Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 210600Z JUN 25 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET // NOFORN REPORTING UNIT: G2 ANALYST, UAF HIGH COMMAND

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Eastern Front (Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia Oblasts): RUF milbloggers report FPV drone strikes by 56th Separate Special Purpose Brigade "KHAN" (Tobol group) on enemy equipment in the Dnipropetrovsk direction. (HIGH CONFIDENCE on RUF claim; LOW CONFIDENCE on specific location/impact).
• Central Ukraine (Zaporizhzhia Oblast): Civilian casualties (one female wounded) reported in Zaporizhzhia District due to enemy attack. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• RUF Territory (RF): Ministry of Defense (MoD) RF claims five Ukrainian UAVs intercepted overnight over Russian regions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE on RUF claim; LOW CONFIDENCE on veracity/number).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors:

• No significant changes impacting operations reported. Night vision/thermal footage from RUF FPV drone strike suggests continued night operations are feasible.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces (UAF):
  • General Staff: Issued daily report on estimated enemy losses, stating 1080 RUF personnel were "deported" (killed/wounded) over the past 24 hours, consistent with previous reporting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Media (РБК-Україна): Reported on a domestic humanitarian event (missing child found in Prikarpattya), indicating normal internal news flow despite conflict. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Russian Forces (RUF):
  • Drone Operations: Milbloggers (Colonelcassad) reporting FPV drone "combat work" in Dnipropetrovsk direction, including video of FPV drone tracking and striking a light armored vehicle. (HIGH CONFIDENCE on RUF claim of strike; MEDIUM CONFIDENCE on reported effect).
  • Information Operations (CRITICAL ESCALATION CONTINUED): "Два майора" continue to push fabricated Iran-Israel conflict narratives with new "visuals" (nighttime aerial event over "Tel Aviv"). TASS continues to focus on domestic control and counter-economic measures (illegal employment). MoD RF issuing claims of intercepted Ukrainian UAVs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE on RUF claims; EXTREMELY LOW CONFIDENCE on veracity of Iran-Israel content; LOW CONFIDENCE on veracity of UAV claims).
  • Domestic Control: TASS reports focus on internal economic issues (illegal employment) and projecting state competence. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Propaganda Channels: "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" channel promoting internal military cohesion ("Desantnoe bratstvo, semya!"). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

1.4. Intelligence Gaps/Collection Requirements:

• CRITICAL: Verify the specific location and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) of RUF FPV drone strikes in the "Dnipropetrovsk direction." Determine the tactical significance of these engagements. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: SIGINT, OSINT, GEOINT, IMINT).
• CRITICAL: Analyze the new video from "Два майора" claiming to show an aerial event over "Tel Aviv." Assess its authenticity, the nature of the depicted event, and how it aligns with the ongoing fabricated Iran-Israel narrative. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: OSINT, FORENSIC ANALYSIS).
• HIGH: Assess the impact of claimed RUF UAV interceptions on Ukrainian deep strike capabilities. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: SIGINT, BDA).
• MEDIUM: Monitor Russian domestic media for any shifts in messaging regarding the war in Ukraine, beyond general claims of intercepted UAVs. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: OSINT).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

• Air/Drone Capabilities: RUF continues to demonstrate FPV drone capabilities for direct engagement of Ukrainian vehicles, even at night. Persistent use of tactical aviation (KABs) and Shahed UAVs is implied by previous reports and civilian casualties in Zaporizhzhia. RUF AD claims continued effectiveness against Ukrainian UAVs over Russian territory. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Information Warfare Capabilities (CRITICAL ESCALATION CONTINUED): RUF's IO apparatus remains highly adaptive and audacious, generating new "visual evidence" for its fabricated Iran-Israel conflict. This indicates a deep commitment to maintaining the information diversion. Domestic messaging aims to project stability and control. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Intentions: RUF intends to:
  • Degrade Ukrainian Military and Civilian Infrastructure: Continued kinetic attacks (KABs, UAVs, FPV drones) on civilian areas and military equipment, including in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk directions, aim to inflict casualties, degrade morale, and hinder UAF operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Sustain Kinetic Pressure: Maintain offensive pressure across key axes with combined arms (ground, air, drones). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Deceive and Divide the International Community: Through sustained, increasingly elaborate fabrications of the "Iran-Israel conflict" to divert attention and resources from Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Maintain Internal Support: By projecting state control, addressing domestic issues (illegal employment), and reporting on successful defensive actions (UAV interceptions), while promoting military cohesion. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• RUF:
  • Drone Operations: Continued emphasis on FPV drone "combat teams" (e.g., "боевая двойка"), indicating a refined tactical application of FPV drones for observation and precision strike. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • IO Adaptation (CRITICAL): Rapid generation and dissemination of new, fabricated "visual evidence" for the Iran-Israel conflict shows an advanced, real-time disinformation capability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• UAF: UAF General Staff maintains consistent daily reporting of enemy losses, indicating persistent offensive pressure from UAF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• RUF: Continued FPV drone operations and air strikes indicate robust supply chains for munitions and equipment. Domestic messaging on economic control (illegal employment) may hint at internal economic pressures, but does not indicate immediate military logistics issues. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• UAF: Sustained defensive operations and reporting on enemy losses imply adequate logistics.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• RUF: RUF C2 continues to coordinate kinetic operations with a sophisticated, multi-layered information warfare campaign. The rapid deployment of new fabricated "visuals" for the Iran-Israel conflict suggests centralized control and rapid response capabilities for IO. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• UAF: UAF C2 demonstrates continued effective intelligence gathering and reporting through General Staff updates. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

2.5. Intelligence Gaps/Collection Requirements:

• CRITICAL: Assess the organizational structure and operational methods of RUF FPV drone "combat teams" to identify vulnerabilities and inform UAF counter-drone strategies. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: SIGINT, HUMINT, TECHINT, OSINT).
• CRITICAL: Quantify the resource allocation and strategic messaging behind RUF's ongoing fabricated Iran-Israel conflict. Determine if this campaign is drawing resources away from other IO efforts or is now the primary focus. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: OSINT, LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Defensive Posture: UAF maintains an active defensive posture against RUF's combined arms attacks, including FPV drones and likely KABs/UAVs, as evidenced by civilian casualties in Zaporizhzhia. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Readiness: UAF maintains a high state of readiness, with continuous engagements across the front, and public reporting on enemy losses. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes: UAF General Staff reports significant RUF personnel losses (1080), indicating successful attritional defense. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Setbacks: Civilian casualty in Zaporizhzhia indicates RUF attacks continue to impact non-combatants and critical infrastructure. RUF claims of successful FPV drone strikes and UAV interceptions, if true, represent tactical setbacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE on Zaporizhzhia casualty; LOW-MEDIUM CONFIDENCE on RUF claims).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Counter-Drone: Urgent requirement for enhanced counter-FPV drone capabilities (EW, jammers, interceptor drones) as RUF emphasizes "combat teams" for precision strikes.
• Air Defense/Counter-UAV/Missile: Continued and urgent requirement for advanced AD systems and interceptors capable of handling persistent KAB/UAV strikes that lead to civilian casualties.
• Counter-IO: Sustained resources are required for developing and disseminating rapid, comprehensive counter-narratives to combat Russia's increasingly sophisticated information warfare, particularly the new reliance on fabricated "visual evidence" for false-flag scenarios.

3.4. Intelligence Gaps/Collection Requirements:

• HIGH: Assess the effectiveness of current UAF counter-drone measures against RUF's FPV drone "combat teams" to identify areas for improvement. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: BDA, SIGINT, TECHINT).
• MEDIUM: Evaluate public reaction within Ukraine to civilian casualties in areas like Zaporizhzhia, and any impact on morale. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: OSINT, HUMINT).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian:
  • Escalated Iran-Israel Fabrication (CRITICAL - NEW VISUALS): RUF continues its aggressive information warfare focused on the fabricated Iran-Israel conflict. New video content from "Два майора" showing a bright aerial event over "Tel Aviv," captioned "Israel. Tel-Aviv," is a direct attempt to provide false visual "evidence" or reinforce the narrative of kinetic activity in the region. This is a direct continuation of previously reported nuclear blackmail and fabricated kinetic strikes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE on RUF claims; EXTREMELY LOW CONFIDENCE on veracity).
  • Military Success Projection: RUF milbloggers showcase FPV drone strikes on Ukrainian equipment, aiming to project tactical success and technological superiority. MoD RF claims successful interception of Ukrainian UAVs over Russian territory to project defensive capability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE on RUF claims).
  • Domestic Control & Stability: TASS reports on internal economic controls (illegal employment) aim to project state competence and stability, potentially to counter any internal discontent. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Military Cohesion: Milbloggers promoting "Desantnoe bratstvo, semya!" indicate efforts to foster internal unity within military ranks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Ukrainian:
  • Transparency & Call for Action: UAF leadership continues daily reporting on enemy losses. Ukrainian media reports on domestic issues, indicating normal functioning despite the war. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Counter-Propaganda: Proactive reporting helps expose Russian lies, though the sheer volume and increasing sophistication of RUF disinformation remains a significant challenge.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian: Public morale remains under pressure from persistent attacks leading to civilian casualties (e.g., Zaporizhzhia). However, resilience is demonstrated by the continued reporting on daily life and humanitarian successes (missing child found). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Russian: The consistent push for military successes (drone strikes, UAV interceptions) and domestic control measures suggests ongoing efforts to maintain internal support and counter potential fatigue or disillusionment. The emphasis on military "brotherhood" hints at a need to reinforce internal cohesion. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• Diversion Effectiveness (CRITICAL): RUF's continued and more sophisticated fabrication of the "Iran-Israel crisis," now with new visual "evidence," continues to effectively divert international attention and resources. The reporting by ASTRA on Pakistan's nomination of Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, while not directly Russian IO, indicates the complex and often unpredictable nature of the global information environment that RUF seeks to exploit. (HIGH CONFIDENCE on RUF diversion efforts).

4.4. Intelligence Gaps/Collection Requirements:

• CRITICAL: Monitor international media and diplomatic responses to Russia's new, more detailed fabrications, especially those related to the fabricated Iran-Israel conflict, with a focus on how the new "visual evidence" is being perceived. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: OSINT, HUMINT).
• HIGH: Analyze the impact of Russia's domestic economic messaging (e.g., illegal employment) on public sentiment within Russia. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: OSINT, HUMINT).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Sustained Kinetic Attacks with Enhanced Drone Use & Targeting of Civilian Areas: RUF will continue to launch KABs, Shahed UAVs, and FPV drones against military equipment and critical infrastructure, as well as civilian populations in Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts. Expect continued focus on attritional ground operations on the Eastern Front. RUF will continue to disseminate highly exaggerated claims of UAF losses via official channels. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Intensified & Globally Directed Information Warfare with New Fabricated "Evidence": RUF will further escalate its information warfare by creating new, even more explicit and outrageous fabrications (e.g., new "visuals" for the Iran-Israel conflict). This will include continued pre-emptive narratives designed to justify future kinetic actions or discredit Ukrainian economic/military viability. RUF milbloggers will likely continue to normalize military logistics and operations through visual content and casual commentary. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Coordinated Multi-Domain Offensive with Global Deception & Cyberattacks: RUF initiates a large-scale ground offensive on a new axis (e.g., Sumy/Chernihiv towards Kyiv or a major thrust on Zaporizhzhia), aiming for a significant breakthrough, supported by simultaneous, overwhelming multi-domain attacks (ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, mass KAB and Shahed UAV attacks targeting strategic and economic infrastructure, cyberattacks targeting UAF C2 and critical infrastructure). This offensive would be accompanied by coordinated false-flag terror attacks within Ukraine or a neighboring state, falsely attributed to internal Ukrainian dissent or "terrorist groups," amplified by RUF IO channels with new, fabricated "visual evidence" (e.g., the "Tel Aviv" video repurposed or similar content generated). This will include intensified dissemination of fabricated POW abuse claims or claims of atrocities committed by UAF against civilians, with manipulated visual and testimonial evidence, likely supported by new milblogger narratives. Concurrently, RUF will launch a massive, globally coordinated cyberattack against critical infrastructure in a NATO or EU member state, falsely attributing it to "Iranian" or "Israeli" actors within the manufactured Middle East crisis (potentially leveraging new "visual evidence" like the "Tel Aviv" video), or falsely claiming these are attacks from Ukrainian "terrorist" elements. This aims to paralyze key Western response mechanisms, divert all attention and resources to the fabricated "crisis" and terror events, and force a Western response that directly benefits Russia's geopolitical objectives in Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 6-12 hours):
  • RUF: Expect continued, high-volume KAB/UAV/FPV drone activity in Eastern, Central, and Northern Oblasts. Further amplification of the fabricated "Iran-Israel crisis" with new, more audacious fabricated "evidence," including new "visuals." Continued efforts to sow discord within NATO via state media.
  • UAF Decision Point: Maintain highest AD readiness, especially in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts under KAB/UAV/FPV threat. Intensify ISR on Northern (Sumy/Chernihiv) and Eastern (Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk) axes for early warning of any ground force buildup. Immediately and publicly debunk new RUF IO fabrications, particularly new "visual evidence" for the Iran-Israel crisis.
• Short-term (Next 24-72 hours):
  • RUF: Potential for another large-scale missile strike or mass UAV attack. Continued high-intensity ground and air pressure. RUF IO will seek new "developments" in its manufactured Middle East narrative and human rights accusations, potentially linked to false-flag events.
  • UAF Decision Point: Prioritize ISR on all RUF airfields and ground force concentrations for early warning of major offensive operations. Engage international partners to directly and unequivocally counter the extreme RUF IO, providing irrefutable evidence of the deception and its strategic implications. Reinforce defensive positions, particularly in Sumy, and prepare flexible reserves. Enhance internal security and counter-intelligence efforts to identify and neutralize potential terror cells or saboteurs following RUF's public promotion of such tactics.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Intelligence & Special Operations:

1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Prioritize all-source ISR on RUF FPV drone "combat teams" operating in the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia directions. Focus on identifying their launch sites, C2 nodes, and logistical support to enable interdiction. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: All-source intelligence, GEOINT, IMINT, SIGINT, BDA).
2. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Establish a dedicated, 24/7, multi-agency counter-disinformation task force to rapidly analyze and debunk Russia's new "visual evidence" for the fabricated Iran-Israel conflict (e.g., "Tel Aviv" video). This cell must provide immediate, evidence-based counter-narratives to international partners and media. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: OSINT, FORENSIC ANALYSIS of video/image evidence).
3. URGENT/CRITICAL: Intensify HUMINT and SIGINT collection regarding RUF's tactical aviation and drone operations to understand their capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities, especially concerning KAB and FPV drone strikes impacting civilians. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: HUMINT, SIGINT, TECHINT).

6.2. Air Defense & Force Protection:

1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Maintain highest AD alert posture across all Oblasts, especially Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, and Kharkiv, against persistent multi-directional KAB, UAV, and FPV drone threats. Prioritize the deployment of mobile AD and counter-drone units to vulnerable areas and critical infrastructure.
2. URGENT/CRITICAL: Accelerate the integration and deployment of advanced counter-UAV and EW systems, particularly those effective against FPV drones and large "Shahed" waves, to frontline units and critical infrastructure defense.
3. URGENT: Reinforce passive air defense measures and provide updated force protection guidance for civilian populations and first responders in areas subject to frequent KAB/UAV/FPV attacks. Ensure emergency services have robust communication and protection protocols.

6.3. Ground Forces:

1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Maintain a robust defensive posture and combat readiness across all Eastern Front axes, including Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk, and reinforce positions in Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts. Prepare for potential MDCOA ground offensive in the North or a major push in the South.
2. URGENT/CRITICAL: Prepare and position flexible strategic reserves for rapid deployment to any axis facing a major RUF ground offensive. Expedite engineering and fortification efforts in potential breakthrough areas.
3. ONGOING: Continue to inflict maximum personnel and equipment losses on RUF through effective defensive operations, counter-battery fire, and precision strikes, leveraging intelligence from drone operations and reported attrition rates.

6.4. Information Operations & Diplomatic:

1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Launch an unprecedented, globally coordinated information campaign to expose and directly counter Russia's new, more audacious fabrications, particularly the "Iran-Israel crisis" and any new "visual evidence" for it. Emphasize the direct link between this destabilization and Russia's military objectives in Ukraine. Simultaneously, forcefully reject and expose the disingenuous nature of Russia's "peace offers" as a strategic deception aimed at providing cover for military aggression or setting conditions for future escalations.
2. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Develop and widely disseminate robust counter-narratives to Russia's escalating dehumanizing rhetoric and war crime justifications. Specifically and immediately debunk new milblogger narratives that showcase "victories" or justify destruction, as well as official exaggerated combat claims. Engage international human rights organizations and religious leaders to condemn such language and warn of potential atrocities.
3. URGENT: Engage international partners to re-focus attention and aid specifically on the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, explicitly countering any narrative that shifts focus to fabricated crises or human rights accusations. Proactively address and seek to mitigate the impact of internal RUF IO.
4. ONGOING: Continue to document and disseminate evidence of RUF war crimes and internal issues (e.g., economic challenges, internal military cohesion efforts) to maintain international pressure and discredit RUF's narratives. Highlight UAF's successes in counter-drone innovation and effective defensive actions to project strength and resilience.

END OF REPORT.