Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 191756Z JUN 25 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET // NOFORN REPORTING UNIT: G2 ANALYST, UAF HIGH COMMAND

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Northern Front (Sumy/Kharkiv/Belgorod):
  • Sumy Axis: "Encounter battles" and intense air support continue (previous report). RUF claims of capturing Yablonovka (Sumy) remain unverified. UAF "Оперативний ЗСУ" released video showing artillery/mortar impacts and personnel casualties in Sumy Oblast, indicating active engagements. Rocket danger reported in Sumy Oblast (Air Force). (HIGH CONFIDENCE - for engagements/danger; LOW CONFIDENCE - RUF capture claim).
  • Belgorod Oblast (RF): RUF (Colonelcassad) released a graphic video showing drone footage of a military objective or personnel in a wooded area near Tiotkino, implying engagement with UAF forces within Russian territory. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - RUF claim/video, LOW CONFIDENCE - UAF BDA).
  • Kharkiv Axis: No new direct reports. Persistent UAV threat (previous report). (NO CHANGE).
• Eastern Front (Donetsk/Lyman/Sievierodonetsk/Kramatorsk/Toretsk/Pokrovsk/Novopavlivka):
  • Pokrovsk/Kostyantynivka Axes: Previous report of intense ground combat and repelled Russian mechanized assaults holds. Confirmed tactical gain by RUF at Novonikolaevka (Donetsk). RUF 39th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade reinforced Pokrovsk axis. MoD Russia released video of a Tor-M1 SAM system operating on the Krasnoarmeysk direction (Pokrovsk axis), claiming protection of assault detachments from UAF reconnaissance UAVs. RUF "Рыбарь" indicates active situation on the Southern-Donetsk direction. UAF Air Force reports RUF tactical aviation launching KABs towards Donetsk Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Piatykhatky (Zaporizhzhia/Donetsk border area): UAF 65th Separate Mechanized Brigade's FPV drones successfully engaged a group of RUF personnel moving in the area, hitting a building where RUF had concealed a camera. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Rubtsovsk Direction (Donetsk): RUF (Colonelcassad) released drone footage showing explosions/impacts and fires around wooded areas near a road on the Rubtsovsk direction, indicating active engagements. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - RUF claim/video, LOW CONFIDENCE - UAF BDA).
• Southern Front (Zaporizhzhia/Kherson):
  • Zaporizhzhia NPP: Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration highlights the NPP as a "continuous danger." (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Deep Rear (Russia/Occupied Territories/International):
  • Russia (Internal - Personnel/Logistics/Industrial):
    • Personnel/Mobilization: Kadyrov reports the departure of another "special flight" with "brave sons of our Fatherland" (volunteers from Chechnya and other regions) from Grozny airport to the SVO zone, highlighting continued volunteer recruitment/deployment. TASS reports that Russian soldiers repatriated in the recent POW exchange plan to return to the front after treatment, which serves as a morale booster for RUF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Military-Industrial/Logistics: Colonelcassad reports on Japanese media claims that DPRK could send up to 25,000 skilled workers to Russia for drone assembly in exchange for drone technology and training. If true, this could significantly boost Russian drone production. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - for Japanese media claim).
  • International (IO - Middle East Focus):
    • US-Iran Narrative (Continued Amplification/Confusion): TASS reports that Trump will decide on striking Iran within two weeks, citing the White House. This is echoed by ASTRA and "Оперативний ЗСУ." However, RBC-Ukraine and STERNENKO (citing Reuters) confirm direct US-Iran talks after Israeli operations, while TASS states there are "no plans for a meeting" but contacts continue, and that the US insists on a ban on uranium enrichment in any deal. Alex Parker Returns attempts to manage expectations regarding US involvement, mocking those in Israel who expected immediate US intervention. Zelenskyy (RBC-Ukraine, Оперативний ЗСУ) states Russia is "trying to save the Iranian nuclear program," linking it to Russia's public signals and non-public activities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - for RUF IO efforts and news reporting; HIGH CONFIDENCE - for overall narrative confusion created by Russia and differing reports).
    • Antisemitic Rhetoric/Anti-Israel Sentiment (Continued): Alex Parker Returns posts a screenshot of a tweet expressing surprise that "half of Twitter believes Israel started the war with Iran," indicating continued RUF efforts to shift blame. Alex Parker Returns also posts a video with a strongly antisemitic caption targeting Netanyahu and "Jewish braggarts" (using offensive language) in response to the US decision timeframe, indicating continued virulent anti-Israeli IO. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for RUF IO, CRITICAL - continued antisemitic rhetoric).
    • Iranian Restraint Narrative: Alex Parker Returns publishes a photo quoting the Iranian Parliament Speaker stating their actions so far have been "restraint," framing Iran as a victim or measured actor. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Israeli Response without US: RBC-Ukraine discusses whether Israel would continue operations against Iran without US support, noting Israel lacks bunker-buster bombs and would need to develop its own scenarios or rely on the US. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • International (Diplomatic/Economic/US Politics):
    • NATO Summit: Operatsiya Z (Voenkory Russkoy Vesny) continues to push the Newsweek report that the US is insisting on limited mention of Ukraine in the NATO summit communiqué. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - RUF reporting on US politics, LOW CONFIDENCE - for actual outcome of communique).
    • US Maritime Reconnaissance in Baltic Sea: "Два майора" reports sighting a French DRIX H8 (autonomous surface vessel for underwater reconnaissance) in the Baltic Sea, noting its successor Drix Océan-16 and its dual-use potential. This highlights Western ISR presence near Russian interests. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - for sighting, MEDIUM - for perceived threat by RUF).
    • Ukraine's Diplomatic Engagements: RBC-Ukraine reports Zelenskyy will meet European leaders after the NATO summit in The Hague. Zelenskyy himself emphasizes the need to end the war during Trump's term, signaling Ukraine's continued focus on US elections and a potential shift in strategy. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors:

• No new direct reports affecting battlefield conditions. (NO CHANGE).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces (UAF):
  • Command Appointments: President Zelenskyy appointed Brigadier General Hennadiy Shapovalov as Commander of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (General Staff, Colonelcassad). This is a significant leadership change, already noted by RUF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Air Defense: Rocket danger reported in Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts (Air Force), indicating active AD posture.
  • Counter-UAV/ISR: UAF 65th Separate Mechanized Brigade successfully used an FPV drone to hit a building concealing an RUF camera near Piatykhatky. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Information Operations (IO): Zelenskyy continues to highlight Russian aggression (missile strike on residential building in Kyiv/Dnipro from Jan 2023 footage, but presented as recent and in Kyiv for impact - this is a notable discrepancy/re-use of old footage by Zelenskyy's official channel for current messaging). Zelenskyy also directly links Russia's actions to "saving the Iranian nuclear program." RBC-Ukraine reports on Zelenskyy's post-NATO meetings and his desire to end the war during Trump's term. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - for UAF IO efforts).
• Russian Forces (RUF):
  • Ground Operations: MoD Russia shows a Tor-M1 SAM system operating on the Krasnoarmeysk direction, protecting assault detachments. Kadyrov highlights deployment of Chechen volunteers. RUF (Colonelcassad) shows drone footage of engagements near Tiotkino and on the Rubtsovsk direction. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - for RUF claims and videos).
  • Air Operations: RUF tactical aviation active, launching KABs towards Donetsk Oblast (Air Force).
  • Information Operations (IO): CRITICAL ESCALATION CONTINUES. RUF IO continues to be hyper-aggressive, with continued amplification of US-Iran conflict narratives, contradictory statements from "White House" sources, and renewed direct, virulent antisemitic rhetoric. They are also attempting to set the narrative for the upcoming NATO summit. RUF IO is also pushing internal morale messaging (repatriated soldiers returning to front, volunteer deployments). Claims about DPRK workers for drone production signal potential for increased industrial capacity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for RUF IO activity, EXTREMELY DANGEROUS).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

• Air/Missile/UAV Capabilities: RUF maintains extensive air and UAV strike capabilities. UAF Air Force reports active RUF tactical aviation launching KABs towards Donetsk. MoD Russia shows AD systems protecting ground advances. The potential for North Korean labor to boost drone production (Colonelcassad) indicates an intent to increase quantity and perhaps diversify types. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Ground Capabilities: RUF continues localized ground assaults along Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka axes, leveraging reinforcements for attritional gains. Active "encounter battles" and confirmed graphic footage of engagements in Sumy border region (Tiotkino) indicate continued aggressive probing/fixing operations. RUF is publicly highlighting volunteer deployments (Kadyrov) and repatriated soldiers returning to the front (TASS), demonstrating an intent to maintain personnel levels and boost morale. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Hybrid/Information Warfare (CRITICAL AND DANGEROUS ESCALATION - GLOBAL STRATEGY):
  • Strategic Diversion & Incitement (Middle East - Global Actors): Russia's intent to divert global attention continues with renewed, direct, virulent antisemitic rhetoric and ongoing amplification of complex and contradictory US-Iran conflict narratives. The goal remains to create a perception of global crisis, stretching US resources and attention away from Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE, EXTREMELY DANGEROUS).
  • Undermining Western Cohesion & Escalating Threats: Russia continues to exploit any signs of disunity within Western alliances (e.g., TASS/Operatsiya Z reporting on Trump administration seeking to minimize Ukraine's mention in NATO summit communiqué). Reporting on US military decisions regarding Iran (TASS/ASTRA) aims to influence global perception of US reliability and commitment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Internal Cohesion & Propaganda: Kadyrov's video of volunteer deployment and TASS's report on repatriated soldiers returning to the front are direct efforts to manage internal public perception, highlight "patriotism," and reassure the public about personnel sustainment and morale despite losses. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Global Partner Integration: The potential DPRK labor agreement for drone production (Colonelcassad) signals an intent to bypass sanctions and increase military-industrial output through non-Western partnerships. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• RUF: Continued UAV focus. Significant and dangerous escalation in IO by fabricating direct kinetic events in the Middle East with increasing specificity and now renewed direct antisemitic rhetoric. Observed release of internal videos showing questionable personnel practices in mobilization (previous report) alongside new videos promoting volunteer deployment and soldier resilience (Kadyrov, TASS). Continued ground efforts with AD support on assault axes (MoD Russia). (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• UAF: Appointment of new Ground Forces Commander, Brig. Gen. Shapovalov. Continued strong defensive actions, counter-UAV and ISR efforts, as evidenced by 65th Mech Bde's FPV drone success. Continued adherence to international law (MIA identifying RUF bodies - previous report). Zelenskyy's re-use of old missile strike footage for current messaging indicates adaptation in IO methods. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• RUF: Kadyrov's deployment video and TASS report on repatriated soldiers returning to the front are attempts to project an image of robust personnel sustainment. However, the previous reports of wounded being sent to the front and an epileptic being issued a firearm still suggest underlying issues with medical pre-deployment screenings. The potential DPRK labor deal (Colonelcassad) points to an attempt to boost military production and bypass Western sanctions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for reports, MEDIUM for widespread impact/DPRK deal).
• UAF: Continued ability to sustain defensive operations. New command appointments (Shapovalov) indicate ongoing efforts to optimize command structure for effective sustainment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• RUF: Highly adaptive and effective C2 for information operations, capable of integrating disparate geopolitical events and fabricating new ones into a coherent, escalating narrative, including the use of antisemitic rhetoric. Military C2 demonstrates ability to conduct sustained air and UAV strikes and prepare ground units for operations, with AD protection. The public promotion of volunteer deployments and returning soldiers signifies a coordinated effort to maintain internal cohesion and public support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for C2 and IO).
• UAF: Strong, synchronized C2 for defensive operations and diplomatic efforts. Effective coordination for complex operations like counter-UAV engagements. The appointment of a new Ground Forces Commander signifies continuity and adaptation in high-level military leadership. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Resilient Defense: UAF maintains a robust defensive posture, actively countering UAV threats and securing critical financial backing.
• High Morale/Rule of Law: Continued adherence to international humanitarian law through body repatriation efforts and intelligence on RUF casualties reinforces morale and international standing.
• Proactive Threat Mitigation: Active collection efforts against Russian drones and continued focus on the safety of the Zaporizhzhia NPP.
• Tactical Innovation: The reported use of FPV drones for targeting RUF cameras/personnel demonstrates UAF adaptability and tactical innovation.
• Leadership Continuity: Appointment of Brigadier General Hennadiy Shapovalov as Commander of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine ensures continuity and potentially new strategic direction.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes:
  • FPV Drone Precision Strike: The UAF 65th Separate Mechanized Brigade's successful FPV drone strike on RUF personnel and a hidden camera near Piatykhatky is a significant tactical success, demonstrating effective ISR, precision, and adaptation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Repelled Mechanized Assault: The decisive repulsion of a large-scale Russian mechanized assault on the Kostyantynivka direction (previous report) remains a significant defensive success. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Setbacks:
  • Persistent UAV/KAB Attacks: RUF tactical aviation is launching KABs towards Donetsk Oblast. Rocket danger alerts in Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts indicate continued air threats. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Local Ground Gain: Russian claims of entry into Muravka (Donetsk, previous report) and observed engagements near Tiotkino (Sumy) and Rubtsovsk (Donetsk) indicate continued localized setbacks on the ground, requiring verification. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).
  • Escalated Russian IO with Fabrications & Antisemitism: Russia's escalating and increasingly sophisticated IO campaign, particularly the direct fabrication of kinetic events in the Middle East and explicit nuclear blackmail, now coupled with direct antisemitic rhetoric, poses an extreme challenge to maintaining international focus and support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE, EXTREME DANGER).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense/Counter-UAV: Remains a critical need due to persistent and evolving Russian KAB and UAV threats, including new variants.
• Information Warfare Capabilities: Urgent need for enhanced capabilities to rapidly counter Russia's increasingly sophisticated and dangerous fabrications and propaganda, especially those incorporating antisemitic elements.
• International Support: Continued urgent need for sustained international advocacy to counter Russia's multi-faceted IO campaign, which aims to divert attention and fragment international coalitions.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian (CRITICAL ESCALATION - DIRECT FABRICATION, INCITEMENT, AND DECEPTION WITH ANTISEMITISM):
  • Strategic Diversion/Incitement (Middle East - Global Actors): This remains the primary Russian strategic effort, now featuring renewed, direct, and virulent antisemitic rhetoric. Continued efforts to push conflicting narratives regarding US-Iran talks and Trump's decision-making timeline aim to sow confusion and prolong the perception of crisis. Explicitly blaming Israel for starting the "war with Iran" (Alex Parker Returns) is a key narrative push. (HIGH CONFIDENCE, EXTREMELY DANGEROUS).
  • Undermining Western Unity & Direct Provocation: Continued efforts to highlight and exploit any signs of disunity within Western alliances (TASS/Operatsiya Z on Ukraine's NATO summit mention). Publicizing the French Drix H8 USV in the Baltic Sea ("Два майора") serves to highlight perceived Western reconnaissance activity near Russian borders.
  • Internal Stability and Cultural Control: Kadyrov's promotion of volunteer deployments and TASS's report on repatriated soldiers returning to the front are designed to bolster internal morale and demonstrate resilience. Reporting on potential DPRK drone factory workers (Colonelcassad) aims to show a robust military-industrial complex capable of overcoming sanctions.
• Ukrainian:
  • Morale Boost (Warrior Ethos/Innovation): Dissemination of information on successful FPV drone strikes (65th Mech Bde) demonstrates ingenuity and boosts morale. Zelenskyy re-uses footage of missile strikes on civilians (from Jan 2023) to highlight Russian brutality, even if the footage itself is old, indicating a tactical choice for emotional impact.
  • Highlighting Threat and Accountability: Emphasizing the danger of the Zaporizhzhia NPP and ongoing KAB attacks. Reporting on new command appointments (Shapovalov) to convey stability and ongoing military effectiveness. Zelenskyy directly links Russia to "saving the Iranian nuclear program," framing Russia as a global destabilizer.
  • Transparency & Accountability: Reporting on diplomatic efforts and addressing domestic challenges (Stryi TCC fatality, previous report). Zelenskyy signaling desire to end war during Trump's term is a significant political message.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian: Morale will be boosted by tactical innovations like the FPV drone success and the new Ground Forces Commander's appointment. Persistent KAB attacks and ground assaults will continue to cause concern. Zelenskyy's efforts to highlight Russian atrocities using impactful (even if re-used) footage aims to maintain public resolve.
• Russian: State propaganda attempts to maintain public confidence despite losses, highlighting "patriotism" (Kadyrov) and commitment (repatriated soldiers returning to front). The exploitation of Middle East and US political narratives, including antisemitic rhetoric, aims to divert attention from internal issues and the war in Ukraine, while consolidating anti-Western sentiment. The reporting on DPRK military-industrial cooperation aims to convey strength and self-sufficiency.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• Russian Objectives:
  1. Global Incitement & Diversion (CRITICAL): Fabricate and inflame Middle East conflict with specific, highly dangerous claims involving global actors, now including renewed, virulent antisemitic rhetoric, to shift global focus and stretch Western resources.
  2. Undermine Western Cohesion: Exploit any signs of disunity (e.g., minimizing Ukraine's mention at NATO summit). Seek new partnerships (DPRK drone workers).
  3. Expand Non-Western Alliances: Continue to foster anti-Western narratives to build a counter-coalition.
• Diplomatic Actions: The upcoming NATO summit, with Russian efforts to minimize Ukraine's presence, will be a key diplomatic battleground. Zelenskyy will meet European leaders after the summit, indicating continued direct engagement. Conflicting reports on US-Iran talks highlight the ongoing diplomatic complexities and Russian attempts to shape the narrative. Zelenskyy's stated desire to end the war during Trump's term signals a significant strategic consideration for Ukraine's diplomacy.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Intensified Air/Artillery/UAV Attacks on All Fronts, especially Northeast and East, with Advanced Variants: RUF will sustain and likely increase systematic air and artillery strikes, with emphasis on KABs and advanced UAVs, targeting military positions and civilian infrastructure. The potential for DPRK labor will likely translate to increased drone quantity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Persistent Ground Pressure in Donetsk with Attritional Assaults & Active Border Engagements, with Limited Gains: RUF will maintain high-intensity localized ground assaults along Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka axes, leveraging reinforcements for attritional gains. "Encounter battles" and probing operations in Sumy border region will continue, likely with intensified air support to draw UAF reserves. Limited tactical gains are possible. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Hyper-Aggressive Information Warfare with Extreme Fabrications and Continued Deceptive Diplomacy, Expanding Global Narrative, featuring Increased Antisemitism: Russia's IO apparatus will continue its dangerous strategy of fabricating and amplifying Middle East narratives, with increasing integration of non-Western actors and intensified use of direct, virulent antisemitic rhetoric. Russia will continue to strongly push the narrative of its readiness for "negotiations" as a tactical deception. (HIGH CONFIDENCE, with increased severity and scope).
• Continued Exploitation of Internal Personnel Issues for Propaganda: RUF will continue to manage and spin narratives around their mobilization challenges (wounded, medical exemptions) and will continue to propagate false claims against UAF. Concurrently, they will emphasize volunteerism and commitment to the front to maintain morale. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Large-Scale Ground Offensive on Sumy Axis under Cover of Global IO Saturation and Deceptive Negotiation: Under the extreme noise of multi-faceted global IO (including new, direct fabrications of kinetic events in the Middle East and intensified antisemitic rhetoric), intensified nuclear blackmail, and deceptive negotiation overtures, RUF launches a large-scale, multi-echelon ground offensive on the Sumy axis. This aims for a rapid breakthrough while international attention is saturated elsewhere, preceded by intensified air and missile strikes against UAF C2, logistics, and AD in the northern sector, utilizing new advanced drone capabilities (potentially boosted by DPRK labor). (HIGH CONFIDENCE, due to persistent signals of activity in Sumy combined with extreme IO diversion and new negotiation overture, which could be a smokescreen).
• Direct Russian Kinetic Provocation in Baltic Sea or against NATO Maritime Assets: Russia orchestrates a kinetic incident in the Baltic Sea or against a NATO maritime asset (e.g., using a USV or UUV) that could be attributed to a NATO member or a third party (false flag). This would be framed within Russia's existing IO and could involve leveraging USV/UUV technology, further escalating tensions and completely overshadowing Ukraine. The reported sighting of the French DRIX H8 in the Baltic Sea by RUF channels indicates a heightened awareness and potential for misinterpretation or deliberate provocation. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE, given RUF reporting on Western ISR in Baltic, history of false flags, and the critical need to divert attention).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 24-48 hours):
  • RUF: Expect continued air, artillery, and UAV strikes across all fronts, particularly intensified KABs in the northeast and east. Anticipate a surge in extreme Russian IO, especially around Middle East fabrications (including new specific claims of Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities and Iranian use of cluster munitions, and fabricated missile strikes), intensified nuclear blackmail, and direct, virulent antisemitic narratives. Continued localized ground assaults in Donetsk. Expect amplified diplomatic statements regarding "negotiations" and statements on buffer zones. Continued observation of questionable personnel practices. Expect continued promotion of volunteer deployments.
  • UAF Decision Point: Maintain robust defensive posture and reinforce areas under persistent KAB/Geran threat, particularly in the northeast. Coordinate international diplomatic and IO response to further Middle East fabrications, nuclear blackmail, and direct warnings, highlighting Russia's deceptive and incitement-focused nature and condemning the antisemitic rhetoric. Prepare rapid, high-level diplomatic responses to any Russian provocations or implied threats against NATO assets. Prepare comprehensive responses to Russian negotiation overtures, understanding their likely deceptive nature. Intensify all-source counter-reconnaissance efforts on all axes, especially Sumy. Continue to leverage POW exchanges for morale and actively promote UAF successes and adherence to international law, including identification of RUF bodies. Proactively counter Russian IO regarding internal NATO divisions and delays in aid. Document new war crimes. Address and transparently report on domestic recruitment challenges. Exploit RUF personnel issues in UAF IO.
• Short-term (Next 72 hours):
  • RUF: Continued probing and pressure on the Sumy/Kharkiv border, with potential for further limited ground incursions. Potential for renewed large-scale mechanized assaults in Donetsk. Continuation of diplomatic "negotiation" narrative. Expect continued efforts to formalize foreign military-industrial cooperation (e.g., DPRK drone workers) and address domestic industrial strains. Monitoring for any increase in aggression against NATO assets in the Black Sea or Baltic Sea (related to USVs).
  • UAF Decision Point: Continue to monitor force dispositions on the Sumy axis for indicators of major offensive preparations. Adjust UAF reserve positioning and defensive lines accordingly. Continue to highlight Russian atrocities against civilians and the risks of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Prepare for intensified information warfare surrounding potential "negotiations." Sustain successful counter-UAV operations and adapt to potential new drone threats. Continue force generation and training efforts. Engage with partners regarding mechanisms for utilizing frozen Russian assets and addressing delays in aid. Continue to monitor and prepare for any implications of Zelenskyy's stated desire to end the war during Trump's term.
• Ongoing: Continuous monitoring of global geopolitical developments, particularly in the Middle East and Baltic Sea, for any signs of direct Russian involvement or false flags. Continue to identify and exploit Russian internal vulnerabilities (e.g., personnel compensation, reliance on public donations, medical issues in mobilization). Develop counter-measures to potential increase in Russian drone production from foreign assistance. Maintain robust AD and counter-UAV capabilities. Prepare for the UNSC meeting regarding the "wave of terror against Ukraine." Monitor effectiveness of newly appointed Ground Forces Commander.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Intelligence & Special Operations:

1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Prioritize all-source collection (HUMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, Overhead ISR) on the Sumy-Kursk-Belgorod border region and the Kharkiv axis. Focus on identifying any Russian force concentrations, logistical build-ups, changes in command structures, and specific units involved in the "encounter battles." Specifically, verify Russian claims of capturing Yablonovka (Sumy), assess the tactical significance and BDA of engagements near Tiotkino and Rubtsovsk. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: ALL-SOURCE ISR for Sumy/Kursk/Belgorod/Kharkiv, GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS of claimed territory).
2. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Reinforce a dedicated multi-agency task force for real-time monitoring and analysis of Russian information operations, focusing on the Middle East, new blame-shifting narratives, and specifically on threats to NATO and global destabilization. Pay particular attention to: **The integration of Chinese and Taliban narratives; the direct fabrication of kinetic events (e.g., missile strikes on Israel, Tel Aviv stock exchange, Arak reactor); any further amplification of narratives questioning "why NATO aviation is not shot down" or similar provocations; and most critically, the intensified use of direct, virulent antisemitic rhetoric. Develop and disseminate rapid, evidence-based counter-narratives globally. Coordinate intelligence sharing with international partners. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: OSINT, SIGINT, Cognitive Domain Analysis).
3. URGENT/HIGH: Conduct immediate and thorough battle damage assessment (BDA) for all recent Russian aviation (KAB/Geran) strikes in Sumy, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk (Nikopol), and for artillery/missile strikes in Kherson and other southern areas, identifying targets, munition types, and assessing impact on both civilian and military infrastructure. Document evidence of indiscriminate shelling against civilian targets. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: Overhead ISR, HUMINT, OSINT).
4. URGENT: Investigate reports of North Korean workers deploying to Russian drone factories. Assess implications for Russian drone production capacity and UAF counter-UAV strategy. Prioritize TECHINT analysis of captured new drone variants (AI-enabled Shaheds, fiber-optic FPVs) to identify vulnerabilities and develop countermeasures. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: SIGINT, HUMINT, OSINT, TECHINT).
5. URGENT: Analyze the impact of reported Russian personnel issues (wounded being sent to front, epilepsy case - previous report) and propaganda efforts (Kadyrov volunteer videos, TASS repatriated soldiers returning) on overall RUF command structure, unit effectiveness, and morale. Identify potential opportunities for psychological operations. (COLLECTION REQUIREMENT: HUMINT, OSINT, TECHINT).

6.2. Air Defense & Force Protection:

1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Maintain maximum AD alert posture across all major population centers and critical infrastructure, especially Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk (Nikopol), Zaporizhzhia, and southern oblasts due to continued KAB, tactical aviation, and ground-launched missile/Geran threats. Prioritize interceptors against these munitions and against Lancet/Geran/Zala drones.
2. URGENT/CRITICAL: Accelerate the deployment and integration of advanced AD systems and munitions in northern, eastern, and southern sectors in response to ongoing KAB and advanced UAV threats. Prioritize systems capable of countering KABs and high-speed targets, and those capable of addressing new drone technologies (AI/fiber-optic, direct RF).
3. URGENT: Enhance force protection measures for civilian populations, including updated air raid warning systems and accessible shelters. Publicly document and disseminate information on civilian casualties. Prioritize resources for shelter reconstruction and long-duration fire suppression and disaster response.

6.3. Ground Forces:

1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Maintain robust defensive postures on all reported axes in Donetsk (Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Kramatorsk etc.), preparing to repel sustained combined-arms assaults. Leverage lessons learned from successful repulsions of mechanized assaults (previous report), adapting tactics to counter persistent Russian tactical drone and artillery support. Ensure timely rotation of units from high-intensity zones. Verify Russian claims of Muravka capture and adjust defensive lines accordingly.
2. URGENT/CRITICAL: Develop and refine contingency plans for a potential major ground offensive on the Sumy axis, in light of confirmed "encounter battles" and "complex strikes." This includes pre-positioning reserves, identifying key defensive lines, conducting counter-mobility operations, and aggressive localized reconnaissance to confirm or deny Russian build-ups.
3. URGENT: Continue and expand successful counter-UAV and counter-battery operations. Prioritize targeting of Russian artillery and reconnaissance drone launch sites (e.g., "Zala" UAVs, previous report). Actively incorporate new counter-FPV technologies and exploit intelligence gathered from captured drones. Explore and document the tactical advantages of FPV drones for targeting RUF positions and equipment, as demonstrated by "65th Separate Mechanized Brigade."
4. ONGOING: Integrate lessons learned from the repulsion of mechanized assaults and successful counter-UAV engagements into training and defensive planning. Continue and expand training programs for new recruits. Address and mitigate impacts of domestic recruitment challenges. New Commander of Ground Forces, Brig. Gen. Shapovalov, should immediately review and implement these priorities.

6.4. Information Operations & Diplomatic:

1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Launch an unprecedented, rapid, and globally coordinated IO and diplomatic campaign to expose and condemn Russia's extreme and dangerous fabrications regarding the Middle East, its consistent use of nuclear blackmail, and especially its dynamic and deceptive tactics of escalation and retraction and direct incitement, now intensified with virulent antisemitic rhetoric.
   • Explicitly debunk all false claims, particularly those integrating Chinese military presence, Taliban legitimization, new direct fabrications of kinetic events (e.g., ballistic missile strikes on Israel, Tel Aviv stock exchange, Arak reactor), and new accusations regarding Iranian cluster munitions.
   • Forcefully condemn Russia's escalating antisemitic rhetoric and its attempt to weaponize historical grievances.
   • Directly counter any new Russian narratives (e.g., questions about "Why not shoot down NATO aviation over the Black Sea") as desperate attempts to portray Western nations as hostile.
   • Proactively address Russian narratives of Western disunity (e.g., Hungarian energy cooperation, Nord Stream, minimizing Ukraine mention at NATO summit, BRICS expansion) and highlight the unity of purpose in supporting Ukraine.
   • Ensure consistent, multilateral messaging across all diplomatic and media channels.
2. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Address Russia's new negotiation overture (after June 22nd).
   • Frame the overture as a likely deceptive maneuver intended to buy time or create division, especially given the simultaneous extreme escalation in IO and direct fabrications.
   • Communicate clear, non-negotiable conditions for genuine peace talks, emphasizing territorial integrity, sovereignty, and accountability.
   • Leverage the POW exchange and body repatriation (previous report; MIA identification, 16:54:01Z) as humanitarian successes for Ukraine, highlighting adherence to international law despite Russian "cynicism."
3. URGENT: Proactively disseminate verified information on UAF defensive successes, particularly the repulsion of major Russian mechanized assaults and successful counter-UAV operations, including novel tactics like FPV drone precision strikes. Highlight innovation in counter-FPV technology and the humane treatment of surrendering enemy personnel.
4. URGENT: Publicly highlight and explain Russia's continued deliberate targeting of civilian areas and critical infrastructure and the ongoing risks of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Support humanitarian campaigns and publicly document war crimes. Counter Russian claims of UAF sabotage in occupied territories (previous report).
5. ONGOING: Continue to highlight instances of Ukrainian resilience and internal accountability, including new military appointments. Address domestic challenges transparently. Leverage Russian internal reports (e.g., wounded being sent to front, epilepsy case, train derailment, oil spills) to show Russia's own vulnerabilities (personnel issues, reliance on public donations, logistical challenges), and highlight Russia's efforts to expand non-Western alliances as a sign of their diplomatic isolation. Engage with international partners to address delays in aid and sanctions. Support efforts to utilize frozen Russian assets. Prepare for and leverage the upcoming UNSC meeting on Russian "terror."

END OF REPORT.