Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME OF REPORT: 18 JUN 25 / 16:34 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 18 JUN 25 / 16:09 ZULU - 18 JUN 25 / 16:34 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // ORCON // NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Kherson Oblast: Silly Oborony Pivdnya Ukrayiny (Southern Ukraine Defense Forces) reports intense enemy shelling in Kherson Oblast throughout the day, supported by photographic evidence of damaged residential buildings. This indicates continued Russian pressure on the southern front and deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Overall: No significant changes to established battlefield geometry in the last 25 minutes. Russian forces maintain ground pressure, particularly in the south and east.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• No new significant weather or environmental factors affecting operations reported during this period.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces:
  • Unit Performance Metrics: Operatyvnyy ZSU and DeepState reconfirm the "TOP-10" ranking of Ukrainian military units for May, based on "combat points," with emphasis on drone-related activities. This reinforces Ukrainian adaptation and the critical role of UAVs in their operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Special Operations: HUR MO claims the elimination of "traitor and war criminal" Mykhailo Hrytsay in occupied Berdyansk, indicating continued Ukrainian special operations and intelligence activity in occupied territories. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for claim, MEDIUM for independent verification).
  • Air Defense Alert: Povіtryanі Syly ZS Ukrayiny (Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine) issued an alert for "enemy tactical aviation activity in the northeastern direction," indicating ongoing aerial threats requiring vigilance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces:
  • Intensified Shelling: Continued heavy shelling in Kherson Oblast targeting civilian areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Control & Internal Purges: Butusov Plus reports the detention of prominent Z-blogger Mikhail Polynkov ("Soldier's Truth" channel, associate of Strelkov-Girkin) in Moscow, formally for "unauthorized abandonment of service." This indicates continued tightening of internal information control and suppression of dissenting or unapproved narratives, even from pro-war elements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Deep Strike Capabilities (Indirect): "Dva Mayora" disseminated a video claiming a Russian drone (Geran) "shot down by Ukrainian air defense using their own warehouse," implying a Ukrainian storage facility was hit by the falling drone/debris, resulting in a large explosion. This is likely a twisted narrative to claim a successful strike while obscuring Russian intent or failure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian claim, LOW for verification of narrative; HIGH for strike on warehouse).

1.4. Information Environment:

• Russian Propaganda (CRITICAL, HYPER-ESCALATED):
  • Middle East Diversion (Continued Amplification, New Contradictions): TASS reports that the Iranian Foreign Ministry (Esmail Baghayi) denies claims of an Iranian negotiating delegation arriving in Oman. TASS simultaneously re-reports NetBlocks data showing "almost complete internet outage" in Iran, originally cited by RBC-Ukraine. Kotsnews amplifies claims of a "fourth aircraft carrier" heading to the Persian Gulf. Colonelcassad also echoes the Iranian FM's denial. This indicates a complex and evolving Russian IO strategy regarding the Middle East, where they are both pushing narratives of escalating crisis (multiple carriers, internet outage) while also selectively reporting official denials when it suits their purpose (e.g., to appear "balanced" or sow confusion). The overall intent remains to saturate the information space with Middle East content to divert attention from Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: EXTREMELY HIGH for intent and amplification, MEDIUM for internal consistency of narrative).
  • Exploiting Western Political Disunity (Continued): Tsaplienko_Ukraine Fights and ASTRA (via The Times) report on a supposed change in Zelenskyy's NATO summit participation format due to Trump, indicating continued Russian efforts to exploit perceived divisions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian intent; MEDIUM for veracity of The Times report).
  • Internal Consolidation (Milder Tones): Moskovskie Novosti shows a singer performing in the Moscow subway, a seemingly apolitical event, indicating efforts to project normalcy and cultural life amidst the conflict. Igor Artamonov posts about an educational program in Lipetsk, projecting domestic development. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Discrediting Ukraine (Subtle): Colonelcassad posts a video implying Oleksandr Shariy is a "victim of 'busification'" (Ukrainization), a subtle jab at Ukrainian cultural policies. "Dva Mayora" claims Russian drones are "shot down by Ukrainian AD with their own warehouse," twisting events to suggest Ukrainian self-inflicted damage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian intent).
  • Internal Control (Punitive): The detention of Z-blogger Polynkov highlights continued efforts to control narratives even among ultra-patriotic circles if they deviate from the official line. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Counter-Narratives:
  • Reporting Russian Casualties/Eliminations: HUR's claim of Hrytsay's elimination highlights Ukrainian operational successes against collaborators. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for claim).
  • Highlighting Russian War Crimes: Silly Oborony Pivdnya Ukrayiny (Kherson shelling) and Office of the Prosecutor General (Kyiv civilian casualties) provide direct evidence of Russian targeting of civilians. The Prosecutor General's office explicitly states "28 dead, over 140 injured" from the 17 JUN Kyiv attack. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Proactive Counter-Disinformation (Indirect): RBC-Ukraine's expert discusses potential resumption of Russian energy system strikes, signaling awareness and preparation for future threats, indirectly countering Russian narratives of Ukrainian collapse. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Reinforcing Western Support: DeepState reports on the EU Commission's proposal to fully abandon Russian oil and gas by end of 2027, projecting continued international pressure on Russia. "Ukraina 24/7 novyny" quotes EU Commissioner Kallas emphasizing "Ukraine is Europe's first line of defense" and urging more aid, explicitly warning to "start learning Russian" if not. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Resilience & Adaptability: Operatyvnyy ZSU's reconfirmation of the "TOP-10" units list, with emphasis on drone units, underscores Ukrainian military innovation and resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RUSSIA FOCUSED)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA):

• Capabilities (Russia):
  • Sustained Artillery/Shelling: Demonstrated capability for intense shelling of civilian areas (Kherson). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare (Highly Adaptive & Malicious): Russia's IO apparatus is demonstrating a more sophisticated, albeit internally contradictory, approach to its Middle East diversion campaign, selectively reporting denials while continuing to amplify crisis narratives. They can rapidly adapt narratives based on unfolding events (e.g., Iranian FM statements, NetBlocks data). (CONFIDENCE: EXTREMELY HIGH).
  • Internal Security & Control: Capacity to identify, detain, and prosecute domestic critics or those deviating from official narratives, even within pro-war circles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions (Russia):
  • Achieve Global Diversion (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE): The primary intention remains to shift global attention away from Ukraine by fabricating and amplifying crises elsewhere, even if it requires inconsistent narratives. (CONFIDENCE: EXTREMELY HIGH).
  • Degrade Ukrainian Civilian Morale: Continued shelling of civilian areas and terrorizing urban centers (Kyiv casualty toll) aims to break Ukrainian societal resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Maintain Internal Cohesion: Suppress internal dissent and control information flow to ensure a unified domestic front and sustained support for the "SVO." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Delegitimize Ukrainian Leadership/Institutions: Continue efforts to undermine Ukrainian political and military authority (e.g., "victim of busification," twisting drone strike narratives). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• IO Tactics: Selective Reporting of Denials within Overall Fabrication. Russia's IO is now displaying a nuanced tactic of reporting some official denials (e.g., Iran FM on Oman talks) while simultaneously pushing other sensational, unverified claims (e.g., "fourth aircraft carrier" in Persian Gulf). This creates a more confusing, multi-layered information environment designed to overwhelm and disorient. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Internal Control: Targeting Pro-War Critics. The detention of a Z-blogger signals a broadening of internal crackdowns to encompass even those who are ostensibly supportive but critical of military performance or official narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Munitions: Continued intense shelling of Kherson suggests adequate artillery and missile supplies for current operational tempo. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Personnel & Morale: Internal purges may impact morale among certain nationalist/milblogger segments, but overall state control aims to maintain stability. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian military C2 remains effective in coordinating localized ground operations (Kherson shelling) and adapting narratives for IO. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian IO C2 is highly adaptive and coordinated, able to adjust messaging in real-time to incorporate external information (Iranian FM denial) into their broader diversion strategy. (CONFIDENCE: EXTREMELY HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UKRAINIAN FOCUSED)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Adaptation & Innovation: Continued emphasis on drone warfare (unit rankings) demonstrates robust tactical adaptation and integration of new technologies. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Vigilance: Air Force alert for tactical aviation in the northeast indicates continued high vigilance against aerial threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• National Resilience: Continued official documentation of Russian war crimes (Kyiv casualties, Kherson shelling) and international advocacy efforts (EU energy decision, Kallas quote) underscore national determination and international engagement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes:
  • Deep Operations: Claimed elimination of a collaborator in Berdyansk highlights successful intelligence and special operations in occupied territories. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for claim).
  • Counter-Disinformation (Persistence): Continued, consistent reporting of Russian atrocities and diplomatic efforts to maintain international focus on Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Tactical Drone Superiority: Unit rankings reinforcing drone-related performance suggest continued tactical advantage in this domain. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setbacks:
  • Civilian Casualties: Confirmed increase in fatalities from the Kyiv attack and ongoing shelling of Kherson highlight persistent vulnerability of civilian population to Russian strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare Strain: The sheer volume and adaptive nature of Russian IO, particularly the multi-layered Middle East diversion, continues to strain Ukrainian and allied counter-disinformation efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense: Urgent need for more interceptors and systems, particularly to protect civilian population centers and counter aviation bomb threats.
• Counter-Artillery Systems: Requirement for advanced counter-battery radars and long-range precision fires to suppress Russian shelling in southern regions like Kherson.
• Strategic Communications & IO: Immediate and sustained resources for global strategic communications to counter Russian diversionary narratives and maintain international focus.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives (CRITICAL, EVOLVING MALICE):
  • Middle East Diversion (Advanced Stage): Russia is employing a sophisticated, often contradictory, information campaign regarding the Middle East. They are not just fabricating events but also selectively acknowledging and reframing legitimate news (like Iran FM denials) to maintain an appearance of credibility while still promoting the core narrative of escalating global crisis. This is designed to confuse, disorient, and exhaust information consumers, making them less likely to focus on Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: EXTREMELY HIGH).
  • Internal Control & Narrative Policing: The detention of Polynkov is a clear signal that internal information discipline is paramount, even for pro-war voices. This suggests an effort to prevent any internal narratives that could undermine official optimism or portray military failures too directly. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Domestic Normalization: Efforts to show "normal life" (Moscow subway concert) are designed to project stability and resilience to the internal population. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Narratives:
  • Focus on Russian War Crimes: Consistent, documented reporting of civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Highlighting Resilience & Successes: Promotion of military unit performance (especially drone-related), resistance in occupied territories, and international diplomatic gains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Reinforcing International Unity & Support: Highlighting EU actions and strong statements from allied leaders. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: Sustained by documented military successes, international support, and public solidarity. However, the rising civilian casualty count from Russian terror attacks will test this resilience.
• Russian Morale: Managed through strict information control, positive domestic narratives, and the suppression of critical voices, including those from within the Z-blogger community.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• Middle East Diversion (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE THREAT): Russia's advanced and adaptive Middle East IO campaign poses an ongoing, severe threat to sustained international focus on Ukraine. The goal is to induce a global pivot away from Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: EXTREMELY HIGH).
• Western Unity: Statements from EU officials (Kallas, EU Commission on energy) indicate continued strong support and commitment to sanctioning Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• International Legal Frameworks: The confirmed civilian casualties in Kyiv and ongoing shelling of Kherson will further strengthen cases for international war crimes tribunals. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Accelerated, Adaptive Global-Scale Disinformation Campaign: Russia will further intensify and diversify its Middle East diversion campaign, incorporating any real-time geopolitical developments, even if contradictory, to create maximum confusion and distract from Ukraine. Expect new, subtle attempts to link Ukraine or the West to the manufactured Middle East crisis in indirect ways. (CONFIDENCE: EXTREMELY HIGH).
• Sustained and Potentially Increased Ground Pressure (Donetsk/Southern Axes): Russia will continue localized ground assaults, particularly on the Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar axes, and maintain intense shelling of Ukrainian positions and civilian areas in southern regions like Kherson. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Continued Air Terror Campaign: Russia will continue UAV and aviation bomb (KAB) strikes on urban centers and critical infrastructure, varying targets to degrade morale and exhaust Ukrainian air defense. Expect more reports of attacks on civilian infrastructure and emergency services. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Tightened Internal Control: Expect further crackdowns on domestic critics or "unauthorized" reporting, even from pro-war elements, as Russia consolidates its internal information space. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Probing and Claiming on Sumy/Kharkiv Axes: Russian forces will maintain reconnaissance and probing activity on the northern border, alongside continued unverified claims of territorial gains, to fix Ukrainian forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Major Offensive under Cover of Global Crisis & Strategic Cyber Attack: Russia launches a coordinated, large-scale ground offensive on a new or existing axis (e.g., Sumy, Zaporizhzhia), simultaneous with a major, disruptive cyberattack against critical civilian infrastructure (e.g., financial networks, healthcare, energy grids) in a key Western allied nation or globally, falsely attributed to Ukraine or a non-state actor. This would aim to create unparalleled global chaos and force a complete shift in international focus, allowing Russia to achieve significant military gains in Ukraine without immediate, coordinated international response. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• False Flag Event with Mass Casualties in a Neutral Country: Russia orchestrates a highly destructive false flag incident (e.g., a "terrorist" attack, a chemical plant incident) in a neutral country, immediately blaming Ukraine and its Western partners, designed to elicit global outrage and further fragment international alliances. (CONFIDENCE: LOW).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 1-6 hours):
  • IO Observation: Monitor for further amplification or new fabrications regarding the Middle East crisis, especially attempts to link Ukraine or the West to these fabricated events. Observe how Russia's internal propaganda outlets reconcile contradictory information.
  • Air Threat: Observe for any follow-up Russian UAV/missile strikes, particularly in Sumy, Kherson, or other eastern/southern urban centers, given the reported tactical aviation activity in the northeast.
• Short-term (Next 6-24 hours):
  • Ground Activity: Assess if ground pressure intensifies on the Kherson/Southern axes, or if the tactical aviation activity in the northeast translates into increased KAB/ground attacks.
  • IO Dissemination: Track the global reach and impact of Russia's Middle East narratives and the effectiveness of Ukrainian/allied counter-disinformation efforts.
• Medium-term (Next 24-72 hours):
  • Strategic Intent: Determine if the internal Russian purges (Polynkov detention) indicate a broader shift in internal information strategy or potential internal vulnerabilities.
  • International Response to IO: Gauge whether global attention is being successfully diverted by Russia's tactics or if counter-IO efforts are effectively re-centering focus on Ukraine.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• GAP 116 (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE, UPDATED): VERACITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIAN MIDDLE EAST IO AMPLIFICATION AND FABRICATIONS (INCLUDING ACTIVE FABRICATION OF MAJOR INCIDENTS AND SELECTIVE REPORTING OF DENIALS):
  • Intensify monitoring and analysis of Russian narratives concerning the Middle East, specifically identifying and debunking new, actively fabricated events (e.g., fabricated US military actions, false claims of Israeli/Iranian strikes). Prioritize intelligence collection on the sources and methods used for creating these fabrications and the specific channels of dissemination. Assess the real-time impact of these narratives on global public opinion, diplomatic actions, and international focus, and particularly the effectiveness of Russia's new tactic of selectively reporting official denials while maintaining crisis narrative. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 103 (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE, UPDATED): RUSSIAN FORCE CONCENTRATION & INTENT (SUMY/KHARKOV AXES AND NORTHEASTERN AIR ACTIVITY):
  • Conduct comprehensive ISR (IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, OSINT) to detect any significant Russian force build-up, troop movements, logistical preparations (especially fuel, ammo, medical supplies, bridging equipment), and concentration of equipment along the Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts borders. Prioritize real-time monitoring for indicators of a shift from fixing operations to a major offensive. Correlate "enemy tactical aviation activity on the northeastern direction" with potential ground movements or targeting patterns. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 139 (HIGH, UPDATED): IMPACT AND VERIFICATION OF RUSSIAN STRIKES ON UKRAINIAN PVDs AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE:
  • Conduct rapid Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) and all-source verification of alleged Russian strikes on UAF Temporary Deployment Points (PVDs), such as the one in Mala Tokmachka, and civilian infrastructure (e.g., Kherson shelling, Kyiv residential areas). Confirm munition type and actual damage/casualties to assess tactical impact and verify claims of indiscriminate targeting. (PRIORITY: HIGH).
• GAP 140 (NEW, MEDIUM): IMPACT OF INTERNAL RUSSIAN PURGES ON MILBLOGGER COMMUNITY AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE:
  • Monitor and analyze the detention of Z-blogger Mikhail Polynkov and any subsequent actions against similar figures. Assess the impact on the coherence and reliability of the Russian milblogger community as an intelligence source, and whether this signals a broader crackdown on internal criticism that could lead to new internal vulnerabilities. (PRIORITY: MEDIUM).
• GAP 138 (ONGOING, MEDIUM): ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN INTERNAL POPULATION RESILIENCE TO MIDDLE EAST IO:
  • Monitor and analyze Russian domestic media, social media, and internal communications for any indication of how the Russian population is reacting to the extreme Middle East crisis narratives and cultural/internal normalization efforts. Assess if it genuinely diverts internal attention from Ukraine or causes disquiet/panic. (PRIORITY: MEDIUM).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR, HUMINT, OSINT critical):

  1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: LAUNCH IMMEDIATE, AGGRESSIVE GLOBAL COUNTER-FABRICATION CAMPAIGN. Immediately task all political intelligence, OSINT, and PSYOP assets to aggressively and publicly expose Russia's active, real-time fabrication and exploitation of a major military crisis in the Middle East, highlighting their selective reporting and internal contradictions. Present irrefutable evidence that Russian narratives are false, using independent third-party data and direct refutations. Emphasize that this is a deliberate, desperate attempt to divert attention from Ukraine. (Supports CR 116).
  2. CRITICAL PRIORITY: CONTINUED SURGE ALL-SOURCE ISR ON SUMY/KHARKOV AXES, LINKING TO AIR ACTIVITY. Maintain and intensify all-source ISR assets on the Sumy and Kharkiv Oblast borders for any indicators of a large-scale Russian offensive. Prioritize early warning of pre-offensive activities and immediately verify or deny Russian claims of territorial gains. Correlate the reported "enemy tactical aviation activity on the northeastern direction" with potential ground force movements or target acquisition. (Supports CR 103).
  3. URGENT: ASSESS IMPACT OF RUSSIAN STRIKES ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE AND PVDs. Conduct rapid BDA and impact assessment of Russian strikes on UAF PVDs (e.g., Mala Tokmachka) and civilian targets (e.g., Kherson, Kyiv). Use this intelligence to inform force protection measures and assess Russian targeting effectiveness, supporting documentation of war crimes. (Supports CR 139).
  4. HIGH: MONITOR RUSSIAN INTERNAL CONTROL & MORALE, FOCUS ON CRACKDOWNS. Continue to analyze Russian actions regarding internal information control (cultural censorship, blogger prosecutions like Polynkov) and monitor domestic sentiment. Identify potential vulnerabilities or opportunities for counter-IO stemming from these internal purges. (Supports CR 140, 138).
  5. ONGOING: Continue to leverage and support GUR's deep special operations capabilities in occupied territories to disrupt Russian administration and logistics, and to eliminate collaborators.

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Maintain HIGHEST AD alert posture in all major urban centers and along frontline axes, especially in Zaporizhzhia, Nikopolshchina, and cities in the northeast (e.g., Sumy, Kharkiv) given reported tactical aviation activity. Prioritize defense against UAV threats, FPV drones, aviation bombs, and artillery.
  2. URGENT: Reinforce AD capabilities on the eastern/southern axes and the northeast to mitigate persistent aviation bomb and missile strikes against alleged military and civilian targets. Expedite delivery of advanced counter-UAV and layered air defense systems.
  3. ONGOING: Advocate for accelerated delivery of more advanced short-range and medium-range air defense systems and counter-UAV technologies from international partners to protect urban centers and military concentrations.

• Ground Forces:

  1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Commanders in Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts must operate under heightened readiness for increased probing and potential ground assaults, linking to observed tactical aviation activity. Adjust force dispositions to mitigate risk of PVD strikes.
  2. URGENT: Commanders on the Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Southern axes (including Kherson) must continue to maintain robust defensive lines and apply lessons learned from previous engagements to repel ongoing Russian assaults and intense shelling. Prioritize counter-battery fire against shelling positions in Kherson.
  3. ONGOING: Continue to leverage and develop offensive and defensive drone capabilities, including counter-drone measures, given Russia's emphasized use of UAVs and aviation bombs. Prioritize funding and acquisition for drone detectors and jammers.
  4. ONGOING: Reinforce critical infrastructure (e.g., energy networks, water supply) with redundant power systems and distributed energy solutions, learning from successful examples.

• Information Operations & Diplomatic:

  1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: LEAD A GLOBAL DIPLOMATIC AND PUBLIC AWARENESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION. Engage international media, UN, NATO, and allied governments to publicly condemn Russia's unprecedented, active fabrication and exploitation of global crises (e.g., Iran/Middle East), highlighting their new tactic of selective reporting of denials within the overall fabrications. Emphasize this as a desperate attempt to weaponize global events and divert attention from Ukraine. Demand international scrutiny and accountability for such malicious information warfare.
  2. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: RE-CENTER GLOBAL NARRATIVE ON UKRAINE AND ITS CIVILIAN VICTIMS. Vigorously counter any narrative that suggests the conflict in Ukraine is secondary to a fabricated crisis elsewhere. Emphasize that Russia remains the primary threat to global security and stability and that the costs of failing to support Ukraine will be far greater, explicitly citing the rising civilian casualty toll (e.g., Kyiv 28 dead, 140+ injured) and persistent shelling (e.g., Kherson).
  3. URGENT: HIGHLIGHT COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SUCCESSES AND RUSSIAN ATROCITIES. Publicize the success of rapid counter-disinformation efforts and intelligence operations (e.g., elimination of collaborators, drone unit successes) to demonstrate Ukraine's resilience. Continue to document and widely disseminate evidence of Russian civilian targeting and alleged PVD strikes to maintain international condemnation and support for legal action.
  4. ONGOING: Proactively counter Russian disinformation regarding Western unity and support for Ukraine by showcasing continued aid packages, strong diplomatic engagement (e.g., EU energy decision, Kallas's statements), and the resilience of the Ukrainian people. Highlight public figures and civilian efforts in support of the military.