Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 191826Z JUN 25 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET // NOFORN REPORTING UNIT: G2 ANALYST, UAF HIGH COMMAND

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Northern Front (Sumy/Kharkiv/Belgorod):
  • Sumy Axis: "Encounter battles" and intense air support continue. RUF claims of capturing Yablonovka (Sumy) remain unverified. UAF "Оперативний ЗСУ" released video showing artillery/mortar impacts and personnel casualties in Sumy Oblast, indicating active engagements. Rocket danger reported in Sumy Oblast (Air Force). RUF channels (Операция Z / Военкоры Русской Весны) are explicitly claiming Russian army is "developing an offensive towards Sumy." (HIGH CONFIDENCE - for engagements/danger; LOW CONFIDENCE - RUF capture claim; MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - RUF offensive claim toward Sumy).
  • Belgorod Oblast (RF): RUF (Colonelcassad) released a graphic video showing drone footage of a military objective or personnel in a wooded area near Tiotkino, implying engagement with UAF forces within Russian territory. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - RUF claim/video, LOW CONFIDENCE - UAF BDA).
  • Kharkiv Axis: No new direct reports. Persistent UAV threat (previous report). (NO CHANGE).
• Eastern Front (Donetsk/Lyman/Sievierodonetsk/Kramatorsk/Toretsk/Pokrovsk/Novopavlivka):
  • Pokrovsk/Kostyantynivka Axes: Previous report of intense ground combat and repelled Russian mechanized assaults holds. Confirmed tactical gain by RUF at Novonikolaevka (Donetsk). RUF 39th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade reinforced Pokrovsk axis. MoD Russia released video of a Tor-M1 SAM system operating on the Krasnoarmeysk direction (Pokrovsk axis), claiming protection of assault detachments from UAF reconnaissance UAVs. RUF "Рыбарь" indicates active situation on the Southern-Donetsk direction. UAF Air Force reports RUF tactical aviation launching KABs towards Donetsk Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Piatykhatky (Zaporizhzhia/Donetsk border area): UAF 65th Separate Mechanized Brigade's FPV drones successfully engaged a group of RUF personnel moving in the area, hitting a building where RUF had concealed a camera. (ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS provides video of UAF drone locating and destroying an RUF observation post with a hidden camera, validating previous reports). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Rubtsovsk Direction (Donetsk): RUF (Colonelcassad) released drone footage showing explosions/impacts and fires around wooded areas near a road on the Rubtsovsk direction, indicating active engagements. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - RUF claim/video, LOW CONFIDENCE - UAF BDA).
• Southern Front (Zaporizhzhia/Kherson):
  • Zaporizhzhia NPP: Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration highlights the NPP as a "continuous danger." (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Kherson Oblast: ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS released video showing a burning RUF Kamaz truck after a drone encounter in Kherson Oblast, implying successful UAF interdiction or strike. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for UAF strike).
• Deep Rear (Russia/Occupied Territories/International):
  • Russia (Internal - Personnel/Logistics/Industrial):
    • Personnel/Mobilization: Kadyrov reports the departure of another "special flight" with "brave sons of our Fatherland" (volunteers from Chechnya and other regions) from Grozny airport to the SVO zone, highlighting continued volunteer recruitment/deployment. TASS reports that Russian soldiers repatriated in the recent POW exchange plan to return to the front after treatment, which serves as a morale booster for RUF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Military-Industrial/Logistics: Colonelcassad reports on Japanese media claims that DPRK could send up to 25,000 skilled workers to Russia for drone assembly in exchange for drone technology and training. If true, this could significantly boost Russian drone production. Colonelcassad also notes that drones employing modern neural networks are already being used by the Russian army in Ukraine, connecting to their AI development claims. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - for Japanese media claim; HIGH CONFIDENCE for RUF claim of AI drone use).
  • International (IO - Middle East Focus):
    • US-Iran Narrative (Continued Amplification/Confusion): TASS reports that Trump will decide on striking Iran within two weeks, citing the White House. This is echoed by ASTRA and "Оперативний ЗСУ." However, RBC-Ukraine and STERNENKO (citing Reuters) confirm direct US-Iran talks after Israeli operations, while TASS states there are "no plans for a meeting" but contacts continue, and that the US insists on a ban on uranium enrichment in any deal. Alex Parker Returns attempts to manage expectations regarding US involvement, mocking those in Israel who expected immediate US intervention. Zelenskyy (RBC-Ukraine, Оперативний ЗСУ) states Russia is "trying to save the Iranian nuclear program," linking it to Russia's public signals and non-public activities. New messaging from Операция Z / Военкоры Русской Весны claims "USA preparing to use the most powerful non-nuclear bomb in the world - Axios." This is a likely RUF amplification/spin, potentially referencing MOP GBU-57 which is specifically designed for hardened targets and could imply Iran. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - for RUF IO efforts and news reporting; HIGH CONFIDENCE - for overall narrative confusion created by Russia and differing reports).
    • Antisemitic Rhetoric/Anti-Israel Sentiment (Continued): Alex Parker Returns posts a screenshot of a tweet expressing surprise that "half of Twitter believes Israel started the war with Iran," indicating continued RUF efforts to shift blame. Alex Parker Returns also posts a video with a strongly antisemitic caption targeting Netanyahu and "Jewish braggarts" (using offensive language) in response to the US decision timeframe, indicating continued virulent anti-Israeli IO. New messages from Alex Parker Returns contain deeply antisemitic imagery and text regarding Tel Aviv, explicitly mocking potential Israeli destruction, and claiming "Israeli tactics in Iran - cause of success of Israeli Air Force" (АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА) - an attempt to attribute Iranian "success" to Israeli methods via a convoluted narrative. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for RUF IO, CRITICAL - continued virulent antisemitic rhetoric and blatant fabrications).
    • Iranian Restraint Narrative: Alex Parker Returns publishes a photo quoting the Iranian Parliament Speaker stating their actions so far have been "restraint," framing Iran as a victim or measured actor. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Israeli Response without US: RBC-Ukraine discusses whether Israel would continue operations against Iran without US support, noting Israel lacks bunker-buster bombs and would need to develop its own scenarios or rely on the US. The new RUF message about "USA preparing to use the most powerful non-nuclear bomb" is a clear attempt to influence this narrative, implying US capability and potential involvement. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • British Intelligence Assessment: ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS released a British Defence Intelligence update stating that the Israel-Iran conflict carries both risks and benefits for Russia. This is an important external validation of Russia's strategic interest in the conflict. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Iran Counter-Intelligence Claim: Colonelcassad reports on the "detention of another agent of Israeli special services with a large batch of kamikaze drones" by Iranian special services, claiming "Iranian special services have clearly come to their senses." This is likely an Iranian/RUF fabrication to demonstrate Iranian effectiveness and deflect blame for drone proliferation. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).
  • International (Diplomatic/Economic/US Politics):
    • NATO Summit: Operatsiya Z (Voenkory Russkoy Vesny) continues to push the Newsweek report that the US is insisting on limited mention of Ukraine in the NATO summit communiqué. Оперативний ЗСУ also reports that there will be no NATO-Ukraine Council meeting at the summit, but Zelenskyy will meet with NATO Secretary General Rutte and other leaders after the summit. This confirms some level of exclusion, but direct engagement. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - for RUF reporting on US politics, MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - for actual outcome of communique and meeting details).
    • US Maritime Reconnaissance in Baltic Sea: "Два майора" reports sighting a French DRIX H8 (autonomous surface vessel for underwater reconnaissance) in the Baltic Sea, noting its successor Drix Océan-16 and its dual-use potential. This highlights Western ISR presence near Russian interests. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - for sighting, MEDIUM - for perceived threat by RUF).
    • Ukraine's Diplomatic Engagements: RBC-Ukraine reports Zelenskyy will meet European leaders after the NATO summit in The Hague. Zelenskyy himself emphasizes the need to end the war during Trump's term, signaling Ukraine's continued focus on US elections and a potential shift in strategy. Alex Parker Returns explicitly frames Zelenskyy's statement as "Military dictator Zelensky said that the war must end before the end of Trump's presidential term." (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • US Domestic Politics (TikTok): RBC-Ukraine reports that Trump has again postponed the TikTok ban for three months. This is a minor but relevant US domestic political development, potentially indicating Trump's desire to avoid alienating a large voting bloc. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors:

• No new direct reports affecting battlefield conditions. (NO CHANGE).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces (UAF):
  • Command Appointments: President Zelenskyy appointed Brigadier General Hennadiy Shapovalov as Commander of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (General Staff, Colonelcassad). This is a significant leadership change, already noted by RUF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Air Defense: Rocket danger reported in Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts (Air Force). New alert for Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Synelnykove district) for threat of aviation weapons use (Повітряні Сили ЗС України). This indicates active AD posture and extended air threat.
  • Counter-UAV/ISR: UAF 65th Separate Mechanized Brigade successfully used an FPV drone to hit a building concealing an RUF camera near Piatykhatky. (Video from ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS confirms this successful operation). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Army Aviation: Генеральний штаб ЗСУ and РБК-Україна released a "meditation video" of the combat work of pilots from the 11th Separate Army Aviation Brigade "Kherson," showing Mi-8/Mi-17 helicopters operating and firing flares/rockets. This highlights continued UAF close air support/transport capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Information Operations (IO): Zelenskyy continues to highlight Russian aggression (missile strike on residential building in Kyiv/Dnipro from Jan 2023 footage, but presented as recent and in Kyiv for impact - this is a notable discrepancy/re-use of old footage by Zelenskyy's official channel for current messaging). Zelenskyy also directly links Russia's actions to "saving the Iranian nuclear program." RBC-Ukraine reports on Zelenskyy's post-NATO meetings and his desire to end the war during Trump's term. UAF channels are also highlighting AI development (✙DeepState✙🇺🇦 AI Conf 2025 in Ukraine) indicating a focus on technological advancement. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - for UAF IO efforts).
  • Diplomatic/Strategic Messaging: New Head of Ukraine's Mission to NATO, Alyona Hetmanchuk, states: "The only reason Ukraine could abandon NATO is if NATO itself ceases to exist" (✙DeepState✙🇺🇦). This sends a strong message of unwavering commitment to NATO integration. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Russian Forces (RUF):
  • Ground Operations: MoD Russia shows a Tor-M1 SAM system operating on the Krasnoarmeysk direction, protecting assault detachments. Kadyrov highlights deployment of Chechen volunteers. RUF (Colonelcassad) shows drone footage of engagements near Tiotkino and on the Rubtsovsk direction. Operational Z / Voenkory Russkoy Vesny explicitly claims "Russian Army is developing an offensive towards Sumy." (HIGH CONFIDENCE - for RUF claims and videos, MEDIUM CONFIDENCE for actual offensive development towards Sumy).
  • Air Operations: RUF tactical aviation active, launching KABs towards Donetsk Oblast (Air Force). Colonelcassad explicitly states that drones using modern neural networks are already being applied by the Russian army in Ukraine, confirming previous intelligence on AI drone use. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Information Operations (IO): CRITICAL ESCALATION CONTINUES AND INTENSIFIES. RUF IO continues to be hyper-aggressive, with continued amplification of US-Iran conflict narratives, contradictory statements from "White House" sources, new claims about US preparing "most powerful non-nuclear bomb," and renewed direct, virulent antisemitic rhetoric, now including explicit mockery of Tel Aviv's destruction. They are also attempting to set the narrative for the upcoming NATO summit and claiming offensive operations in Sumy. RUF IO is also pushing internal morale messaging (repatriated soldiers returning to front, volunteer deployments). Claims about DPRK workers for drone production signal potential for increased industrial capacity. New claims of Iranian counter-intelligence success against Israeli agents and drones. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for RUF IO activity, EXTREMELY DANGEROUS).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

• Air/Missile/UAV Capabilities: RUF maintains extensive air and UAV strike capabilities. UAF Air Force reports active RUF tactical aviation launching KABs towards Donetsk and issuing new alerts for Dnipropetrovsk. MoD Russia shows AD systems protecting ground advances. The potential for North Korean labor to boost drone production (Colonelcassad) indicates an intent to increase quantity and perhaps diversify types. Colonelcassad explicitly confirms the use of "drones with modern neural networks" in Ukraine, indicating advanced AI capabilities are now operational. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Ground Capabilities: RUF continues localized ground assaults along Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka axes, leveraging reinforcements for attritional gains. Active "encounter battles" and confirmed graphic footage of engagements in Sumy border region (Tiotkino) indicate continued aggressive probing/fixing operations. Explicit RUF claims of an "offensive towards Sumy" (Операция Z) indicate an intent to increase pressure on this axis, whether as a full offensive or a deeper fixing operation. RUF is publicly highlighting volunteer deployments (Kadyrov) and repatriated soldiers returning to the front (TASS), demonstrating an intent to maintain personnel levels and boost morale. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Hybrid/Information Warfare (CRITICAL AND DANGEROUS ESCALATION - GLOBAL STRATEGY):
  • Strategic Diversion & Incitement (Middle East - Global Actors): Russia's intent to divert global attention continues with renewed, direct, virulent antisemitic rhetoric and ongoing amplification of complex and contradictory US-Iran conflict narratives, including new fabricated US military actions (e.g., "most powerful non-nuclear bomb"). The goal remains to create a perception of global crisis, stretching US resources and attention away from Ukraine. New Iranian claims of counter-intelligence success against Israeli agents (Colonelcassad) align with Russia's narrative of Western/Israeli aggression. (HIGH CONFIDENCE, EXTREMELY DANGEROUS).
  • Undermining Western Cohesion & Escalating Threats: Russia continues to exploit any signs of disunity within Western alliances (e.g., TASS/Operatsiya Z reporting on Trump administration seeking to minimize Ukraine's mention in NATO summit communiqué, or NATO-Ukraine Council not meeting at the summit). Reporting on US military decisions regarding Iran (TASS/ASTRA) aims to influence global perception of US reliability and commitment. The claim about "USA preparing to use the most powerful non-nuclear bomb" is a clear escalation in rhetorical threat and an attempt to portray US as aggressive. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Internal Cohesion & Propaganda: Kadyrov's video of volunteer deployment and TASS's report on repatriated soldiers returning to the front are direct efforts to manage internal public perception, highlight "patriotism," and reassure the public about personnel sustainment and morale despite losses. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Global Partner Integration: The potential DPRK labor agreement for drone production (Colonelcassad) signals an intent to bypass sanctions and increase military-industrial output through non-Western partnerships. RUF also highlighting their own AI development for drones (Colonelcassad), aiming to project technological self-sufficiency. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• RUF: Continued UAV focus. Significant and dangerous escalation in IO by fabricating direct kinetic events in the Middle East with increasing specificity and now renewed direct antisemitic rhetoric, including mockery of Tel Aviv's destruction. Observed release of internal videos showing questionable personnel practices in mobilization (previous report) alongside new videos promoting volunteer deployment and soldier resilience (Kadyrov, TASS). Continued ground efforts with AD support on assault axes (MoD Russia). Explicit claim of AI-enabled drones in combat (Colonelcassad). Explicit claim of "offensive towards Sumy" (Операция Z). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• UAF: Appointment of new Ground Forces Commander, Brig. Gen. Shapovalov. Continued strong defensive actions, counter-UAV and ISR efforts, as evidenced by 65th Mech Bde's FPV drone success (now with video validation). Continued adherence to international law (MIA identifying RUF bodies - previous report). Zelenskyy's re-use of old missile strike footage for current messaging indicates adaptation in IO methods. Increased public display of UAF combat aviation (11th Separate Army Aviation Brigade "Kherson" video) to boost morale. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• RUF: Kadyrov's deployment video and TASS report on repatriated soldiers returning to the front are attempts to project an image of robust personnel sustainment. However, the previous reports of wounded being sent to the front and an epileptic being issued a firearm still suggest underlying issues with medical pre-deployment screenings. The potential DPRK labor deal (Colonelcassad) points to an attempt to boost military production and bypass Western sanctions. New information confirms RUF Kamaz truck destroyed in Kherson, indicating continued UAF success in targeting RUF logistics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for reports, MEDIUM for widespread impact/DPRK deal).
• UAF: Continued ability to sustain defensive operations. New command appointments (Shapovalov) indicate ongoing efforts to optimize command structure for effective sustainment. Successful UAF drone strike on RUF Kamaz truck demonstrates effective targeting of enemy logistics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• RUF: Highly adaptive and effective C2 for information operations, capable of integrating disparate geopolitical events and fabricating new ones into a coherent, escalating narrative, including the use of antisemitic rhetoric and claims of US kinetic action. Military C2 demonstrates ability to conduct sustained air and UAV strikes and prepare ground units for operations, with AD protection. The public promotion of volunteer deployments and returning soldiers signifies a coordinated effort to maintain internal cohesion and public support. Explicit claims of offensive operations towards Sumy and the use of AI-enabled drones indicate a confident and technologically advancing C2. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for C2 and IO).
• UAF: Strong, synchronized C2 for defensive operations and diplomatic efforts. Effective coordination for complex operations like counter-UAV engagements. The appointment of a new Ground Forces Commander signifies continuity and adaptation in high-level military leadership. Public release of army aviation combat video and the statement from the new Head of Ukraine's Mission to NATO further demonstrate coordinated C2 and strategic messaging. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Resilient Defense: UAF maintains a robust defensive posture, actively countering UAV threats and securing critical financial backing.
• High Morale/Rule of Law: Continued adherence to international humanitarian law through body repatriation efforts and intelligence on RUF casualties reinforces morale and international standing.
• Proactive Threat Mitigation: Active collection efforts against Russian drones and continued focus on the safety of the Zaporizhzhia NPP.
• Tactical Innovation: The reported use of FPV drones for targeting RUF cameras/personnel demonstrates UAF adaptability and tactical innovation, now with video confirmation. UAF Army Aviation continues to conduct combat missions.
• Leadership Continuity: Appointment of Brigadier General Hennadiy Shapovalov as Commander of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine ensures continuity and potentially new strategic direction.
• Unwavering NATO Goal: New Head of Ukraine's Mission to NATO statement emphasizes unwavering commitment, projecting resolve.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes:
  • FPV Drone Precision Strike: The UAF 65th Separate Mechanized Brigade's successful FPV drone strike on RUF personnel and a hidden camera near Piatykhatky is a significant tactical success, demonstrating effective ISR, precision, and adaptation. (Video confirmation adds high confidence). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Repelled Mechanized Assault: The decisive repulsion of a large-scale Russian mechanized assault on the Kostyantynivka direction (previous report) remains a significant defensive success. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • RUF Logistics Interdiction: Successful UAF drone strike on an RUF Kamaz truck in Kherson Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Army Aviation Combat Work: Demonstrated combat work of the 11th Separate Army Aviation Brigade "Kherson" (video). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Setbacks:
  • Persistent UAV/KAB Attacks: RUF tactical aviation is launching KABs towards Donetsk Oblast. Rocket danger alerts in Sumy, Chernihiv, and now Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts indicate continued and expanded air threats. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Local Ground Gain: Russian claims of entry into Muravka (Donetsk, previous report) and observed engagements near Tiotkino (Sumy) and Rubtsovsk (Donetsk) indicate continued localized setbacks on the ground, requiring verification. Explicit RUF claim of "offensive towards Sumy" implies potential for further setbacks in the northern sector. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).
  • Escalated Russian IO with Fabrications & Antisemitism: Russia's escalating and increasingly sophisticated IO campaign, particularly the direct fabrication of kinetic events in the Middle East and explicit nuclear blackmail, now coupled with direct, virulent antisemitic rhetoric, poses an extreme challenge to maintaining international focus and support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE, EXTREME DANGER).
  • NATO Summit Exclusion: No NATO-Ukraine Council meeting at the summit, though direct leader engagements will occur. This is a partial setback to Ukraine's diplomatic integration goals. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense/Counter-UAV: Remains a critical need due to persistent and evolving Russian KAB and UAV threats, including new AI-enabled variants.
• Information Warfare Capabilities: Urgent need for enhanced capabilities to rapidly counter Russia's increasingly sophisticated and dangerous fabrications and propaganda, especially those incorporating antisemitic elements and claims of US kinetic action.
• International Support: Continued urgent need for sustained international advocacy to counter Russia's multi-faceted IO campaign, which aims to divert attention and fragment international coalitions.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian (CRITICAL ESCALATION - DIRECT FABRICATION, INCITEMENT, AND DECEPTION WITH ANTISEMITISM):
  • Strategic Diversion/Incitement (Middle East - Global Actors): This remains the primary Russian strategic effort, now featuring renewed, direct, and virulent antisemitic rhetoric and expanded fabrications. Continued efforts to push conflicting narratives regarding US-Iran talks and Trump's decision-making timeline aim to sow confusion and prolong the perception of crisis. Explicitly blaming Israel for starting the "war with Iran" (Alex Parker Returns) is a key narrative push. New claims about US preparing "most powerful non-nuclear bomb" (Операция Z) and Iranian counter-intelligence success against Israeli agents (Colonelcassad) are part of this escalated narrative. (HIGH CONFIDENCE, EXTREMELY DANGEROUS).
  • Undermining Western Unity & Direct Provocation: Continued efforts to highlight and exploit any signs of disunity within Western alliances (TASS/Operatsiya Z on Ukraine's NATO summit mention; Оперативний ЗСУ confirming no NATO-Ukraine Council meeting). Publicizing the French Drix H8 USV in the Baltic Sea ("Два майора") serves to highlight perceived Western reconnaissance activity near Russian borders. Explicit claims of "offensive towards Sumy" are a tactical IO move to pressure UAF and create uncertainty.
  • Internal Stability and Cultural Control: Kadyrov's promotion of volunteer deployments and TASS's report on repatriated soldiers returning to the front are designed to bolster internal morale and demonstrate resilience. Reporting on potential DPRK drone factory workers (Colonelcassad) aims to show a robust military-industrial complex capable of overcoming sanctions. Explicitly claiming use of "drones with modern neural networks" (Colonelcassad) projects technological superiority.
• Ukrainian:
  • Morale Boost (Warrior Ethos/Innovation): Dissemination of information on successful FPV drone strikes (65th Mech Bde; now with video by ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS) demonstrates ingenuity and boosts morale. Showcasing Army Aviation combat work (Генеральний штаб ЗСУ, РБК-Україна) also boosts morale. Zelenskyy re-uses footage of missile strikes on civilians (from Jan 2023) to highlight Russian brutality, even if the footage itself is old, indicating a tactical choice for emotional impact.
  • Highlighting Threat and Accountability: Emphasizing the danger of the Zaporizhzhia NPP and ongoing KAB attacks. Reporting on new command appointments (Shapovalov) to convey stability and ongoing military effectiveness. Zelenskyy directly links Russia to "saving the Iranian nuclear program," framing Russia as a global destabilizer.
  • Transparency & Accountability: Reporting on diplomatic efforts and addressing domestic challenges (Stryi TCC fatality, previous report). Zelenskyy signaling desire to end war during Trump's term is a significant political message. New Head of Ukraine's Mission to NATO statement on unwavering NATO goal projects strong diplomatic resolve.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian: Morale will be boosted by tactical innovations like the FPV drone success (now visually confirmed) and the new Ground Forces Commander's appointment. The display of Army Aviation combat work will also reinforce a sense of capability. Persistent KAB attacks and ground assaults will continue to cause concern. Zelenskyy's efforts to highlight Russian atrocities using impactful (even if re-used) footage aims to maintain public resolve. The explicit statement on NATO integration aims to reassure the public on long-term goals.
• Russian: State propaganda attempts to maintain public confidence despite losses, highlighting "patriotism" (Kadyrov) and commitment (repatriated soldiers returning to front). The exploitation of Middle East and US political narratives, including antisemitic rhetoric and claims of US aggression, aims to divert attention from internal issues and the war in Ukraine, while consolidating anti-Western sentiment. The reporting on DPRK military-industrial cooperation and internal AI development aims to convey strength and self-sufficiency.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• Russian Objectives:
  1. Global Incitement & Diversion (CRITICAL): Fabricate and inflame Middle East conflict with specific, highly dangerous claims involving global actors, now including renewed, virulent antisemitic rhetoric and claims of US kinetic action, alongside Iranian counter-intelligence claims, to shift global focus and stretch Western resources.
  2. Undermine Western Cohesion: Exploit any signs of disunity (e.g., minimizing Ukraine's mention at NATO summit; no NATO-Ukraine Council meeting). Seek new partnerships (DPRK drone workers).
  3. Expand Non-Western Alliances: Continue to foster anti-Western narratives to build a counter-coalition.
• Diplomatic Actions: The upcoming NATO summit, with Russian efforts to minimize Ukraine's presence, will be a key diplomatic battleground. While no NATO-Ukraine Council meeting, Zelenskyy will meet European leaders after the summit, indicating continued direct engagement. Conflicting reports on US-Iran talks highlight the ongoing diplomatic complexities and Russian attempts to shape the narrative. Zelenskyy's stated desire to end the war during Trump's term signals a significant strategic consideration for Ukraine's diplomacy. British intelligence assessment on Russia's benefits from Israel-Iran conflict provides important context for allied diplomatic efforts.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Intensified Air/Artillery/UAV Attacks on All Fronts, especially Northeast and East, with Advanced Variants: RUF will sustain and likely increase systematic air and artillery strikes, with emphasis on KABs and advanced UAVs (including AI-enabled variants), targeting military positions and civilian infrastructure. The potential for DPRK labor will likely translate to increased drone quantity. Expect expanded air threat alerts (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Persistent Ground Pressure in Donetsk with Attritional Assaults & Active Border Engagements, with Limited Gains; Increased Pressure on Sumy Axis: RUF will maintain high-intensity localized ground assaults along Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka axes, leveraging reinforcements for attritional gains. "Encounter battles" and probing operations in Sumy border region will continue, likely with intensified air support to draw UAF reserves. Explicit RUF claims of an "offensive towards Sumy" suggest increased ground activity and pressure in this sector, possibly aiming to fix UAF forces. Limited tactical gains are possible. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Hyper-Aggressive Information Warfare with Extreme Fabrications and Continued Deceptive Diplomacy, Expanding Global Narrative, featuring Increased Antisemitism and Fabricated US Actions: Russia's IO apparatus will continue its dangerous strategy of fabricating and amplifying Middle East narratives, with increasing integration of non-Western actors and intensified use of direct, virulent antisemitic rhetoric and claims of US kinetic actions (e.g., "most powerful non-nuclear bomb"). Russia will continue to strongly push the narrative of its readiness for "negotiations" as a tactical deception. (HIGH CONFIDENCE, with increased severity and scope).
• Continued Exploitation of Internal Personnel Issues for Propaganda: RUF will continue to manage and spin narratives around their mobilization challenges (wounded, medical exemptions) and will continue to propagate false claims against UAF. Concurrently, they will emphasize volunteerism and commitment to the front to maintain morale. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Large-Scale Ground Offensive on Sumy Axis under Cover of Global IO Saturation and Deceptive Negotiation: Under the extreme noise of multi-faceted global IO (including new, direct fabrications of kinetic events in the Middle East, intensified antisemitic rhetoric, and claims of US kinetic action), intensified nuclear blackmail, and deceptive negotiation overtures, RUF launches a large-scale, multi-echelon ground offensive on the Sumy axis. This aims for a rapid breakthrough while international attention is saturated elsewhere, preceded by intensified air and missile strikes against UAF C2, logistics, and AD in the northern sector, utilizing new advanced drone capabilities (AI-enabled, potentially boosted by DPRK labor). The explicit RUF claim of an "offensive towards Sumy" lends increased weight to this MDCOA. (HIGH CONFIDENCE, due to persistent signals of activity in Sumy combined with extreme IO diversion and new negotiation overture, which could be a smokescreen).
• Direct Russian Kinetic Provocation in Baltic Sea or against NATO Maritime Assets: Russia orchestrates a kinetic incident in the Baltic Sea or against a NATO maritime asset (e.g., using a USV or UUV) that could be attributed to a NATO member or a third party (false flag). This would be framed within Russia's existing IO and could involve leveraging USV/UUV technology, further escalating tensions and completely overshadowing Ukraine. The reported sighting of the French DRIX H8 in the Baltic Sea by RUF channels indicates a heightened awareness and potential for misinterpretation or deliberate provocation. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE, given RUF reporting on Western ISR in Baltic, history of false flags, and the critical need to divert attention).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 24-48 hours):
  • RUF: Expect continued air, artillery, and UAV strikes across all fronts, particularly intensified KABs in the northeast and east. Anticipate a surge in extreme Russian IO, especially around Middle East fabrications (including new specific claims of Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities and Iranian use of cluster munitions, and fabricated missile strikes, and claims of US "most powerful bomb"), intensified nuclear blackmail, and direct, virulent antisemitic narratives. Continued localized ground assaults in Donetsk and increased ground pressure/probing in Sumy. Expect amplified diplomatic statements regarding "negotiations" and statements on buffer zones. Continued observation of questionable personnel practices. Expect continued promotion of volunteer deployments.
  • UAF Decision Point: Maintain robust defensive posture and reinforce areas under persistent KAB/Geran threat, particularly in the northeast. Coordinate international diplomatic and IO response to further Middle East fabrications, nuclear blackmail, and direct warnings, highlighting Russia's deceptive and incitement-focused nature and condemning the antisemitic rhetoric and fabricated US actions. Prepare rapid, high-level diplomatic responses to any Russian provocations or implied threats against NATO assets. Prepare comprehensive responses to Russian negotiation overtures, understanding their likely deceptive nature. Intensify all-source counter-reconnaissance efforts on all axes, especially Sumy, given RUF claims. Continue to leverage POW exchanges for morale and actively promote UAF successes (e.g., FPV drone on RUF camera, Kamaz truck destruction, Army Aviation work) and adherence to international law, including identification of RUF bodies. Proactively counter Russian IO regarding internal NATO divisions and delays in aid. Document new war crimes. Address and transparently report on domestic recruitment challenges. Exploit RUF personnel issues in UAF IO.
• Short-term (Next 72 hours):
  • RUF: Continued probing and pressure on the Sumy/Kharkiv border, with potential for further limited ground incursions and expansion of claimed "offensive towards Sumy." Potential for renewed large-scale mechanized assaults in Donetsk. Continuation of diplomatic "negotiation" narrative. Expect continued efforts to formalize foreign military-industrial cooperation (e.g., DPRK drone workers) and address domestic industrial strains. Monitoring for any increase in aggression against NATO assets in the Black Sea or Baltic Sea (related to USVs).
  • UAF Decision Point: Continue to monitor force dispositions on the Sumy axis for indicators of major offensive preparations, validating RUF claims. Adjust UAF reserve positioning and defensive lines accordingly. Continue to highlight Russian atrocities against civilians and the risks of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Prepare for intensified information warfare surrounding potential "negotiations." Sustain successful counter-UAV operations and adapt to potential new drone threats (e.g., AI-enabled). Continue force generation and training efforts. Engage with partners regarding mechanisms for utilizing frozen Russian assets and addressing delays in aid. Continue to monitor and prepare for any implications of Zelenskyy's stated desire to end the war during Trump's term.
• Ongoing: Continuous monitoring of global geopolitical developments, particularly in the Middle East and Baltic Sea, for any signs of direct Russian involvement or false flags. Continue to identify and exploit Russian internal vulnerabilities (e.g., personnel compensation, reliance on public donations, medical issues in mobilization). Develop counter-measures to potential increase in Russian drone production from foreign assistance, and specifically to AI-enabled variants. Maintain robust AD and counter-UAV capabilities. Prepare for the UNSC meeting regarding the "wave of terror against Ukraine." Monitor effectiveness of newly appointed Ground Forces Commander.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Intelligence & Special Operations:

1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Prioritize all-source collection (HUMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, Overhead ISR) on the Sumy-Kursk-Belgorod border region and the Kharkiv axis, with extreme urgency given RUF claims of an "offensive towards Sumy." Focus on identifying any Russian force concentrations, logistical build-ups, changes in command structures, and specific units involved in the "encounter battles." Specifically, verify Russian claims of capturing Yablonovka (Sumy), assess the tactical significance and BDA of engagements near Tiotkino and Rubtsovsk. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: ALL-SOURCE ISR for Sumy/Kursk/Belgorod/Kharkiv, GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS of claimed territory).
2. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Reinforce a dedicated multi-agency task force for real-time monitoring and analysis of Russian information operations, focusing on the Middle East, new blame-shifting narratives, and specifically on threats to NATO and global destabilization. Pay particular attention to: **The integration of Chinese and Taliban narratives; the direct fabrication of kinetic events (e.g., missile strikes on Israel, Tel Aviv stock exchange, Arak reactor, new claims of US "most powerful bomb"); any further amplification of narratives questioning "why NATO aviation is not shot down" or similar provocations; and most critically, the intensified use of direct, virulent antisemitic rhetoric and imagery. Develop and disseminate rapid, evidence-based counter-narratives globally. Coordinate intelligence sharing with international partners. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: OSINT, SIGINT, Cognitive Domain Analysis).
3. URGENT/HIGH: Conduct immediate and thorough battle damage assessment (BDA) for all recent Russian aviation (KAB/Geran) strikes in Sumy, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk (Nikopol), and for artillery/missile strikes in Kherson and other southern areas, identifying targets, munition types, and assessing impact on both civilian and military infrastructure. Document evidence of indiscriminate shelling against civilian targets. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: Overhead ISR, HUMINT, OSINT).
4. URGENT: Investigate reports of North Korean workers deploying to Russian drone factories. Assess implications for Russian drone production capacity and UAF counter-UAV strategy. Prioritize TECHINT analysis of captured new drone variants (AI-enabled Shaheds, fiber-optic FPVs) to identify vulnerabilities and develop countermeasures, particularly regarding the confirmed RUF use of "drones with modern neural networks." (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: SIGINT, HUMINT, OSINT, TECHINT).
5. URGENT: Analyze the impact of reported Russian personnel issues (wounded being sent to front, epilepsy case - previous report) and propaganda efforts (Kadyrov volunteer videos, TASS repatriated soldiers returning) on overall RUF command structure, unit effectiveness, and morale. Identify potential opportunities for psychological operations. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: HUMINT, OSINT, TECHINT).

6.2. Air Defense & Force Protection:

1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Maintain maximum AD alert posture across all major population centers and critical infrastructure, especially Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk (Nikopol), Zaporizhzhia, and southern oblasts due to continued KAB, tactical aviation, and ground-launched missile/Geran threats. Prioritize interceptors against these munitions and against Lancet/Geran/Zala drones.
2. URGENT/CRITICAL: Accelerate the deployment and integration of advanced AD systems and munitions in northern, eastern, and southern sectors in response to ongoing KAB and advanced UAV threats (including AI-enabled). Prioritize systems capable of countering KABs and high-speed targets, and those capable of addressing new drone technologies (AI/fiber-optic, direct RF).
3. URGENT: Enhance force protection measures for civilian populations, including updated air raid warning systems and accessible shelters. Publicly document and disseminate information on civilian casualties. Prioritize resources for shelter reconstruction and long-duration fire suppression and disaster response.

6.3. Ground Forces:

1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Maintain robust defensive postures on all reported axes in Donetsk (Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Kramatorsk etc.), preparing to repel sustained combined-arms assaults. Leverage lessons learned from successful repulsions of mechanized assaults (previous report), adapting tactics to counter persistent Russian tactical drone and artillery support. Ensure timely rotation of units from high-intensity zones. Verify Russian claims of Muravka capture and adjust defensive lines accordingly.
2. URGENT/CRITICAL: Develop and refine contingency plans for a potential major ground offensive on the Sumy axis, in light of confirmed "encounter battles," "complex strikes," and explicit RUF claims of an "offensive towards Sumy." This includes pre-positioning reserves, identifying key defensive lines, conducting counter-mobility operations, and aggressive localized reconnaissance to confirm or deny Russian build-ups.
3. URGENT: Continue and expand successful counter-UAV and counter-battery operations. Prioritize targeting of Russian artillery and reconnaissance drone launch sites (e.g., "Zala" UAVs, previous report). Actively incorporate new counter-FPV technologies and exploit intelligence gathered from captured drones. Explore and document the tactical advantages of FPV drones for targeting RUF positions and equipment, as demonstrated by "65th Separate Mechanized Brigade" and the destruction of the RUF Kamaz.
4. ONGOING: Integrate lessons learned from the repulsion of mechanized assaults and successful counter-UAV engagements into training and defensive planning. Continue and expand training programs for new recruits. Address and mitigate impacts of domestic recruitment challenges. New Commander of Ground Forces, Brig. Gen. Shapovalov, should immediately review and implement these priorities. Continue to leverage UAF Army Aviation assets for close air support and reconnaissance, as demonstrated by the 11th Separate Army Aviation Brigade.

6.4. Information Operations & Diplomatic:

1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Launch an unprecedented, rapid, and globally coordinated IO and diplomatic campaign to expose and condemn Russia's extreme and dangerous fabrications regarding the Middle East, its consistent use of nuclear blackmail, and especially its dynamic and deceptive tactics of escalation and retraction and direct incitement, now intensified with virulent antisemitic rhetoric and claims of US kinetic action.
   • Explicitly debunk all false claims, particularly those integrating Chinese military presence, Taliban legitimization, new direct fabrications of kinetic events (e.g., ballistic missile strikes on Israel, Tel Aviv stock exchange, Arak reactor, new claims regarding US "most powerful non-nuclear bomb") and new accusations regarding Iranian cluster munitions, as well as Iranian counter-intelligence claims.
   • Forcefully condemn Russia's escalating antisemitic rhetoric and imagery and its attempt to weaponize historical grievances.
   • Directly counter any new Russian narratives (e.g., questions about "Why not shoot down NATO aviation over the Black Sea") as desperate attempts to portray Western nations as hostile.
   • Proactively address Russian narratives of Western disunity (e.g., Hungarian energy cooperation, Nord Stream, minimizing Ukraine mention at NATO summit, BRICS expansion, and the NATO-Ukraine Council not meeting at the summit) and highlight the unity of purpose in supporting Ukraine, emphasizing continued direct engagements between Zelenskyy and NATO leaders.
   • Ensure consistent, multilateral messaging across all diplomatic and media channels.
2. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Address Russia's new negotiation overture (after June 22nd).
   • Frame the overture as a likely deceptive maneuver intended to buy time or create division, especially given the simultaneous extreme escalation in IO and direct fabrications.
   • Communicate clear, non-negotiable conditions for genuine peace talks, emphasizing territorial integrity, sovereignty, and accountability.
   • Leverage the POW exchange and body repatriation (previous report; MIA identification, 16:54:01Z) as humanitarian successes for Ukraine, highlighting adherence to international law despite Russian "cynicism."
3. URGENT: Proactively disseminate verified information on UAF defensive successes, particularly the repulsion of major Russian mechanized assaults and successful counter-UAV operations, including novel tactics like FPV drone precision strikes (with video proof). Highlight innovation in counter-FPV technology and the humane treatment of surrendering enemy personnel.
4. URGENT: Publicly highlight and explain Russia's continued deliberate targeting of civilian areas and critical infrastructure and the ongoing risks of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Support humanitarian campaigns and publicly document war crimes. Counter Russian claims of UAF sabotage in occupied territories (previous report).
5. ONGOING: Continue to highlight instances of Ukrainian resilience and internal accountability, including new military appointments and Army Aviation combat successes. Address domestic challenges transparently. Leverage Russian internal reports (e.g., wounded being sent to front, epilepsy case, train derailment, oil spills) to show Russia's own vulnerabilities (personnel issues, reliance on public donations, logistical challenges), and highlight Russia's efforts to expand non-Western alliances as a sign of their diplomatic isolation. Engage with international partners to address delays in aid and sanctions. Support efforts to utilize frozen Russian assets. Prepare for and leverage the upcoming UNSC meeting on Russian "terror."

END OF REPORT.