Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME OF REPORT: 16 JUN 25 / 00:23 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 16 JUN 25 / 00:00 ZULU - 16 JUN 25 / 00:23 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // ORCON // NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Ukraine Operational Area:
  • Air Activity: Air raid alerts for Kyiv have been lifted (РБК-Україна, КМВА, 00:06Z-00:06Z). This indicates the cessation of immediate aerial threats to the capital, following previous drone activity reported in the preceding ISR. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). "Mykolaiv Vanek" reports "all-clears" and permission to "sleep," further confirming the de-escalation of immediate drone threats in the south. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground Activity: No new direct reports of ground engagements or shifts in control in this immediate reporting period.
• Russian Operational Area:
  • TASS reports minor seismic activity (magnitude 2.5) near a nuclear facility in Iran, citing the Iranian Seismological Center (00:13Z). This aligns with and reinforces the ongoing Russian narrative of instability and potential incidents around Iranian nuclear sites, previously propagated by Colonelcassad. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for TASS report, MEDIUM for its use in Russian IO).
• Information Environment (Global):
  • Russian state media (TASS) continues to push domestic economic narratives (Wildberries, mortgage market, fuel quality, scam activity) related to the upcoming SPIEF (St. Petersburg International Economic Forum). These are likely pre-recorded or prepared statements, serving to project an image of stability and economic development within Russia, potentially to counter international sanctions and war-related economic strain. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian milbloggers, specifically Colonelcassad, are disseminating a compilation of drone operations videos (00:20Z) from the "Parabellum" channel. This includes FPV drone strikes on Ukrainian positions/equipment and a thermal video of what appears to be a successful Russian counter-drone interception. This serves as a propaganda effort to showcase Russian drone capabilities and tactical successes, potentially boosting domestic morale and projecting combat effectiveness. One video within this compilation is identified as showing Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian positions, suggesting Colonelcassad may be curating and re-sharing enemy combat footage as part of a wider compilation without specific attribution for all individual clips, or it's a misidentification in the source analysis. This requires further clarification. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for content dissemination, MEDIUM for precise attribution of all clips).
  • "НгП раZVедка" (Russian milblogger) poses a dismissive, derogatory question about the name of Lutsk (00:08Z). This is a low-level, opportunistic propaganda attempt aimed at psychological degradation of Ukrainian identity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• Night operations remain ongoing as evidenced by the period of air raid alerts and subsequent all-clears. No new specific weather or environmental factors affecting operations reported.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces: Maintain active air defense readiness, successfully neutralizing immediate aerial threats to major population centers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces: Continue to employ deep strike capabilities (as evidenced by earlier drone activity now concluded) and maintain a highly active information warfare apparatus. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RUSSIA FOCUSED)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA):

• Capabilities (Russia):
  • Persistent Deep Strike: As per previous ISR, capability remains for widespread drone strikes. The conclusion of alerts indicates a phase of these strikes has ended. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Sophisticated Information Warfare (CRITICAL - Confirmed and diversified): Russia continues to demonstrate a highly adaptive, rapid, and aggressive information campaign, now extending to managing domestic economic narratives alongside escalating international crisis narratives. The compilation of drone footage is a direct effort to project military capability and successful tactical operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Narrative Control over Middle East Developments: Capable of immediately leveraging global events, such as seismic activity in Iran, to reinforce pre-existing disinformation narratives (e.g., instability, potential nuclear incidents). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions (Russia):
  • Degrade Ukrainian AD & Logistics: Continued deep strikes (now in a temporary lull for Kyiv) aim to exhaust Ukrainian air defense resources and disrupt rear area logistics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Undermine Western Support to Ukraine (CRITICAL): Intensify efforts to promote narratives of Western resource diversion and aid reduction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Project Global Relevance & Domestic Stability: Utilize state media to project an image of economic stability and successful domestic governance, while simultaneously leveraging global events to portray Russia as a key player. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Boost Military Morale & Deterrence: Use compiled combat footage to showcase "successful" operations and instill confidence in Russian military capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Courses of Action (COA) (Russia):
  • COA 1 (Sustained Deep Strikes & AD Attrition): Continue high-volume drone attacks across Ukrainian operational depth, aiming to deplete AD munitions and force redeployments, while simultaneously targeting critical infrastructure and C2 nodes. The current lull may be a pause before another wave. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • COA 2 (Accelerated, Specific Narrative of Western Weakness & Resource Diversion - CRITICAL): Intensify information operations, leveraging specific, often unverified or misrepresented, claims (e.g., "The Telegraph" on US aid) to aggressively promote the narrative that Western nations are diminishing or diverting military aid from Ukraine. This COA is becoming more targeted and potentially more damaging due to its specificity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • COA 3 (Exploitation of Middle East Instability & Domestic Narrative Control): Continue to amplify any negative developments in the Middle East, especially those related to Iran, to reinforce narratives of global instability and draw attention away from Ukraine. Simultaneously, TASS and other state media will promote domestic "successes" to project stability and resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • COA 4 (Visual Propaganda of Military Success): Regularly release compiled combat footage, particularly drone operations, to reinforce perceptions of Russian tactical effectiveness and technological advantage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Operational Pause: Kyiv's air alerts being lifted suggests a temporary operational pause in deep strike activities against the capital, allowing for assessment or re-preparation for subsequent waves. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Diversification of Propaganda: The use of curated drone combat footage (Colonelcassad) as a propaganda tool is a consistent, but now observed, adaptation for direct military messaging beyond purely political or economic narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Continued drone strikes (prior to the current lull) indicate sustained Shahed drone supply. The compilation of drone footage also suggests a high rate of FPV drone expenditure and continued re-supply, or effective resupply, allowing for sustained operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). TASS reports on decreasing substandard fuel in Russia (00:18Z) are a domestic narrative designed to project logistical and regulatory control within Russia, rather than indicating direct military logistics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for narrative, LOW for direct military logistics relevance).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian Military C2: Effective in coordinating multi-regional drone strikes. The tactical video compilation released by Colonelcassad also points to effective C2 in coordinating and filming drone operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian IO/Diplomatic C2: Highly agile, aggressive, and effective in responding to real-time events (e.g., Iranian seismic activity) and shaping narratives, now employing more specific and potentially damaging claims, alongside a consistent stream of domestic economic messaging. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UKRAINIAN FOCUSED)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Ukrainian Air Defense forces remain on high alert and are actively engaging incoming drone threats, as evidenced by the lifting of alerts in Kyiv. This demonstrates continued vigilance and operational readiness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Success (AD): Successful neutralization of the immediate aerial threat to Kyiv, allowing for the lifting of air raid alerts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Mykolaiv Vanek's report of "remains of mopeds" (previous ISR) indicates continued successful interception of Russian drones.
• Setback (Information Warfare Challenge - CRITICAL): The "The Telegraph" report amplified by Russian milbloggers regarding "Washington stopping military aid to Ukraine" continues to pose a significant information challenge. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). The derogatory comment on Lutsk is a minor, but insidious, psychological attack.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• The persistence of drone attacks, even in a temporary lull, highlights the critical and ongoing need for robust, layered air defense systems and munitions. The intensifying narrative of aid cessation will create significant political and material constraints if not effectively countered. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives (CRITICAL - HIGHLY ACTIVE, AGGRESSIVE & MANIPULATIVE):
  • "US Stops Aid to Ukraine" (HIGH IMPACT, SPECIFIC): This narrative remains active from previous reporting. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • "Iran's Effective Strikes on Israeli Nuclear Sites" (HIGH IMPACT, ONGOING): TASS report of minor seismic activity near an Iranian nuclear facility (00:13Z) aligns with previous Colonelcassad claims, lending a veneer of "official" credibility to the narrative of instability and potential incidents around Iranian nuclear sites. This aims to reinforce the idea of a volatile Middle East. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for intent).
  • Showcasing Military Effectiveness (NEW FOCUS): Colonelcassad's compilation of "our drone operators' work" (00:20Z) directly serves to project Russian military prowess, successful tactical engagements (FPV strikes), and effective counter-drone capabilities. This is a clear effort to boost morale and counter narratives of Russian military weakness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Domestic Economic Stability: TASS reports (Wildberries, mortgages, fuel quality) aim to portray Russia as stable and prosperous despite the war, likely for internal consumption and to demonstrate resilience against sanctions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Psychological Degradation: The derogatory comment about Lutsk (00:08Z) is a minor but persistent element of the broader psychological warfare aimed at demeaning Ukrainian identity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Counter-Narratives: Ukrainian Air Force and Oblasts report ongoing drone threats and AD operations, providing real-time transparency and countering Russian narratives of air supremacy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: The lifting of air alerts provides a temporary relief but the underlying threat of drone attacks persists. The aggressive and specific narrative of US aid cessation continues to pose a significant risk to public confidence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Morale: Russian IO aims to boost domestic morale by portraying Russia as a globally relevant power and by suggesting Western support for Ukraine is fragile and actively collapsing. The drone combat footage is specifically designed to reinforce military confidence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• The narratives amplified by Russian media, particularly "The Telegraph" report on aid cessation, continue to be critical threats to international perceptions of support for Ukraine. The TASS report on Iranian seismic activity aligns with Russia's broader effort to manipulate international opinion regarding the Middle East and divert focus. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Renewed Deep Strikes (Post-Lull): Russia will resume large-scale drone attacks across Ukraine following this current operational lull, aiming to deplete AD munitions and force redeployments, while targeting critical infrastructure and C2 nodes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Aggressive, Targeted Narrative Campaign on Western Aid Cessation/Diversion: Russia will continue its intensified information campaign, leveraging specific, often unverified or misrepresented, claims (e.g., "The Telegraph" on US aid) to aggressively promote the narrative that Western nations are diminishing or diverting military aid from Ukraine. This will be the primary focus of Russian IO. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Exploitation of Middle East Developments & Domestic "Successes": Russia will continue to propagate unverified and inflammatory claims regarding the Israel-Iran conflict (e.g., seismic activity near nuclear sites) to maintain global distraction. Concurrently, Russian state media will continue to disseminate positive domestic economic news to project stability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Increased Visual Propaganda: Russia will increase the release of curated combat footage (especially drone operations) to showcase tactical successes and technological prowess, aimed at both internal and external audiences. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Coordinated Strategic Strike Package with Ground Offensive under Cover of Diversion Narrative & Political Pressure (Retained from previous ISR): Russia executes a highly coordinated, large-scale combined arms offensive, potentially targeting the Pokrovsk axis or a renewed thrust from the north. This would involve:
  1. A massed strike of ballistic and cruise missiles in conjunction with loitering munitions against critical Ukrainian C2, logistics, and major AD sites across the entire operational depth, aimed at achieving temporary air superiority and operational paralysis, capitalizing on the psychological impact of perceived Western aid withdrawal.
  2. Simultaneous major ground offensives on multiple axes, capitalizing on the psychological impact of perceived Western aid diversion and the physical degradation of Ukrainian command and control.
  3. This would be synchronized with an unprecedented surge in Russian IO, including fabricated "false flag" events in Ukraine or neighboring countries to justify the escalation and reinforce the narrative of Western impotence and Ukrainian collapse, especially on the back of amplified claims of aid cessation. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 1-6 hours):
  • ISR: Continue to prioritize collection to verify or refute the "The Telegraph" claim regarding US military aid cessation. Monitor for any renewed drone activity after the current lull. Continue real-time tracking of Russian milblogger and state media channels for new narratives or amplification of existing ones, particularly regarding Western aid, Middle East developments, and new "combat footage."
  • IO: Commanders must continue preparation for a robust counter-narrative to the "US stops aid to Ukraine" claim. Ukrainian channels should highlight the successful neutralization of the recent air threat to maintain public confidence.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• GAP 1: VERIFICATION OF "THE TELEGRAPH" REPORT ON US AID CESSATION (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE, HYPER-PRIORITY): Independent, all-source verification of the "The Telegraph" report amplified by Russian sources regarding the cessation of US military aid to Ukraine. Assess the type, quantity, and operational impact of any such claims on Ukrainian defense capabilities.
  • COLLECTION REQUIREMENT (CR): Prioritize SIGINT, OSINT (direct source review of "The Telegraph" article for context, content, and accuracy), IMINT, and HUMINT from US, NATO, and Ukrainian sources to confirm or refute these reports. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 2: VERIFICATION OF IRANIAN STRIKE ON WEIZMANN INSTITUTE (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE): Independent, all-source verification of the claim propagated by Colonelcassad regarding an Iranian missile strike on the Weizmann Institute in Tel Aviv, specifically its alleged link to a nuclear program. Assess the TASS report of seismic activity near an Iranian nuclear facility for any connection.
  • CR: Prioritize SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT from Israeli, US, and regional sources. Monitor for satellite imagery confirmation or denial of damage. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 3: BDA OF OREL STRIKES & UKRAINIAN INVOLVEMENT (HIGH): Determine the full extent of damage from reported explosions in Orel, Russia, and confirm Ukrainian operational involvement and method of strike (e.g., drone type).
  • CR: Prioritize OSINT (local reports, social media, imagery), and HUMINT to ascertain impact and attribution. (PRIORITY: HIGH).
• GAP 4: RUSSIAN INTENT & FORCE DISPOSITION ON NORTHERN AXIS (CRITICAL): Verification of reports of Russian troop movements to Belarus.
  • CR: Prioritize IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT on Russian force composition, logistics build-up, and intent on the Belarus border. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 5: UKRAINIAN BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA) FROM RECENT DEEP STRIKES (CRITICAL): Full extent of damage and operational impact from recent Russian deep strikes on Ukrainian C2 and ammunition depots (e.g., "Lugansk" OTG KP, 36th Marine Bde KP, 142nd Mech Bde ammo depot).
  • CR: Prioritize HUMINT from affected units, OSINT (local reports, social media analysis), and IMINT (satellite imagery analysis if available) to determine operational impact and identify vulnerabilities. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 6: NATURE OF RUSSIA-AZERBAIJAN LOGISTICAL CHANNEL (CRITICAL): Full scope and purpose of the new transit route via Baku. Is this a one-off evacuation or the establishment of a strategic corridor for personnel and/or materiel from Iran?
  • CR: Prioritize HUMINT and SIGINT on Russia-Iran-Azerbaijan diplomatic and logistical interactions. Monitor for increased cargo or personnel movements along this route beyond stated purposes. (PRIORITY: HIGH).
• GAP 7: CLARIFICATION ON COLONELCASSAD'S DRONE COMPILATION (MEDIUM, NEW): Determine if the compilation of drone footage includes misattributed Ukrainian combat footage or if the source analysis was inaccurate. Clarify the specific origin of all clips.
  • CR: OSINT analysis of "Parabellum" and "ГРУППА ЗЛОГО" channels to confirm original sources of video clips. (PRIORITY: MEDIUM).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR, HUMINT, OSINT critical):

  1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE VERIFICATION OF "THE TELEGRAPH" AID CESSATION CLAIM. All-source intelligence must rapidly confirm or refute the Russian-amplified report on US military aid cessation. This is the single most critical collection requirement for the next 6-12 hours, as it directly impacts morale and international support. (Supports CR 1).
  2. CRITICAL PRIORITY: VERIFY IRANIAN STRIKE ON WEIZMANN INSTITUTE AND LINK TO SEISMIC REPORTS. Rapidly confirm or deny the alleged Iranian strike on a sensitive Israeli nuclear-related site and assess the TASS seismic report for any connection. This is a highly escalatory disinformation narrative that needs immediate debunking if false. (Supports CR 2).
  3. IMMEDIATE: ASSESS BDA OF OREL STRIKES & UKRAINIAN INVOLVEMENT. If Ukrainian forces were involved, leverage this for strategic messaging (see IO below). If not, understand the source and impact for defensive planning. (Supports CR 3).
  4. CRITICAL PRIORITY: INTENSIFY ISR ON POKROVSK, KHARKIV-KUPYANSK, SUMY, DNIPROPETROVSK AXES, AND NORTHERN BORDER WITH BELARUS. Maintain continuous monitoring for any signs of Russian force buildup or offensive preparations. (Supports CR 4).
  5. URGENT: ASSESS BDA OF RECENT C2/LOGISTICS STRIKES. GUR/SBU to conduct immediate, granular battle damage assessment (BDA) for the "Lugansk" OTG KP, 36th Marine Bde KP, and 142nd Mech Bde ammo depot strikes. Identify systemic vulnerabilities and develop immediate counter-measures. (Supports CR 5).
  6. IMMEDIATE: MONITOR AND EXPLOIT RUSSIAN IO NARRATIVES (ESPECIALLY ON WESTERN AID CESSATION & MIDDLE EAST "EFFECTIVE STRIKES" / "INSTABILITY"). Actively monitor for and analyze new Russian IO narratives, particularly those claiming reduced/stopped Western aid to Ukraine or exaggerating Middle East "successes" or "incidents." (Supports CR 1, 2).
  7. CLARIFY DRONE FOOTAGE ATTRIBUTION. Expedite analysis of Colonelcassad's drone compilation to confirm the origin and attribution of all clips, particularly if any Ukrainian combat footage was included or misattributed. (Supports CR 7).
  8. CONTINUOUS COUNTER-SABOTAGE INTELLIGENCE & INTERNAL SECURITY MONITORING. (Supports CR 6).

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. MAINTAIN HIGHEST AIR DEFENSE READINESS ACROSS ALL OBLASTS. Despite the current lull in Kyiv, anticipate Russia may increase the intensity or breadth of aerial attacks (UAVs and ballistic missiles, KABs) to capitalize on global distraction and the IO narrative of Western aid cessation. Ensure layered AD coverage for critical infrastructure and population centers.
  2. ADAPT TO WIDER GEOGRAPHIC DRONE THREAT & COUNTER DEEP DRONE STRIKES. Implement and refine TTPs to counter widespread, multi-axis Shahed attacks. Prioritize resources for defending critical C2 nodes and ammunition depots against confirmed Russian deep drone strikes.
  3. ENHANCE ACTIVE DEFENSE MEASURES: Consider increasing the frequency and range of proactive long-range strikes against Russian launch sites, logistics hubs, and military infrastructure in response to their persistent deep strikes on Ukrainian territory. (Linked to CR 3).

• Ground Forces:

  1. MAINTAIN DISCIPLINED DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN POKROVSK, KHARKIV-KUPYANSK, SUMY, DNIPROPETROVSK, AND NORTHERN BORDER DIRECTIONS. Prioritize strong defensive lines.
  2. REVIEW AND REHEARSE CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS (COOP) PLANS. Due to recent successful deep strikes on C2 nodes, all units must immediately review and rehearse COOP plans, ensuring redundant communication pathways and alternate command posts are ready.

• Information Operations (IO):

  1. IMMEDIATE & AGGRESSIVE: COUNTER RUSSIAN NARRATIVES ON "US AID CESSATION" & MIDDLE EAST "SUCCESSES." Proactively and forcefully counter the narrative (originating from "The Telegraph" via TASS) that the US is stopping aid. If false, debunk unequivocally. If there are any legitimate reallocations, frame it within the context of adaptive, ongoing support, emphasizing the sustained long-term commitment. Immediately debunk the false claim of an Iranian strike on the Weizmann Institute. Emphasize that Russia seeks to destabilize both regions to exhaust Western resources.
  2. LEVERAGE POTENTIAL OREL STRIKES: If Ukrainian involvement in the Orel explosions is confirmed, use this information strategically to demonstrate Ukrainian offensive capabilities and the cost to Russia of its aggression, countering the narrative of Western aid drying up.
  3. RAPID DEBUNKING OF MISINFORMATION. Maintain rapid response to immediately debunk unverified and sensationalized claims propagated by Russian state media and milbloggers (e.g., Iranian AD successes over Tehran, fabricated Israeli/US actions, internal Iranian issues).
  4. PROMOTE UKRAINIAN RESILIENCE & AD SUCCESSES: Highlight ongoing Ukrainian AD operations and any successful intercepts to reassure the public and international partners of continued defensive capabilities.
  5. COUNTER PSYCHOLOGICAL DEGRADATION EFFORTS. Respond to minor, derogatory narratives (e.g., Lutsk comment) by reinforcing Ukrainian national identity and resilience, without giving undue attention.

• Diplomatic/Inter-Agency:

  1. IMMEDIATE & PROACTIVE: ENGAGE KEY PARTNERS ON SUSTAINED SUPPORT AND COUNTERING RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC MANIPULATION AND AID NARRATIVES. Ukrainian diplomatic missions should immediately engage with US, EU, and other key partners to address "The Telegraph" report on aid cessation. Seek clarification and a unified, strong public message of continued robust support. Emphasize that such narratives are deliberate Russian attempts to sow discord and undermine support.
  2. COORDINATE WITH ALLIES ON IO STRATEGY: Coordinate closely with allied IO agencies to ensure a unified and consistent counter-narrative to Russian disinformation, particularly regarding aid and global conflict.
  3. INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF CIVILIAN TARGETING. Continue to highlight Russian drone strikes on civilian targets (e.g., Obukhiv District, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhzhia) to maintain international pressure and secure further AD assistance.