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Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-06-12 09:11:57Z
8 months ago
Previous (2025-06-12 08:41:51Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME OF REPORT: 12 JUN 25 / 09:11 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 12 JUN 25 / 08:41 ZULU - 12 JUN 25 / 09:11 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET / ORCON / NOFORN


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

  • Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk Oblast):
    • NO CHANGE: Russian sources (Colonelcassad) continue to report strikes by the 29th Combined Arms Army of the "Vostok" Grouping on enemy personnel and shelters on the Shakhtyorsk direction, indicating ongoing localized ground engagements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH, supported by video)
    • NO CHANGE: Ukrainian General Staff reports continued Russian airstrikes in Poltavka, Koptyeve, Myrnohrad, Udachne, Oleksiyivka, Iskra of Donetsk region. This indicates continued Russian air assault and shaping operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Northern Ukraine (Kharkiv Oblast):
    • NO CHANGE: Ukrainian General Staff reports Russian aviation conducted airstrikes at Lutivka, Petrivka, Vovchansk, Okhrimivka of Kharkiv region. Clashes near Okhrimivka. Indicates sustained air and ground pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Southern Ukraine (Zaporizhzhia Oblast):
    • NO CHANGE: Ukrainian General Staff reports Russian aviation conducted airstrikes at Obratne, Olhivske, Hulyaypole, Bilohirya, Novoandriyivka, Veselyanka, Prymorske of Zaporizhzhia region. Indicates sustained air pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • NEW: Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration (Ivan Fedorov) reports ongoing clean-up operations after a missile strike in Zaporizhzhia, confirming continued Russian long-range missile attacks on urban centers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH, supported by video)
  • Southern Ukraine (Odesa Oblast):
    • NEW: Russian source (Dnevnik Desantnika🇷🇺) claims destruction of locations of Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups and UAV depots in Odesa Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: LOW, Russian milblogger claim, lacks independent verification of targets or BDA)
    • NEW: Ukrainian 40th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade reportedly used mortars and drone drops to track and destroy enemy boats and personnel. This indicates ongoing small-unit engagements and drone-supported precision strikes in coastal/riverine areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH, supported by video)
  • Russian Deep Rear (Moscow Oblast):
    • NEW: Ukrainian General Staff (via Север.Реалии) claims a strike on an electronics factory in Moscow Oblast last night. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM, Ukrainian claim via Russian opposition media, requires independent verification)
    • NEW: Unverified report of a strike on "Rezonit" plant 40km from Moscow. (CONFIDENCE: LOW, lacks BDA, likely same incident as above)
  • Russian Occupied Territories (Kherson Oblast):
    • NEW: Russian sources (Alex Parker Returns) claim Russian forces installed the Russian flag in Kherson (temporarily occupied by Ukraine) using a drone, attributing it to the "Dnepr" Grouping. This is an information operation, not a tactical advance, but implies continued Russian attempts at psychological influence in occupied/contested areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH, supported by video, but actual ground control unchanged)
    • NEW: OVG (Office of the Prosecutor General) reports uncovering a criminal organization in Kherson Oblast, composed of former law enforcement officers, who tortured people. This highlights continued efforts to expose and combat collaborators and war crimes in liberated territories. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Russian Occupied Territories (Donetsk People's Republic - DPR):
    • NEW: Komendant's curfew in Mangush and Novoazovsk municipal districts (DPR) is reportedly cancelled until September 30. This suggests perceived stabilization and improved security for Russian forces in these areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • International Incidents (India):
    • Multiple Russian (TASS, ASTRA) and Ukrainian (РБК-Україна, Оперативний ЗСУ) sources report a civilian plane crash near Ahmedabad airport in India with 100-290 people on board. This is a significant civilian incident, not directly related to the conflict. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

  • Continued successful Ukrainian drone strikes on enemy boats (Odesa Oblast) and Russian FPV drone strikes against Ukrainian positions indicate continued favorable weather conditions for UAV operations.
  • Russian air strikes with KABs on various oblasts require clear to partly cloudy conditions for effective targeting.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

  • Ukrainian Forces:
    • Naval/Riverine Defense: 40th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade demonstrates effective counter-riverine capabilities with mortars and drone drops. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • UAV Capabilities: Ministry of Defense approves "Volynyaka" domestic UAV complex for use in ZSU. This indicates continued Ukrainian efforts to expand indigenous drone production and capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Counter-IO: Ukrainian sources are quick to report on the "Rezonit" factory strike and the criminal organization in Kherson, demonstrating proactive information warfare. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Troop Morale: Interviews (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС) suggest a continued awareness of the war's realities, and a focus on financial motivation for Russian recruits. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM, based on interview)
  • Russian Forces:
    • UAV Operations: Continues high-intensity FPV drone operations, demonstrated by "Baba Yaga" strikes on dugouts/personnel and 36th Combined Arms Army's claims of destroying MaxxPro BBMs, ammo depots, and temporary deployment points. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH, supported by videos)
    • Artillery: 36th Combined Arms Army reportedly integrates artillery with FPV drones for precision strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH, supported by video)
    • Airborne Forces (VDV): MoD Russia releases a video of Ussuriysk-based paratroopers receiving awards, signaling continued recognition and valorization of this branch, likely to boost morale and recruitment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH, informational)
    • Logistics/Personnel: Russian milblogger "Новости Москвы" reports a shortage of drivers in Russia, potentially impacting logistics. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
    • Strategic Focus: Poddubny (Russian milblogger) emphasizes increasing ground forces' combat capabilities and special attention to the nuclear triad. This highlights continued strategic priorities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Information Operations: Continues to leverage Russia Day for patriotic narratives (ARCHANGEL SPETSNAZ, Alex Parker Returns), and promote narratives of military success and resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA):

  • Capabilities:
    • Integrated Drone Warfare: Russia continues to demonstrate advanced integration of FPV drones with reconnaissance (thermal imagery) and artillery, enabling precision strikes against fortified positions, personnel, and armored vehicles (MaxxPro). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Persistent Aerial Bombardment: Maintains capability for high-volume KAB airstrikes across multiple fronts (Kharkiv, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia) to degrade Ukrainian defenses and infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Localized Ground Pressure: Continues to exert localized ground pressure on the Shakhtyorsk direction and other active fronts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Robust IO & PsyOps: Highly capable of coordinated information operations, using national holidays, fabricated claims of tactical gains (Kherson flag), and propaganda videos to influence domestic and international audiences. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Intentions:
    • Sustain Attrition: Continue to degrade Ukrainian combat power through persistent air and ground assaults, with a notable focus on FPV drone superiority. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Dominate Information Space: Leverage every opportunity to project strength, demoralize Ukraine, and counter Ukrainian deep strikes with narratives of tactical success and patriotic fervor. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Maintain Control of Occupied Territories: The lifting of curfew in Mangush and Novoazovsk suggests an intent to normalize life and consolidate control in perceived secure areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Courses of Action (COA):
    • COA 1 (FPV-centric Attrition): Russia will continue high-intensity attritional ground assaults on existing fronts (Donetsk, Shakhtyorsk) supported by overwhelming FPV drone and artillery fire. Massed KAB strikes will continue on urban centers and frontline areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • COA 2 (Consolidation & IO): Russia will focus on consolidating gains in occupied territories (e.g., lifting curfews) and intensifying information operations to project normalcy and control, while concurrently exploiting national holidays (Russia Day) for domestic mobilization and propaganda. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • COA 3 (Retaliatory Strikes): Russia will likely conduct retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian military-industrial targets or urban centers in response to claimed Ukrainian strikes on Russian electronics factories. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

  • The reported lifting of curfew in some occupied DPR districts (Mangush, Novoazovsk) suggests a shift in Russian assessment of security and control in these specific areas, possibly allowing for reallocation of security forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Continued display of seamless coordination between FPV drones and artillery (36th Combined Arms Army) highlights an ongoing refinement of combined arms tactics at the small unit level. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

  • The reported shortage of drivers in Russia (Новости Москвы) is a potential indicator of logistical vulnerabilities that could affect long-term sustainment. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Ukrainian claims of strikes on Russian electronics factories (Moscow Oblast) suggest continued pressure on Russia's military-industrial complex, impacting future production and sustainment of advanced systems. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

  • Russian C2: Appears effective in integrating FPV drone operations with ground and artillery units. The ability to coordinate large-scale IO campaigns is also evident. The decision to lift curfews in some occupied areas suggests a degree of confidence in local control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ukrainian C2: Demonstrated effectiveness in reporting on Russian actions (airstrikes, flag-raising IO) and rapid internal adaptation (approving new drone systems). The successful counter-riverine operation indicates effective C2 for small-unit, specialized tasks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

  • Air Defense Readiness: Remains high, with continued intercepts and focus on defending urban centers. The approval of "Volynyaka" indicates an ongoing effort to bolster domestic UAV capabilities for offensive and defensive purposes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Specialized Forces Readiness: Coastal Defense units demonstrate high readiness for operations in complex terrain (riverine, coastal). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Logistics & Industrial Readiness: Continues to develop indigenous defense capabilities (UAVs) and conduct deep strikes against Russian military-industrial targets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

  • Successes:
    • Successful strike on an electronics factory in Moscow Oblast (claimed by Ukraine). (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
    • Effective use of mortars and drones by 40th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade to destroy Russian boats and personnel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Ministry of Defense approval of "Volynyaka" domestic UAV complex. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Exposure of a criminal organization in Kherson Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Setbacks:
    • Continued civilian casualties and destruction in Zaporizhzhia from missile strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Continued Russian air pressure on Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts with KABs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Russian claims of destroying Ukrainian military targets (MaxxPro BBMs, ammo depots, temporary deployment points) with FPV drones. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

  • Critical Need: Continued and expedited supply of advanced air defense systems and interceptors to counter the persistent and varied aerial threats, particularly KABs and high-volume FPV drone attacks.
  • Urgent Need: Further investment and rapid production/procurement of diverse UAV systems (ISR, FPV, strike) to maintain and expand Ukrainian drone superiority. The "Volynyaka" approval is a positive step, but scale and speed of deployment are key.
  • Support for Liberated Areas: Continued support for civilian administrations in liberated territories to address war crimes and stabilize rule of law (Kherson example).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

  • Russian Narratives:
    • Military Effectiveness: Amplifying claims of successful FPV drone strikes against Ukrainian military equipment, personnel, and logistics to project strength and demoralize Ukrainian forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Patriotism & National Unity: Heavy emphasis on Russia Day celebrations, featuring military personnel and patriotic imagery, to foster domestic unity and support for the war. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Territorial Claims: The symbolic drone-borne flag raising in Kherson is a clear attempt to reinforce the narrative of "eternal Russian lands" and undermine Ukrainian sovereignty. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Nuclear Posturing: Poddubny's statement on strengthening the nuclear triad is designed for deterrence and to project an image of unassailable Russian security. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Justification for Attrition: The interview about Russian recruitment motivations (money, lack of awareness) is an attempt to rationalize the high attrition rates. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Ukrainian Counter-Narratives:
    • Highlighting Russian Atrocities: Immediately reporting on civilian infrastructure damage in Zaporizhzhia due to missile strikes to rally international support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Showcasing Indigenous Capability: Announcing the "Volynyaka" UAV approval to demonstrate self-sufficiency and technological advancement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Exposing War Crimes: Publicizing the criminal organization in Kherson to underscore the brutality of Russian occupation and the need for accountability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Combat Effectiveness: Showcasing successful operations like the coastal defense unit's destruction of boats to boost morale and counter Russian claims of superiority. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

  • Ukrainian Morale: Remains resilient due to tactical successes and effective counter-IO, but is continuously challenged by persistent missile and air strikes on urban centers (Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv). The exposure of internal war crimes in liberated areas also creates a sense of justice and resolve. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Russian Morale: Likely bolstered by Russia Day celebrations and state propaganda focusing on military achievements and national pride. However, reports of driver shortages and ongoing internal struggles (like the Chebarkul cyberattack from previous report) might indicate underlying issues, which are being managed. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

  • Geopolitical Focus: The "military journalist" Kotonok's focus on Israeli-Iranian tensions and the US Ambassador's departure from Russia indicates an attempt by Russian sources to divert attention from Ukraine and highlight global instability or shifts in diplomatic relations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Global Events: The extensive reporting on the Indian plane crash by both Russian and Ukrainian sources suggests a brief shared focus on a humanitarian crisis, but it carries no direct military implications for the conflict. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Western Alliance Stability: Trump's speculation about Putin's indifference to losses (ЦАПЛІЄНКО) is a significant narrative that, regardless of its accuracy, can be exploited by Russia to sow doubt within the Western alliance regarding its commitment and understanding of the conflict. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

  • Sustained Attrition & Deep Strikes (Next 24-48 hours): Russia will continue high-intensity attritional ground assaults on the Donetsk axis (Shakhtyorsk, Pokrovsk) supported by concentrated FPV drone and artillery fire. Massed KAB strikes will continue on Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. Russia will likely conduct retaliatory drone/missile strikes on Ukrainian military-industrial targets or urban centers in response to claimed deep strikes in Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Intensified IO & Symbolic Actions (Next 24-72 hours): Russia will continue to leverage national holidays and other opportunities for large-scale information operations, including symbolic actions (e.g., drone-borne flag raising) and propaganda videos to bolster domestic support and sow division or demoralization in Ukraine and among its allies. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Focus on Logistics & Personnel Regeneration: Given reports of driver shortages and the emphasis on nuclear triad, Russia will likely focus on improving logistical capabilities and potentially increase efforts to regenerate personnel, possibly with further emphasis on financial incentives. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

  • Massed Missile/Drone Strike on Critical Infrastructure (Next 24-48 hours): Russia launches a coordinated, multi-wave missile and drone strike against key Ukrainian electronics factories, energy infrastructure, or critical AD nodes across multiple regions, aiming to degrade Ukraine's military-industrial complex and defensive capabilities significantly. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH, given claims of strike on Moscow Oblast electronics factory)
  • Escalated Ground Offensive with Combined Arms (Next 48-72 hours): Russia capitalizes on its integrated FPV and artillery capabilities to achieve a tactical breakthrough on the Donetsk axis, leading to a rapid advance that outpaces Ukrainian defensive adjustments, potentially threatening key logistical hubs or command centers. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM-HIGH)
  • Hybrid Operation with Sabotage & Disinformation (Next 24-72 hours): Russia conducts a complex hybrid operation involving covert sabotage (e.g., targeting critical infrastructure in liberated areas) combined with a robust disinformation campaign aimed at creating mass panic or diverting Ukrainian military resources. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

  • Immediate (Next 1-3 hours):
    • CRITICAL: Monitor for any immediate Russian retaliatory strikes following Ukrainian claims of hitting an electronics factory in Moscow Oblast. Decision Point: Activate heightened AD readiness in potential target areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • CRITICAL: Continue monitoring all active fronts for sustained FPV drone and KAB strikes. Decision Point: Continue real-time counter-UAV and AD operations; re-task ISR for immediate BDA on reported strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Short Term (Next 6-12 hours):
    • Verify the claims of destroyed Ukrainian military targets (MaxxPro BBMs, ammo depots) by Russian FPV drones. Decision Point: If confirmed, review force protection TTPs and countermeasures for these specific targets. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
    • Assess implications of "Volynyaka" UAV complex approval; accelerate production/deployment as feasible. Decision Point: Allocate resources for rapid scale-up. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Analyze Russian information operations related to Russia Day and the Kherson flag stunt. Decision Point: Develop and disseminate counter-IO narratives highlighting the illegal nature of occupation and the futility of symbolic gestures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Mid Term (Next 24-72 hours):
    • Evaluate the impact of lifting curfews in occupied DPR districts on Russian force posture and civilian control. Decision Point: Adjust ISR and HUMINT collection on these areas. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
    • Continue to monitor for any escalation of Israeli-Iranian tensions as this could divert international attention and resources. Decision Point: Brief diplomatic channels on potential implications. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR is paramount):

    1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: Intensify ISR coverage (IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, HUMINT) on Russian military-industrial targets, especially electronics and munitions production facilities, to assess the impact of recent Ukrainian strikes and anticipate retaliatory actions. (Collection Requirement: IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT)
    2. HIGH PRIORITY: Focus ISR on identifying precise locations and methodologies of Russian FPV drone and artillery integration to develop effective counter-targeting and electronic warfare strategies. Prioritize disruption of their C2 and targeting links. (Collection Requirement: SIGINT, ELINT, MASINT)
    3. EXPLOIT: Leverage information regarding Russian driver shortages and internal economic vulnerabilities in PSYOPs to undermine morale and public support for the war. (Collection Requirement: OSINT, HUMINT)
    4. CONTINUE HIGH PRIORITY: Maintain robust ISR on all active ground fronts to detect any shifts in Russian force disposition or the initiation of new offensive pushes. (Collection Requirement: IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT)
  • Air Defense & Force Protection:

    1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Maintain highest air defense alert levels for all major urban centers and critical infrastructure, particularly in response to potential Russian retaliatory strikes. Prioritize mobile AD groups and layered defenses.
    2. URGENT: Expedite the production and deployment of the "Volynyaka" UAV complex and other indigenous drone systems to enhance Ukrainian ISR, strike, and defensive capabilities. Allocate resources for rapid scaling.
    3. FORCE PROTECTION: Review and update TTPs for protecting armored vehicles (e.g., MaxxPro) and temporary deployment points from FPV drone attacks. Consider enhanced camouflage, dispersal, and active protection systems.
    4. TACTICAL ADAPTATION: Continue developing and disseminating TTPs for countering massed FPV drone attacks, including electronic warfare, anti-drone nets, and small arms engagement.
  • Ground Forces:

    1. ONGOING: Maintain robust defensive posture and attritional tactics on all active fronts, particularly Donetsk, to inflict maximum casualties on Russian forces and degrade their offensive potential.
    2. TACTICAL ADAPTATION: Enhance drone integration at the tactical level for precision targeting, reconnaissance, and force protection, drawing lessons from both Ukrainian successes and Russian FPV effectiveness.
    3. RIVERINE OPERATIONS: Continue to resource and support specialized units like the 40th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade to maintain superiority in riverine and coastal operations.
  • Information Operations (IO):

    1. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Vigorously publicize confirmed damage to Russian military-industrial targets (e.g., Moscow Oblast electronics factory) to counter Russian narratives of invulnerability and demonstrate Ukraine's strategic reach.
    2. IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL: Counter Russian symbolic actions (e.g., Kherson flag stunt) by emphasizing their lack of actual territorial control and the continued illegality of occupation. Highlight Ukrainian resistance and the strong desire for liberation in these areas.
    3. COUNTER-IO: Proactively address narratives from Western figures that may undermine support for Ukraine (e.g., Trump's comments on Putin's indifference to losses) by consistently reiterating the stakes of the conflict and Ukraine's resolve.
    4. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION: Amplify the exposure of Russian war crimes and collaborators (e.g., Kherson criminal organization) to maintain international pressure and demonstrate commitment to justice.
  • Diplomatic/Inter-Agency:

    1. CRITICAL: Leverage all diplomatic channels to highlight continued Russian aggression, including missile strikes on urban centers and attempts to normalize occupation in seized territories, to secure sustained and increased international aid.
    2. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION: Ensure seamless information flow between military intelligence, regional civil-military administrations, law enforcement, and emergency services for rapid, coordinated response to attacks and effective public communication.
    3. INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT: Brief international partners on evolving Russian military-industrial capabilities and any new threats identified (e.g., enhanced FPV drones) to ensure aid packages are tailored to specific needs.
    4. LEGAL ACTION: Continue compiling evidence of Russian war crimes, including torture by collaborators, to support international legal proceedings.

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