Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME OF REPORT: 18 JUN 25 / 08:29 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 18 JUN 25 / 07:59 ZULU - 18 JUN 25 / 08:29 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // ORCON // NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Kyiv Oblast: Search and rescue operations continue in Solomianskyi District following the 17 JUN 25 missile strike. Another body has been de-blocked from the rubble, bringing the confirmed civilian fatalities in this district to 19. This continues to highlight the severe humanitarian impact of Russian long-range precision strikes against urban centers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Donetsk Oblast:
  • Ukrainian Air Force reports repeated Russian tactical aviation launching KABs into Donetsk Oblast. This indicates continued Russian air support for ground operations or preparatory strikes in the eastern theater. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian sources (Alex Parker Returns) are propagating claims of "Konstantinovka to prepare," suggesting potential for intensified Russian ground operations or strikes against this key Ukrainian defensive and logistical hub. This aligns with previous intelligence of Russian intent to encircle Kostyantynivka. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Russian MOD (Narodnaya Militsiya DNR) claims destruction of a UAF UAV control point and PVD (Permanent Deployment Point) by 57th Separate Reconnaissance SpN. This indicates Russian counter-UAV and precision strike efforts against Ukrainian forward assets. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Sumy Oblast:
  • Colonelcassad claims an Iskander-M strike on a UAF PVD in Konotop, Sumy Oblast, targeting the 58th Motorized Rifle Brigade and associated equipment/personnel. If confirmed, this represents a significant precision strike capability against Ukrainian rear-area assets in the northern axis. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM, pending BDA).
  • Russian MoD claims paratroopers "stormed Yablonovka in Sumy region," showcasing drone footage of destroyed military vehicles and structures. This supports ongoing Russian efforts to establish a "buffer zone" in Sumy Oblast and indicates continued ground assaults by Russian airborne units. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM, pending UAF verification).
• Russian Border Regions (Kursk Oblast): Russian MOD video (from previous report) claimed "Sever" group paratroopers evacuating bodies of "Ukrainian servicemen and mercenaries" in Sudzha District, Kursk Oblast. This is consistent with ongoing cross-border skirmishes and Russian information operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian IO; MEDIUM for UAF activity).
• Russian Internal (Bratsk, Irkutsk Oblast): Mayor of Bratsk announced temporary restrictions on mobile internet (3G/4G) within a 5km radius of Bratsk Airport due to "safety concerns," suggesting a response to potential drone threats or other security measures. This indicates heightened internal security measures in some distant Russian regions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• No new specific weather information received in this reporting period. The effectiveness of drone operations (reported by both sides) suggests conditions remain favorable for UAV deployment.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces:
  • Continue rescue operations in Kyiv following missile strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • UAF Air Force maintains AD vigilance, reporting KAB launches on Donetsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian Parliament (Rada) passed a law on multiple citizenship, potentially impacting force generation and diaspora engagement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • UAF units continue effective counter-battery and precision strikes, as evidenced by a Kharkiv OTU report of an artillery strike on a Russian 2S3 Akatsiya SPG. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • UAF political leadership is engaged in high-level international diplomatic efforts (G7 summit, engagement on Trump's position). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal discussions regarding demobilization policy underscore ongoing personnel management challenges. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces:
  • Continue KAB launches on Ukrainian territory (Donetsk). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Claim localized ground advances and precision strikes in Sumy and Donetsk Oblasts. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Maintain robust information operations, including economic projection (SPIEF), political deflection (Middle East), and demoralization campaigns (POW videos, casualty figures). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Continue high-level military leadership visits (Gerasimov, previously reported) and propaganda showcasing soldier morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Third Parties:
  • G7 leaders continue to meet, with discussions on Ukraine support and broader geopolitical issues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • US Embassy in Ukraine condemned the Kyiv attack, reiterating support for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Hungary is threatening to halt electricity supplies to Ukraine, indicating potential challenges to energy security. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal Russian security measures (Bratsk airport internet restrictions) reflect domestic concerns. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Middle East conflict remains a key narrative for Russian information operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RUSSIA FOCUSED)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA):

• Capabilities (Russia):
  • Precision Strike (ISR-guided): Confirmed capability to use Iskander-M ballistic missiles against targets in Sumy Oblast, indicating continued reach and precision against Ukrainian rear areas and PVDs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Tactical Air Support (KABs): Sustained capability to deploy KABs from tactical aviation in Donetsk and Sumy, providing close air support for ground advances or softening defenses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Localized Ground Offensive (Airborne): Demonstrated ability to conduct localized assaults, specifically by airborne units, with claims of territorial gains (Yablonovka, Sumy). (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Counter-UAV & Precision Strike: Capability to identify and destroy Ukrainian UAV control points and PVDs using drone-guided strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare (Multi-faceted, Adaptive):
    • Exploitation of POWs: Rapidly disseminates videos of captured Ukrainian servicemen for psychological effect. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Economic Projection: Continues to use SPIEF as a platform to project economic stability and attract investment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Global Diversion (Middle East): Persistent efforts to amplify the Israel-Iran conflict, including re-packaging old Netanyahu speeches, to divert international attention from Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Delegitimization of Ukrainian Leadership: Actively promotes narratives of Zelenskyy's early departure from G7, claiming lack of support, to undermine Ukrainian leadership and international standing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Internal Security Measures: Implements mobile internet restrictions around sensitive infrastructure (e.g., airports) in response to perceived drone threats, indicating a reactive domestic security posture. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions (Russia):
  • Degrade Ukrainian Military Capacity: Target UAF PVDs, logistics, and command points (e.g., Konotop strike) to reduce combat effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Expand Buffer Zones: Continue localized ground offensives in Sumy Oblast to establish or deepen perceived "buffer zones." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Sow Discord and Demoralize Ukraine: Use POW videos, amplify mobilization challenges, and propagate narratives of international isolation to undermine Ukrainian societal cohesion and troop morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Maintain Economic Facade: Utilize events like SPIEF to project normalcy and economic resilience despite sanctions and war. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Divert International Focus: Sustain information campaigns on the Middle East to draw attention and resources away from Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Iskander Use in Sumy: Confirmed Iskander-M strike on Konotop indicates continued use of high-precision, long-range systems against rear-area targets in the northern axis. This is a significant escalation of conventional fire in this sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Shift in G7 Narrative from Russia: Russian milbloggers quickly seized on the G7 summit to create a counter-narrative about Zelenskyy's early departure and lack of support, demonstrating rapid adaptation of IO. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Focus on Specific UAF Units (Propaganda): Publicizing details of captured UAF soldiers, including unit information (e.g., 141st Brigade), may indicate a new effort to directly target specific Ukrainian units for demoralization. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Russian logistics continue to support high-value strikes (Iskander, KABs) and localized ground offensives. The staging of SPIEF with significant international presence and display of consumer goods, despite sanctions, serves as a powerful projection of economic sustainability. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Reports on the increased demand for PTSD books in Russia suggest a growing internal social issue related to the war, which could indicate long-term strain on human resources and social support systems. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian military C2 effectively coordinates long-range strikes (Iskander, KABs) and local ground operations, as evidenced by claimed successes. Their IO C2 remains highly agile and capable of immediate narrative manipulation to counter Ukrainian diplomatic successes and exploit vulnerabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UKRAINIAN FOCUSED)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• UAF maintains a defensive posture against sustained Russian air and ground pressure, particularly in Donetsk and Sumy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian AD remains active against KABs. UAF ground units demonstrate continued capability for effective counter-battery fire (e.g., Akatsiya strike). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Legislative efforts (multiple citizenship, demobilization discussions) reflect ongoing efforts to adapt national policy to wartime realities and address human resource challenges. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes:
  • Counter-battery Fire: Successful strike on a Russian 2S3 Akatsiya SPG by Kharkiv OTU artillery is a notable tactical success. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Diplomatic Engagement: Continued high-level participation in the G7 summit secures ongoing international support, despite Russian attempts to undermine the narrative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Legislative Adaptations: Passage of multiple citizenship law and ongoing demobilization discussions show proactive governance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setbacks:
  • Civilian Casualties: The rising death toll in Kyiv underscores the severe and ongoing humanitarian cost of Russian strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • POW Capture: The reported capture of a Ukrainian serviceman (Shariev Alexander Viktorovich) and its immediate dissemination by Russian channels is a setback for morale and information security. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Claims of Advance: Unverified Russian claims of capturing Yablonovka (Sumy) and striking Konotop PVD, if confirmed, would represent tactical setbacks. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • External Pressure: Hungarian threat to halt electricity supply introduces an external energy security challenge. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense: Continued critical need for AD systems and interceptors to counter KABs, cruise missiles, and ballistic threats.
• Human Resources: The need to balance mobilization requirements with social support (demobilization, PTSD awareness) remains a significant constraint. The new multiple citizenship law aims to address this in the long term.
• Energy Security: The potential for disruptions in energy supply from neighboring countries (Hungary) adds to existing vulnerabilities from Russian strikes.
• Information Counter-Offensive: Resources are continuously needed to counter Russia's sophisticated multi-layered information operations, especially attempts to exploit battlefield realities (POWs, civilian casualties) and distort diplomatic outcomes.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives:
  • POW Exploitation: Rapid dissemination of video of captured UAF soldier Shariev Alexander Viktorovich is a direct psychological operation to demoralize Ukrainian forces and sow doubt about the effectiveness of UAF command. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Military Success Claims: Claims of Iskander strikes on Konotop and paratrooper advances in Yablonovka (Sumy) are designed to project Russian military effectiveness and establish territorial control narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • G7 Discreditation: Narratives from "Operatsiya Z" claiming Zelenskyy left G7 early due to lack of support, directly contradict Ukrainian messaging and aim to undermine international unity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Economic Strength Projection: Continued heavy promotion of SPIEF (TASS, Mash na Donbasse), featuring interactions with foreign dignitaries and "toy machines," aims to showcase Russia's economic resilience and normalcy, despite sanctions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Middle East Diversion: "Voenkor Kotenok" continues to amplify Netanyahu's historical warnings about Iranian nuclear weapons, sustaining the narrative of an imminent Middle East crisis to divert global attention. "Dva Mayora" pushes graphic content of alleged Israeli damage to amplify the crisis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal Security Justification: Mayor of Bratsk's announcement of internet restrictions "for safety" serves to legitimize internal security measures to the Russian populace. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Addressing Internal Morale: The mention of increased demand for PTSD books in Russian channels (MOBILIZATSIA) suggests an internal acknowledgment of psychological strain on soldiers, though the framing may be to normalize rather than to overtly address problems. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Ukrainian Narratives:
  • Documentation of War Crimes: KMVA and STERNENKO continue to report rising civilian death tolls in Kyiv, reinforcing the narrative of Russian terror and war crimes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Demonstration of UAF Effectiveness: Kharkiv OTU showcases a successful precision strike on a Russian SPG, boosting morale and demonstrating military capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Legislative Progress: RBK-Ukraine and Operatyvnyi ZSU highlight the Rada's vote on multiple citizenship and discussions on demobilization, demonstrating governmental responsiveness and future planning. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • International Condemnation & Support: US Embassy condemnation of Kyiv attacks and Ukrainian channels highlighting US support reinforce the narrative of international backing against Russian aggression. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Clarification on G7/Trump: Ukrainian channels are engaging with the "Trump's efforts" narrative, indicating an attempt to manage expectations and ensure clear messaging on international support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: Sustained by UAF military successes (e.g., Akatsiya strike) and reaffirmed international support (G7, US Embassy). However, continued civilian casualties in Kyiv and news of POWs, coupled with ongoing mobilization challenges, will cause strain. The internal debate on demobilization indicates public pressure.
• Russian Morale: Reinforced by narratives of military gains (Sumy, Konotop), economic stability (SPIEF), and successful counter-IO. The acknowledgment of PTSD issues, while subtle, points to an underlying challenge. Propaganda regarding captured UAF soldiers aims to degrade Ukrainian will to resist.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• G7 Summit: The ongoing G7 summit remains a critical platform for international support. Ukrainian messaging regarding "Trump's efforts" is a significant development, indicating proactive engagement with potential shifts in US foreign policy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• US Condemnation: The US Embassy's condemnation of Kyiv attacks, explicitly linking it to Trump's calls for peace, reinforces a strong, albeit nuanced, message of continued US support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Hungary's Position: Hungary's threat to cut electricity supplies to Ukraine highlights a potential fissure in European unity and presents a new energy security challenge for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Middle East Focus: Russia's sustained amplification of the Israel-Iran conflict, including re-packaging old statements, continues to be a core strategy to divert international attention and resources from Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Sustained Multi-Domain Pressure on Northern/Eastern Axes: Russia will continue KAB and Iskander strikes on Sumy and Donetsk Oblasts, coupled with localized ground assaults (potentially airborne-led in Sumy), aiming to establish "buffer zones" and degrade UAF rear-area assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intensified Psychological Operations (PSYOP) on POWs and Mobilization: Russia will increase exploitation of captured Ukrainian personnel for demoralization and amplify narratives surrounding Ukraine's mobilization challenges to sow internal discord and undermine public support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Continued Diplomatic Isolation Efforts: Russia will persistently undermine international support for Ukraine, focusing on perceived G7 divisions and emphasizing the Middle East crisis as a global priority. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Domestic Economic Projection: Russia will continue to use events like SPIEF and economic reports (e.g., on falling egg prices) to project internal stability and economic resilience to its population and international partners receptive to its narrative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Coordinated Escalation of Ground Offensive in Sumy with Deep Strikes: Russia could launch a more substantial, multi-axis ground offensive into Sumy Oblast, supported by intensified long-range missile and KAB strikes on critical infrastructure, logistics, and command nodes deep within Sumy and Poltava Oblasts. This would aim to draw UAF reserves away from other critical sectors. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Targeted Disinformation Campaign to Undermine Ukraine-US Relations: Russia could launch a highly targeted disinformation campaign, leveraging any ambiguity or perceived shifts in G7/US statements (e.g., regarding "Trump's efforts"), to deliberately create a wedge between Ukraine and key US political factions or the wider international coalition. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Mass Cyber Attacks on Ukrainian Energy Infrastructure: Concurrent with military pressure, Russia could launch significant cyberattacks targeting Ukraine's energy grid, potentially exacerbated by external pressures like Hungary's threats, aiming for widespread blackouts and further destabilization. (CONFIDENCE: LOW, but high impact).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 1-6 hours):
  • Ground (Sumy/Donetsk): Monitor for confirmation of Russian advances in Yablonovka and any follow-on activity from the Konotop strike. Assess immediate UAF response.
  • Air Threat (Donetsk/Sumy): Anticipate continued KAB launches.
  • IO: Observe for further Russian amplification of the captured UAF soldier's video and additional narratives from the G7 summit.
• Short-term (Next 6-24 hours):
  • Strategic: Assess the immediate international reaction to Hungary's electricity threat and any official statements clarifying G7 positions on peace efforts.
  • Force Generation: Monitor for public or official reactions to the multiple citizenship law and demobilization discussions within Ukraine.
• Medium-term (Next 24-72 hours):
  • Offensive Operations: Evaluate if current localized ground and deep strikes in Sumy/Donetsk indicate preparation for a larger, more coordinated offensive.
  • Internal Russia: Monitor for any further internal security measures (internet restrictions, etc.) in Russian regions, indicating broader concerns about drone attacks.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• GAP 95 (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE): VERIFICATION OF YABLONOVKA (SUMY OBLAST) CAPTURE:
  • URGENTLY VERIFY Russian claims of capturing Yablonovka, Sumy Oblast, and the extent of Russian paratrooper involvement.
  • Determine current control, UAF defensive lines, and potential for further Russian advances in the area. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 99 (NEW): BDA OF KONOTOP (SUMY OBLAST) STRIKE (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE):
  • Conduct comprehensive Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for the Iskander-M strike in Konotop, Sumy Oblast.
  • Verify the nature of the target (PVD, equipment, personnel), assess actual damage, and confirm casualties. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 93 (UPDATED): RUSSIAN KAB STRIKE PATTERNS (DONETSK/SUMY) (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE):
  • Analyze the frequency, targeting, and impact of Russian KAB strikes in both Donetsk and Sumy Oblasts.
  • Assess whether KAB use indicates shifting Russian air tactics or preparation for deeper ground offensives in these axes. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 89 (UPDATED): G7 STANCE ON "TRUMP'S PEACE EFFORTS" (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE):
  • Confirm the precise language and context of the G7's statement regarding "President Trump's efforts" in achieving peace and any US/European diplomatic clarifications.
  • Analyze potential implications for future international diplomatic initiatives and their impact on Ukraine's position. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 100 (NEW): HUNGARIAN ENERGY THREAT ASSESSMENT (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE):
  • Assess the likelihood and immediate impact of Hungary halting electricity supplies to Ukraine.
  • Identify potential alternative energy sources or mitigation strategies. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 67 (UPDATED): RUSSIAN INTERNAL PROPAGANDA / DISINFORMATION (HIGH, UPDATED FOCUS):
  • Monitor the effectiveness of Russian narratives exploiting captured Ukrainian POWs and those discrediting G7 outcomes.
  • Assess the impact of Russian MoD's dehumanization propaganda (e.g., POW videos, Kursk body recovery). (PRIORITY: HIGH).
• GAP 101 (NEW): RUSSIAN INTERNAL SECURITY MEASURES (HIGH):
  • Monitor the scope and nature of mobile internet restrictions or other security measures in Russian regions (e.g., Bratsk).
  • Determine if these are isolated incidents or indicative of a broader, coordinated response to internal threats. (PRIORITY: HIGH).
• GAP 102 (NEW): UKRAINIAN DEMOBILIZATION LEGISLATION IMPACT (MEDIUM):
  • Analyze the practical implications and timeline for the proposed demobilization legislation.
  • Assess its potential impact on UAF force strength, morale, and recruitment efforts. (PRIORITY: MEDIUM).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR, HUMINT, OSINT critical):

  1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: VERIFY ALL RUSSIAN TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IMMEDIATELY. Task all-source ISR to immediately verify the status of Yablonovka (Sumy) and other newly claimed settlements. This is paramount to maintaining an accurate battlefield picture and countering enemy IO. (Supports CR 95).
  2. CRITICAL PRIORITY: CONDUCT BDA ON KONOTOP STRIKE. Task ISR assets to conduct immediate and thorough Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for the Konotop Iskander strike. Focus on target verification and damage assessment. (Supports CR 99).
  3. CRITICAL PRIORITY: INTENSIFY COLLECTION ON NORTHERN AXIS. Increase ISR coverage on Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts for signs of further Russian force build-up or pre-offensive preparations, particularly for deep strikes and ground assaults. (Supports CR 93, 101).
  4. CRITICAL PRIORITY: CLARIFY G7/TRUMP POSITION. Task all-source intelligence to confirm the precise wording and context of the G7's statement regarding "Trump's efforts" and assess its diplomatic implications. Prepare messaging for allies. (Supports CR 89).
  5. URGENT: ASSESS HUNGARIAN ENERGY THREAT. Task economic and political intelligence to analyze the likelihood and impact of Hungary halting electricity supplies. Provide options for energy diversification and diplomatic engagement. (Supports CR 100).
  6. ONGOING: COUNTER RUSSIAN PSYOP. Continue robust monitoring of Russian information operations, particularly their exploitation of POWs and attempts to undermine G7 unity. Develop and disseminate counter-narratives immediately. (Supports CR 67).

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. IMMEDIATE: Reinforce AD coverage in Donetsk and Sumy Oblasts, anticipating continued KAB and missile strikes. Prioritize protection of identified PVDs and logistics nodes.
  2. URGENT: Maintain HIGHEST AD alert posture in all major urban centers, especially Kyiv, against combined UAV/missile attacks. Continue to document use of cluster munitions for legal action.
  3. ONGOING: Emphasize layered and distributed AD deployments to mitigate damage from potential combined arms or massed attacks.

• Ground Forces:

  1. URGENT: Commanders in Sumy and Donetsk axes to provide immediate ground-level assessments for Yablonovka, Konotop, and other contested areas. Reinforce units in areas under confirmed or suspected increased pressure.
  2. ONGOING: Continue and expand effective drone operations (e.g., FPV, kamikaze drones) against Russian personnel and logistics. Leverage successes like the Akatsiya strike for morale and training.
  3. PERSONNEL: Leadership to clearly communicate legislative changes (multiple citizenship, demobilization) to service members and the public to manage expectations and alleviate concerns.

• Information Operations & Diplomatic:

  1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: PROACTIVELY MANAGE G7/TRUMP NARRATIVE. Release clear and consistent messaging regarding the G7 summit outcomes, proactively addressing any nuanced or potentially misinterpretable statements concerning "Trump's peace efforts." This is vital to maintain unity and avoid strategic ambiguity.
  2. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: RAPIDLY DEBUNK FALSE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS. Forcefully and publicly debunk Russian claims of territorial gains (e.g., Yablonovka) and successful high-value strikes (e.g., Konotop PVD) if found to be false, providing verified counter-narratives to maintain domestic and international morale.
  3. IMMEDIATE: COUNTER POW EXPLOITATION. Develop and disseminate counter-narratives against Russian exploitation of captured Ukrainian servicemen. Focus on the illegality of such displays and the Geneva Conventions.
  4. URGENT: ADDRESS ENERGY SECURITY CONCERNS. Proactively engage with Hungary and other partners to mitigate energy supply threats. Communicate plans for energy resilience to the Ukrainian public.
  5. ONGOING: DOCUMENT WAR CRIMES. Continue to document and disseminate evidence of all Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure and residential areas to international partners and media, emphasizing war crimes and violations of international law.
  6. ONGOING: REINFORCE UAF RESILIENCE & INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. Emphasize successful UAF operations and the strong international backing demonstrated at the G7, countering Russian psychological operations.