Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME OF REPORT: 18 JUN 25 / 16:09 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 18 JUN 25 / 15:39 ZULU - 18 JUN 25 / 16:09 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // ORCON // NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Zaporizhzhia: Russian sources (Colonelcassad, TASS, Дневник Десантника🇷🇺) confirm precision strikes on an alleged Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) Temporary Deployment Point (PVD) of the 118th Separate Mechanized Brigade near Mala Tokmachka, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, using RBK-500 cluster munitions or aviation bombs. This indicates continued Russian deep strike capabilities against alleged military targets in rear areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for strike; MEDIUM for specific target verification and munition type). An air raid alert in Zaporizhzhia concluded during the reporting period, indicating ongoing, albeit intermittent, aerial threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Kursk Oblast (Russia): Alex Parker Returns claims "trophies" including Leopard and Abrams tanks from Kursk Oblast. This is a highly suspect claim, possibly propaganda, given the nature of cross-border operations and the unlikelihood of such high-value captures from recent engagements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian claim; LOW for independent verification).
• Overall: No significant changes to established battlefield geometry in the last 30 minutes. Russian forces continue to contest positions, particularly in the eastern and southern axes.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• No new significant weather or environmental factors affecting operations reported during this period. Localized weather conditions (e.g., rain at SPIEF) are noted but do not broadly impact frontlines.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces:
  • Adaptation & Modernization (Kryvyi Rih): Oleksandr Vilkul reports the delivery of 32 modern autonomous power supply systems to "Kryvorizhzhia Teplomerezha" (Heating Network Enterprise) in Kryvyi Rih through cooperation with international partners (GIZ). These systems, combining inverters, batteries, and solar panels, aim to ensure continuous power for critical infrastructure. This highlights Ukrainian efforts to enhance energy resilience against Russian strikes and continued international support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Unit Morale & Performance Metrics: DeepState published a "TOP-10" ranking of Ukrainian military units for May based on "combat points," likely a morale-boosting initiative for performance recognition, possibly related to drone operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Public Figures Supporting Military: Ex-footballer Yevhen Seleznyov's video expressing patriotism and confirming donation of 50 FPV drones (valued at 1,000,000 UAH) to Kraken and Strix (Border Guard Rapid Response unit) highlights continued public and celebrity support for the military. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces:
  • Targeting Ukrainian Rear Areas: The confirmed strike on Mala Tokmachka indicates continued efforts to target Ukrainian temporary deployment points and logistics in the rear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Propaganda & Morale (Internal): "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" publishes information on "Payments for the death of a serviceman in the SVO in 2025 (part 2)", suggesting internal focus on personnel welfare/compensation for casualties. Alex Parker Returns also posts a video of Russian soldiers expressing gratitude, likely for support or donations, aiming to bolster domestic morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Display of Captured Equipment: Colonelcassad and Alex Parker Returns disseminate images of alleged captured Western military vehicles (Leopard, Abrams), likely for propaganda purposes to demonstrate Russian success and demoralize Ukrainian forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian intent; LOW for independent verification of location/capture).

1.4. Information Environment:

• Russian Propaganda (CRITICAL, HYPER-ESCALATED):
  • Middle East Diversion (Intensified): Alex Parker Returns and "Два майора" immediately amplify claims of the US evacuating its embassy from Israel and advising citizens to leave, citing deployment of a new Carrier Strike Group (USS Gerald R. Ford). "Военкор Котенок" also echoes this with "They know something." This is a rapid and concerted effort to fabricate and inflate a sense of immediate, catastrophic crisis in the Middle East, aiming to completely overshadow the war in Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Weaponizing US Politics (Continued): Kotsnews and РБК-Україна immediately pick up and disseminate "The Times" report claiming Zelenskyy's NATO summit participation format was changed due to Trump. This continues Russia's strategy of exploiting perceived US/Western disunity and political vulnerabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Discrediting Ukraine (Cont.): "Два майора" claims Kyiv is "paying for 'Yaroslavna's lament' in the foreign press" to regain attention, attempting to discredit Ukrainian appeals for support as manufactured. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Antisemitic Narratives: Colonelcassad explicitly addresses questions about "how to treat Jews in light of what is happening," responding "the same as before." This is a subtle yet dangerous reinforcement of underlying antisemitic narratives previously observed in Russian IO, attempting to control the discourse around Jewish communities amidst manufactured Middle East crises. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal Control (Culture): ASTRA reports authorities in Primorsky Krai cancelled a musical "Cabaret" due to "improper content," indicating continued tightening of cultural control and censorship within Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Counter-Narratives:
  • Resilience & Modernization: Vilkul's report on energy infrastructure modernization in Kryvyi Rih counters Russian narratives of degrading Ukrainian infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Morale & Public Support: DeepState's unit rankings and Seleznyov's video showcasing FPV drone donations highlight Ukrainian military performance, public support, and successful adaptation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Debunking Russian IO (Iran): РБК-Україна reports "Almost all of Iran is without Internet," citing NETBLOCKS.ORG data, directly (and correctly) attributing internet disruptions to internal Iranian actions, not an external military strike as Russia is implying. This is a crucial, real-time counter-disinformation effort. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RUSSIA FOCUSED)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA):

• Capabilities (Russia):
  • Precision Deep Strike: Demonstrated capability to hit alleged UAF PVDs with precision (Mala Tokmachka). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Sustained Ground Pressure: Continues to maintain ground pressure, albeit no confirmed major breakthroughs in this reporting period.
  • Advanced, Aggressive Information Warfare (CRITICAL, EXTREMELY MALICIOUS): Russia's IO apparatus is operating at an unprecedented level of aggression and coordination, specifically in manufacturing and amplifying a major, immediate, and catastrophic global crisis in the Middle East to fully divert international attention from Ukraine. They are rapidly reacting to and exploiting external geopolitical events (US embassy evacuations) to fuel this narrative. (CONFIDENCE: EXTREMELY HIGH).
• Intentions (Russia):
  • Achieve Global Diversion (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE): The primary intention is to establish the Middle East crisis as the overriding global security concern, thereby diminishing the perceived urgency of the conflict in Ukraine and fracturing international support. (CONFIDENCE: EXTREMELY HIGH).
  • Degrade Ukrainian Morale & Unity: Continues to use both kinetic strikes and information operations (discrediting appeals for aid, showcasing alleged captured equipment) to undermine Ukrainian morale and perceived international support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Maintain Internal Control: Continued efforts to control internal narratives and suppress dissent (e.g., cultural censorship, focus on military welfare/compensation). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• IO Tactics: Real-Time Fabrication and Hyper-Amplification. Russia's information operations are now demonstrating real-time, highly aggressive fabrication and amplification of geopolitical events (US embassy/carrier group movements) to create immediate global panic and narrative diversion. This is a new, dangerous level of speed and brazenness in their IO. (CONFIDENCE: EXTREMELY HIGH).
• Targeting: Continued focus on alleged rear-area UAF deployment points. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Munitions: Continued use of aviation bombs and potentially cluster munitions (RBK-500) indicates sufficient supply for current strike operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Personnel & Morale: Information on death benefits and videos of soldiers seeking support suggest a continued focus on personnel issues and maintaining morale for those serving. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian military C2 remains effective in coordinating localized ground operations and deep strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian IO C2 is demonstrating an alarming level of agility, coordination, and willingness to engage in extreme, proactive fabrication and exploitation to achieve strategic objectives. The rapid coordinated amplification of the "US embassy evacuation" narrative is a prime example. (CONFIDENCE: EXTREMELY HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UKRAINIAN FOCUSED)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Resilience and Adaptation: Efforts in Kryvyi Rih to harden critical infrastructure against energy attacks demonstrate continued national resilience and strategic adaptation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Active Defense: Ukrainian forces continue to maintain defensive posture and repel Russian strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Internal Cohesion: Public figures actively supporting the military through donations and morale-boosting efforts underscore strong internal cohesion. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes:
  • Infrastructure Hardening: Successful implementation of autonomous power systems in Kryvyi Rih enhances resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Public Support & Donations: Significant FPV drone donation from a public figure highlights ongoing, critical support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Effective Counter-Disinformation: Rapid and accurate debunking of Russian fabricated Iran internet outage claims (RBC-Ukraine citing NetBlocks) is a significant success in the information domain. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setbacks:
  • Continued Deep Strikes: Alleged PVD strike near Mala Tokmachka highlights persistent vulnerability to Russian aerial bombardment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare Pressure: The sheer volume and intensity of Russian global diversion efforts represent a significant challenge to maintaining international focus on Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense & Counter-UAV: Continued requirement for robust air defense to counter Russian aerial bombs and missile strikes, especially against alleged military and civilian targets in rear areas.
• Information Warfare Capabilities: Critical and immediate need for enhanced counter-disinformation capabilities to rapidly identify, analyze, and refute Russian fabrications on a global scale.
• Long-Term Infrastructure Hardening: Continued international support for projects like those in Kryvyi Rih to build resilience into critical civilian infrastructure.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives (CRITICAL, EXTREMELY MALICIOUS, HYPER-ESCALATED):
  • Fabricated/Inflated Global Crisis in Iran/Middle East (Immediate, Overwhelming Priority): Russia is now engaging in real-time, active fabrication and amplification of an immediate, catastrophic military crisis in the Middle East, including claims of US embassy evacuations and carrier group deployments. This is the most dangerous and urgent disinformation threat, designed to completely eclipse the war in Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: EXTREMELY HIGH for fabrication/amplification, EXTREME for malicious intent).
  • Exploitation of US Political Figures: Continued leveraging of Trump's statements and perceived NATO responses to portray Western disunity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Discrediting Ukrainian Appeals: Efforts to portray Ukrainian calls for aid as manufactured or "lamentations." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Domestic Control & Narrative Shaping: Censorship of cultural events, promotion of compensation for military deaths, and showcasing alleged captured Western equipment all serve to maintain internal support and control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Antisemitic Undercurrents: Colonelcassad's direct response to questions about Jewish communities in the context of Middle East escalation indicates a willingness to engage with and potentially normalize antisemitic tropes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Narratives:
  • Showcasing Resilience and International Support: Highlighting infrastructure modernization (Kryvyi Rih) and celebrity donations reinforces national strength and continued international partnership. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Rapid Counter-Disinformation: The quick debunking of the Iran internet outage narrative using verifiable data (NetBlocks) demonstrates effective, agile counter-IO. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: Continuously boosted by demonstrated resilience, strong public support for the military, and effective counter-disinformation efforts. However, ongoing deep strikes create a persistent psychological burden.
• Russian Morale: Likely sustained by narratives of military prowess (captured equipment), global influence (Middle East crisis), and strong internal information control.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• Middle East Diversion (CRITICAL, URGENT): Russia's aggressive, real-time fabrication of a major military crisis in the Middle East poses an immediate and severe threat to the sustained international focus on and support for Ukraine. The goal is to induce panic and force a global pivot away from Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: EXTREMELY HIGH).
• International Legal Frameworks: Confirmed Russian strikes on alleged PVDs using potentially indiscriminate munitions will add to evidence for international legal action.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Global-Scale Disinformation Campaign (Iran/Middle East & US Politics): Russia will immediately and intensely escalate its fabricated and exploited narratives of a major, immediate military conflict in Iran and the broader Middle East, actively incorporating any and all real-time geopolitical events (e.g., US troop movements, diplomatic statements, UN Security Council sessions) to create maximum confusion, panic, and diversion from Ukraine. This will be the predominant and most aggressive Russian effort. (CONFIDENCE: EXTREMELY HIGH).
• Sustained Deep Strikes with Focus on Military & Civilian Areas: Russia will continue to launch UAV, missile, and artillery strikes on alleged Ukrainian military targets (e.g., PVDs) and civilian infrastructure/urban centers (e.g., Zaporizhzhia, Nikopolshchina). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intensified Ground Pressure on Donetsk Axes (Chasiv Yar): Russia will maintain and likely intensify ground assaults on the Chasiv Yar and Southern Donetsk axes, leveraging artillery and drones, and continuing to claim incremental gains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Continued Probing and Unverified Claims on Sumy/Kharkiv Axes: Russia will maintain reconnaissance activity and continue to claim territorial gains in Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts to fix Ukrainian forces and maintain a psychological threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Tightening Internal Information Control & Cultural Censorship: Russia will continue to restrict access to information, prosecute individuals perceived as undermining state narratives, and enforce cultural censorship. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Coordinated Major Ground Offensive on Sumy/Kharkiv Axes under IMMEDIATE, Globally Fabricated "False Flag" Event: Russia launches a large-scale ground offensive on the Sumy/Kharkiv axes, designed for a rapid breakthrough, preceded by or simultaneous with a major, globally televised false flag event outside Ukraine, attributed to Ukraine or its Western allies (e.g., a fabricated, highly destructive terrorist attack in a third country, or a false flag cyber event on global financial systems designed to create immediate, overwhelming international outrage and confusion, possibly even a falsely attributed nuclear incident). This would aim to completely divert attention and resources, allowing Russia to achieve significant territorial gains in northern Ukraine with minimal immediate international condemnation. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Escalated Hybrid Attack on a NATO Member State: Under the cover of global crisis, Russia attempts a significant hybrid attack (e.g., large-scale cyberattack, sabotage of critical infrastructure) on a NATO member state, aiming to sow disunity and test NATO's Article 5 resolve, while simultaneously claiming Ukrainian or Western involvement. (CONFIDENCE: LOW).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 1-6 hours):
  • IO Observation: Monitor for any further highly aggressive Russian fabrications regarding Iran/Middle East or other global crises, especially attempts to directly link Ukraine or the West to these fabricated events (e.g., claiming a false flag attack).
  • Air Threat: Observe for any follow-up Russian UAV/missile strikes, particularly on Zaporizhzhia, Nikopolshchina, or other eastern/southern urban centers.
  • Sumy/Kharkiv: Monitor for independent verification of Russian territorial claims.
• Short-term (Next 6-24 hours):
  • Ground Activity: Assess if Russian ground pressure on Chasiv Yar intensifies or if there are new confirmed advances in other areas.
  • IO Dissemination: Track the global reach and impact of Russia's fabricated Iran/Middle East narratives and counter-Western unity narratives.
• Medium-term (Next 24-72 hours):
  • Strategic Intent: Determine if Russian claims and reconnaissance efforts in Sumy/Kharkiv translate into observable force build-ups or pre-offensive activities.
  • International Response to IO: Gauge the effectiveness of counter-disinformation efforts against Russia's extreme fabrications and whether global attention shifts significantly.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• GAP 116 (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE, UPDATED): VERACITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIAN MIDDLE EAST IO AMPLIFICATION AND FABRICATIONS (INCLUDING ACTIVE FABRICATION OF MAJOR INCIDENTS):
  • Intensify monitoring and analysis of Russian narratives concerning the Middle East, specifically identifying and debunking new, actively fabricated events (e.g., fabricated US military actions, false claims of Israeli/Iranian strikes). Assess the real-time impact of these narratives on global public opinion, diplomatic actions, and international focus. Prioritize intelligence collection on the sources and methods used for creating these fabrications and the specific channels of dissemination. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 103 (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE, UPDATED): RUSSIAN FORCE CONCENTRATION & INTENT (SUMY/KHARKOV AXES):
  • Conduct comprehensive ISR (IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, OSINT) to detect any significant Russian force build-up, troop movements, logistical preparations (especially fuel, ammo, medical supplies, bridging equipment), and concentration of equipment along the Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts borders. Prioritize real-time monitoring for indicators of a shift from fixing operations to a major offensive, particularly focused on Konotop and Sumy City. Verify or deny Russian territorial claims (Dolgenkoye, Novonikolaevka, and any new claims). (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 138 (NEW, HIGH): ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN INTERNAL POPULATION RESILIENCE TO MIDDLE EAST IO:
  • Monitor and analyze Russian domestic media, social media, and internal communications for any indication of how the Russian population is reacting to the extreme Middle East crisis narratives. Assess if it genuinely diverts internal attention from Ukraine or causes disquiet/panic. (PRIORITY: HIGH).
• GAP 139 (NEW, MEDIUM): IMPACT AND VERIFICATION OF RUSSIAN STRIKES ON UKRAINIAN PVDs:
  • Conduct rapid Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) and all-source verification of alleged Russian strikes on UAF Temporary Deployment Points (PVDs), such as the one in Mala Tokmachka. Confirm munition type and actual damage/casualties to assess tactical impact. (PRIORITY: MEDIUM).
• GAP 136 (ONGOING, HIGH): ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN INTERNAL INFORMATION CONTROL:
  • Monitor and analyze Russian state actions (e.g., Roskomnadzor blocks, legal cases against bloggers, cultural censorship) to assess the effectiveness and scope of internal information control efforts. Evaluate the impact on dissenting voices and the overall coherence of Russian domestic narratives. (PRIORITY: HIGH).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR, HUMINT, OSINT critical):

  1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: LAUNCH IMMEDIATE, AGGRESSIVE GLOBAL COUNTER-FABRICATION CAMPAIGN. Immediately task all political intelligence, OSINT, and PSYOP assets to aggressively and publicly expose Russia's active, real-time fabrication and exploitation of a major military crisis in the Middle East. This must involve presenting irrefutable evidence that Russian narratives are false, using independent third-party data (e.g., legitimate NetBlocks data vs. Russian claims, real-time intelligence on US force movements vs. Russian claims of carrier deployments/embassy evacuations) to undermine their credibility. Emphasize that this is a deliberate, desperate attempt to divert attention from Ukraine. (Supports CR 116).
  2. CRITICAL PRIORITY: CONTINUED SURGE ALL-SOURCE ISR ON SUMY/KHARKOV AXES. Maintain and intensify all-source ISR assets on the Sumy and Kharkiv Oblast borders for any indicators of a large-scale Russian offensive. Prioritize early warning of pre-offensive activities and immediately verify or deny Russian claims of territorial gains. (Supports CR 103).
  3. URGENT: ASSESS IMPACT OF RUSSIAN PVD STRIKES. Conduct rapid BDA and impact assessment of alleged Russian strikes on UAF PVDs (e.g., Mala Tokmachka). Use this intelligence to inform force protection measures and assess Russian targeting effectiveness. (Supports CR 139).
  4. HIGH: MONITOR RUSSIAN INTERNAL CONTROL & MORALE. Continue to analyze Russian actions regarding internal information control (cultural censorship, blogger prosecutions) and monitor domestic sentiment regarding the manufactured Middle East crisis to understand their evolving methods and identify potential vulnerabilities or opportunities for counter-IO. (Supports CR 136, 138).
  5. ONGOING: Continue to leverage and support GUR's deep special operations capabilities in occupied territories to disrupt Russian administration and logistics.

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Maintain HIGHEST AD alert posture in all major urban centers and along frontline axes, especially in Zaporizhzhia and Nikopolshchina. Prioritize defense against UAV threats, FPV drones, aviation bombs, and artillery.
  2. URGENT: Reinforce AD capabilities on the eastern/southern axes to mitigate persistent aviation bomb and missile strikes against alleged military targets and civilian infrastructure. Expedite delivery of advanced counter-UAV and layered air defense systems.
  3. ONGOING: Advocate for accelerated delivery of more advanced short-range and medium-range air defense systems and counter-UAV technologies from international partners to protect urban centers and military concentrations.

• Ground Forces:

  1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Commanders in Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts must operate under the assumption of an imminent, large-scale Russian offensive, and maintain high readiness to respond to probing attacks and potential full-scale assaults. Adjust force dispositions to mitigate risk of PVD strikes.
  2. URGENT: Commanders on the Chasiv Yar and Southern Donetsk axes must continue to maintain robust defensive lines and apply lessons learned from previous engagements to repel ongoing Russian assaults.
  3. ONGOING: Continue to leverage and develop offensive and defensive drone capabilities, including counter-drone measures, given Russia's emphasized use of UAVs and aviation bombs. Prioritize funding and acquisition for drone detectors and jammers.
  4. ONGOING: Reinforce critical infrastructure (e.g., energy networks, water supply) with redundant power systems and distributed energy solutions, learning from successes in Kryvyi Rih.

• Information Operations & Diplomatic:

  1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: LEAD A GLOBAL DIPLOMATIC AND PUBLIC AWARENESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION. Engage international media, UN, NATO, and allied governments to publicly condemn Russia's unprecedented, active fabrication and exploitation of global crises (e.g., Iran/Middle East). Highlight this as a desperate attempt to weaponize global events and divert attention from Ukraine. Demand international scrutiny and accountability for such malicious information warfare.
  2. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: RE-CENTER GLOBAL NARRATIVE ON UKRAINE. Vigorously counter any narrative that suggests the conflict in Ukraine is secondary to a fabricated crisis elsewhere. Emphasize that Russia remains the primary threat to global security and stability and that the costs of failing to support Ukraine will be far greater.
  3. URGENT: HIGHLIGHT COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SUCCESSES AND RUSSIAN ATROCITIES. Publicize the success of rapid counter-disinformation efforts (e.g., NetBlocks data on Iran) to demonstrate Ukraine's information resilience. Continue to document and widely disseminate evidence of Russian civilian targeting and alleged PVD strikes to maintain international condemnation and support for legal action.
  4. ONGOING: Proactively counter Russian disinformation regarding Western unity and support for Ukraine by showcasing continued aid packages, diplomatic engagement, and the resilience of the Ukrainian people. Highlight public figures and civilian efforts in support of the military.