Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME OF REPORT: 18 JUN 25 / 03:15 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 18 JUN 25 / 02:45 ZULU - 18 JUN 25 / 03:15 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // ORCON // NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Kharkiv Oblast: Russian source (Andrey Marochko via TASS) claims initiation of combat operations for the capture of Novyi Myr in Kharkiv Oblast. This indicates continued Russian offensive pressure in this sector, aiming to expand gains or fix UAF forces. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - unverified Russian claim, but consistent with ongoing activity).
• Zaporizhzhia Oblast: Ukrainian source (Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration) reports and provides video evidence of aftermath of enemy attack on Zaporizhzhia city, showing significant damage to civilian/commercial infrastructure. This confirms continued Russian long-range strike capabilities against urban centers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Donetsk Axis: Colonelcassad (Russian milblogger) shares video showing 35th Combined Arms Army artillery and UAV operations at night. While lacking specific location, this is consistent with ongoing Russian indirect fire support for ground operations, likely in Donetsk or adjacent areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.2. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces:
  • Defense: UAF continues to defend against Russian ground assaults and long-range strikes. Immediate response and damage control evident in Zaporizhzhia.
  • Strategic/Diplomatic: UAF maintains focus on diplomatic engagement, as evidenced by continued reporting on US diplomatic activities (Trump envoy to Lukashenko).
• Russian Forces:
  • Ground Forces: Claims of initiating combat for Novyi Myr (Kharkiv Oblast) suggest ongoing localized offensives.
  • Long-Range Fire: Demonstrated capability for effective missile/artillery strikes on urban centers (Zaporizhzhia).
  • Information Operations (IO): Continued focus on amplifying narratives of Russian geopolitical influence (BRICS), domestic issues (corruption claims), and exploiting international conflicts (Iran-Israel).

1.3. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• No new specific weather updates. The video from Zaporizhzhia shows debris and water, possibly from firefighting, indicating clear conditions for emergency response. Nighttime artillery operations (Colonelcassad video) suggest standard operational tempo regardless of light conditions.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RUSSIA FOCUSED)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA):

• Capabilities (Russia):
  • Ground Offensive (Localized/Tactical): Capability to initiate localized ground assaults, as claimed in Novyi Myr, Kharkiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Long-Range Strike (Precision/Area): Demonstrated capability to conduct destructive strikes against Ukrainian urban centers, likely using missiles/UAVs, resulting in significant infrastructure damage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Artillery/UAV Integration: Continued integration of UAVs for targeting with artillery, particularly in night operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare (Global Exploitation): Continues to leverage state media (TASS) and milblogger channels to promote geopolitical narratives (BRICS, US-Iran conflict escalation) and internal 'anti-corruption' narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions (Russia):
  • Expand Control/Fix Forces: Intent to seize ground in Kharkiv Oblast (Novyi Myr), likely to either expand buffer zones or to fix UAF forces away from other critical axes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Degrade Civilian Morale/Infrastructure: Intent to continue terrorizing Ukrainian population centers and damaging critical/commercial infrastructure via long-range strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Divert Global Attention: Intent to continually amplify and sensationalize international conflicts (e.g., US-Iran war possibility) to divert global attention and resources away from Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Project Internal Stability/Governance: Promotion of domestic "anti-corruption" initiatives (Mironov statement) aims to project internal stability and responsive governance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• No significant new tactical changes directly observed from the latest messages beyond confirmation of existing capabilities. The persistent focus on Kharkiv suggests a sustained effort in that direction.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• No new direct intelligence on logistics. Internal Russian reports on financial disputes (Mironov's proposal regarding educational institution funding) suggest continued domestic issues that may indirectly affect resource allocation, but no immediate impact on frontline sustainment.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Military C2: Appears capable of coordinating localized ground assaults (Novyi Myr claim) and executing long-range strikes on multiple urban targets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• IO C2: Highly effective in rapidly integrating global events into their narrative, attempting to shape international perceptions and domestic support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UKRAINIAN FOCUSED)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Defensive Posture: UAF remains in a defensive posture, responding to ground assaults in Kharkiv Oblast and missile/UAV attacks on urban centers.
• Emergency Response: Demonstrated rapid and effective emergency response in Zaporizhzhia following attacks.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Setbacks: Confirmed significant damage to civilian infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia due to enemy strikes represents a localized setback in civilian protection. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Russian claims of initiating combat for Novyi Myr, if accurate, indicate continued pressure and potential loss of ground. (CONFIDENCE: LOW due to unverified claim).
• Successes: Continued efforts to expose Russian aggression and war crimes (documenting damage in Zaporizhzhia).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense: Continued critical requirement for AD systems to protect urban centers from ongoing long-range strikes.
• Reconstruction/Aid: Significant ongoing need for resources for humanitarian aid and reconstruction in heavily damaged urban areas.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives (Geopolitical Influence, US Weakness, Internal Focus):
  • BRICS Expansion: TASS promoting BRICS as a successful Russian initiative, aimed at projecting global influence and eroding US/Western hegemony. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • US-Iran War Escalation: TASS report on ABC News' claim of US potential military action against Iran within 24-48 hours. This is a deliberate amplification by Russia to divert global attention, create panic, and portray the US as an aggressive actor. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian amplification intent). Ayatollah Khamenei's quote about 'no mercy for Zionists' further amplified by Russian channels aims to exacerbate regional tensions and associate Ukraine (through previous narratives) with instability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for amplification intent).
  • Internal Governance: Mironov's proposal for criminalizing school fundraising is a domestic-facing narrative aimed at addressing social issues and projecting a caring government, distracting from war realities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for domestic intent).
  • Military Efficacy (Ground): Marochko's claim regarding Novyi Myr (Kharkiv) aims to demonstrate ongoing Russian offensive successes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for propaganda intent).
• Ukrainian Narratives (US Engagement, Resilience):
  • US Diplomatic Engagement: RBC-Ukraine's reporting on the Trump envoy (Kellogg) meeting Lukashenko, and on Trump's TikTok stance, indicates ongoing Ukrainian media interest in US political and diplomatic developments, as these directly impact Western support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Aftermath Documentation: Zaporizhzhia video provides concrete evidence of Russian attacks and civilian suffering, supporting Ukrainian narratives of unprovoked aggression and war crimes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: Sustained long-range strikes on urban centers (Zaporizhzhia) will negatively impact civilian morale. However, the continuous documentation of damage and emergency response efforts may foster resilience.
• Russian Morale: Narratives of geopolitical success (BRICS) and internal governance (Mironov) are aimed at maintaining domestic support. The amplification of external conflicts like the US-Iran situation is a deliberate attempt to redirect public anxiety and rally support against a perceived common enemy (the West).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• US Engagement with Belarus: The Reuters report (via RBC-Ukraine) regarding a Trump envoy (likely Kellogg) planning to meet Lukashenko is a significant development. This suggests continued, perhaps evolving, US diplomatic efforts in the region, potentially aimed at influencing Belarus's role in the conflict or exploring peace initiatives outside established frameworks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Middle East Diversion: Russia's aggressive amplification of US-Iran tensions is a clear and present threat to international focus on Ukraine. The direct quote from Ayatollah Khamenei amplified by Russian channels aims to further inflame this situation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Sustained Long-Range Strikes on Urban Centers: Russia will continue to launch missile and UAV attacks on Ukrainian cities, including Zaporizhzhia, targeting civilian and commercial infrastructure to terrorize populations and degrade the economy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Localized Ground Offensives in Kharkiv Oblast: Russia will persist with localized ground assaults in Kharkiv Oblast, attempting to seize tactical ground (e.g., Novyi Myr) and stretch UAF defenses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intensified Global Information Operations: Russia will continue to exploit and amplify international conflicts, particularly the Middle East situation, to divert global attention and diplomatic resources away from Ukraine. They will also continue to project an image of Russia's growing global influence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Exploitation of US-Belarus Talks: Russia attempts to leverage the perceived 'backchannel' diplomacy between the US and Belarus (Kellogg-Lukashenko meeting) to sow discord within the Western alliance, suggesting a unilateral US move or a weakening of the unified front on Ukraine. This could be coupled with increased Russian military pressure on Belarus to demonstrate unwavering loyalty. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Escalation on Kharkiv Axis with Deception: Building on current claims (Novyi Myr), Russia could launch a multi-battalion offensive in Kharkiv Oblast, possibly feigning a shift in focus from Sumy, aiming for a deeper penetration while UAF attention is divided by persistent long-range strikes and the international focus on the Middle East. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 1-6 hours):
  • IO: Monitor for further Russian amplification of US-Iran war possibility and any narratives emerging from the Kellogg-Lukashenko meeting.
  • Ground: Continue monitoring Kharkiv Oblast (Novyi Myr area) for verification of Russian ground operations and UAF counter-actions.
• Short-term (Next 6-24 hours):
  • Strategic/Diplomatic: Closely observe any public statements or leaks regarding the Kellogg-Lukashenko meeting and its implications for Belarus's role or the overall peace process.
  • Ground: Assess if the claimed Novyi Myr operations are isolated or part of a larger, coordinated offensive in Kharkiv.
• Medium-term (Next 24-72 hours):
  • IO: Assess the effectiveness of Russian attempts to divert global attention to the Middle East.
  • Ground: Evaluate UAF resource allocation and reinforcement needs in Kharkiv Oblast if Russian pressure increases.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• GAP 2 (UPDATED): VERIFICATION OF RUSSIAN CLAIMS OF UKRAINIAN SHELLING IN KURSK OBLAST (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE, HYPER-PRIORITY): No new information directly from this update, remains critical.
• NEW GAP 88: RUSSIAN ADVANCES IN NOVYI MYR, KHARKIV OBLAST (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE):
  • URGENTLY VERIFY Russian claims of initiating combat for Novyi Myr.
  • Determine the scale of Russian forces involved, their specific objectives, and UAF defensive posture/response.
  • Assess if this is a tactical probing action or the start of a sustained offensive. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• NEW GAP 89: KELLOGG-LUKASHENKO MEETING DETAILS AND OBJECTIVES (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE):
  • Obtain any available details on the specific agenda, attendees, and key topics discussed during the meeting.
  • Assess the implications of this meeting for US policy towards Belarus, Belarus's alignment with Russia, and any potential 'peace' initiatives it might foreshadow. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 86 (UPDATED): G7 JOINT STATEMENT STATUS (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE): No new information from this update, remains critical.
• GAP 67 (UPDATED): RUSSIAN INTERNAL PROPAGANDA / DISINFORMATION (HIGH, UPDATED FOCUS):
  • Continue to monitor Russian state media (TASS) and milblogger channels (e.g., Colonelcassad) for narratives related to BRICS, US-Iran tensions, and any further attempts to link Ukraine to global crises. (PRIORITY: HIGH).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR, HUMINT, OSINT critical):

  1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE VERIFICATION OF NOVYI MYR OPERATIONS. Task all-source ISR to immediately verify the Russian claim of combat for Novyi Myr, Kharkiv Oblast. Determine the tactical situation, enemy disposition, and UAF response. (Supports CR 88).
  2. CRITICAL PRIORITY: MONITOR KELLOGG-LUKASHENKO OUTCOMES. Task all-source ISR and HUMINT (via diplomatic channels) to gather intelligence on the Kellogg-Lukashenko meeting. This is crucial for understanding potential shifts in US policy or Belarus's alignment. (Supports CR 89).
  3. ONGOING: Maintain heightened ISR over all axes, with particular emphasis on Kharkiv Oblast, for signs of Russian tactical adaptation, force generation, or shifts in main effort.
  4. ONGOING: Continue rapid analysis and monitoring of Russian information operations, specifically their exploitation of the Middle East situation and any attempts to undermine Western unity.

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. IMMEDIATE: Reinforce AD coverage in and around Zaporizhzhia and other vulnerable urban centers. Analyze the BDA from the latest attack to identify strike patterns and adapt AD deployment accordingly.
  2. ONGOING: Maintain high AD alert posture. Emphasize dispersal and concealment of AD assets to minimize vulnerability to follow-on strikes.

• Ground Forces:

  1. URGENT: Commander of forces in Kharkiv Oblast to provide immediate, ground-level assessment of the situation in Novyi Myr to confirm or deny Russian claims and assess the threat. Reinforce or adjust defensive lines as required.
  2. ONGOING: Maintain readiness for localized ground assaults across all axes. Emphasize intelligence sharing between units regarding observed Russian tactics and adaptations.

• Information Operations & Diplomatic:

  1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: COUNTER MIDDLE EAST DIVERSION. Proactively release clear and consistent messaging that highlights Russia's deliberate attempt to divert global attention from its aggression in Ukraine by hyping other conflicts. Emphasize that Russia's actions in Ukraine remain the primary threat to European and global security.
  2. IMMEDIATE: ADDRESS LUKASHENKO MEETING. Prepare swift and unified messaging to explain the nature of any US-Belarus engagement and to preempt Russian/Belarusian attempts to exploit it for propaganda purposes or to suggest a weakening of international support for Ukraine. Reiterate commitment to Ukraine's territorial integrity. (Supports CR 89).
  3. ONGOING: Continue to document and disseminate evidence of Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure (e.g., Zaporizhzhia video) to international partners and media, emphasizing war crimes and violations of international law.

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