Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 11 JUN 25 / 11:37 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 11 JUN 25 / 11:07 ZULU - 11 JUN 25 / 11:37 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET / ORCON / NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Eastern Ukraine (Kharkiv Oblast): Continued "Shahed" UAV activity reported in southern Kharkiv Oblast, with UAVs now en route towards Poltava Oblast. This indicates a persistent aerial threat extending beyond immediate frontline areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Northern Ukraine (Sumy Oblast): A confirmed explosion reported in Sumy city. This aligns with previous intelligence indicating Russian intent to intensify pressure on this axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Southern Ukraine (Kherson Oblast): Confirmed Russian strike on a critical energy facility. This is a direct attack on civilian infrastructure, aiming to disrupt power supply and civilian life. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Central Ukraine (Kyiv): Air raid sirens were active, followed by a ballistic missile threat from the northeast, indicating continued high-alert status for the capital region. Threat was subsequently cleared. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian Territory (Internal Affairs):
  • Internal Security Operations: Further evidence of aggressive internal security operations, including the forcible detention of a civilian (Buryat woman) in Podmoskovye by what appears to be a "people's дружинник" (volunteer militia) in camouflage, under the pretext of "migrant checks." This highlights increased internal security focus and potential for abuses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Another incident of a military individual being detained near Volgograd for "shooting two people" points to internal discipline and societal issues within Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Judicial Actions: Politician Lev Schlossberg was placed under house arrest in Pskov for repeated "discrediting" the army. This confirms ongoing suppression of dissent and use of legal mechanisms to control narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Prisoner/Body Exchanges: Multiple Russian sources (Rybar, Два майора, TASS, Kotsnews, Поддубный |Z|О|V| edition, WarGonzo, Операция Z, Сливочный каприз) confirm the commencement of "sanitary exchanges" of severely wounded prisoners and bodies. Confirmed figures of 1212 Ukrainian bodies received for 27 Russian bodies (TASS). This indicates an ongoing, if asymmetric, humanitarian process. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• Recent "Shahed" UAV activity in Kharkiv and towards Poltava, combined with previous reports of clear visibility for UAVs, indicates continued favorable weather for aerial operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• The video of the Ka-52 "low pass" shows clear weather, suggesting good visibility and conditions for rotary-wing air support and reconnaissance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces:
  • Air Defense: Active in Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, and Kyiv in response to aerial threats. Rapid response to ballistic missile threats in Kyiv demonstrates continued vigilance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Energy Sector: Facing direct attacks on critical infrastructure in Kherson Oblast, necessitating immediate response and potential long-term power supply adjustments. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Operations (IO): Ukrainian channels (РБК-Україна, Оперативний ЗСУ, ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS, STERNENKO) are actively reporting on Russian strikes (Kherson, Sumy), AD alerts, and diplomatic visits (Serbian President). They also highlight internal Russian issues (Schlossberg arrest, internal support for Putin/war). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Special Operations/National Police: "Оперативний ЗСУ" released archived footage of an "Enei" Battalion (National Police) operation in Toretsk involving the mining and demolition of a multi-story building. This is likely a propaganda piece aimed at showcasing capabilities and morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - regarding intent).
• Russian Forces:
  • Aerial Attack: Continued employment of "Shahed" UAVs, now extending threat to Poltava Oblast. Confirmed strike on an energy facility in Kherson. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ballistic Missile Threat: Continued use of ballistic missiles from the northeast against Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv, indicating a persistent long-range precision strike capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal Security: Russian internal security forces (OMON, police, "народный дружинник" elements) are conducting aggressive operations targeting civilians, including forcible detention and arrests for "discrediting" the army. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Reports of military personnel committing crimes (Volgograd shooting) also indicate internal discipline issues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Operations (IO): Russian milbloggers and official sources are heavily focused on the body/prisoner exchanges, attempting to frame Russia as humanitarian and engaged in "peaceful" processes. They also continue to amplify narratives of internal Ukrainian instability (former RT employee, transgender individual leaving Russia) and "foreign mercenary" involvement (British/French mercenaries). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Peskov's statements regarding Russian readiness to remove nuclear material from Iran also serve to project Russia as a responsible global actor with strategic influence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Military Propaganda: "Fighterbomber" posts a video of a Ka-52 helicopter conducting a "very low pass," likely a propaganda piece to showcase air force capabilities and pilot skill. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

• Capabilities:
  • Persistent Aerial Bombardment: Russia demonstrates the capability for sustained UAV and ballistic missile attacks against critical infrastructure and urban centers across various Ukrainian oblasts (Kharkiv, Poltava, Kherson, Sumy, Kyiv). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Combined Arms Pressure: Continued capability for localized ground operations (Sumy explosion suggests kinetic pressure) and support from tactical aviation (Ka-52 low pass). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Robust Internal Control: Russia maintains extensive capabilities for internal security operations, including aggressive policing, suppression of dissent, and criminal prosecution for perceived anti-war activities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Sophisticated Information Warfare: Russia has proven capability to rapidly disseminate and amplify narratives (e.g., humanitarian exchange, foreign fighters, internal stability) across multiple channels, including official media and milbloggers, often leveraging partial truths or outright falsehoods. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intentions:
  • Degrade Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure: Direct targeting of energy facilities (Kherson) aims to disrupt services, undermine economic stability, and exert psychological pressure on civilians. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Sustain Air Campaign Pressure: Continue to exhaust Ukrainian AD assets and force the diversion of resources by launching UAVs and ballistic missiles against diverse targets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Reinforce Internal Stability and Control: Intensify internal security measures and judicial actions to suppress any opposition or critical voices, framing these actions as necessary for national security. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Shape Information Environment: Leverage humanitarian actions (body/POW exchanges) to project a false image of Russian benevolence. Continue to dehumanize Ukrainian forces and foreign volunteers to justify attacks and undermine international support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Project Global Power: Diplomatic statements (e.g., Iran nuclear material) are intended to assert Russia's role on the global stage and its influence over key geopolitical issues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Shift in UAV Targeting/Route: The detection of Shahed UAVs on a course towards Poltava Oblast from southern Kharkiv indicates a potential shift in targeting patterns or an attempt to exploit perceived AD vulnerabilities in different regions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Publicization of Body/POW Exchanges: The coordinated and widespread Russian reporting on body/POW exchanges, including specific numbers, is a clear IO adaptation aimed at projecting a humane image and possibly influencing international opinion or internal morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) The extremely skewed exchange ratio (1212:27) is a particularly significant data point in this narrative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Heightened Internal Security Aggression: The "народный дружинник" incident (Buryat woman) suggests an emboldening of non-state actors in internal security operations, potentially leading to increased abuses and a more repressive internal environment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Russian Aerial Munitions: The sustained rate of Shahed UAV launches, even if smaller waves, suggests a continued ability to produce or procure these systems. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian Internal Security Logistics: The capability to conduct multiple coordinated internal security operations (OMON raids, civilian detentions, judicial processes) indicates a well-resourced and coordinated internal security apparatus. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Energy Sector: The attack on the Kherson energy facility highlights a continuous need for resources for repair and resilience to maintain critical services, particularly heading into summer. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Humanitarian Logistics: The successful commencement of body/POW exchanges, despite the disparity, signifies the functionality of a logistics chain for this purpose, likely mediated by the ICRC. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian C2 for Aerial Operations: Russian C2 appears effective in coordinating multiple UAV launches and ballistic missile threats across different axes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian C2 for Internal Security & IO: Russian C2 for internal security operations and their synchronization with information operations remains highly effective, demonstrating a centralized control over narratives and actions within Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian C2 Resilience: Ukrainian AD C2 is demonstrating real-time responsiveness to aerial threats across multiple regions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) The rapid reporting on the Sumy explosion and Kherson energy strike indicates effective C2 for damage assessment and public communication. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Air Defense: Ukrainian AD remains on high alert and responsive, as evidenced by the rapid alerts and clearance of ballistic missile threats in Kyiv, and tracking of Shahed UAVs in Kharkiv/Poltava. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Vigilance against Hybrid Threats: The continued proactive reporting on Russian disinformation and internal Russian issues (e.g., Schlossberg, internal support for Putin) demonstrates a strong posture in the information domain. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Internal Security: The National Police (Lyut Brigade) continues to promote its capabilities, showcasing readiness for special operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Setbacks/Challenges:
  • Direct strike on a critical energy facility in Kherson Oblast, leading to potential prolonged power outages, is a significant setback for civilian infrastructure and resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Continued aerial threats over Kharkiv and towards Poltava, and a confirmed explosion in Sumy, indicate persistent pressure on multiple fronts and a challenge for AD resources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Successes:
  • Successful tracking of Shahed UAVs heading towards Poltava, indicating effective early warning. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Rapid response to ballistic missile threats in Kyiv, ensuring civilian safety (despite the alarm). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • The successful, albeit asymmetrical, body exchange indicates that humanitarian mechanisms are functioning and Ukraine is recovering its fallen, which is a significant morale factor. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense: The persistent and varied aerial threats (UAVs, ballistic missiles) necessitate an continuous, substantial supply of AD interceptors and platforms. The extension of UAV threats to Poltava highlights the geographic breadth of the AD challenge. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Energy Sector Resilience: Immediate need for resources to repair the damaged Kherson energy facility and develop contingency plans for power supply in affected regions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Information Warfare: Continued investment in counter-disinformation capabilities is crucial to rapidly and effectively counter sophisticated Russian narratives, particularly those leveraging humanitarian issues like body exchanges. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives:
  • "Humanitarian" Facade: Russian channels are heavily promoting the body/POW exchanges to project Russia as a benevolent actor adhering to international norms, despite the underlying conflict. The vastly disproportionate exchange ratio (1212 Ukrainian for 27 Russian bodies) is a key factual element they do not emphasize but which reveals the true cost of the conflict for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal Stability/Control: The publicizing of internal security operations (OMON raids, arrests of dissidents) and judicial actions serves to project state control and deter dissent. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Dehumanization/Justification: The continued focus on "foreign mercenaries" (British and French) is an ongoing effort to dehumanize Ukrainian forces and justify targeting non-Ukrainian combatants, even if these individuals are legally serving in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Anti-Western/Anti-LGBTQ+: The "Alex Parker Returns" post, despite being a personal anecdote, is a clear example of Russian state-aligned media using individual stories to promote anti-Western, anti-LGBTQ+, and anti-Ukrainian narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Discrediting Western Aid: "Старше Эдды" claiming US military aid will be reduced from 2026 aims to undermine confidence in Western support and suggest Ukraine's inevitable abandonment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Projection of Global Influence: Peskov's statement on Iran's nuclear material aims to project Russia's global diplomatic and security relevance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal Army Morale/Discipline: "БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС" (Ukrainian source) reports on Russian soldiers being abused by comrades and commanders, highlighting potential internal discipline issues and low morale within the Russian forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Counter-Narratives:
  • Factual Reporting on Attacks: Ukrainian media (РБК-Україна, Оперативний ЗСУ) are quickly reporting on Russian strikes (Sumy, Kherson), exposing the reality of Russian aggression against civilians. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Highlighting Civilian Resilience: Reports on the "Укренерго" forecast for summer power cuts reflect transparency and public preparedness, countering potential panic. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Showcasing Internal Operations: "Оперативний ЗСУ"'s archived video of the "Enei" Battalion operation serves to demonstrate Ukrainian internal military/police capabilities and offensive spirit. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Diplomatic Engagement: Reports on the Serbian President's visit highlight continued international diplomatic support for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Reporting on Russian Internal Issues: Ukrainian channels (ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS) reporting on German intelligence assessment of Russian public support for Putin/war, and on internal Russian abuses (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС), serves to expose the nature of the Russian regime. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: The ongoing aerial attacks and infrastructure damage (Kherson) will strain public morale, but swift AD responses and clear communication from authorities can mitigate panic. The recovery of fallen soldiers' bodies provides a crucial, if somber, morale boost. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian Morale: The state-controlled narrative regarding prisoner/body exchanges likely aims to boost domestic morale by presenting a picture of "humanitarian" conduct, while the suppression of dissent (Schlossberg) indicates a continued need to control public opinion forcefully. The internal issues (Volgograd shooting, alleged abuse within ranks) could erode morale if widely known internally. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• International Sentiment: Attacks on civilian infrastructure (Kherson) and persistent aerial terror campaigns will reinforce international condemnation of Russia and underscore the need for continued support to Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) The stark contrast in body exchange numbers may also influence international perceptions of the conflict's human cost. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• Serbian President Vučić's visit to Ukraine is a notable diplomatic step, indicating growing or sustained engagement with Ukraine from traditionally more neutral or Russia-leaning states in Southeast Europe. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian diplomatic efforts (e.g., Peskov on Iran nuclear material) aim to project influence and challenge Western unipolarity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Claims by "Старше Эдды" regarding US military aid reduction from 2026 are likely aimed at influencing internal Ukrainian and international perceptions of the longevity of Western support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Sustained, Distributed Aerial Attacks: Russia will continue to launch Shahed UAVs and potentially ballistic missiles against urban centers and critical infrastructure, diversifying targets and routes (e.g., Poltava, Kherson) to exhaust AD, disrupt daily life, and inflict economic damage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Continued Attritional Ground Operations on Existing Axes: Russia will maintain pressure on the Donetsk axis and intensify localized probes and assaults on the Sumy axis, attempting to create a "buffer zone" or draw Ukrainian reserves. The Sumy explosion indicates continued kinetic activity on this front. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intensified Internal Control and IO: Russia will further clamp down on internal dissent and perceived "foreign agents," leveraging judicial processes for propaganda. The IO campaign will continue to focus on "humanitarian" efforts (body/POW exchanges) to project a positive image, while simultaneously pushing narratives of Ukrainian atrocities and foreign mercenary involvement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Targeting of Energy Infrastructure: Russia will likely continue to prioritize strikes on energy facilities, especially as Ukraine approaches summer, to disrupt power supply and put pressure on the grid. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Coordinated Multi-Axis Offensive: Russia simultaneously launches a significant ground offensive on the Sumy axis while attempting a breakthrough on the Donetsk axis, supported by massed aerial and missile strikes on key C2 nodes and logistics hubs, aiming to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses and force a major operational retreat. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Large-Scale Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure: Russia conducts a highly sophisticated, widespread cyber attack targeting Ukraine's energy grid, telecommunications, or banking system, aiming to cause widespread disruption and chaos, synchronized with physical attacks to maximize impact. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Escalated Repression and Mobilization in Russia: Russia significantly escalates internal repression, including widespread forced conscription or mobilization, to generate sufficient manpower for sustained, high-intensity offensives, potentially leading to increased internal unrest but also a more formidable ground force. (CONFIDENCE: LOW - but potential strategic impact is high)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Next 1-3 Hours (Immediate Threat): Continued monitoring of Shahed UAV movements (e.g., towards Poltava) and potential follow-on ballistic missile threats. Decision Point: Immediate AD re-tasking and alert level adjustment if new aerial threats materialize or current ones persist. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Next 3-6 Hours: Assess the full scope of damage to the Kherson energy facility and the immediate impact on power supply. Decision Point: Implement emergency power supply measures and coordinate with humanitarian aid organizations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Next 6-12 Hours: Monitor Russian information channels for continued amplification of "humanitarian exchange" narratives and counter-narratives regarding foreign fighters. Decision Point: Prepare and disseminate proactive counter-disinformation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Next 24-48 Hours (Medium Term): Closely observe Sumy Oblast for further kinetic activity or ground force movements beyond the reported explosion, to distinguish between isolated strikes and sustained offensive. Decision Point: If sustained pressure is observed, consider reinforcing defensive positions and pre-positioning reserves. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Next 72 Hours (Medium Term): Analyze the broader implications of internal Russian security crackdowns and the public support for the war, and how these might affect future Russian force generation and stability. Decision Point: Adjust strategic communication and diplomatic efforts to highlight Russian internal authoritarianism. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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6. RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR is paramount):

  1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: Intensify ISR on the Sumy axis, including cross-border areas. Determine the nature of the explosion in Sumy and assess the full intent and scale of Russian ground force activity in the region. Prioritize distinguishing between localized probes, artillery/UAV strikes, and a potential major ground offensive. (Collection Requirement: IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, HUMINT on ground movements).
  2. HIGH PRIORITY: Maintain continuous tactical ISR on all active fronts, especially Donetsk and the Northern border, to identify and track Russian force concentrations, logistics nodes, and C2 elements. (Collection Requirement: IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, HUMINT).
  3. CRITICAL PRIORITY: Develop and disseminate rapid, factual counter-narratives to combat Russian disinformation, particularly regarding prisoner/body exchanges (highlighting the disparity in numbers and overall context), and the "foreign mercenary" claims. Proactively expose Russian internal security abuses. (Collection Requirement: OSINT, HUMINT).
  4. TECHINT: Continue forensic analysis of downed Russian UAVs and missiles, especially regarding their flight paths and origin points, to refine AD strategies and targeting. (Collection Requirement: TECHINT).
  5. INTERNAL SECURITY SUPPORT: Provide all necessary intelligence support to Ukrainian internal security services (SBU, National Police) to effectively counter domestic information influence operations and propaganda aimed at eroding trust or causing panic.

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. CRITICAL/IMMEDIATE: Maintain the highest AD alert levels for Kyiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, and other critical urban centers. Prioritize allocation of AD assets capable of intercepting both UAVs and ballistic missiles to protect civilian populations and critical infrastructure.
  2. URGENT: Expedite repair and hardening of damaged energy infrastructure in Kherson Oblast. Implement contingency plans for prolonged power outages and ensure emergency power for critical services. Advocate for international assistance for energy sector resilience.
  3. TACTICAL ADAPTATION: Disseminate intelligence on new Russian UAV flight paths and targeting priorities (e.g., towards Poltava) to all AD units to adjust coverage and readiness.
  4. FORCE PROTECTION (Civilian): Enhance public awareness campaigns on air raid procedures, shelter locations, and emergency preparedness, especially in areas under persistent aerial threat.

• Ground Forces:

  1. IMMEDIATE: Commanders in Sumy Oblast and other northern border regions must remain at a heightened state of readiness. Conduct aggressive reconnaissance-in-force to confirm Russian ground force dispositions and intent. Prepare for potential cross-border ground incursions.
  2. TACTICAL: Units on all fronts must maintain robust defensive postures, leveraging all available assets to attrit Russian forces. Emphasize counter-battery fire, drone operations, and precision strikes against Russian troop concentrations.
  3. LOGISTICS: Ensure continuous and resilient supply lines to frontline units, prioritizing AD munitions, drone components, and medical supplies.
  4. MORALE & WELFARE: Continue and expand initiatives for supporting military families, including those of POWs and fallen soldiers, to maintain troop morale and ensure long-term readiness.

• Information Operations (IO):

  1. CRITICAL/IMMEDIATE: Publicize the disproportionate numbers of recovered Ukrainian bodies in exchanges with Russia. Use this stark fact to highlight the human cost of the war and Russian aggression to both domestic and international audiences.
  2. URGENT: Amplify confirmed reports of Russian strikes on civilian infrastructure (Kherson, Sumy explosion) to counter Russian claims of precision strikes and demonstrate ongoing war crimes.
  3. STRATEGIC: Leverage the Serbian President's visit to Ukraine as evidence of growing international diplomatic support, countering Russian efforts to isolate Ukraine.
  4. EXPOSE AUTHORITARIANISM: Systematically expose Russian internal crackdowns, human rights abuses (e.g., forced detentions), and judicial actions against dissidents to international audiences, reinforcing the narrative of an authoritarian aggressor state.
  5. RESILIENCE NARRATIVE: Promote narratives of Ukrainian resilience in the face of ongoing attacks and the nation's ability to maintain critical services despite adversity (e.g., "Укренерго" forecasts, AD successes).