Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME OF REPORT: 16 JUN 25 / 00:00 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 15 JUN 25 / 23:23 ZULU - 16 JUN 25 / 00:00 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // ORCON // NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Ukraine Operational Area:
  • Continued Russian drone activity observed. Ukrainian Air Force (AF) reports indicate ongoing drone movements (AFU, 23:45Z, 23:47Z). "Mykolaiv Vanek" also reports "remains of mopeds" (23:27Z), implying successful Ukrainian Air Defense (AD) engagements or debris from previous attacks. This confirms the ongoing nature of Russian deep strike operations targeting diverse operational rear areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • New: Reports from Russian social media (РБК-Україна, 23:23Z) indicate multiple explosions over Orel city, Russia, with local channels reporting AD activity near a local oil refinery (НПЗ). This suggests potential Ukrainian long-range drone strikes into Russian territory. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM for Ukrainian involvement, HIGH for explosions/AD in Orel).
• International Operational Area:
  • The Israel-Iran situation remains a focal point for Russian information operations (IO). Colonelcassad continues to amplify claims attributed to Trump regarding a likely Israel-Iran ceasefire (23:27Z). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • New: Colonelcassad propagates a new, unverified claim from "American journalist Mike Blumenthal" that a facility in the Weizmann Institute in Tel Aviv, associated with the Israeli nuclear program, was struck by an Iranian missile. This claim includes a reference to FBI viewing it as a theoretical nuclear weapons development site (23:36Z). This is a significant escalation of Russian IO regarding the Israel-Iran conflict, attempting to frame Iran's actions as effective and targeting sensitive Israeli assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian amplification; LOW for veracity of the claim).
  • New: Colonelcassad also introduces a narrative claiming "90% of strikes on Iran today and now are the result of actions of INTERNAL elements" (23:49Z), attempting to shift blame for attacks within Iran to internal factors rather than external actors. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian amplification; LOW for veracity of the claim).
  • New: "Операция Z" (Russian milblogger) is widely disseminating a report from "The Telegraph" (UK source) stating "Washington is stopping military aid to Ukraine: Trump's course for peace talks instead of weapons" (23:49Z). This is a direct and aggressive amplification of the narrative regarding Western aid cessation, leveraging a Western media source (albeit selectively quoted or misrepresented) to add false credibility. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian amplification; LOW for veracity of The Telegraph's interpretation/accuracy).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• Night operations continue, evidenced by drone strikes and reported AD activity. No new specific weather or environmental factors affecting operations in this immediate reporting period.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces: Actively engaging Russian drone threats. Potential long-range strike capabilities into Russian territory demonstrated by reports from Orel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for AD; MEDIUM for Orel strike).
• Russian Forces: Sustaining deep strike operations with loitering munitions. Russian IO continues to exploit and amplify global events, particularly the Israel-Iran situation, and disseminate narratives detrimental to Ukrainian support, now with increased aggressiveness and specificity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RUSSIA FOCUSED)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA):

• Capabilities (Russia):
  • Persistent Deep Strike: Demonstrated capability to conduct widespread drone strikes across Ukrainian territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Sophisticated Information Warfare (CRITICAL ESCALATION): Highly adaptive, rapid, and now demonstrably more aggressive and specific information campaign. Russia is now attempting to weaponize specific, unverified claims (e.g., Iranian strike on Israeli nuclear facility) and misrepresent Western media (e.g., The Telegraph on US aid cessation) to shape narratives beneficial to Moscow. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Strategic Distraction: Capable of generating and amplifying global instability narratives to divert Western attention and resources from Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions (Russia):
  • Degrade Ukrainian AD & Logistics: Continue drone strikes to exhaust Ukrainian air defense resources and disrupt rear area logistics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Undermine Western Support to Ukraine (CRITICAL): Intensify efforts to promote narratives of Western resource diversion and aid reduction, now directly citing Western media (even if misrepresented) to create doubt and disunity among allies supporting Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Project Global Relevance & Control Narratives: Position Russia as a key player in global crises and a counter-balance to perceived Western hegemonic decline. Actively seeks to control the narrative around complex events like the Israel-Iran conflict. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Courses of Action (COA) (Russia):
  • COA 1 (Sustained Deep Strikes & AD Attrition): Continue high-volume drone attacks across Ukrainian operational depth, aiming to deplete AD munitions and force redeployments, while simultaneously targeting critical infrastructure and C2 nodes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • COA 2 (Accelerated, Specific Narrative of Western Weakness & Resource Diversion - CRITICAL): Intensify information operations, now leveraging specific, often unverified or misrepresented, claims (e.g., "The Telegraph" on US aid, Iranian strike on Israeli nuclear facility) to aggressively promote the narrative that Western nations are diminishing or diverting military aid from Ukraine, thus signaling diminished support and weakening Ukrainian resolve. This COA is becoming more targeted and potentially more damaging due to its specificity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • COA 3 (Exaggeration of Middle East Conflict Resolution to Focus on Ukraine, with Russia as Beneficiary): Amplify any statements or developments suggesting a de-escalation or ceasefire in the Middle East, immediately pivoting focus back to Ukraine while maintaining the narrative that Western attention and resources were successfully diverted or exhausted, and implicitly, that Russia's global standing has improved. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Wider Geographic Scope of Drone Attacks: Drone activity reported in Khmelnytskyi and Zaporizhzhia oblasts (previous ISR), in addition to ongoing generalized alerts, suggests a broad targeting strategy to stretch Ukrainian AD. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Aggressive & Specific Narrative Control (CRITICAL): Rapid amplification of external reports (e.g., CNN, Trump) now includes direct misrepresentation or selective quoting of Western media ("The Telegraph") and the propagation of specific, unverified tactical claims (Iranian strike on Weizmann Institute). This demonstrates a more aggressive and potentially more damaging proactive effort to control the narrative regarding Western aid and global conflicts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Continued widespread Shahed drone strikes indicate sustained production or procurement and deployment capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• The continued "remains of mopeds" reporting (Mykolaiv Vanek, 23:27Z) indicates ongoing successful Ukrainian AD interception, leading to Russian platform attrition. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). No new information regarding ground force logistics.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian Military C2: Effective in coordinating multi-regional drone strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian IO/Diplomatic C2: Highly agile, aggressive, and effective in responding to real-time events and shaping narratives, now employing more specific and potentially damaging claims. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UKRAINIAN FOCUSED)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Ukrainian Air Defense forces remain on high alert and are actively engaging incoming drone threats in multiple oblasts. This demonstrates continued vigilance and operational readiness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• New: Reports of explosions and AD activity over Orel, Russia, suggest Ukrainian forces retain and potentially employ long-range strike capabilities, possibly targeting Russian infrastructure. This indicates an adaptive and proactive offensive posture. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Success (AD): Continued successful engagement of Russian drones (Mykolaiv Vanek, 23:27Z) demonstrates effective AD operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Potential Success (Long-Range Strike): The reported explosions in Orel, Russia, indicate potential successful Ukrainian long-range strike operations against Russian territory. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Setback (Information Warfare Challenge - CRITICAL): The "The Telegraph" report amplified by Russian milbloggers regarding "Washington stopping military aid to Ukraine" creates a significant information challenge and potential perceived setback for Ukrainian forces by directly implying a reduction in critical Western support, leveraging a seemingly credible Western source. This is a higher-impact narrative than generic claims of aid diversion. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for narrative impact).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• The persistence of drone attacks across multiple regions highlights the critical and ongoing need for robust, layered air defense systems and munitions. The intensifying narrative of aid cessation (now directly citing Western media) will create significant political and material constraints if not effectively countered. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives (CRITICAL - HIGHLY ACTIVE, AGGRESSIVE & MANIPULATIVE):
  • "US Stops Aid to Ukraine" (NEW, HIGH IMPACT, SPECIFIC): The amplification of "The Telegraph" report by "Операция Z" is a critical, new, and highly impactful narrative designed to sow panic and undermine confidence in Western support. This is a direct, seemingly credible (due to the source attribution) attack on Western unity and Ukrainian morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for intent and impact).
  • "Iran's Effective Strikes on Israeli Nuclear Sites" (NEW & HIGH IMPACT): Colonelcassad's promotion of the unverified claim about an Iranian missile strike on the Weizmann Institute (linked to Israeli nuclear program) is a significant escalation. It aims to portray Iran as highly capable, amplify regional instability, and potentially justify future Russian/Iranian cooperation against perceived Western interests. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for intent).
  • "Internal Elements Causing Iranian Attacks": Colonelcassad's narrative (23:49Z) attempting to blame "internal elements" for attacks on Iran is a diversionary tactic, likely aimed at absolving external actors (e.g., Israel) and muddling the information space. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for intent).
  • "Middle East De-escalation" (Trump Amplification): Continued amplification of Trump's statements on potential Israel-Iran ceasefire, likely aiming to redirect global focus back to Ukraine but on terms favorable to Russia (i.e., with Ukraine perceived as abandoned). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Counter-Narratives: Ukrainian Air Force and Oblasts report ongoing drone threats and AD operations, providing real-time transparency and countering Russian narratives of air supremacy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Potential Ukrainian strikes into Russia, if confirmed and publicized, could serve as a counter-narrative of Ukrainian offensive capability. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: The widespread drone attacks across multiple regions continue to test public morale. The aggressive and specific narrative of US aid cessation (via "The Telegraph" report) poses a significant risk to Ukrainian public confidence and could sow deep doubt and fear regarding the long-term sustainability of Western support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Morale: Russian IO aims to boost domestic morale by portraying Russia as a globally relevant power capable of influencing major international crises and by suggesting Western support for Ukraine is fragile and actively collapsing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• The "The Telegraph" report amplified by Russian media, regardless of its veracity, could severely impact international perceptions of the longevity and commitment of support to Ukraine. This is a critical development to monitor and aggressively counter. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). The new narratives regarding the Israel-Iran conflict also seek to further polarize international opinion and strain alliances. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Intensified Psychological & Resource Attrition through Deep Strikes: Russia will sustain and potentially increase the volume and geographical spread of Shahed drone attacks across Ukraine, targeting critical infrastructure, C2 nodes, and population centers, aiming to deplete Ukrainian AD munitions and personnel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Aggressive, Targeted Narrative Campaign on Western Aid Cessation/Diversion: Russia will launch an even more concerted, multi-platform information campaign to amplify reports (credible or not, and increasingly using misrepresented Western sources like "The Telegraph") of Western military aid being stopped or diverted from Ukraine. This campaign will aim to create a sense of abandonment, undermine Ukrainian morale, and fracture Western unity. This will be the primary focus of Russian IO in the immediate term. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Escalated Middle East Disinformation: Russia will continue to propagate unverified and inflammatory claims regarding the Israel-Iran conflict (e.g., Iranian strikes on sensitive Israeli sites, internal instability in Iran) to maintain global distraction and portray itself as a key influencer or beneficiary of regional chaos. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Coordinated Strategic Strike Package with Ground Offensive under Cover of Diversion Narrative & Political Pressure: Russia executes a highly coordinated, large-scale combined arms offensive, potentially targeting the Pokrovsk axis or a renewed thrust from the north. This would involve:
  1. A massed strike of ballistic and cruise missiles in conjunction with loitering munitions against critical Ukrainian C2, logistics, and major AD sites across the entire operational depth, aimed at achieving temporary air superiority and operational paralysis, capitalizing on the psychological impact of perceived Western aid withdrawal.
  2. Simultaneous major ground offensives on multiple axes, capitalizing on the psychological impact of perceived Western aid diversion and the physical degradation of Ukrainian command and control.
  3. This would be synchronized with an unprecedented surge in Russian IO, including fabricated "false flag" events in Ukraine or neighboring countries to justify the escalation and reinforce the narrative of Western impotence and Ukrainian collapse, especially on the back of amplified claims of aid cessation. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 1-6 hours):
  • ISR: CRITICAL: Prioritize collection to verify or refute the "The Telegraph" claim regarding US military aid cessation to Ukraine. This is paramount. Monitor for any corroborating or contradictory evidence from credible Western sources. Continue real-time tracking of drone movements and Ukrainian AD engagements. Monitor Russian milblogger and state media channels for new narratives or amplification of existing ones, particularly regarding Western aid and Middle East developments. Prioritize BDA for the reported Orel explosions.
  • IO: Commanders must prepare for an immediate, robust, and evidence-based counter-narrative to the "US stops aid to Ukraine" claim. This must be debunked immediately and forcefully if false. Ukrainian channels should highlight any successful AD engagements and potential offensive actions (e.g., Orel) to maintain public confidence and demonstrate continued capability.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• GAP 1: VERIFICATION OF "THE TELEGRAPH" REPORT ON US AID CESSATION (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE, HYPER-PRIORITY NEW GAP): Independent, all-source verification of the "The Telegraph" report amplified by Russian sources regarding the cessation of US military aid to Ukraine. Assess the type, quantity, and operational impact of any such claims on Ukrainian defense capabilities.

  • COLLECTION REQUIREMENT (CR): Prioritize SIGINT, OSINT (direct source review of "The Telegraph" article for context, content, and accuracy), IMINT, and HUMINT from US, NATO, and Ukrainian sources to confirm or refute these reports. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).

• GAP 2: VERIFICATION OF IRANIAN STRIKE ON WEIZMANN INSTITUTE (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE, NEW GAP): Independent, all-source verification of the claim propagated by Colonelcassad regarding an Iranian missile strike on the Weizmann Institute in Tel Aviv, specifically its alleged link to a nuclear program.

  • CR: Prioritize SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT from Israeli, US, and regional sources. Monitor for satellite imagery confirmation or denial of damage. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).

• GAP 3: BDA OF OREL STRIKES & UKRAINIAN INVOLVEMENT (HIGH, NEW GAP): Determine the full extent of damage from reported explosions in Orel, Russia, and confirm Ukrainian operational involvement and method of strike (e.g., drone type).

  • CR: Prioritize OSINT (local reports, social media, imagery), and HUMINT to ascertain impact and attribution. (PRIORITY: HIGH).

• GAP 4: RUSSIAN INTENT & FORCE DISPOSITION ON NORTHERN AXIS (CRITICAL - REINFORCED): Verification of reports of Russian troop movements to Belarus.

  • CR: Prioritize IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT on Russian force composition, logistics build-up, and intent on the Belarus border. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).

• GAP 5: UKRAINIAN BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA) FROM RECENT DEEP STRIKES (CRITICAL - REINFORCED): Full extent of damage and operational impact from recent Russian deep strikes on Ukrainian C2 and ammunition depots (e.g., "Lugansk" OTG KP, 36th Marine Bde KP, 142nd Mech Bde ammo depot).

  • CR: Prioritize HUMINT from affected units, OSINT (local reports, social media analysis), and IMINT (satellite imagery analysis if available) to determine operational impact and identify vulnerabilities. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).

• GAP 6: NATURE OF RUSSIA-AZERBAIJAN LOGISTICAL CHANNEL (CRITICAL - REINFORCED): Full scope and purpose of the new transit route via Baku. Is this a one-off evacuation or the establishment of a strategic corridor for personnel and/or materiel from Iran?

  • CR: Prioritize HUMINT and SIGINT on Russia-Iran-Azerbaijan diplomatic and logistical interactions. Monitor for increased cargo or personnel movements along this route beyond stated purposes. (PRIORITY: HIGH).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR, HUMINT, OSINT critical):

  1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE VERIFICATION OF "THE TELEGRAPH" AID CESSATION CLAIM. All-source intelligence must rapidly confirm or refute the Russian-amplified report on US military aid cessation. This is the single most critical collection requirement for the next 6-12 hours, as it directly impacts morale and international support. (Supports CR 1).
  2. CRITICAL PRIORITY: VERIFY IRANIAN STRIKE ON WEIZMANN INSTITUTE. Rapidly confirm or deny the alleged Iranian strike on a sensitive Israeli nuclear-related site. This is a highly escalatory disinformation narrative that needs immediate debunking if false. (Supports CR 2).
  3. IMMEDIATE: ASSESS BDA OF OREL STRIKES & UKRAINIAN INVOLVEMENT. If Ukrainian forces were involved, leverage this for strategic messaging (see IO below). If not, understand the source and impact for defensive planning. (Supports CR 3).
  4. CRITICAL PRIORITY: INTENSIFY ISR ON POKROVSK, KHARKIV-KUPYANSK, SUMY, DNIPROPETROVSK AXES, AND NORTHERN BORDER WITH BELARUS. Maintain continuous monitoring for any signs of Russian force buildup or offensive preparations. (Supports CR 4).
  5. URGENT: ASSESS BDA OF RECENT C2/LOGISTICS STRIKES. GUR/SBU to conduct immediate, granular battle damage assessment (BDA) for the "Lugansk" OTG KP, 36th Marine Bde KP, and 142nd Mech Bde ammo depot strikes. Identify systemic vulnerabilities and develop immediate counter-measures. (Supports CR 5).
  6. IMMEDIATE: MONITOR AND EXPLOIT RUSSIAN IO NARRATIVES (ESPECIALLY ON WESTERN AID CESSATION & MIDDLE EAST "EFFECTIVE STRIKES"). Actively monitor for and analyze new Russian IO narratives, particularly those claiming reduced/stopped Western aid to Ukraine or exaggerating Middle East "successes." (Supports CR 1, 2).
  7. CONTINUOUS COUNTER-SABOTAGE INTELLIGENCE & INTERNAL SECURITY MONITORING. (Supports CR 6).

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. MAINTAIN HIGHEST AIR DEFENSE READINESS ACROSS ALL OBLASTS, ESPECIALLY KYIV, KHARKIV, DONETSK, ZAPORIZHZHYA, SUMY, KHMLNYTSKYI, AND DNIPROPETROVSK. Anticipate Russia may increase the intensity or breadth of aerial attacks (UAVs and ballistic missiles, KABs) to capitalize on global distraction and the IO narrative of Western aid cessation. Ensure layered AD coverage for critical infrastructure and population centers.
  2. ADAPT TO WIDER GEOGRAPHIC DRONE THREAT & COUNTER DEEP DRONE STRIKES. Implement and refine TTPs to counter widespread, multi-axis Shahed attacks. Prioritize resources for defending critical C2 nodes and ammunition depots against confirmed Russian deep drone strikes.
  3. ENHANCE ACTIVE DEFENSE MEASURES: Consider increasing the frequency and range of proactive long-range strikes against Russian launch sites, logistics hubs, and military infrastructure in response to their persistent deep strikes on Ukrainian territory. (Linked to CR 3).

• Ground Forces:

  1. MAINTAIN DISCIPLINED DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN POKROVSK, KHARKIV-KUPYANSK, SUMY, DNIPROPETROVSK, AND NORTHERN BORDER DIRECTIONS. Prioritize strong defensive lines.
  2. REVIEW AND REHEARSE CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS (COOP) PLANS. Due to recent successful deep strikes on C2 nodes, all units must immediately review and rehearse COOP plans, ensuring redundant communication pathways and alternate command posts are ready.

• Information Operations (IO):

  1. IMMEDIATE & AGGRESSIVE: COUNTER RUSSIAN NARRATIVES ON "US AID CESSATION" & MIDDLE EAST "SUCCESSES." Proactively and forcefully counter the narrative (originating from "The Telegraph" via TASS) that the US is stopping aid. If false, debunk unequivocally. If there are any legitimate reallocations, frame it within the context of adaptive, ongoing support, emphasizing the sustained long-term commitment. Immediately debunk the false claim of an Iranian strike on the Weizmann Institute. Emphasize that Russia seeks to destabilize both regions to exhaust Western resources.
  2. LEVERAGE POTENTIAL OREL STRIKES: If Ukrainian involvement in the Orel explosions is confirmed, use this information strategically to demonstrate Ukrainian offensive capabilities and the cost to Russia of its aggression, countering the narrative of Western aid drying up.
  3. RAPID DEBUNKING OF MISINFORMATION. Maintain rapid response to immediately debunk unverified and sensationalized claims propagated by Russian state media and milbloggers (e.g., Iranian AD successes over Tehran, fabricated Israeli/US actions, internal Iranian issues).
  4. PROMOTE UKRAINIAN RESILIENCE & AD SUCCESSES: Highlight ongoing Ukrainian AD operations and any successful intercepts to reassure the public and international partners of continued defensive capabilities.

• Diplomatic/Inter-Agency:

  1. IMMEDIATE & PROACTIVE: ENGAGE KEY PARTNERS ON SUSTAINED SUPPORT AND COUNTERING RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC MANIPULATION AND AID NARRATIVES. Ukrainian diplomatic missions should immediately engage with US, EU, and other key partners to address "The Telegraph" report on aid cessation. Seek clarification and a unified, strong public message of continued robust support. Emphasize that such narratives are deliberate Russian attempts to sow discord and undermine support.
  2. COORDINATE WITH ALLIES ON IO STRATEGY: Coordinate closely with allied IO agencies to ensure a unified and consistent counter-narrative to Russian disinformation, particularly regarding aid and global conflict.
  3. INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF CIVILIAN TARGETING. Continue to highlight Russian drone strikes on civilian targets (e.g., Obukhiv District, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhzhia) to maintain international pressure and secure further AD assistance.