Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME OF REPORT: 12 JUN 25 / 10:20 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 12 JUN 25 / 10:11 ZULU - 12 JUN 25 / 10:20 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET / ORCON / NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk Oblast - Pokrovsk Direction):
  • NO CHANGE: Russian sources (Dva Mayora) release drone footage claiming to be from the Pokrovsk direction, showing destruction of armored vehicles and a building. This aligns with Ukrainian General Staff reports of continued clashes in this sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • NO CHANGE: Russian MoD (via TASS) claims liberation of Petrovskoye and Alekseevka in DNR. This is likely referring to villages within the broader Donetsk Oblast, potentially near the Pokrovsk or Toretsk directions. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk Oblast - General):
  • NO CHANGE: Ukrainian National Police (via Operatyvnyi ZSU) reports 2 fatalities from shelling in Donetsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • NO CHANGE: Russian milblogger "Воин DV" claims 29th Combined Arms Army destroyed a UAV control point near Yalta (likely in Donetsk Oblast, not Crimea), four Ukrainian personnel deployment points (Zirka, Piddubne, Tolstoye), two pickups, three "Baba Yaga" hexacopters, a tank, and an armored vehicle. (CONFIDENCE: LOW).
• Eastern Ukraine (Kharkiv Oblast - General):
  • NO CHANGE: DeepState (via Tsaplienko) claims Russian forces occupied Dvorichna and advanced near Dovhenke. This indicates continued Russian pressure and localized gains in Kharkiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Southern Ukraine (Kherson Oblast - Kherson City):
  • NO CHANGE: Russian milblogger Colonelcassad posts video claiming a Russian flag-carrying drone flew over "enemy-occupied Kherson" and installed a flag on a city building. This is a clear information operation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Southern Ukraine (Odesa Oblast):
  • NO CHANGE: Ukrainian Office of Prosecutor General and Operatyvnyi ZSU report a terrorist act near a Military Law Enforcement unit in Odesa Oblast, and the detention of a woman who made the explosive device. This indicates internal security threats and hybrid operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Border Regions (Bryansk Oblast):
  • NO CHANGE: Russian source AV Bogomaz reports strong precipitation, thunderstorms, hail, and wind gusts (15-18 m/s) for June 13 in Bryansk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Border Regions (Belgorod Oblast):
  • NO CHANGE: ASTRA reports 3 casualties (including a child) from Ukrainian attack in Belgorod Oblast, citing the governor. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• International Incidents (India):
  • UPDATE: TASS reports the Air India Boeing 787 Dreamliner crashed into a doctors' dormitory. Previously reported casualty figures remain unclarified by new messages. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • NO MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE: This remains a civilian incident, with minimal military implications beyond potential for IO manipulation.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• Forecasted severe weather (strong precipitation, thunderstorms, hail, high winds) in Bryansk Oblast for June 13 could significantly impact Russian ground and air operations in this sector, potentially reducing UAV and aviation activity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Current conditions generally permit air activity across various front lines as evidenced by continued KAB strikes and drone operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces:
  • Defensive and Counter-offensive Actions: Continues to repel Russian attacks and conduct deep strikes. Localized setbacks in Kharkiv are noted, but overall defensive lines hold. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal Security Operations: Successful SBU operation in Odesa Oblast highlights ongoing counter-subversion efforts. NEW: Dnipropetrovsk ODA (Serhiy Lysak) reports continued efforts to counter Russian intelligence services recruiting Ukrainian youth for arson, terrorist acts, or information leaks. This confirms persistent Russian hybrid threats targeting critical internal stability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Logistical Reinforcement: Significant delivery of white Toyota Hilux pickup trucks to Ukrainian defenders (e.g., 92nd Mechanized Brigade) boosts tactical mobility. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • UAV Capability: Ukrainian forces demonstrate continued proficiency in offensive drone operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces:
  • Continued Ground Pressure: Active on multiple axes, with specific claims of advances in Donetsk and Kharkiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Hybrid Operations: Deployment of "ждуни" (waiting drones) in Sumy Oblast indicates an adaptation in Russian drone tactics. NEW: Persistent efforts to recruit Ukrainian youth for sabotage and intelligence gathering in rear areas (Dnipropetrovsk) underscore the breadth of Russian hybrid warfare. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Air-Ground Integration: Claims of destroying Ukrainian UAV control points and "Baba Yaga" hexacopters. (CONFIDENCE: LOW-MEDIUM).
  • Logistical Challenges/Volunteer Reliance: Russian artillery reconnaissance unit expressing gratitude for donated civilian generators highlights reliance on volunteer networks for essential non-lethal equipment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Operations: Continued heavy focus on "Russia Day" celebrations with patriotic events, and claims of Russian advances/Ukrainian losses. The drone footage over Kherson is a direct PSYOP. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal Affairs: Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs declared former "Golos" coordinator Inna Karezina and "Vot Tak" editor Sergey Kovalchenko wanted. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA):

• Capabilities:
  • Hybrid Drone Tactics: Demonstrated capability to deploy "loitering/waiting" drones. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Persistent Ground Offensive: Maintains capability for multi-axis ground assaults. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Propaganda & PSYOPS: Highly effective at producing and disseminating propaganda to bolster domestic support and demoralize Ukrainian population. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal Security Enforcement & Subversion: Capability to pursue and arrest political opponents and alleged saboteurs, and to actively recruit and direct agents (youth for arson/terrorist acts) within Ukrainian territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions:
  • Consolidate Territorial Gains: Primary intent remains to secure and expand control over occupied territories. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Degrade Ukrainian Combat Effectiveness: Continued kinetic operations and targeting of C2 aims to reduce Ukrainian fighting capacity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Undermine Ukrainian Stability (Deep Rear): Hybrid operations (terrorism in Odesa, drone tactics in Sumy, and youth recruitment in Dnipropetrovsk) are intended to create insecurity, disrupt logistics/morale, and create internal unrest far from the frontlines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Boost Domestic Morale & Legitimacy: Propaganda efforts, especially around "Russia Day," are designed to rally internal support and project an image of strength and unity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Courses of Action (COA):
  • COA 1 (Sustained Attritional Offensives): Russia will continue high-tempo, attritional ground assaults on existing frontlines (Donetsk, Kharkiv), supported by KABs and adapted drone tactics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • COA 2 (Enhanced Hybrid Operations & Subversion): Russia will increase the deployment of "waiting drones" and similar adaptive UAV tactics, especially in border regions. CRITICAL: Russia will intensify efforts to recruit and direct agents (including youth) for sabotage, arson, and information gathering in Ukrainian rear areas, particularly in key oblasts like Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • COA 3 (Information Dominance & Internal Cohesion): Russia will continue to heavily promote nationalistic narratives ("Russia Day"), propagate claims of Ukrainian losses and internal instability, while actively suppressing domestic dissent. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• "Waiting Drones" (Дрони-«ждуни»): This new Russian drone tactic in Sumy Oblast indicates an adaptation to overcome initial Ukrainian air defense/response. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Targeting of UAV Control Points: Russian claims of destroying Ukrainian UAV C2 suggests a growing focus on degrading Ukrainian drone capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: LOW-MEDIUM).
• Hybrid Warfare in Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk: The reported terrorist act and arrest of a saboteur in Odesa, coupled with the confirmed Russian efforts to recruit Ukrainian youth for sabotage in Dnipropetrovsk, highlights ongoing Russian attempts to destabilize rear areas through clandestine means, beyond direct military engagement. This signifies a broadening and deepening of their subversion efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• The reliance of an artillery reconnaissance unit on civilian-donated generators suggests systemic gaps in the Russian military's ability to consistently supply all necessary non-lethal equipment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Overall logistics appear sufficient for current operational tempo, but with noted specific weaknesses. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian C2: Appears effective in coordinating multi-domain operations, including ground offensives, adapted drone tactics, and integrated information operations. The internal security apparatus (FSB/MVD) also demonstrates effective C2 in suppressing dissent and directing subversion efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian C2: Continues to effectively coordinate defensive operations, internal security, and offensive drone strikes. The timely reporting of Russian tactical adaptations (e.g., "waiting drones," youth recruitment) and successful SBU operations indicates effective intelligence gathering and responsive command. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Resilient Defense: Despite localized Russian advances, Ukrainian forces maintain a generally strong defensive posture. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Enhanced Tactical Mobility: The delivery of Toyota Hilux pickups significantly enhances tactical mobility. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Adaptive Drone Warfare: Ukrainian units demonstrate highly effective offensive drone capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Robust Internal Security: The SBU's successful operation in Odesa and the active counter-recruitment efforts highlighted by Dnipropetrovsk ODA underscore strong counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence capabilities, crucial for maintaining stability in rear areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes:
  • Successful SBU operation against a saboteur in Odesa. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Significant enhancement of tactical mobility for frontline units. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Continued effectiveness of Ukrainian FPV drones. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Proactive efforts by regional administrations (Dnipropetrovsk ODA) to counter Russian intelligence recruitment of youth. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setbacks:
  • Reported Russian occupation of Dvorichna and advance near Dovhenke in Kharkiv Oblast represent localized territorial losses. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Persistent Russian shelling resulting in civilian casualties in Donetsk Oblast underscores ongoing attritional pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Continued Mobility Support: Ongoing need for procurement and maintenance of tactical vehicles.
• Counter-Hybrid Capabilities (CRITICAL): Resources are urgently needed to counter evolving Russian hybrid tactics, including "waiting drones" and deepening subversion efforts like agent recruitment (youth for terror acts). This requires enhanced electronic warfare (EW) for drones, and increased intelligence-sharing and specialized training for internal security forces to detect and neutralize recruitment networks.
• Personnel Management: Sustained combat operations necessitate continuous manning efforts and robust medical/rehabilitation support.
• Air Defense Munitions: Continuous Russian air attacks maintain a high demand for air defense munitions.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives:
  • "Russia Day" Reinforcement: Continued use of "Russia Day" as a central theme for national unity and strength. NEW: Basurin о главном posts #СДНЕМРОССИИ video message, reinforcing this theme. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Territorial Gains & Ukrainian Losses: Russian MoD and milbloggers continue to claim liberation of villages and significant Ukrainian losses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Assertion of Control: The drone flying the Russian flag over Kherson. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Focus on Civilian Incidents: Continued extensive reporting on the Indian plane crash, with conflicting casualty figures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal Criticism of Ukraine: Russian milbloggers continue to mock Ukrainian leadership. NEW: Kotsnews mocks Zelenskyy comparing himself to Churchill, using derogatory language. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Propaganda of Civilian Protection (Domestic): Discussion of "safe rooms" in new apartments in Lviv framed by Russian sources as proof of Ukrainian fear/vulnerability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Product Marketing as Military Footage: Alex Parker Returns continues to post images of military-style tactical gear with explicit branding ("Marvin Tactical"), blending commercial promotion with what appears to be military content. This dilutes the information space and can be used for subtle influence operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Counter-Narratives:
  • Resilience and Effectiveness: Ukrainian General Staff and regional administrations continue to report successful defensive actions and logistical support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Highlighting Enemy Attrition: The 5th Separate Assault Kyiv Brigade's "Who Wants to Be a Millionaire" video. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Exposing Hybrid Threats: Official reporting of SBU operations (Odesa terror plot) and Dnipropetrovsk ODA's public warning about youth recruitment demonstrate Ukrainian capacity to identify and neutralize internal threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Exposing Russian Tactical Adaptations: The report of "waiting drones" in Sumy is a proactive counter-disinformation effort. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: Likely sustained by successful defensive operations, visible logistical support, and effective PSYOPs. However, civilian casualties and reported territorial losses will place pressure on morale. The increased visibility of Russian intelligence efforts to recruit Ukrainian youth for sabotage (Dnipropetrovsk ODA) will likely increase public anxiety and vigilance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Morale: Actively boosted by "Russia Day" celebrations and state propaganda. Claims of Ukrainian losses likely reinforce a sense of progress. Reliance on volunteer support for basic equipment might signal underlying issues. Internal dissent continues to be suppressed. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• NEW: TASS reports the EU Council approved duties on Russian and Belarusian agricultural products and fertilizers. This is a punitive economic measure, indicative of continued Western economic pressure on Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• No other significant new international support or diplomatic developments regarding the conflict itself were reported in this period.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Intensified Ground Pressure on Donetsk and Kharkiv Axes (Next 24-48 hours): Russia will likely continue to concentrate ground assaults, particularly on the Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and potentially the Siversk axes, building on recent claimed advances. This will be supported by heavy artillery and sustained KAB strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Expanded Hybrid Operations & Subversion (Next 24-72 hours): Russia will increase the deployment of "waiting drones" and other adaptive UAV tactics, especially in border regions. CRITICAL: Russia will intensify efforts to recruit and direct agents (including vulnerable youth) for sabotage, arson, and information gathering in Ukrainian rear areas, particularly targeting critical infrastructure and administrative centers in regions like Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Kyiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Persistent Information Campaigns (Next 24-72 hours): Russia will maintain a high tempo of information operations, leveraging national holidays for domestic support and amplifying narratives of Ukrainian military weakness and internal instability, while promoting their "liberation" claims. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Continued Internal Security Crackdown: Russia will continue to identify and prosecute individuals deemed subversive or disloyal to the state, maintaining internal control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Sustained Economic Pressure from West: The EU will likely follow through on new duties on Russian/Belarusian agricultural products, intensifying economic pressure, potentially leading to Russian countermeasures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Localized Breakthrough and Exploitation (Next 48-72 hours): Russia achieves a significant, sustained breakthrough on one of the key Donetsk axes (e.g., Pokrovsk or Toretsk), rapidly exploiting the breach with armored reserves, forcing Ukrainian forces into a significant withdrawal or costly counter-attack. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM-HIGH)
• Coordinated Hybrid Strike in Key Rear Areas (Next 24-48 hours): Russia conducts a series of coordinated hybrid attacks (e.g., targeted assassinations, major sabotage of critical infrastructure, high-impact IEDs, or mass disinformation campaigns synchronized with kinetic strikes) across multiple Ukrainian rear oblasts (e.g., Odesa, Kyiv, Dnipro, Lviv) to create widespread panic, divert military resources from the front, and demoralize the population. This could involve newly recruited local agents. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Large-Scale UAV/Missile Barrage with New Capabilities (Next 24-48 hours): Russia launches a massed, multi-wave strike using confirmed new drone types (e.g., "Geran-3" with improved speed/AI), coupled with ballistic/cruise missiles, specifically targeting Ukrainian command centers, air defense nodes, and logistics hubs to achieve strategic paralysis. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 1-3 hours):
  • CRITICAL: Monitor Pokrovsk and Toretsk axes for any signs of intensified Russian ground assaults or breakthroughs. Decision Point: Ready tactical reserves and prepare for immediate counter-fire operations if a localized breakthrough becomes imminent. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • CRITICAL: Heighten awareness and vigilance for "waiting drones" in Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts. Decision Point: Implement real-time adjustments to counter-drone TTPs, focusing on post-engagement surveillance and electronic warfare. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Short Term (Next 6-12 hours):
  • CRITICAL: Conduct immediate geolocational analysis of claimed Russian advances in Petrovskoye, Alekseevka, Dvorichna, and Dovhenke to verify claims and assess the actual extent of Russian gains. Decision Point: Adjust defensive lines and fire support plans based on confirmed enemy positions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • CRITICAL: Disseminate immediate warnings regarding Russian intelligence attempts to recruit Ukrainian youth for sabotage/terrorist acts, especially in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and other major rear areas. Emphasize vigilance among youth and parents. Decision Point: Launch public awareness campaigns immediately. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT: Prepare and disseminate immediate counter-narratives to Russian claims of "liberated" villages and exaggerated Ukrainian losses, emphasizing Ukrainian defensive successes and resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Mid Term (Next 24-72 hours):
  • Assess the impact of recent vehicle deliveries on Ukrainian unit capabilities and readiness. Decision Point: Identify additional units requiring similar mobility enhancements and prioritize future procurement. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Monitor internal Russian developments related to manpower and dissent for indicators of internal instability. Decision Point: Adjust HUMINT/OSINT collection accordingly. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Evaluate the threat posed by forecasted severe weather in Bryansk Oblast for potential impacts on Russian operations along that border. Decision Point: Adjust friendly force posture for potential changes in enemy activity. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • ECONOMIC: Monitor the implementation and impact of new EU duties on Russian/Belarusian agricultural products. Decision Point: Assess potential for Russian retaliatory economic measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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6. RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR & HUMINT critical):

  1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: Intensify ISR (IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, HUMINT) on the Pokrovsk and Toretsk axes to confirm/deny Russian claims of village capture (Petrovskoye, Alekseevka) and assess the scale of any advances. Identify specific units involved and their combat effectiveness. (Collection Requirement: IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, OSINT)
  2. HIGH PRIORITY: Focus ISR on Sumy and Kharkiv border regions to characterize the deployment and effectiveness of Russian "waiting drones" and other adaptive UAV tactics. Develop and disseminate immediate counter-drone TTPs. (Collection Requirement: SIGINT, ELINT, IMINT)
  3. CRITICAL PRIORITY: HUMINT/OSINT: Intensify intelligence collection on Russian intelligence services' efforts to recruit Ukrainian youth and other individuals for sabotage, arson, and information leakage in rear areas (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa). Develop and disseminate specific indicators and warnings (I&W) for these activities. (Collection Requirement: HUMINT, OSINT)
  4. HUMINT: Continue to exploit POWs for information on Russian logistical shortfalls, unit morale, and the impact of Ukrainian drone strikes on their personnel. (Collection Requirement: HUMINT)
  5. OSINT: Closely monitor Russian state media and milbloggers for narratives around "Russia Day" and exaggerated claims of Ukrainian losses. Prepare targeted counter-narratives showcasing Ukrainian resilience and effective defense. (Collection Requirement: OSINT)
  6. ISR: Conduct BDA on all claimed Russian strikes (e.g., on UAV C2, "Baba Yaga" drones) to verify claims and assess the actual impact on Ukrainian capabilities. (Collection Requirement: IMINT, SIGINT)

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Disseminate intelligence on Russian "waiting drone" tactics to all frontline units, particularly in Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts. Emphasize immediate post-engagement surveillance and rapid repositioning/dispersal.
  2. FORCE PROTECTION: Reinforce static positions and personnel deployment points with enhanced camouflage and deception measures to mitigate drone detection and attack. Prioritize EW systems to counter drone threats.
  3. AD ASSET ALLOCATION: Maintain high air defense alert for major urban centers (e.g., Odesa) and critical infrastructure in rear areas, given the ongoing threat of hybrid attacks and missile/drone strikes.

• Ground Forces:

  1. IMMEDIATE: Commanders on the Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Kharkiv axes must conduct aggressive patrolling and reconnaissance to confirm enemy positions and assess the intent behind any recent claimed advances. Prepare for immediate counter-attacks if a breakthrough is confirmed.
  2. ONGOING: Integrate new mobility assets (e.g., Toyota Hilux pickups) into frontline units immediately, prioritizing their use for rapid logistics, reconnaissance, and personnel transport to enhance operational flexibility.
  3. TACTICAL ADAPTATION: Review and update standard operating procedures (SOPs) for small unit tactics to specifically address Russian "waiting drone" tactics, emphasizing rapid disengagement, dispersion, and avoidance of predictable patterns.
  4. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT: Continue aggressive recruitment and training efforts, ensuring new personnel are adequately prepared for the demanding combat environment and familiarized with both friendly and enemy drone tactics.

• Information Operations (IO):

  1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Publicize the tactical effectiveness of Ukrainian FPV drones, especially the "Who Wants to Be a Millionaire" video, to demoralize Russian forces and boost domestic and international morale. Highlight precise targeting and enemy personnel losses.
  2. CRITICAL: Develop and disseminate public awareness campaigns (through all available media channels) warning Ukrainian youth and parents about Russian intelligence recruitment efforts for sabotage and information gathering. Provide clear channels for reporting suspicious contacts.
  3. COUNTER-DISINFORMATION: Expose Russian reliance on civilian volunteer aid for basic military equipment (e.g., generators) to highlight their logistical weaknesses and counter narratives of self-sufficiency.
  4. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION: Vigorously publicize SBU operations against saboteurs in rear areas (e.g., Odesa) to demonstrate Ukrainian internal security capabilities and counter Russian attempts at destabilization.
  5. GLOBAL FOCUS: Provide timely and accurate updates on battlefield developments to international partners, emphasizing the intensity of Russian attacks and the need for continued military assistance, particularly air defense and mobility assets.

• Diplomatic/Inter-Agency:

  1. CRITICAL: Leverage diplomatic channels to highlight Russian development of new hybrid tactics (e.g., "waiting drones") and their expanded attempts to destabilize Ukrainian rear areas through agent recruitment, advocating for increased EW and intelligence-sharing support.
  2. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION: Ensure seamless coordination between military, SBU, National Police, and regional administrations to counter internal security threats and hybrid operations, particularly in sensitive regions like Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk. Share intelligence and best practices for countering youth recruitment.
  3. INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT: Brief international partners on the continued challenges of sustaining forces amidst high attrition rates and the need for consistent, predictable military aid shipments, especially for mobility platforms and counter-drone systems.
  4. ECONOMIC: Advocate for further international sanctions and economic pressure on Russia, specifically highlighting their continued hybrid warfare efforts and disregard for civilian safety.

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