Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME OF REPORT: 18 JUN 25 / 15:39 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 18 JUN 25 / 15:09 ZULU - 18 JUN 25 / 15:39 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // ORCON // NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Zaporizhzhia: New video from "Сили оборони Півдня України" and a warning from Zaporizhzhia OBA confirm continued Russian deep strikes on civilian areas, specifically a vehicle service center or parking lot, with damage consistent with missile or aerial strike. This indicates ongoing Russian intent to target civilian infrastructure in Ukrainian rear. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy's presence inspecting damage highlights the severity of the attacks and their impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Donetsk Direction (Chasiv Yar): BŪTŪSOV PLUS video report confirms continued heavy fighting for Chasiv Yar, with Ukrainian 18th Sloviansk Brigade of the National Guard recalling intense combat. The presence of Russian thermal drone imagery indicates persistent Russian reconnaissance and targeting in the area. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Southern Donetsk Direction: "Воин DV" and Colonelcassad report on the situation in the Southern Donetsk direction, indicating ongoing Russian offensive operations. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Nikopolshchina (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast): Serhiy Lysak reports "almost a dozen and a half attacks" per day, including artillery, FPV drones, and munitions dropped from UAVs, striking Nikopol and Pokrovska communities. This confirms continued intense Russian indirect fire and drone activity against civilian targets across the Dnipro river. Damage photos show severely damaged civilian housing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Sumy/Kharkiv Oblasts: Russian milblogger Andrei Marochko (via TASS) claims RF Armed Forces are "straightening the front line" from Andreevka to Yunakovka, Sumy Oblast (approx. 15 km), and "Старше Эдды" claims liberation of Dolgenkoye (Kharkiv) and Novonikolaevka (Sumy). These remain unverified but indicate continued Russian claims and potential pressure on these axes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian claims, LOW for independent verification).
• Occupied Berdyansk: ASTRA and RBK-Ukraina confirm the killing of collaborator Mykhailo Hrytsai, described as a "high-ranking representative of the occupation 'administration'" who "tortured prisoners," with the Ukrainian GUR claiming responsibility via pistol. This indicates continued successful Ukrainian special operations activity in deep rear areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Deep Rear (Kropotkinskaya, Krasnodar Krai): Operatyvny ZSU reports the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) estimates losses of 2.7 billion rubles from a drone attack on the Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station. This confirms successful Ukrainian deep strikes against Russian energy infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• TASS reports unexpected rain at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), suggesting localized weather conditions but no broader impact on Ukrainian frontlines.
• Chasiv Yar report mentions strategic importance of entering during bad weather to avoid drone detection, indicating weather remains a factor for drone operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces:
  • Persistent Defense (Chasiv Yar): Ukrainian 18th Sloviansk Brigade of the National Guard maintains defensive posture under heavy daily attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Deep Strike Capability (Russia): Confirmed drone attack on Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station demonstrates continued ability to strike high-value Russian energy infrastructure in depth. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Special Operations (Berdyansk): Successful elimination of a high-value collaborator in occupied territory highlights active and effective GUR special operations. GUR statement signals intent for further operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Air Defense (Drones): STERNENKO reports 1129th ZRP shot down 5 Russian UAVs with cryptodonations, indicating active air defense against drones and reliance on crowdfunding for critical equipment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Drone Operations: DeepState shows successful Ukrainian drone strikes targeting Russian positions, 'assault bikers,' and strongholds, demonstrating effective tactical drone warfare. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Tactical Aviation (Southeast): Ukrainian Air Force reports Russian tactical aviation activity in the southeastern direction, indicating continued aerial threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Fundraising: КіберБорошно | CyberBoroshno announces participation in a fundraiser for drone detectors, indicating ongoing need for counter-UAV technology. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces:
  • Continued Offensive Operations (Donetsk): Reports from "Воин DV" and Colonelcassad, along with Ukrainian accounts from Chasiv Yar, confirm ongoing ground pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Persistent Deep Strikes (Zaporizhzhia, Nikopolshchina): Continued UAV/missile/artillery strikes on civilian areas indicate Russia's sustained intent to degrade Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Operations (Sumy/Kharkiv): Russian claims of territorial gains in Sumy and Kharkiv, though unverified, signal continued narrative shaping for these axes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Air Defense Response: Implied air defense activity against Ukrainian deep strikes (Kropotkinskaya). (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

1.4. Information Environment:

• Russian Propaganda (CRITICAL, HYPER-ESCALATED):
  • Continued Iran/Middle East Fabrications/Amplification: TASS continues to push narratives implying US military action against Iran, quoting Pentagon chief's refusal to discuss strike options to Trump. Alex Parker Returns reinforces Iranian rhetoric of non-negotiation under pressure. Colonelcassad quotes Chinese Foreign Minister blaming Israel for Middle East escalation. Fighterbomber publishes image of Israeli sniper watching Russian TV, implying cooperation or influence. These efforts continue to fuel and exploit tensions in the Middle East. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for amplification/exploitation).
  • Internal Control/Disinformation: Alex Parker Returns reports on an Irkutsk blogger facing criminal charges for insulting police (not discrediting military), which is likely a veiled warning to others. "Два майора" posts "Soldier's routine" photos, likely for internal morale. TASS reports Roskomnadzor blocked Wattpad, indicating continued efforts to control information access. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • US Political Exploitation (Continued): ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS and Alex Parker Returns both highlight Donald Trump's statements about his handling of Russia/Putin and his rejection of Putin's mediation offer in the Israel-Iran conflict. This continues Russia's strategy of exploiting US political figures for narrative benefit. "Операция Z" propagates a "The Times" report suggesting Zelenskyy's NATO summit program is limited to avoid Trump, feeding narratives of US/Western disunity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Domestic Focus (Medical Recruitment): Igor Artamonov's post about medicine suggests internal recruitment/mobilization efforts in the medical field. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Ukrainian Counter-Narratives:
  • Highlighting Resilience and Special Operations: Ukrainian channels (Sili Oborony, GUR, RBK-Ukraina) publicly highlight successful deep operations (Berdyansk) and resilience under attack (Zaporizhzhia), maintaining morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Drone Capabilities and Fundraising: STERNENKO and DeepState videos showcasing successful drone strikes and fundraising for drone detectors demonstrate Ukrainian ingenuity and public support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RUSSIA FOCUSED)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA):

• Capabilities (Russia):
  • Persistent Ground Offensive: Maintains capability for ongoing ground assaults on key axes (Chasiv Yar, Southern Donetsk) and claiming advances in others (Sumy, Kharkiv). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Deep Strike Capability: Demonstrated continued capacity for long-range UAV/missile strikes against Ukrainian urban centers (Zaporizhzhia) and strategic infrastructure within Russia (Kropotkinskaya). Also sustained indirect fire (artillery, FPV drones, guided munitions) on frontline cities (Nikopolshchina). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Advanced Information Warfare (CRITICAL, EXTREMELY MALICIOUS): Russia's IO apparatus is actively engaging in multi-front global narrative manipulation, including exploiting and fabricating elements of the Israel-Iran conflict, discrediting Western political and military figures (Trump, US AD), and tightening internal information control. This is a deliberate, concerted effort to divert international attention, fracture alliances, and undermine confidence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions (Russia):
  • Achieve Breakthroughs on Donetsk Front: Maintain and potentially increase pressure on Chasiv Yar and Southern Donetsk to achieve tactical/operational gains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Degrade Ukrainian Infrastructure and Morale: Sustained deep strikes and heavy shelling aim to inflict damage and psychological pressure on Ukrainian cities and population. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Maximize Global Diversion and Fracture Ukraine Support (CRITICAL, HYPER-ESCALATED): The primary and most immediate intention is to manufacture and exploit global crises, particularly the Israel-Iran situation, to completely divert international attention and resources away from Ukraine. This is coupled with efforts to sow disunity within Western alliances. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Control Internal Narrative: Continue tightening information control internally (blocking platforms, prosecuting bloggers) to maintain support for the war and suppress dissent. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Test/Prepare Sumy/Kharkiv Axes: Continued KAB strikes, reconnaissance, and unverified claims of advances suggest intent to keep Ukraine guessing and potentially prepare for future operations in Sumy/Kharkiv. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• IO Tactics: Intensified Multi-Front Disinformation (CRITICAL, URGENT). The Russian IO machine is demonstrating an increased capacity for simultaneous, complex disinformation campaigns across multiple geopolitical fronts (Ukraine, Middle East, US politics), aiming for global narrative saturation and diversion. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Internal Information Control: Greater emphasis on prosecuting bloggers for perceived slights against domestic authority figures rather than just "discrediting the army," suggesting a broader tightening of internal control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Personnel: Continued "Soldier's routine" posts indicate efforts to maintain morale and potentially highlight the normalcy of service. Medical recruitment efforts suggest sustained personnel needs in that sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• UAV/Munitions: Persistent deep strikes and heavy shelling (Nikopolshchina) indicate sufficient supply of UAVs and munitions to sustain current operational tempo. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian military C2 remains effective in coordinating localized ground operations and deep strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian IO C2 is demonstrating an alarming level of agility, coordination, and willingness to engage in extreme, proactive fabrication and exploitation to achieve strategic objectives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UKRAINIAN FOCUSED)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Proactive Special Operations: GUR's success in Berdyansk highlights an active, deep-penetrating special operations capability with clear intent for further actions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Resilient Emergency Services/Civilian Leadership: Zelenskyy's visit to Zaporizhzhia attack site and DSNS response demonstrates continued resilience and high-level commitment to civilian protection. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Persistent Deep Strike Pressure: Confirmed UAV attack on Kropotkinskaya demonstrates offensive reach and persistent pressure on Russian energy infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Active Air Defense: Successful drone intercepts by 1129th ZRP confirm ongoing, effective air defense, though reliance on crowdfunding highlights resource needs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Effective Tactical Drone Warfare: DeepState's compilation shows continued successful application of drones in direct combat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes:
  • Elimination of Collaborator: Significant tactical and psychological success in Berdyansk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • UAV Strike on Russian Oil Infrastructure: Confirmed attack on Kropotkinskaya, inflicting economic damage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Drone Intercepts: 5 Russian UAVs shot down by 1129th ZRP. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Effective Offensive Drone Use: Compilation shows multiple successful tactical drone strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setbacks:
  • Continued Deep Strikes: Zaporizhzhia and Nikopolshchina suffering significant damage from UAVs, missiles, and artillery, indicating persistent vulnerability to Russian air and indirect fire assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ongoing Pressure on Chasiv Yar: Defenders continue to face heavy attacks, indicating the high cost of holding this key position. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE): The ongoing deep strikes (Zaporizhzhia, Nikopolshchina) reinforce the urgent need for more comprehensive air defense systems, especially against UAVs, artillery, and cruise missiles, to protect urban centers and frontline communities.
• Counter-UAV & Electronic Warfare: Continued requirement for systems to counter Russian FPV drones and other UAVs used in deep strike operations and for reconnaissance, highlighted by crowdfunding for drone detectors.
• Special Operations Support: Continued resources for deep-strike and counter-collaboration operations.
• Munitions: Sustained heavy fighting in areas like Chasiv Yar and Nikopolshchina indicates a high rate of munition consumption.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives (CRITICAL, EXTREMELY MALICIOUS):
  • Fabricated/Exploited Global Crisis in Iran/Middle East: The overt and continuous manipulation of the Middle East situation to create a "new reality" that eclipses Ukraine is the most pressing disinformation threat. This includes exploiting US political statements and using Chinese rhetoric to amplify narratives of global instability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for fabrication/exploitation, EXTREME for malicious intent).
  • Exploitation of US Political Figures: Continued leveraging of Trump's statements to portray US/Western disunity and internal political chaos. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Justification for Internal Crackdowns: Use of legal action against bloggers for "insulting police" rather than military as a broader deterrent against dissent. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Narrative Control: Blocking platforms like Wattpad indicates a continued effort to restrict information access for Russian citizens. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Territorial Claims (Unverified): Promotion of unverified territorial gains in Sumy and Kharkiv to shape domestic and international perception of battlefield success. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Narratives:
  • Showcasing Resilience and Special Operations: Highlighting successful elimination of collaborators and effective emergency responses (Zelenskyy visit) serves to maintain domestic morale and project capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Demonstrating Innovation and Citizen Support: Showcasing successful drone operations and crowdfunding efforts reinforces national unity and technological adaptation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: Boosted by successes against collaborators and effective drone operations, but continuously tested by ongoing deep strikes against urban centers and frontline shelling. The presence of Zelenskyy at a strike site can bolster resolve.
• Russian Morale: Likely sustained by narratives of military prowess (Chasiv Yar pressure, claimed territorial gains), global influence (Iran fabrications, US political exploitation), and internal censorship.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• Middle East Diversion (CRITICAL, URGENT): Russia's active fabrication/exploitation of a major military crisis in Iran is the most significant threat to sustained international focus and support for Ukraine. The goal is to make Ukraine appear secondary or irrelevant compared to an invented global flashpoint. US political dynamics (Trump) are being weaponized to further this. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• International Legal Frameworks: Continued Russian targeting of civilian infrastructure and use of indiscriminate munitions provides further evidence for international legal action. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Intensified Ground Pressure on Donetsk Axes (Chasiv Yar): Russia will maintain and potentially intensify ground assaults on the Chasiv Yar and Southern Donetsk axes, leveraging artillery and drones. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Sustained Deep Strikes with Focus on Infrastructure & Civilian Areas: Russia will continue to launch UAV, missile, and artillery strikes on Ukrainian urban centers, with an emphasis on energy, industrial, and transport infrastructure (e.g., Zaporizhzhia, Kropotkinskaya) and continued terror shelling of frontline civilian communities (Nikopolshchina). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Global-Scale Disinformation Campaign (Iran/Middle East & US Politics): Russia will further escalate its fabricated and exploited narratives of a major military conflict in Iran and the broader Middle East, actively tying in US political figures to create maximum confusion and diversion from Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Continued Probing and Unverified Claims on Sumy/Kharkiv Axes: Russia will maintain reconnaissance activity and continue to claim territorial gains in Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts to fix Ukrainian forces and maintain a psychological threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Tightening Internal Information Control: Russia will continue to restrict access to information and prosecute individuals perceived as undermining state narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Coordinated Major Ground Offensive on Sumy/Kharkiv Axes under Immediate, Global False Flag Diversion: Russia initiates a large-scale ground offensive on the Sumy/Kharkiv axes, designed for a rapid breakthrough, preceded by or simultaneous with a major, globally televised false flag event outside Ukraine, attributed to Ukraine or its Western allies (e.g., a fabricated, highly destructive attack in a third country, or a false flag cyber event on global financial systems designed to create immediate, overwhelming international outrage and confusion. This would aim to completely divert attention and resources, allowing Russia to achieve significant territorial gains in northern Ukraine with minimal immediate international condemnation. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Targeted Assassination/Disruption of Key Ukrainian Leadership via Deep Strike: Russia conducts a precision deep strike against a high-value Ukrainian leadership target (military or political), aiming to decapitate C2 or cause severe demoralization, potentially using advanced guided munitions. (CONFIDENCE: LOW).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 1-6 hours):
  • IO Observation: Monitor for any further highly aggressive Russian fabrications regarding Iran/Middle East or other global crises, especially attempts to directly link Ukraine or the West to these fabricated events.
  • Air Threat: Observe for any follow-up Russian UAV/missile strikes, particularly on Zaporizhzhia, Nikopolshchina, or other eastern/southern urban centers.
  • Sumy/Kharkiv: Monitor for independent verification of Russian territorial claims.
• Short-term (Next 6-24 hours):
  • Ground Activity: Assess if Russian ground pressure on Chasiv Yar intensifies or if there are new confirmed advances in other areas.
  • IO Dissemination: Track the global reach and impact of Russia's fabricated Iran narratives and counter-Western unity narratives.
• Medium-term (Next 24-72 hours):
  • Strategic Intent: Determine if Russian claims and reconnaissance efforts in Sumy/Kharkiv translate into observable force build-ups or pre-offensive activities.
  • International Response to IO: Gauge the effectiveness of counter-disinformation efforts against Russia's extreme fabrications and whether global attention shifts significantly.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• GAP 116 (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE, UPDATED): VERACITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIAN MIDDLE EAST IO AMPLIFICATION AND FABRICATIONS (INCLUDING ACTIVE FABRICATION OF MAJOR INCIDENTS):
  • Intensify monitoring and analysis of Russian narratives concerning the Middle East, specifically identifying and debunking new, actively fabricated events (e.g., Iranian "bombardments", "internet outages" in Iran not supported by verifiable data). Assess the real-time impact of these narratives on global public opinion, diplomatic actions, and international focus. Prioritize intelligence collection on the sources and methods used for creating these fabrications. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 103 (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE, UPDATED): RUSSIAN FORCE CONCENTRATION & INTENT (SUMY/KHARKOV AXES):
  • Conduct comprehensive ISR (IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, OSINT) to detect any significant Russian force build-up, troop movements, logistical preparations (especially fuel, ammo, medical supplies, bridging equipment), and concentration of equipment along the Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts borders. Prioritize real-time monitoring for indicators of a shift from fixing operations to a major offensive, particularly focused on Konotop and Sumy City. Verify or deny Russian territorial claims (Dolgenkoye, Novonikolaevka). (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 136 (NEW, HIGH): ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN INTERNAL INFORMATION CONTROL:
  • Monitor and analyze Russian state actions (e.g., Roskomnadzor blocks, legal cases against bloggers) to assess the effectiveness and scope of internal information control efforts. Evaluate the impact on dissenting voices and the overall coherence of Russian domestic narratives. (PRIORITY: HIGH).
• GAP 137 (NEW, MEDIUM): IMPACT OF UKRAINIAN DEEP STRIKES ON RUSSIAN ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE:
  • Collect and analyze all-source intelligence on the economic and operational impact of Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian energy infrastructure (e.g., Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station). Assess the extent of damage, repair timelines, and broader implications for Russian logistics and revenue. (PRIORITY: MEDIUM).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR, HUMINT, OSINT critical):

  1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: LAUNCH A GLOBAL COUNTER-FABRICATION CAMPAIGN. Immediately task all political intelligence, OSINT, and PSYOP assets to aggressively and publicly expose Russia's active fabrication and exploitation of a major military crisis in the Middle East. This must involve presenting irrefutable evidence that Russian narratives are false, using independent third-party data (e.g., legitimate NetBlocks data vs. Russian claims, analysis of doctored videos) to undermine their credibility. Emphasize that this is a deliberate, desperate attempt to divert attention from Ukraine. (Supports CR 116).
  2. CRITICAL PRIORITY: CONTINUED SURGE ALL-SOURCE ISR ON SUMY/KHARKOV AXES. Maintain and intensify all-source ISR assets on the Sumy and Kharkiv Oblast borders for any indicators of a large-scale Russian offensive. Prioritize early warning of pre-offensive activities and immediately verify or deny Russian claims of territorial gains. (Supports CR 103).
  3. URGENT: ASSESS IMPACT OF UKRAINIAN DEEP STRIKES. Conduct rapid BDA and impact assessment of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian energy infrastructure (e.g., Kropotkinskaya). Use this intelligence to inform future targeting strategies and to understand Russian defensive vulnerabilities. (Supports CR 137).
  4. HIGH: MONITOR RUSSIAN INTERNAL CONTROL. Continue to analyze Russian actions regarding internal information control (blogger prosecutions, platform blocks) to understand their evolving methods and identify potential vulnerabilities or opportunities for counter-IO. (Supports CR 136).
  5. ONGOING: Continue to leverage and support GUR's deep special operations capabilities in occupied territories to disrupt Russian administration and logistics.

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Maintain HIGHEST AD alert posture in Zaporizhzhia, Nikopolshchina, and other at-risk urban centers. Prioritize defense against UAV threats, FPV drones, and artillery, especially in frontline communities.
  2. URGENT: Reinforce AD capabilities on the eastern/southern axes to mitigate persistent UAV and missile strikes against industrial and civilian infrastructure. Expedite delivery of counter-UAV systems.
  3. ONGOING: Advocate for accelerated delivery of more advanced short-range and medium-range air defense systems and counter-UAV technologies from international partners to protect urban centers and industrial sites.

• Ground Forces:

  1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Commanders in Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts must operate under the assumption of an imminent, large-scale Russian offensive, and maintain high readiness to respond to probing attacks and potential full-scale assaults.
  2. URGENT: Commanders on the Chasiv Yar and Southern Donetsk axes must continue to maintain robust defensive lines and apply lessons learned from previous engagements to repel ongoing Russian assaults.
  3. ONGOING: Continue to leverage and develop offensive and defensive drone capabilities, including counter-drone measures, given Russia's emphasized use of UAVs. Prioritize funding and acquisition for drone detectors.

• Information Operations & Diplomatic:

  1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: LEAD A GLOBAL DIPLOMATIC AND PUBLIC AWARENESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION. Engage international media, UN, NATO, and allied governments to publicly condemn Russia's unprecedented, active fabrication and exploitation of global crises (e.g., Iran/Middle East). Highlight this as a desperate attempt to weaponize global events and divert attention from Ukraine. Demand international scrutiny and accountability for such malicious information warfare.
  2. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: RE-CENTER GLOBAL NARRATIVE ON UKRAINE. Vigorously counter any narrative that suggests the conflict in Ukraine is secondary to a fabricated crisis elsewhere. Emphasize that Russia remains the primary threat to global security and stability and that the costs of failing to support Ukraine will be far greater.
  3. URGENT: HIGHLIGHT COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SUCCESSES AND RUSSIAN ATROCITIES. Publicize the success of operations like the elimination of collaborators in occupied territories. Continue to document and widely disseminate evidence of Russian civilian targeting (Zaporizhzhia, Nikopolshchina) to maintain international condemnation and support for legal action.
  4. ONGOING: Proactively counter Russian disinformation regarding Western unity and support for Ukraine by showcasing continued aid packages, diplomatic engagement, and the resilience of the Ukrainian people.