlight Russia's deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, and transport, and UAF training centers. Expose RUF's continuous war crimes and its blatant disregard for international humanitarian law.
  3. HIGH: Publicize NATO's upcoming statement on large-scale support for drones and AD for Ukraine, and the new Dutch aid package. Emphasize Ukraine's resilience and growing international backing.
  4. HIGH: Counter RUF narratives that attempt to delegitimize Ukraine's diplomatic efforts or portray Ukraine as "begging" for aid. Reiterate Ukraine's principled stand for peace based on territorial integrity and sovereignty.
  5. HIGH: Collaborate with international partners to fact-check and expose RUF's internal propaganda related to domestic security and "pro-Ukrainian" threats, demonstrating their use of these narratives to justify repression and sustained aggression.

END OF REPORT

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