Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 11 JUN 25 / 11:07 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 11 JUN 25 / 10:37 ZULU - 11 JUN 25 / 11:07 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET / ORCON / NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Eastern Ukraine (Kharkiv Oblast): Confirmed continued rescue operations in Kharkiv following recent "Shahed" UAV attacks. Video from "Оперативний ЗСУ" (Patrol Police, Kharkiv Oblast) shows police actively engaged in rescue, extracting individuals and even a dog from a burning, severely damaged building. The singing of the Ukrainian anthem by a rescued individual underscores civilian resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk Oblast): A video from "БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС" depicts the aftermath of an apparent artillery or missile strike on a military encampment in a wooded area, showing burning wreckage, shattered vehicles, and at least one confirmed deceased combatant. This indicates active engagement and destructive fires. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). "Поддубный |Z|О|V| edition" (Russian source) claims RGF are advancing into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, with elements of the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 90th Tank Division pushing west from the Donetsk People's Republic border, an unverifiable claim but indicative of Russian perceived objectives. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Russian Territory (Internal Affairs):
  • Internal Security Operations: "АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА" posts a video of OMON (Russian Special Purpose Mobile Unit) conducting a raid, likely targeting undocumented immigrants or illegal activities. This reflects continued internal security focus. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Judicial Actions: "Север.Реалии" reports an Estonian court sentenced a former "Russia Today" employee, Svetlana Burtseva, to six years. "ASTRA" reports a Samara artist sentenced to 20 years for "treason." These are examples of legal actions against individuals perceived as threats or dissidents, both internally and externally. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Government Focus: Videos from "Старше Эдды," "Полиция Хабаровского края," and TASS show Russian officials (Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev, Duma deputies) discussing issues like migration, cybercrime, and cryptocurrency confiscation. This points to key internal priorities for the Russian government. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Estonia: A court in Estonia sentenced a former "Russia Today" employee. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Serbia: "Два майора" reports Serbian President Vučić will visit Ukraine on June 11, 2025, to participate in the Ukraine-Southeast Europe Summit. This is a significant diplomatic development. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• The Kharkiv rescue video shows active fire and smoke, indicating challenging and hazardous conditions for emergency responders following the "Shahed" UAV strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• The "БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС" video shows a muddy track and dense wooded foliage, suggesting recent precipitation or soft ground conditions, and providing natural cover for military operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• The FPV drone footage from "Воин DV" shows clear visibility, indicating favorable conditions for UAV operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces:
  • Emergency Response/Civilian Protection: Kharkiv police and DSNS are actively engaged in rescue operations post-strike, demonstrating resilience and professionalism. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Counter-UAV Operations: STERNENKO posts a video claiming the 5th Separate Assault Brigade destroyed five reconnaissance UAVs. While the video is promotional, the claim aligns with ongoing Ukrainian efforts to counter Russian drones. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - due to video style).
  • FPV Drone Operations: "Воин DV" (likely Ukrainian channel, despite Russian name) posts FPV drone strike video against a military vehicle, showcasing continued effective tactical drone use. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal Security: "РБК-Україна" reports a "shooting" incident at a Lviv school, which initial analysis suggests is a staged event, not a genuine security threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - regarding assessment of staged nature).
  • Personnel Management: The Coordination Staff for POW Affairs held a meeting with families of servicemen from the 142nd Separate Mechanized Brigade, demonstrating ongoing support for military families. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces:
  • Internal Security: Russian OMON units are conducting raids, focused on internal order and migration issues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Operations (IO): Russian milbloggers continue to be highly active:
    • Dehumanization/Justification: "Операция Z" propagates a narrative that Zelensky "admitted" he won't evacuate people from cities, implying a "human shield" tactic. This is a clear attempt to dehumanize Ukrainian leadership and justify attacks on urban centers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Internal Messaging: "Старше Эдды" and "Полиция Хабаровского края" amplify official messages from Interior Minister Kolokoltsev on migration and cybercrime, aiming to project governmental competence and control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Propaganda of Success: "Поддубный |Z|О|V| edition" claims significant RGF advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, a highly ambitious and likely exaggerated claim aimed at boosting morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - for observation of claim).
    • Strategic Diplomacy (IO): TASS reports Kim Jong Un congratulated Putin on "Russia Day," signaling continued strategic alignment and mutual support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Judicial Warfare: "ASTRA" and "Север.Реалии" reporting on convictions for "treason" or "terrorism" serves to reinforce the Russian narrative of internal threats and a just war. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Civic Action / Propaganda: "Народная милиция ДНР" posts about a "summer collection of aid for children of Donbas and the SMO zone," a clear propaganda effort to portray humanitarian concern and gain public support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Official Statements: Colonelcassad summarizes Russian military operations, claiming strikes on UAV production/storage, intelligence C2, ammunition depots, and temporary deployment points in 147 areas. This is a standard daily operational report. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Civilian Disinformation: The "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" video purports to show Ukrainian assault troops (VSU) caught in an ambush, and includes a Union Jack patch, likely intended to imply foreign mercenary involvement and Ukrainian vulnerability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - for observation of disinformation elements).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

• Capabilities:
  • Sustained Aerial Attacks: Russia retains the capability to conduct persistent "Shahed" UAV attacks on urban centers, causing widespread damage and casualties (Kharkiv). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Artillery and Ground Combat: Russia demonstrates the capability for concentrated artillery strikes against military encampments and sustained ground pressure (Donetsk axes, and claimed Dnipropetrovsk advances). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal Security: Russia maintains robust internal security forces (OMON) for control, suppression, and enforcement of internal policies (e.g., migration). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Integrated Information Warfare: Russia has highly effective and integrated IO capabilities, leveraging official channels and milbloggers for real-time narrative shaping, psychological operations, and disinformation (e.g., "human shield" narrative, exaggerated advances, foreign mercenary claims). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions:
  • Degrade Ukrainian Morale and Infrastructure: Continue aerial terror campaigns to exhaust Ukrainian AD, break civilian will, and disrupt urban life, as seen in Kharkiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Maintain Ground Pressure & Seek Advances: Continue attritional ground offensives on existing axes (Donetsk) and probe new areas (Sumy, and claims of Dnipropetrovsk) to fix Ukrainian reserves and gain tactical/operational advantage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Control Internal Narrative & Suppress Dissent: Intensify internal security measures and judicial actions to suppress opposition and perceived "treason," while simultaneously framing these as responses to "Ukrainian aggression" or internal threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Exploit Information Environment: Actively use disinformation (e.g., "human shield," foreign mercenary claims, false advances) to demoralize Ukrainians, undermine international support, and justify their actions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Project International Strength & Cohesion: Emphasize diplomatic ties with allies (DPRK) and focus on internal stability to project an image of strength to both domestic and international audiences. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Russian Escalation of Dehumanizing PSYOPs: The "human shield" narrative from "Операция Z" represents a heightened level of dehumanizing propaganda, directly accusing Ukrainian leadership of putting civilians at risk, likely to justify future indiscriminate attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Increased Russian Claims of Offensive Expansion: The claim by "Поддубный |Z|О|V| edition" of Russian forces entering Dnipropetrovsk Oblast suggests a new, audacious operational narrative, even if unverified. This indicates a potential shift in Russian information strategy to portray greater success and expand perceived operational objectives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Targeting Foreign Personnel in Disinformation: The "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" video featuring a Union Jack patch is an adaptation of Russian disinformation, directly implicating foreign volunteers and trying to generate specific narratives about their involvement and alleged vulnerabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Focus on Specific Brigade Family Support: The Coordination Staff for POW Affairs meeting with families of the 142nd Mechanized Brigade indicates a granular focus on supporting specific military units' families, a crucial morale-building adaptation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Russian Logistics (Implied Vulnerability): The OMON raid on migrant housing, and discussions of cybercrime and cryptocurrency, while not directly military, may hint at Russian concerns about internal stability and potential disruptions that could indirectly affect logistics (e.g., crime networks, illicit financing). (CONFIDENCE: LOW - indirect inference).
• Ukrainian Civilian Sustainment: The rescue operations in Kharkiv underscore the continuous strain on civilian emergency services and the need for medical and recovery resources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Morale Sustainment: The ongoing support for military families (142nd Brigade) and the defiant spirit of civilians (Kharkiv anthem) are critical for sustaining morale and the broader war effort. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian C2 for Internal Security: Russian C2 for internal security operations (OMON raids, judicial actions) appears highly effective and synchronized with information operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian C2 for Information Operations: Russian C2 for IO remains highly agile, rapidly deploying narratives to exploit events and deflect blame. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian C2 Resilience: Ukrainian C2 remains robust, demonstrating effective emergency response, continued tactical drone operations, and ongoing support for military families. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). The swift assessment of the Lviv school incident as staged also indicates effective internal security C2. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Civil Defense: Kharkiv police and DSNS demonstrate high readiness and resilience in responding to persistent aerial attacks, including active fire suppression and civilian extraction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Counter-UAV & FPV Capabilities: Ukrainian forces continue to demonstrate high proficiency in counter-UAV operations and offensive FPV drone strikes, indicating sustained readiness and technological adaptation at the tactical level. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ground Forces: While facing intense pressure, Ukrainian forces appear to be maintaining active defense and inflicting casualties on Russian armored groups (as implied by Belyayev's video and the FPV strike). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Psychological Readiness: The singing of the Ukrainian anthem by a rescued civilian underscores strong national spirit and psychological resilience among the civilian population, which directly supports the war effort. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Family Support & Morale: The Coordination Staff for POW Affairs' direct engagement with families of specific brigades (142nd Mech. Bde.) indicates a proactive posture to maintain troop morale and address critical welfare issues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Setbacks/Challenges:
  • Continued civilian casualties and infrastructure damage in Kharkiv due to Russian Shahed attacks represent a significant setback, underscoring ongoing AD challenges. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • The Russian claim of advancing into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, even if unverified, highlights persistent pressure and the need for vigilance on all axes. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Successes:
  • Civilian Resilience & Emergency Response: The successful rescue operations in Kharkiv, including the extraction of individuals and animals, and the defiant civilian spirit, are significant humanitarian and morale successes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Effective Tactical Drone Operations: The continued showcasing of successful FPV drone strikes against Russian vehicles demonstrates ongoing tactical effectiveness and precision. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Proactive Family Support: Direct engagement with military families by the Coordination Staff for POW Affairs helps maintain morale and address critical needs, contributing to overall force readiness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal Security Vigilance: The rapid assessment of the Lviv school incident as staged demonstrates vigilance and effective internal security/law enforcement procedures to prevent panic and misdirection. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense: The persistent threat to urban centers necessitates continuous resupply and deployment of advanced AD systems and interceptor munitions, especially those optimized against UAVs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Counter-UAV/FPV Capabilities: Continued investment in both offensive FPV drones and defensive counter-drone technologies (EW, jammers) is essential to maintain tactical advantage and protect personnel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Humanitarian & Medical Aid: The ongoing civilian casualties demand sustained humanitarian aid, medical supplies, and resources for reconstruction and psychological support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Information Warfare Resources: Enhanced resources for proactive counter-disinformation campaigns are required to combat sophisticated Russian PSYOPs and maintain public trust. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives:
  • "Human Shield" Propaganda: "Операция Z" actively promotes the narrative that Zelensky is intentionally keeping civilians in cities as "human shields," a highly inflammatory and dehumanizing claim designed to justify indiscriminate attacks and sow public distrust in Ukrainian leadership. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Exaggerated Military Gains: "Поддубный |Z|О|V| edition" propagates unverified claims of Russian advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, aiming to inflate Russian successes and demoralize Ukrainian audiences. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Foreign Mercenary Disinformation: The "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" video's inclusion of a Union Jack patch in a purported ambush scene is a deliberate attempt to portray foreign fighter casualties, implying external interference and undermining their perceived effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal Stability Projection: Russian official channels (TASS, police, milbloggers) are actively showcasing government focus on internal issues (migration, cybercrime, law enforcement), aiming to project an image of stability and control amidst the conflict. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Judicial Warfare for IO: News of individuals sentenced for "treason" or "terrorism" (e.g., Samara artist, former RT employee) serves to reinforce the narrative of a just war and internal threats, aiming to deter dissent and justify state actions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • "Goodwill" Propaganda: "Народная милиция ДНР"'s promotion of aid collections for children is a soft power propaganda effort to project a caring image. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • US Political Manipulation: TASS continues to publish content regarding Trump's statements on Russia and Ukraine, likely attempting to signal potential shifts in US policy and influence international perceptions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Counter-Narratives:
  • Documenting Resilience & War Crimes: "Оперативний ЗСУ"'s video from Kharkiv directly counters Russian narratives by showcasing civilian resilience and the direct impact of Russian strikes on non-military targets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Highlighting Tactical Effectiveness: FPV drone footage from "Воин DV" demonstrates Ukrainian tactical successes and technological prowess, countering Russian claims of battlefield dominance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Transparency & Support for Military: The Coordination Staff for POW Affairs' meeting with military families signals transparency and dedicated support, bolstering public trust and morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Exposing Staged Events: "РБК-Україна"'s analysis of the Lviv school incident as staged demonstrates proactive counter-disinformation on domestic issues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Diplomatic Engagements: The report on the Serbian President's visit to Ukraine highlights continued international support, countering Russian efforts to isolate Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: The resilience displayed by Kharkiv civilians, particularly the defiant singing of the national anthem, indicates strong national morale despite ongoing suffering. Tactical successes (FPV drones) and visible support for military families will further boost morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). The ability to identify and dismiss staged incidents (Lviv school) helps maintain public trust and prevent panic. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Morale: Russian narratives of battlefield advances and internal security successes are aimed at bolstering domestic morale. However, the persistent focus on internal issues like migration and cybercrime may indicate underlying public anxieties about stability and the effectiveness of governance. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• International Morale: Continued Russian targeting of civilians in Kharkiv will likely reinforce international condemnation and solidify support for Ukraine. Ukrainian demonstrations of effective defense and tactical prowess will incentivize continued military aid. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Russian disinformation campaigns, if effectively countered, may diminish international trust in Russian official sources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• The visit of Serbian President Vučić to Ukraine for a summit is a significant diplomatic development, indicating continued engagement and support from Southeast European partners. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• The ongoing civilian casualties in Kharkiv will continue to pressure international partners to provide more comprehensive air defense systems and humanitarian assistance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian efforts to project strong ties with DPRK (Kim Jong Un's message to Putin) aim to signal a robust anti-Western bloc, which may influence Western resolve. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Judicial actions against individuals perceived as supporting Ukraine (e.g., former RT employee in Estonia, Samara artist) highlight the broader hybrid conflict and the need for international legal and diplomatic responses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Sustained Aerial Attacks on Kharkiv and other Border/Frontline Cities: Russia will continue using Shahed UAVs and potentially KABs against Kharkiv and other urban centers to attrit AD, inflict civilian casualties, and exhaust emergency services. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Continued Attritional Ground Operations on Donetsk Axes: Russia will maintain relentless pressure on Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Toretsk, conducting attritional assaults with artillery and tactical air support, aiming for incremental gains and to fix Ukrainian forces. Claims of advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast will likely persist as an IO tactic. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intensified Information Operations (IO) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPs): Russia will escalate disinformation campaigns, particularly focusing on "human shield" narratives, exaggerated advances, and foreign mercenary involvement, to undermine Ukrainian morale and influence international perceptions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Reinforced Internal Security Measures and Judicial Warfare: Russia will continue its crackdown on internal dissent and perceived "agents," leveraging such detentions and judicial processes for propaganda purposes, aiming to project strength and control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Exploitation of Border Areas for Pressure: Continued kinetic activity in Sumy and Kursk Oblasts to draw Ukrainian reserves and generate a "buffer zone" narrative, as previously assessed. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Large-Scale Offensive on a New Axis (e.g., Sumy or Dnipropetrovsk): Russia, having conducted extensive shaping operations and probes, commits significant operational reserves to a new axis (e.g., Sumy/Dnipropetrovsk), attempting a rapid, deep penetration of Ukrainian lines to force a large-scale Ukrainian withdrawal or commitment of strategic reserves under disadvantageous conditions. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Coordinated Massed Strike on Ukrainian Strategic Communications/Civilian Infrastructure: Russia conducts a highly coordinated, multi-domain attack (missiles, drones, cyber) targeting key Ukrainian civilian communications networks, media outlets, and critical infrastructure (beyond just energy), aiming to disrupt national cohesion, spread panic, and degrade Ukraine's ability to wage information warfare. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Introduction of Advanced EW/Counter-UAV Systems in Key Sectors: Russia introduces and effectively employs a new generation of electronic warfare (EW) or counter-UAV systems that significantly degrade Ukraine's highly effective FPV drone capabilities in a critical sector, creating a temporary tactical advantage that could lead to localized Russian breakthroughs. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Next 1-3 Hours (Immediate Threat): Continued monitoring for follow-on Shahed/KAB attacks on Kharkiv and other urban centers. Decision Point: Immediate reinforcement of AD assets for Kharkiv and other vulnerable urban areas if an increase in aerial activity is detected. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Next 3-6 Hours: Monitor Russian ground force movements in the vicinity of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to verify or refute claims of advancement. Decision Point: If confirmed, assess threat level and begin planning for potential repositioning of reserves. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Next 6-12 Hours: Closely monitor Russian information channels for further PSYOPs related to the "human shield" narrative or foreign mercenary involvement. Decision Point: Proactively launch counter-disinformation campaigns to discredit these narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Next 24-48 Hours (Medium Term): Assess any new tactical adaptations or counter-measures by Russia against the highly effective Ukrainian FPV drone operations. Decision Point: Adapt Ukrainian FPV drone tactics and consider counter-counter-measures if Russian EW/AD capabilities are enhanced. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Next 72 Hours (Medium Term): Analyze the broader diplomatic impact of the Serbian President's visit to Ukraine and any Russian counter-moves on the diplomatic front. Decision Point: Leverage diplomatic successes to secure further international support and isolate Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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6. RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR is paramount):

  1. CRITICAL/IMMEDIATE PRIORITY: Task all available ISR assets to verify and quantify Russian ground force movements and claimed advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Prioritize distinguishing between localized probes, fixing operations, and genuine attempts at large-scale offensives. (Collection Requirement: IMINT (satellite/aerial), SIGINT, HUMINT, OSINT).
  2. HIGH PRIORITY: Maintain persistent tactical ISR on Donetsk axes (Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, Toretsk) to anticipate Russian breakthroughs and identify high-value targets (e.g., C2 nodes, troop concentrations, logistics), especially given the intensity of engagements. (Collection Requirement: IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT).
  3. CRITICAL PRIORITY: Continue to rapidly analyze and proactively counter Russian information operations, particularly the "human shield" narrative and disinformation regarding foreign fighters. Develop and disseminate clear, factual counter-narratives. (Collection Requirement: OSINT, HUMINT).
  4. TACTICAL ISR: Expand and sustain highly effective FPV drone operations to continuously attrit Russian personnel and vehicles across all active fronts. Prioritize targeting of enemy drone operators, artillery, and logistics. (Collection Requirement: TECHINT (enemy counter-drone TTPs), BDA).
  5. INTERNAL SECURITY SUPPORT: Provide all necessary intelligence support to Ukrainian internal security services (SBU, National Police) to effectively counter staged events and identify foreign information influence operations within Ukraine.

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. CRITICAL/IMMEDIATE: Maintain highest AD alert for Kharkiv, Odesa, and other critical urban centers. Expedite delivery and deployment of additional advanced AD systems and munitions, particularly those effective against Shahed UAVs and KABs. Explore passive defense measures and hardened shelters for critical civilian infrastructure.
  2. URGENT: Disseminate lessons learned from successful FPV drone operations (e.g., "Воин DV" footage) to all ground units. Emphasize the importance of dispersal, robust camouflage, and active counter-drone measures (personal jammers, vigilant watch, rapid response to drone threats).
  3. FORCE PROTECTION (Civilian): Continue and expand support for DSNS and police rescue operations in urban areas. Advocate for international assistance for specialized rescue equipment, medical supplies, and psychological support for civilian casualties.
  4. CRITICAL: Accelerate procurement and deployment of advanced counter-UAV systems for frontline units, including those capable of disrupting precision loitering munitions and protecting high-value targets. Prioritize training operators in offensive counter-UAV tactics.

• Ground Forces:

  1. IMMEDIATE: Commanders in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and other potentially new axes of attack must remain at a heightened state of readiness. Reinforce defensive positions, conduct aggressive reconnaissance-in-force, and prepare for potential larger-scale Russian ground offensives.
  2. TACTICAL: Units on the Donetsk and Kharkiv axes must continue to maintain robust defenses and conduct targeted counter-attacks, leveraging precision assets like FPV drones and artillery against high-value enemy targets.
  3. LOGISTICS: Ensure continuous and resilient supply lines to frontline units, prioritizing drone components, medical supplies, and engineering materials. Continue to leverage initiatives like the Coordination Staff for POW Affairs to support military families, which contributes directly to morale and sustainment.
  4. PERSONNEL: Intensify personnel mobilization, training, and rotation to sustain defensive lines and address the impact of casualties. Ensure comprehensive support for returning personnel and their families.
  5. RESERVE MANAGEMENT: Maintain strategic reserves in a flexible posture, ready for rapid deployment to any axis where a Russian breakthrough or significant offensive materializes. Avoid over-commitment to shaping operations.

• Information Operations (IO):

  1. CRITICAL/IMMEDIATE: Immediately and widely publicize confirmed footage of Russian strikes on civilian targets (Kharkiv) and the resilience of the Ukrainian people. Directly counter the Russian "human shield" narrative with evidence of indiscriminate targeting.
  2. URGENT: Leverage footage of successful Ukrainian FPV drone strikes to demonstrate tactical effectiveness and technological advantage, countering Russian claims of dominance and foreign fighter disinformation.
  3. STRATEGIC: Proactively expose and condemn Russian PSYOPs, especially those attempting to sow panic (e.g., Sumy evacuation claims from previous reports) or erode trust in Ukrainian leadership. Provide timely, factual updates from official Ukrainian sources.
  4. COUNTER-DISINFORMATION: Counter Russian narratives justifying internal crackdowns (e.g., Samara artist, former RT employee) by emphasizing their authoritarian nature and lack of due process. Frame Russian judicial actions as tools of political oppression.
  5. DIPLOMATIC IO: Use confirmed intelligence (civilian casualties, tactical successes, Russian disinformation) to reinforce appeals for advanced Western military aid, especially AD, and to press for increased sanctions on Russia's military-industrial complex. Highlight strong diplomatic ties (e.g., Serbian President's visit) to project international support.