Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME OF REPORT: 18 JUN 25 / 07:59 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 18 JUN 25 / 07:30 ZULU - 18 JUN 25 / 07:59 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // ORCON // NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Kyiv Oblast: Continued search and rescue operations for civilian casualties from the 17 JUN 25 missile strike. Another body has been de-blocked from the rubble. This reinforces the ongoing humanitarian impact of Russian long-range precision strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Limansk Direction: Ukrainian forces report a successful drone strike resulting in a Russian soldier's apparent self-inflicted fatality. This suggests continued close-quarters combat and potential psychological strain on Russian forces in this area. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Sumy Oblast: Russian milblogger Kotsnews claims the "liberation" of Novonikolaevka in Sumy Oblast by "fearless motorized riflemen." This is a significant claim of territorial gain if true and warrants immediate verification. This aligns with previous intelligence of Russian intent to establish a "buffer zone" in the region. (CONFIDENCE: LOW for full liberation; MEDIUM for Russian intent to claim and for indicating continued offensive operations in Sumy).
• Kharkiv Oblast: Ukrainian Air Force (AFU) reports Russian tactical aviation launching KABs on Kharkiv Oblast. This confirms continued Russian air pressure on the region, in addition to Sumy, supporting the earlier observation of sustained Russian ground pressure and claims of localized advances in border areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Border Regions (Kursk, Belgorod, Bryansk, Kaluga, Tula, Ryazan, Moscow Oblasts, Republic of Adygea): Russian milblogger "Voenkor Kotenok" claims Ukrainian drones attempted to attack eight Russian regions overnight. This suggests continued Ukrainian cross-border deep strikes, likely asymmetric operations targeting infrastructure or military facilities. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM, based on Russian reporting of attacks).
• Sudzha District (Kursk Oblast, Russia): Russian MoD video shows "Sever" group paratroopers evacuating bodies of "Ukrainian servicemen and mercenaries." This is consistent with previous Russian propaganda efforts to dehumanize UAF and exaggerate their losses in cross-border raids, or could indicate continued UAF activity resulting in casualties. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM for UAF activity; HIGH for Russian propaganda intent).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• Recent rain indicated by wet streets in Ukraine (Colonelcassad video), which could impact ground mobility, particularly for unpaved roads and off-road movement. Clear conditions observed in Kermanshah, Iran, suggesting favorable conditions for drone operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces: UAF continues drone operations against Russian personnel (Limansk Direction). Rescue services remain active in civilian areas affected by strikes (Kyiv). Ukrainian political leadership is engaged in high-level diplomatic efforts (G7 summit photo).
• Russian Forces: Continue drone strikes into Russian territory (according to Russian sources). Maintain ground pressure and claim localized advances (Novonikolaevka, Sumy). Russian senior military leadership (Gerasimov) is conducting morale-boosting visits to forward command posts. Russian information operations remain highly active, focusing on internal narratives (SPIEF, economic stability) and external narratives (Middle East diversion, discrediting Ukrainian mobilization).
• Third Parties: Iranian air defenses appear ineffective against certain drone types (Hermes 900 / Shahed-136 over Kermanshah). US/NATO air transport activities potentially increasing towards Europe (unverified Russian milblogger claim based on civilian flight tracking).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RUSSIA FOCUSED)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA):

• Capabilities (Russia):

  • Air Strikes (KABs): Confirmed capability to conduct precision strikes using KABs via tactical aviation in Kharkiv Oblast, adding to the pressure on border regions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground Offensive Operations: Capability to conduct localized assaults, claiming territorial gains in border regions like Sumy. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Long-Range Air Defense / Counter-Drone Operations (Internal): Claimed drone attacks on 8 regions suggests continued internal AD/counter-drone operations, although success rate is not indicated by Russian sources (e.g., "tried to attack"). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for attempts, LOW for effectiveness).
  • Senior Leadership Presence: Top military leadership (Gerasimov) is capable of conducting frontline visits to boost morale and issue directives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare (Multi-faceted, Sustained):
    • Counter-Mobilization Efforts: Actively exploiting and amplifying instances of forced mobilization in Ukraine to demoralize the population and sow dissent. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Economic Resilience Projection: Continuing to leverage the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) to project an image of economic stability and growth, showcasing luxury cars and general business activity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Global Diversion (Middle East): Still actively amplifying conflict in the Middle East, including claims of high Israeli casualties from Iranian attacks, to divert international attention from Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Dehumanization/Demoralization: Continued use of graphic content (body recovery video) to dehumanize UAF and "foreign mercenaries" to demoralize support for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Denial/Counter-Propaganda: Countering Ukrainian narratives regarding Russian body counts by accusing Ukraine of fabricating methods (e.g., body parts counted as separate bodies, exhuming pre-war graves). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

• Intentions (Russia):

  • Degrade Ukrainian Morale and Mobilization: Intends to undermine Ukrainian societal cohesion and recruitment efforts by highlighting controversial mobilization practices. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Project Internal Stability and Economic Strength: Continue to use large-scale events like SPIEF to demonstrate that Russia is not isolated and its economy is functioning despite sanctions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Maintain Multi-Domain Pressure on Ukraine: Sustain air pressure (KABs) and localized ground offensives (Sumy, Kharkiv) while simultaneously waging an aggressive information war. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Consolidate Control in Border Areas: Attempts to establish "buffer zones" in Sumy Oblast and continue ground operations to secure perceived Russian territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Control Narrative on Casualties: Actively manipulate casualty figures and body recovery operations to undermine Ukrainian credibility and internal support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• KABs on Kharkiv Axis: Confirmed KAB launches on Kharkiv Oblast from tactical aviation, indicating a widening or sustained use of these precision munitions in the northern direction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Focus on Mobilization Narrative: Increased emphasis in Russian propaganda on perceived Ukrainian mobilization abuses, suggesting a targeted effort to exploit internal Ukrainian vulnerabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Senior Leadership Visibility: Gerasimov's reported visit to "Center" group forward command posts suggests high-level engagement to directly supervise and motivate troops, possibly indicating preparations for new operations or shoring up existing ones. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Russian military logistics appear sufficient to sustain current KAB strike rates and localized ground offensives. The continued focus on SPIEF, showcasing luxury goods and economic projects, is a clear effort to project overall economic and industrial capacity, even if it's primarily a civilian-facing event. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian military C2 effectively coordinates tactical air strikes and localized ground movements. IO C2 remains highly adaptive and capable of immediate narrative amplification across multiple channels, including direct responses to Ukrainian counter-propaganda. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UKRAINIAN FOCUSED)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• UAF maintains an active defensive posture, responding to Russian air attacks (AD activity in Kharkiv). Successful drone operations demonstrate continued asymmetric warfare capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian leadership is actively engaged in high-level international diplomatic efforts, seeking continued support (G7). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• The continued finding of bodies in Kyiv rubble points to the severe strain on civilian rescue services and the broader society. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes:
  • Drone Operations: Successful drone strike on a Russian soldier in the Limansk direction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Diplomatic Engagement: High-level participation in the G7 summit, securing continued international support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setbacks:
  • Civilian Casualties: Another body de-blocked in Kyiv underscores the severe and ongoing humanitarian cost of Russian strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Claims of Advance: Unverified but persistent Russian claims of territorial gains (Novonikolaevka in Sumy) require immediate verification, as they could represent tactical setbacks if true. (CONFIDENCE: LOW, but requires rapid assessment).
  • Mobilization Challenges: Public footage of forceful conscription attempts, amplified by Russian propaganda, indicates ongoing challenges with mobilization efforts and potential for internal social friction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense: Critical need for AD systems and interceptors remains paramount to protect urban centers from KAB and missile strikes.
• Human Resources: Mobilization challenges, as highlighted by controversial conscription methods, suggest ongoing personnel needs.
• Information Counter-Offensive: Resources needed to counter Russia's sophisticated multi-layered information operations, particularly their attempts to exploit internal Ukrainian issues (mobilization) and divert international focus.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives:
  • Mass Drone Attacks on Russia: "Voenkor Kotenok" claims Ukrainian drones attacked eight Russian regions, a narrative designed to show Ukraine as aggressive and to justify Russian retaliation, as well as to rally internal support for the war. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Territorial Claims (Novonikolaevka): Kotsnews's claim of "liberating" Novonikolaevka is a clear attempt to project military success and justify the creation of a "buffer zone" in Sumy Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Dehumanization and Casualty Control: Russian MoD video of body retrieval in Kursk, along with accompanying claims, continues the effort to dehumanize UAF and "foreign mercenaries" and to manage the narrative on casualties. "Dva Mayor" directly counters Ukrainian narratives on Russian body counts by fabricating methods, showing a sophisticated and rapid response to Ukrainian IO. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Exploitation of Ukrainian Mobilization: "Colonelcassad" posts multiple videos of forceful conscription attempts in Ukraine, framing it as the "Kyiv regime" abandoning democratic principles and resorting to violence against its own citizens. This is a direct psychological operation aimed at demoralizing Ukrainians and undermining international support by portraying Ukraine as oppressive. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Economic Prosperity: TASS continues its extensive coverage of SPIEF, showcasing luxury vehicles (Lada Aura, Chinese Tank/Wey models, Lada Iskra Sport), and general business activity. This aims to project an image of economic resilience and attract investment despite sanctions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Middle East Diversion (Sustained): "Dva Mayor" and ASTRA continue to amplify narratives of high Israeli casualties from Iranian missile strikes, linking it to the US repositioning aircraft, attempting to maintain global focus on this crisis to divert from Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Narratives:
  • Documentation of War Crimes: RBK-Ukraine reports continued efforts to de-block bodies from Kyiv rubble, reinforcing the narrative of Russian attacks on civilians and their war crimes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Countering Russian Disinformation: Ukrainian media (e.g., RBK-Ukraine on "illegitimacy of Zelenskyy") actively counters Russian propaganda efforts to delegitimize Ukrainian leadership. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Positive International Engagement: Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration's photo and statement on G7 support for Ukraine and Trump's peace efforts (if accurate) project a narrative of strong international backing. Note the mention of Trump is a new and significant element in Ukrainian messaging. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for narrative intent, MEDIUM for accurate reflection of G7 communique details).
  • Military Success: "Operatyvnyi ZSU" and "Sternenko" videos showcase successful drone strikes against Russian personnel and positions, boosting morale and demonstrating UAF capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: Sustained resilience is evident, but civilian casualties and reports of forceful conscription create ongoing strain. Publicizing SBU successes and international support is crucial for maintaining morale. The need for clear messaging on G7 support, especially concerning Trump's involvement, will be critical to manage expectations.
• Russian Morale: Actively reinforced by narratives of military success (Novonikolaevka), economic stability (SPIEF coverage), and historical pride. Propaganda aiming to highlight Ukrainian mobilization abuses seeks to delegitimize the Ukrainian government in the eyes of its own population and the international community. Gerasimov's visit to the front aims to boost troop morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• G7 Summit: The G7 leaders' meeting in Kananaskis, with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy and NATO Secretary General Ruttte in attendance, reaffirms significant international support for Ukraine, including discussions on defense budget solutions and reconstruction aid. The mention of "President Trump's efforts" in achieving peace by the G7 leaders (as reported by Zaporizhzhia RMA) is a highly significant and potentially contentious development, indicating a shift in public framing of potential peace initiatives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for G7 support; MEDIUM for the precise phrasing and implications of Trump's involvement).
• Middle East Diversion: Russia continues to actively amplify the Middle East crisis to divert international attention and resources from Ukraine, with a new focus on alleged high Israeli casualties and US military movements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Kyrgyzstan Blackout: TASS reports a blackout in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. While not directly related to Ukraine, it's a regional instability factor Russia might exploit or be concerned about for its own influence in Central Asia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Armenian Politics: Pashinyan's statement about "Elsetey" company nationalization (linked to Karapetyan, on Mirotvorets list) is an internal Armenian development, but its connection to Mirotvorets means Russia may leverage it in their narratives against Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Sustained Air & Artillery Pressure on Border Regions: Russia will continue KAB strikes on Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts, likely as part of shaping operations for continued localized ground advances, aiming to establish or expand a buffer zone. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intensified Information Operations Against Ukrainian Mobilization: Russia will increase propaganda exploiting incidents of forceful conscription, aiming to sow discord within Ukraine and undermine international perceptions of Ukrainian democracy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Continued Global Diversion Efforts: Russia will maintain aggressive amplification of the Middle East conflict and other international crises to dilute international focus and resources from Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Propaganda Focus on Economic Resilience and Military Strength: Russia will continue to use events like SPIEF and high-level military visits (Gerasimov) to project stability and strength to internal and select external audiences. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Localized Ground Offensive into Sumy Oblast with Air Support: Russia could launch a more substantial ground offensive in Sumy Oblast, beyond localized probing, aiming to seize key settlements and establish a deeper buffer zone, potentially drawing UAF reserves from other fronts. This would be supported by sustained KAB strikes and artillery. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Escalated Hybrid Warfare Targeting G7 Diplomatic Unity: Russia could intensify its efforts to create divisions among G7 members by exploiting any perceived weaknesses or differences (e.g., regarding "Trump's peace efforts") through disinformation and targeted influence operations, aiming to weaken the coalition's resolve and support for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Increased Asymmetric Strikes on Russian Civilian/Military Infrastructure: If Ukrainian cross-border drone activity (as claimed by Russia) is a precursor, Russia might interpret this as escalation and respond with more severe strikes, potentially including deliberate targeting of Ukrainian civilian infrastructure deeper within Ukraine or intensified long-range missile strikes. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 1-6 hours):
  • Air Threat: Monitor Sumy and Kharkiv for continued KAB launches or other tactical aviation activity.
  • Ground (Sumy): Seek immediate verification of Novonikolaevka status and Russian ground force movements in the area.
  • IO: Observe for further Russian amplification of the Middle East crisis and any new narratives regarding the G7 summit and Trump's peace efforts.
• Short-term (Next 6-24 hours):
  • Ground (Sumy/Kharkiv): Assess whether current KAB strikes are isolated or precursors to increased ground activity in these border regions.
  • IO: Evaluate the reach and impact of Russian narratives related to SPIEF and any political/diplomatic shifts stemming from G7.
  • Civilian Protection: Continue rescue operations in Kyiv and assess needs for affected areas.
• Medium-term (Next 24-72 hours):
  • Strategic: Analyze any official reactions or diplomatic fallout from the G7 communique, particularly regarding mentions of "Trump's efforts."
  • Mobilization: Monitor for any internal Ukrainian governmental responses or changes in approach to mobilization, in response to public pressure and Russian IO.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• GAP 95 (NEW): VERIFICATION OF NOVO-NIKOLAEVKA (SUMY OBLAST) CAPTURE (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE):
  • URGENTLY VERIFY the Russian claim of capturing Novonikolaevka, Sumy Oblast.
  • Determine current control, scale of Russian forces involved, and UAF defensive posture/response. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 93 (UPDATED): RUSSIAN KAB STRIKE PATTERNS (SUMY/KHARKIV) (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE):
  • Analyze the frequency, targeting, and impact of Russian KAB strikes in both Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts.
  • Assess whether KAB use indicates shifting Russian air tactics or preparation for deeper ground offensives in the northern axis. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 90 (UPDATED): BDA IN KYIV (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE):
  • Continue comprehensive Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for Kyiv missile attacks, prioritizing confirmed Kh-101 cluster munition use.
  • Determine specific targeting patterns, munition types, and estimated civilian/infrastructure damage. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 96 (NEW): RUSSIAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP MOVEMENTS (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE):
  • Verify Valery Gerasimov's presence at "Center" group forward command posts.
  • Assess the strategic significance of such visits: are they routine morale boosts, or precursors to major operational planning/execution? (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 67 (UPDATED): RUSSIAN INTERNAL PROPAGANDA / DISINFORMATION (HIGH, UPDATED FOCUS):
  • Monitor the effectiveness of Russian narratives exploiting Ukrainian mobilization and those directly countering Ukrainian claims regarding Russian casualties/body handling.
  • Assess the impact of Russian MoD's dehumanization propaganda (Kursk body recovery). (PRIORITY: HIGH).
• GAP 89 (UPDATED): G7 STANCE ON "TRUMP'S PEACE EFFORTS" (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE): The Ukrainian G7 statement raises a critical information gap.
  • Confirm the precise language and context of the G7's statement regarding "President Trump's efforts" in achieving peace.
  • Analyze potential implications for future international diplomatic initiatives and their impact on Ukraine's position. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 97 (NEW): IRANIAN AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES (HIGH, LONGER-TERM):
  • Further investigate Iran's air defense effectiveness against various drone types, especially given the observed ineffectiveness against Hermes 900/Shahed-136. This has implications for broader regional air defense assessments. (PRIORITY: HIGH).
• GAP 98 (NEW): RUSSIAN MILITARY TRAVEL/LOGISTICS TO EUROPE (HIGH):
  • Investigate Russian milblogger claims of increased US/NATO cargo flights towards Europe. While based on civilian flight tracking, any unusual military air transport activity requires verification and assessment. (PRIORITY: HIGH).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR, HUMINT, OSINT critical):

  1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: VERIFY ALL RUSSIAN TERRITORIAL CLAIMS. Task all-source ISR to immediately verify the status of Novonikolaevka (Sumy) and other newly claimed settlements. This is paramount to maintaining an accurate battlefield picture and countering enemy IO. (Supports CR 95).
  2. CRITICAL PRIORITY: KAB STRIKE ANALYSIS. Immediately conduct detailed analysis of KAB strikes in Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts, including BDA and potential targeting patterns. Disseminate findings to UAF ground and air defense units to inform tactical adjustments. (Supports CR 93).
  3. CRITICAL PRIORITY: MONITOR RUSSIAN HIGH COMMAND. Increase collection on Russian senior military leadership movements and activities (e.g., Gerasimov's visits) to identify potential strategic decision points or operational planning. (Supports CR 96).
  4. CRITICAL PRIORITY: G7 COMMUNIQUE & DIPLOMATIC IMPACT. Task all-source intelligence to confirm the precise wording and context of the G7's statement regarding "Trump's efforts." Prepare assessments on potential diplomatic shifts and their impact on future international support. (Supports CR 89).
  5. ONGOING: COUNTER RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION PROPAGANDA. Continue robust monitoring of Russian information operations, particularly their amplification of Ukrainian mobilization challenges. Develop and disseminate counter-narratives that address concerns while reinforcing the necessity of defense. (Supports CR 67).

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. IMMEDIATE: Reinforce AD coverage in Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts, anticipating continued KAB and UAV strikes. Adjust AD assets to counter this specific threat profile.
  2. URGENT: Maintain HIGHEST AD alert posture in all major urban centers, especially Kyiv, against combined UAV/missile attacks. Continue to document use of cluster munitions for legal action.
  3. ONGOING: Emphasize layered and distributed AD deployments to mitigate damage from potential combined arms or massed attacks.

• Ground Forces:

  1. URGENT: Commanders in Sumy and Kharkiv axes to provide immediate ground-level assessments for Novonikolaevka and other contested areas. Reinforce units in areas under confirmed or suspected increased pressure.
  2. ONGOING: Continue and expand effective drone operations (e.g., FPV, kamikaze drones) against Russian personnel and logistics.
  3. PERSONNEL: Review current mobilization procedures to minimize friction and address public concerns, while ensuring critical force generation requirements are met.

• Information Operations & Diplomatic:

  1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: CLARIFY G7 STANCE ON PEACE EFFORTS. Proactively release clear and consistent messaging regarding the G7 summit outcomes, particularly any nuanced or potentially misinterpretable statements concerning "Trump's peace efforts." This is vital to maintain unity and avoid strategic ambiguity.
  2. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: RAPIDLY DEBUNK FALSE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS. Forcefully and publicly debunk Russian claims of territorial gains (e.g., Novonikolaevka) if found to be false, providing verified counter-narratives to maintain domestic and international morale.
  3. IMMEDIATE: COUNTER MOBILIZATION PROPAGANDA. Develop proactive messaging to address public concerns regarding mobilization. Highlight the necessity of defense while emphasizing efforts to ensure fairness and legality in conscription.
  4. ONGOING: DOCUMENT WAR CRIMES. Continue to document and disseminate evidence of all Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure and residential areas to international partners and media, emphasizing war crimes and violations of international law.
  5. ONGOING: REINFORCE UAF RESILIENCE & INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. Emphasize successful UAF operations and the strong international backing demonstrated at the G7, countering Russian psychological operations.