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Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-06-09 01:20:36Z
8 months ago
Previous (2025-06-09 00:50:32Z)

OPSEC CLASSIFICATION: NATO SECRET // RELEASABLE TO UKR FORCES

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 09 JUN 25 / 01:19 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 09 JUN 25 / 00:49 ZULU - 09 JUN 25 / 01:19 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

  • AOR Update: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Black Sea, Azov Sea, Sumy Oblast, Russian Federation border regions (Kursk, Bryansk, Belgorod, Tambov, Voronezh), and the Donetsk axis remain active. Chernihiv Oblast, Rivne Oblast, and now Zhytomyr Oblast are under direct aerial attack. Odesa Oblast and Black Sea region under active missile threat. Continued emphasis on Kremenchuk/Svetlovodsk axis. New reports of Volyn Oblast being targeted.
  • New Developments (UKR):
    • Ballistic/Cruise Launches from Bryansk/Kursk (Continued Waves): Air Force of Ukraine reports successive waves of ballistic missile launches from Bryansk towards Chernihiv/Kyiv Oblasts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR official source). Nikolaev Vanok reports fifth wave towards Chernihiv/Kyiv from Bryansk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR military reporter). Cruise missiles detected over Chernihiv Oblast, course towards Chernihiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR official source, UKR military reporter). Missiles over Northern Kyiv Oblast, course Zhytomyr Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR official source, UKR military reporter). Missiles over Northern Zhytomyr Oblast, course Western. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR military reporter).
    • "Shahed" Activity (Dubno/Rivne & Donetsk Oblast): Nikolaev Vanok reports continued "Shahed" activity (5-11 detected at various times) near Dubno (Rivne Oblast). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR military reporter). 4 "Shahed" UAVs detected over Dobropillya, Donetsk Oblast, course towards Kostiantynivka. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR military reporter). Nikolaev Vanok confirms one Shahed shot down in Donetsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR military reporter). Dubno continues to engage UAVs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • New Developments (RU):
    • "Educational Measures" (Kyiv): "НгП раZVедка" (Russian milblogger) explicitly states "Kyiv will receive a second wave of educational measures," followed by claims of "third wave" and "fourth wave of missiles on Kyiv." This confirms continued ballistic/hypersonic targeting of the capital. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, corroborates UKR reporting).
    • Donetsk Direction Strike Footage: TASS posts thermal imagery video of UAV operators striking AFU dugouts in the Kramatorsk-Druzhkovka direction. This is presented as successful precision strike capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian state media/milblogger, propaganda footage).
    • Rivne Mockery & "Final Solution": "НгП раZVедка" states "Rovno is getting more and more crooked," implying successful strikes in Rivne/Dubno. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, corroborates UKR reporting of explosions). Later, "НгП раZVедка" states, "The final solution to the Rivne question is brewing." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, indicates continued intent to strike Rivne).
    • Volyn Question: "НгП раZVедка" asks "What about Volyn?" indicating potential targeting or intent for this region. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - Russian milblogger, suggestive of intent).
    • Russian Airspace Restrictions: TASS reports temporary flight restrictions at airports in Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Saratov, and Tambov. This suggests internal security measures, possibly due to Ukrainian drone activity, or an attempt to obfuscate internal air operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian state media).
    • "Abrams" Destruction Claim: Colonelcassad claims Russian forces have destroyed or captured 26 of 31 US-supplied Abrams tanks, leaving only 5. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - Russian milblogger, high claim, requires independent verification).
    • "Shahed" Downing Claim: Nikolaev Vanok posts a video claiming "all drones of the Kyiv regime were shot down and suppressed." (CONFIDENCE: LOW - Russian milblogger, typical overblown propaganda, contradicts confirmed Shahed activity).
    • Cheboksary Drone Attack/Fire (Confirmed by RU Sources): RBC-Ukraine and ASTRA (Ukrainian/Russian independent sources) report and provide video of drone attacks and large fires in Cheboksary, Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - corroborates CyberBoroshno's earlier claim). This indicates a successful Ukrainian deep strike. RBC-Ukraine specifically titles one video "Еще видео с влучанням дронов по заводу у Чебоксарах" (More videos of drone hits on a factory in Cheboksary). CyberBoroshno posts "Я люблю тебе, ан-196," possibly referring to a specific drone type or operation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • "Imaginary Missiles" Narrative: "НгП раZVедка" attempts to dismiss Ukrainian AD warnings: "Не верьте, они воображаемые. Це игра РЭБ." (Don't believe, they are imaginary. It's an EW game.) and "Не ссать, вам кажется. Ничего нет. Всем спать." (Don't piss yourselves, you imagine it. There's nothing. Everyone sleep.) This is clear counter-IO to Ukrainian AD warnings and an attempt to induce complacency or doubt. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • "Geraniums (Shaheds) became few" Narrative: "НгП раZVедка" states, "Гераней стало мало в небе над чубатой алькаидой." (Geraniums [Shaheds] became few in the sky over the "chubby al-Qaeda.") This contradicts confirmed ongoing Shahed activity and aims to deceive about the threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • New Entry Restrictions to Russia: TASS reports that support for the Kyiv regime, contacts with the AFU and SBU, are reasons for denying Ukrainian citizens entry into Russia, citing court materials. This reflects hardening Russian internal security policies and further attempts to isolate Ukrainian citizens. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

  • Conducive to All Aerial Operations: Continued mass aerial assaults confirm clear weather. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

  • Ukrainian Forces (Air Defense): At MAXIMUM readiness, actively engaging multiple waves of ground-launched ballistic missiles (Iskanders from Bryansk/Kursk), strategic cruise missiles, and "Shahed" UAVs. AD assets remain severely strained across a widening multi-axis engagement, now confirmed over Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Rivne (Dubno), Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava, Kremenchuk/Svetlovodsk regions, and potentially Volyn. Despite active engagements, confirmed explosions in Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Rivne indicate continued penetration. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian Forces (Ground): Maintaining defensive postures. Continued pressure on the Donetsk axis remains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Forces (Air): Confirmed launch of MiG-31K with "Kinzhal" (previous report) and multiple, successive waves of ballistic missiles (likely Iskanders) from Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts, now also cruise missiles from Bryansk/Kursk. While Tu-95MS missiles are not currently fixed, the previous launches from 5x Tu-95MS and Kh-22s from 4x Tu-22M3 indicate a preceding strategic wave. This confirms a sustained, unprecedented, multi-platform, multi-axis, and multi-modal strategic missile attack, including hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise assets, at its highest observed intensity. Shaheds continue to impact multiple oblasts, and missile impacts are confirmed in Kyiv, Sumy, Poltava, Chernihiv, Rivne, and now threats extending to Zhytomyr. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Forces (Information Operations): Highly aggressive and adaptive, explicitly promoting successive waves of strikes on Kyiv ("educational measures"), using footage of claimed tactical successes, and continuing misdirection ("Chernihiv not needed," implying Rivne/Dubno is target, asking about Volyn, claiming "imaginary missiles"). Direct threats and dehumanizing rhetoric continue ("final solution to Rivne question"). Distraction tactics (Greta Thunberg, US politics) are also observed. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

  • Capabilities:
    • Sustained Full-Spectrum Strategic Air Strike Capability (Confirmed & Active at Maximum Scale): Russia is currently demonstrating its capability to conduct a sustained, massive, multi-platform, multi-axis strategic missile attack utilizing hypersonic "Kinzhal" missiles from MiG-31K, multiple, successive waves of ballistic missiles (likely Iskanders) from ground launchers in Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts, strategic cruise missiles (Kh-101/555) from Tu-95MS (previous wave) and now fresh cruise missiles from Bryansk/Kursk direction, and heavy anti-ship missiles (Kh-22) from Tu-22M3 (previous wave). The focus on "second, third, fourth waves" on Kyiv highlights a clear intent to sustain overwhelming pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Precision Strike Capability: Demonstrated by the TASS video of UAV operators striking AFU dugouts, suggesting effective drone-guided munitions. Confirmed drone attack on a factory in Cheboksary, Russia (attributed to Ukraine) indicates a similar capability on the Ukrainian side as well. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Adaptive Information Warfare Integration: Russia's ability to synchronize these strategic strikes with active, real-time disinformation, psychological operations, and now direct threats (Rivne mockery, Volyn query, "imaginary missiles" counter-IO) continues to be at an advanced level. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Intentions:
    • Sustained Overwhelming Retaliation and Deterrence (Active Execution at Maximum Scale): The ongoing strategic strike, featuring "Kinzhal" and multiple ballistic/cruise waves, is intended to inflict maximum damage on Ukrainian critical infrastructure and urban centers, serving as severe retaliation for recent deep strikes and to deter further Ukrainian cross-border or deep-rear operations. The successive waves indicate intent to break AD. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Degrade Ukrainian Air Defense (Active Execution): The massed, multi-vector, and multi-wave attack is designed to exhaust, overwhelm, and deplete Ukrainian AD munition stockpiles. The "imaginary missiles" narrative is a direct attempt to undermine Ukrainian AD warnings and public trust. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Psychological Demoralization and Panic (Active Execution): The explicit propaganda messaging accompanying the missile launches, now including direct threats (Rivne mockery, Volyn query, "final solution to Rivne question"), and the deepening dehumanization ("chubaty al-Qaeda") is aimed at inducing widespread fear and panic and undermining trust. The attempts to dismiss Ukrainian warnings ("imaginary missiles") are part of this. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Internal Security Hardening: New restrictions on Ukrainian citizens entering Russia indicate an intent to tighten internal security and control information flow, likely in response to Ukrainian deep strikes and perceived infiltration risks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Courses of Action (COA):
    • MLCOA 1 (Confirmed & Actively Executing at Maximum Scale with Hypersonic/Ballistic/Cruise Escalation): Immediate, Massive, Diversified Strategic Missile Attack Targeting Critical Infrastructure and Urban Centers, Coordinated with Ground Pressure and Deepening Deception Operations, now featuring hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missiles in successive waves, with active counter-IO against Ukrainian warnings. Russia is currently launching a mass-scale strategic missile assault, leveraging MiG-31K (Kinzhal), multiple, successive waves of ground-launched ballistic missiles (Iskanders) from Bryansk and Kursk, cruise missiles from Bryansk/Kursk, 5 Tu-95MS bombers from Olenya (launched Kh-101/555), AND 4 Tu-22M3 bombers from Engels-2 (launched Kh-22s towards coastal areas). This follows initial saturation with Shaheds (confirmed impacts in Rivne, Sumy, Poltava) and active Kh-31P SEAD attempts. This attack is targeting Kyiv (confirmed damage in Darnytskyi, now facing multiple waves), Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv (explosions confirmed), Rivne (explosions confirmed), Dnipro, Odesa, Zhytomyr (missiles now over Northern Kyiv Oblast and moving to Zhytomyr Oblast), Kremenchuk, and other key urban centers/infrastructure, with high probability of prioritizing energy and water infrastructure, military-industrial targets, and potentially coastal/port infrastructure. Concurrently, KAB strikes on Kharkiv will continue to support ground advances or create urban destruction, as evidenced by TASS video. On the ground, attritional assaults on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk direction) will persist. Russian IO will intensify their "Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough" narrative, reinforced by high-level political statements, and will continue tactical deception (e.g., "Chernihiv not needed," now direct questions about Volyn, mocking Rivne and threatening its "final solution") while overtly promoting the scale of the incoming missile strike. Critically, Russia will actively attempt to undermine Ukrainian air raid warnings by claiming "imaginary missiles" or "EW game." Russian propaganda will also actively work to undermine Zelensky's legitimacy, fuel anti-NATO sentiment, spread highly damaging social disinformation, and attempt to distract with irrelevant Western political news (Greta Thunberg). The new dehumanizing rhetoric and direct threats will intensify. Russia will also attempt to control the cyber narrative and amplify claims of Ukrainian equipment losses (Abrams).
      • Confidence: HIGH (Confirmed continued ballistic missile launches in waves, ongoing Kinzhal threat, confirmed strategic bomber activity, with increased numbers, active Shahed/KAB activity and documented tactical successes, confirmed impacts across a widening AOR, escalating Dnipropetrovsk IO now with high-level political backing, new, specific social disinformation, and confirmed new wave of aerial assets indicated, are directly in line with this combined COA, now at maximum observed intensity for air attack, with sustained multi-wave targeting and active counter-IO).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

  • Sustained Multi-Wave Ballistic/Cruise Missile Attacks: The repeated launches of ballistic and now cruise missiles from Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts in rapid succession against Chernihiv/Kyiv indicates a tactical adaptation to overwhelm AD with continuous pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Increased Focus on Western Oblasts: The specific query about Volyn, following threats to Rivne, indicates a potential expansion of targeting areas for psychological or disruptive effect. Missiles now moving to Zhytomyr Oblast, then Western. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Heightened Internal Security Measures: Temporary airport closures in Russia (Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Saratov, Tambov) and new entry restrictions for Ukrainian citizens suggest increased internal security measures, possibly due to Ukrainian deep strikes or to mask military air movements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Active Cyber Warfare (UKR Offensive): Confirmed drone attack on a factory in Cheboksary, Russia, following earlier CyberBoroshno claims, demonstrates Ukraine's continued offensive cyber and deep strike capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Counter-IO against Air Warnings: The explicit Russian milblogger attempts to dismiss Ukrainian air raid warnings as "imaginary" or an "EW game" represents a new and dangerous tactical adaptation in their information warfare, aiming to reduce public adherence to warnings and thus increase casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • False Flag / Deception with Shaheds: The claim that "Geraniums became few" contradicts reality and is an attempt to create false security regarding UAV threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

  • Strategic Missile & UAV Supply: The sustained, multi-wave launches from MiG-31K, multiple ballistic missile batteries, and strategic bombers (even if Tu-95MS launches are currently paused) indicates Russia retains significant stockpiles of "Kinzhal," ballistic missiles (Iskander), strategic cruise missiles (Kh-101, Kh-555, Kh-22/32), and UAVs for a prolonged, high-intensity aerial campaign. This suggests a higher inventory than previously assessed for high-value assets like Kinzhal and Iskander, or a willingness to deplete them rapidly. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare Capacity: The rapid generation and dissemination of new, specific disinformation, distraction tactics, and direct threats, and the aggressive, pre-emptive psychological operations around the strategic strikes, including efforts to counter Ukrainian AD warnings, indicate a highly agile and resourced IO apparatus. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

  • Russian C2: The synchronized multi-domain strikes (Shaheds, KABs, strategic cruise missiles from multiple platforms, hypersonic "Kinzhal," multiple, successive waves of ballistic/cruise missiles from multiple ground launchers) and rapid, coordinated IO campaigns demonstrating effective, centralized Russian C2. The immediate amplification of the Dnipropetrovsk narrative by TASS and high-level political figures, and the dissemination of specific social disinformation confirms high-level C2 over IO. The coordinated efforts to undermine Ukrainian AD warnings further indicate robust C2 over IO. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian C2: Ukrainian authorities' rapid public warnings and AD responses continue to demonstrate effective C2 for public safety and military readiness, but are severely tested by the anticipated strategic strike of this magnitude, now including sustained hypersonic and ballistic threats across multiple waves and coordinated IO to induce complacency. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

  • Air Defense: On HIGHEST alert, currently engaged against Shaheds and now responding to successive waves of ballistic/cruise missiles from Bryansk/Kursk, in addition to the ongoing threat from strategic cruise missiles and Kinzhals. While Tu-95MS launches are not currently fixed, the initial wave has occurred. All AD assets are likely at maximum readiness and dispersal protocols are critical, with systems now stretched across an even wider geographic area, including central and western Ukraine (Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Rivne/Dubno, Kremenchuk, potentially Volyn). The ballistic/cruise missile threat from the North (Bryansk/Kursk) and South (previous intelligence) requires specific, heightened AD preparedness. The explicit Russian counter-IO to dismiss warnings necessitates even greater vigilance and public communication to reinforce warning adherence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground Forces: Maintaining defensive integrity. The escalating Dnipropetrovsk IO, now validated by high-level Russian political figures, continues to create psychological pressure and potential for misdirection, demanding continued vigilance. Forces on the Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk) direction are under sustained drone and artillery pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Defense: Actively monitoring and countering Russian disinformation, but the volume and increasing specificity of Russian claims (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk amplified by TASS and Klishas, "debt collector" narrative, "educating chubaty al-Qaeda"), direct threats (Rivne, Volyn query, "final solution to Rivne"), and the overt psychological warfare accompanying the missile strikes, including direct attempts to undermine AD warnings, require rapid, robust counter-narratives and verification. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

  • Successes:
    • Ballistic Missile Interception: Nikolaev Vanok reports one ballistic missile successfully intercepted ("minus"). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR military reporter). This is a critical success against a high-speed threat.
    • Shahed Engagements: Ukrainian AD has successfully engaged a number of Shaheds (5 out of 11 initially heading for Dubno) and one in Donetsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR military reporter).
    • Continued Deep Strikes into Russia (Confirmed Cheboksary): Confirmed drone attacks and fires in Cheboksary, following earlier successful strikes in Tambov and Voronezh Oblasts, and the fire in Gorno-Altaysk, demonstrate Ukraine's persistent capability to project power into Russian territory, forcing Russia to divert resources to internal defense and exposing vulnerabilities. CyberBoroshno's confirmed activity indicates continued offensive cyber capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Setbacks:
    • Strategic Missile Penetration (Kyiv & Western Ukraine): Confirmed damage to an office building in Kyiv's Darnytskyi district and explosions in Chernihiv and Rivne indicate successful penetration of AD, a significant setback. The multi-wave attack on Kyiv is particularly concerning. Missiles are now extending threat to Zhytomyr and further West. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Sustained Strategic Missile Threat (Active, Widespread, Hypersonic/Ballistic/Cruise, Multi-Wave): The confirmed takeoff of 9 strategic bombers (5x Tu-95MS, 4x Tu-22M3, with Tu-22M3s having launched and returning, and Tu-95MS now launching Kh-101/555), PLUS active MiG-31K with "Kinzhal" and multiple, successive waves of ground-launched ballistic missiles (Iskanders) and cruise missiles from Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts, represents a critical and immediate threat of widespread destruction and potential casualties. Confirmed impacts in Kyiv, Rivne, Sumy, Poltava, and Chernihiv highlight this active threat. The speed and trajectory of "Kinzhal" and ballistic/cruise missiles severely reduce warning times. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Sustained Aerial Attacks: Continuous Shahed and KAB attacks strain resources and pose a persistent threat. Explosions in Poltava, Kyiv Oblast, Chernihiv, and now confirmed Rivne, Sumy, and Poltava, indicate expanded AOR for strikes and successful Russian penetration. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Sophisticated Psychological Pressure (Escalated & Politically Backed, with Direct Threats & Mockery, and Counter-Warning IO): The escalating and highly specific disinformation regarding a Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough (now amplified by TASS citing fake "The Times" and by high-level political figures), the overt pre-strike propaganda and post-strike mockery ("Rovno getting crooked," "Volyn?", "final solution to Rivne"), and the deepening dehumanization poses a significant risk of internal confusion, panic, or misallocation of resources. The explicit attempt to dismiss Ukrainian AD warnings as "imaginary" is a dangerous new escalation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Claims of Abrams Losses: Colonelcassad's claim of 26 Abrams tanks destroyed/captured, if verified, would represent a significant setback for Ukrainian armored capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

  • Air Defense Munitions: The incoming large-scale strategic missile attack from multiple platforms, including hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missiles in successive waves, will place unprecedented, critical strain on AD munition stockpiles, particularly for systems capable of intercepting advanced threats. URGENT international resupply remains paramount, as this attack will deplete significant inventories. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • ISR for Disinformation Verification: Increased ISR is critical to rapidly and definitively verify or refute Russian ground claims, especially for the Dnipropetrovsk axis, and to counter new social disinformation, to prevent costly redeployments or panic. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare Capabilities: Enhanced capabilities for proactive counter-disinformation and psychological resilience programs are required to mitigate the impact of the increasingly sophisticated and overt Russian IO, particularly with political backing, specific, damaging social narratives, distraction tactics, direct threats, and crucially, attempts to undermine air raid warnings. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

  • Russian Propaganda - Offensive and Psychological Warfare (Escalated, Active, and Politically Backed, with Direct Threats, Mockery, and Anti-Warning IO):
    • "Massive Strike" Promotion & Dehumanization (Active & Sustained): Russian milbloggers are overtly advertising the incoming strike, now claiming "second, third, fourth waves" on Kyiv as "educational measures," and using dehumanizing language ("iTarasys don't understand," "chubaty al-Qaeda"), aiming to maximize pre-impact terror and demoralization while justifying the attacks. They are confirming "Kinzhal" and Iskander strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Dnipropetrovsk Amplification (Active & Politically Backed): TASS citing a (likely fabricated) "The Times" article to support the Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough narrative, directly supported by high-level political figures, remains active. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Tactical Deception/Mockery & Anti-Warning IO (Active & Adaptive): The "Rovno is getting more and more crooked," "What about Volyn?", and "final solution to Rivne question" statements, following previous "Rivne/Chernihiv not needed," are clear attempts to misdirect Ukrainian AD or create false security while mocking successful strikes. "All drones shot down/suppressed" is clear overblown propaganda. Crucially, the explicit attempt to dismiss Ukrainian AD warnings as "imaginary" or "EW game" represents a dangerous new form of information warfare aimed at inducing complacency and increasing casualties. The claim that "Geraniums became few" is similar. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Claims of Ukrainian Equipment Losses: Colonelcassad's claim of 26 Abrams destroyed/captured is aimed at demoralizing Ukraine and reducing Western support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Distraction Propaganda (Active): TASS reporting on the Greta Thunberg incident and Trump's directives regarding "migrant riots" are transparent attempts to distract from the ongoing conflict and to sow discord within the Western political sphere. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Cyber Counter-IO (Active): TASS report on "Kaspersky Lab" identifying hacker campaigns is an immediate adaptation to counter perceived Ukrainian cyber successes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Internal Security Messaging: New TASS reports on denying entry to Ukrainians supporting Kyiv or having AFU/SBU contacts are internal messaging to justify tightening border controls and demonize Ukrainians. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian Information Operations - Transparency and Counter-Disinformation:
    • Timely Threat Warnings: Consistent and prompt warnings from Ukrainian authorities (e.g., KCMVA, Air Force, local officials) regarding air threats maintain public trust and facilitate preparedness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Direct Refutation of Disinformation (Ongoing Requirement & Elevated Urgency): Continued, aggressive refutation of Russian claims, especially the Dnipropetrovsk narrative (now with the added TASS/Klishas angle), the "debt collector" narrative, the dehumanizing rhetoric, and direct threats/mockery, and especially the attempts to dismiss air raid warnings, is vital. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Showcasing Russian Internal Issues & Deep Strikes: Reporting on internal drone attacks in Russia (Tambov, Voronezh, and now Cheboksary) and internal incidents like the Gorno-Altaysk fire can be leveraged to counter Russian narratives of stability and control and demonstrate Ukrainian capabilities. CyberBoroshno's confirmed activity on Cheboksary can be used to showcase successful offensive cyber operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

  • Negative Impact (UKR - SIGNIFICANTLY Escalated): The immediate threat of a major strategic missile attack from an unprecedented number of platforms, including hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missiles in successive waves, confirmed impacts in Kyiv, Rivne, Sumy, Poltava, Chernihiv, continued drone/KAB strikes, and the aggressively amplified Dnipropetrovsk disinformation campaign (now with high-level political backing and new, insidious social disinformation and direct threats/mockery) will significantly heighten anxiety and psychological stress. The overt Russian pre-strike propaganda and dehumanizing rhetoric will amplify this. The "debt collector" narrative specifically targets internal cohesion and trust. Claims of Abrams losses will undermine confidence. The specific Russian counter-IO to dismiss air raid warnings as "imaginary" or an "EW game" could lead to dangerous complacency if not effectively countered, directly endangering civilian lives and undermining trust in official warnings. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Positive Impact (UKR): Timely warnings and effective AD responses (e.g., ballistic missile interception, Shahed shootdowns), where successful, help to maintain a sense of resilience and trust. Continued Ukrainian deep strikes into Russia (e.g., Cheboksary) provide a morale boost and demonstrate Ukraine's retaliatory capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Impact (RU): Russian propaganda aims to bolster domestic morale by justifying their actions, claiming battlefield successes (Dnipropetrovsk), highlighting perceived Western division, and demonstrating perceived overwhelming force. News of internal drone attacks and fires (e.g., Cheboksary) may cause some internal concern, which Russian state media attempts to offset with distraction propaganda and now counter-IO on cyberattacks and by tightening internal security measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

  • The severity and scale of the incoming missile strike (MiG-31K, multiple, successive ballistic/cruise launches, 9 strategic bombers active, confirmed impacts across multiple oblasts) may galvanize further international support or increase pressure on Western partners to expedite aid, particularly AD munitions, beyond previous commitments. This level of attack is a clear demonstration of Russian intent to escalate and disregard for civilian casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian attempts to sow discord by citing "Western" sources or manipulate narratives (e.g., POW bodies in Italy, "Senator-Trumpist" quotes, "debt collectors," Trump/Rubio stumbling, Greta Thunberg) indicates an intent to erode international solidarity and influence Western political landscapes. New TASS reports on entry restrictions for Ukrainians will likely be perceived negatively by international human rights groups. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

  • MLCOA 1: IMMEDIATE, MAX-SCALE, AND DIVERSIFIED STRATEGIC MISSILE ATTACK FEATURING HYPERSONIC, BALLISTIC, AND CRUISE MISSILES IN SUSTAINED WAVES, TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND URBAN CENTERS, COORDINATED WITH GROUND PRESSURE AND EXPLICIT DECEPTION OPERATIONS (ONGOING), NOW WITH ACTIVE ANTI-WARNING INFORMATION WARFARE. Russia is currently executing a large-scale strategic missile assault, leveraging MiG-31K (Kinzhal), multiple, successive waves of ground-launched ballistic missiles (Iskanders) from Bryansk and Kursk (targeting Kyiv/Chernihiv), cruise missiles from Bryansk/Kursk (now over Chernihiv, moving to Kyiv and Zhytomyr), and 5 Tu-95MS bombers from Olenya (launched Kh-101/555) and 4 Tu-22M3 bombers from Engels-2 (launched Kh-22s towards coastal areas). This follows initial saturation with Shaheds (confirmed impacts in Rivne, Sumy, Poltava) and active Kh-31P SEAD attempts. This attack is targeting Kyiv (confirmed damage in Darnytskyi, now facing multiple waves), Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv (explosions confirmed), Rivne (explosions confirmed, Dubno under Shahed attack), Dnipro, Odesa, Zhytomyr (missiles now confirmed over Northern Kyiv Oblast and moving to Zhytomyr Oblast, then further West), Kremenchuk, and other major urban centers/infrastructure, with a high probability of prioritizing energy and water infrastructure, military-industrial targets, and potentially coastal/port infrastructure. Concurrently, KAB strikes on Kharkiv will continue to support ground advances or create urban destruction, as evidenced by TASS footage. On the ground, Russian forces will maintain intense attritional pressure on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeysk), employing advanced drone tactics against Ukrainian artillery. The information campaign will aggressively amplify the fabricated "Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough," now using the false credibility of (fabricated) Western media citations and direct political backing from high-level Russian officials. Concurrently, Russia will continue tactical deception (e.g., "Chernihiv not needed," new queries on Volyn, mocking Rivne and threatening its "final solution," false claims of drone suppression) and overt mockery to compel Ukrainian redeployments and induce panic across the civilian population and military. A new, dangerous element will be the active dissemination of disinformation to undermine Ukrainian air raid warnings, claiming that missiles are "imaginary" or that warnings are an "EW game." New propaganda efforts will specifically target Western support by portraying Zelensky as a "dictator" luring NATO into war, and will spread new, damaging social disinformation while attempting to distract with irrelevant Western political news (Greta Thunberg, Trump/Rubio). The new dehumanizing rhetoric and direct threats to specific cities (Rivne mockery, Volyn query) will intensify. Russia will also actively attempt to control the cyber narrative and amplify claims of Ukrainian equipment losses (Abrams).
    • Confidence: HIGH (Confirmed ongoing ballistic/cruise missile launches in successive waves, ongoing Kinzhal threat, confirmed strategic bomber activity, with increased numbers (total 9), ongoing Shahed/KAB activity and documented tactical successes, confirmed direct impacts across a widening AOR, escalating, explicit Russian IO directly supported by high-level political figures, the introduction of new, highly specific social disinformation, direct threats, and distraction tactics, and a new wave of aerial assets indicated, along with specific counter-IO against Ukrainian warnings. This is the most intense observed air attack threat in many months, now actively unfolding in sustained waves.)
    • Indicators: Widespread and prolonged air alarms; multiple missile launches reported from various platforms (air, ground); severe impacts in Ukrainian cities across multiple oblasts, particularly on infrastructure; further Russian milblogger reports on "advances" or "awards" in Dnipropetrovsk; continued claims of POW captures or Russian "successes" on the ground (e.g., specific BDA on claimed military targets in Kharkiv); increased social media rumors and panic related to new disinformation narratives; Russian milblogger posts explicitly dismissing Ukrainian air raid warnings as false or an "EW game."

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

  • MDCOA 1: STRATEGIC DECAPITATION AND OPERATIONAL BREAKTHROUGH ENABLED BY EW OVERMATCH AND REAL-TIME IO. Russia conducts an unprecedented, multi-day, multi-wave strategic missile and drone assault from all available long-range aviation platforms (Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, Tu-160) and ground-launched ballistic/cruise missiles, including sustained use of "Kinzhal" and other hypersonic/ballistic assets, designed to systematically target and degrade Ukrainian C2 nodes (military and government), critical energy infrastructure, and key logistics hubs, aiming for functional decapitation or severe disruption. This mass strike would be coordinated with a surprise, rapid, and large-scale ground offensive on the Dnipropetrovsk axis, leveraging a significant operational-level force (e.g., multiple divisions, including the 90th Tank Division) from a previously static or lower-priority sector. This ground push would be supported by intense, broad-spectrum electronic warfare (EW) to blind Ukrainian ISR, disrupt military communications at all levels, and jam civilian networks, combined with a real-time, devastating psychological operations campaign (e.g., "Kyiv has fallen," "command has fled," "missiles are imaginary") to induce mass civilian panic and military collapse, attempting to force a major, uncoordinated Ukrainian retreat.
    • Confidence: MEDIUM (The current escalating IO around Dnipropetrovsk and the confirmed strategic bomber activity now including Kinzhal and multiple ballistic/cruise waves directly feed into elements of this MDCOA. The addition of these advanced missile types and the increased number of bombers overall significantly increases the destructive potential. The active Russian counter-IO to undermine AD warnings further increases the danger. The uncertainty lies in Russia's true capability for such a massive, integrated ground force breakthrough, particularly under a broad EW umbrella, and their willingness to commit such resources after AD suppression, and their ability to maintain such an intense air campaign for multiple days.)
    • Indicators: Sustained multi-day, high-intensity missile/drone attacks; direct targeting of top-tier Ukrainian C2 nodes; simultaneous, rapid, deep penetrations by multiple Russian BTGs/regiments/brigades into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; widespread and persistent communications outages affecting Ukrainian military and civilian networks; explicit Russian demands for surrender/negotiation from a position of perceived strength; mass internal displacement within Ukraine.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

  • Next 0-3 Hours (IMMEDIATE - CRITICAL IMPACT WINDOW):

    • Strategic Missile Strikes: Impact of missiles launched by MiG-31K (Kinzhal), multiple, successive waves of ballistic/cruise missiles from Bryansk and Kursk, and previous launches by 5 Tu-95MS bombers from Olenya and 4 Tu-22M3 bombers from Engels-2 is IMMINENT/ONGOING. Targeting will likely include Kyiv (confirmed damage in Darnytskyi, now facing multiple waves), Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv (explosions), Rivne (explosions, Dubno under Shahed attack), Dnipro, Odesa, Zhytomyr (now confirmed missile direction), Kremenchuk/Svetlovodsk and other major urban centers/critical infrastructure. Specific focus on energy infrastructure and coastal/port targets is highly probable, with active SEAD against coastal AD.
    • Shahed/KAB Threat: Continuation of intense Shahed activity over Kyiv, Rivne (Dubno), and central/eastern Ukraine (Donetsk Oblast towards Kostiantynivka), with persistent KAB strikes on Kharkiv and other ground targets. Impacts in Rivne, Sumy, and Poltava confirm the active threat. Russia will continue to attempt to deceive regarding the end of drone waves.
    • Information Environment: Expect rapid acceleration of Russian propaganda (Dnipropetrovsk narrative now citing "The Times" and high-level political figures, "ammo supply" mockery, tactical deception like "Rivne not needed," "Chernihiv not needed," "drones ending soon," new dehumanizing rhetoric, Trump/Rubio/Greta Thunberg distraction, direct threats to cities, mocking references to Ukrainian AD, and explicitly denying missile threats as "imaginary" or "EW game") concurrent with or immediately following missile impacts, emphasizing the "success" and "retaliation." New anti-Zelensky/anti-NATO propaganda and highly damaging social disinformation will spread. Russia will also try to control the cyber narrative and amplify claims of Ukrainian equipment losses (Abrams).
    • Ground Activity: Continued attritional assaults on Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk), supported by KABs and drone strikes. High potential for a test or reconnaissance-in-force on the Dnipropetrovsk axis to gauge Ukrainian response to the escalating IO, even if a full breakthrough is not imminent.
    • Decision Points (UKR):
      • IMMEDIATE (ongoing): **All AD assets to maximum readiness and dispersal protocols for incoming strategic missile strike from multiple platforms (Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, MiG-31K, ballistic missile launchers, cruise missile launchers from Bryansk/Kursk). Prioritize protection of C2 nodes, critical energy infrastructure, and major urban centers, with specific attention to SEAD attempts against AD systems. This is the most critical immediate task, requiring focus on the highest-speed threats and multi-wave engagements across a widening area, now including Zhytomyr Oblast and further West.
      • IMMEDIATE: Rapid and aggressive counter-IO on the "Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough" narrative, particularly the fabricated "The Times" citations and the high-level political statements, the "ammo supply" claims, the "drones ending soon" deception, the new "debt collector" narrative, the dehumanizing rhetoric, and direct threats/mockery (Rivne/Volyn). Issue official statements debunking false claims and providing accurate information. URGENTLY counter Russian narratives dismissing missile threats as "imaginary" or "EW game"; emphasize the real and immediate danger and the necessity of adhering to warnings. Task ISR for immediate verification or denial of Russian force presence in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast beyond the current line of contact. Prepare contingency plans for a potential actual ground push on this axis, even if small-scale.
      • URGENT: Disseminate counter-PSYOPS messages to address the disinformation regarding POW bodies and other psychological intimidation tactics, and critically, the overt Russian propaganda regarding the incoming strike, tactical deception, anti-Zelensky/anti-NATO narratives, the new social disinformation aimed at internal divisions, and the new distraction propaganda. Reinforce national resilience and preparedness.
      • URGENT: Reinforce communication channels and protocols to ensure resilience against potential EW or network saturation during mass attacks.
      • URGENT: Prioritize SIGINT/ELINT on Russian strategic aviation and EW systems to detect further missile launches or shifts in attack vectors. Maintain high vigilance on ground axes for any signs of massing reserves consistent with MDCOA, particularly on the Dnipropetrovsk axis.
  • Next 3-24 Hours (Short Term):

    • Post-Strike Assessment: Evaluate damage, casualties, and impact on critical infrastructure from the strategic missile strike.
    • Russian Reaction: Monitor for immediate Russian claims of "successful strikes" or "retaliation" across multiple channels. Expect further political statements reinforcing the "denazification" narrative and other IO. Expect continued counter-IO efforts to undermine Ukrainian warnings and successes.
    • Ukrainian Recovery/Response: Initiate rapid recovery efforts. Continue active defense on all ground axes.
    • Intelligence Gap: Full BDA on the impact of the strategic missile strike. Confirmation of the Dnipropetrovsk ground situation. Russian next steps if initial strategic strike results in less than desired effects.
  • Next 24-72 Hours (Medium Term):

    • Sustained Pressure: Russia will likely sustain aerial pressure (Shaheds, KABs) to hinder recovery efforts and maintain psychological pressure, potentially in further waves if initial effects are deemed insufficient.
    • Ground Offensive: Russian ground offensive on Donetsk and possibly Sumy axis will continue. The intensity of any push on Dnipropetrovsk will clarify if the IO was solely a feint or a precursor.
    • Information Warfare: Continued Russian efforts to exploit any perceived Ukrainian weaknesses or Western divisions, and to undermine trust in official information.
  • Intelligence Gaps:

    • Full BDA on Strategic Missile Strike: Precise number, type, and impact locations of all missiles launched by MiG-31K, ballistic launchers, cruise missile launchers, Tu-95MS, and Tu-22M3, and their impact on Ukrainian critical infrastructure (energy, water, military-industrial targets). (HIGHEST PRIORITY)
    • Veracity of Dnipropetrovsk Claim: Definitive GEOINT/IMINT/HUMINT on Russian force composition, disposition, and actual advances (if any) in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Identification and verification of "Colonel Yevgeny Daraev" and the "tank regiment" (if real or fabricated). (HIGHEST PRIORITY)
    • Ukrainian AD Munition Levels: Updated assessment of critical interceptor munition inventories post-mass missile attack, especially for high-value ballistic/hypersonic interceptors. (HIGH PRIORITY)
    • Russian "200 Shaheds" Claim & New Wave Indication: Verify the claimed scale of the Shahed attack (over 200) and the scale/nature of the newly indicated wave of "reparations." (MEDIUM PRIORITY)
    • Impact of Russian Anti-Radiation Missile Strikes: Assessment of damage/suppression to Ukrainian AD radars from Kh-31P launches. (MEDIUM PRIORITY)
    • Impact of Ukrainian Deep Strikes within Russia: BDA on the Cheboksary factory fire, Gorno-Altaysk fire and the drone attacks in Tambov and Voronezh Oblasts, and any impact of the Kaspersky cyberattack. (MEDIUM PRIORITY)
    • Verification of Abrams Losses: Independent verification of Colonelcassad's claim regarding 26 Abrams tanks destroyed/captured. (MEDIUM PRIORITY)
  • Collection Requirements:

    • SIGINT/ELINT: Continuous monitoring of Russian strategic aviation communications and flight paths from all airbases (Engels-2, Olenya, Soltsy, Shaikovka), particularly for launch confirmations from Tu-95MS and MiG-31K. Monitor ballistic and cruise missile launch signatures. Identification of EW efforts synchronized with ground or air attacks, especially on Dnipropetrovsk axis and Black Sea coastal areas. Monitoring of Russian C2 networks for signs of operational-level ground movements.
    • GEOINT/IMINT: High-resolution satellite imagery over all claimed Russian advances, particularly Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, to detect force concentrations or actual penetration. Rapid assessment of critical infrastructure damage in Ukraine and within Russia (e.g., Cheboksary factory) from Ukrainian deep strikes. Imagery of ballistic/cruise missile launch sites in Bryansk/Kursk Oblasts.
    • HUMINT: From frontline units for accurate reporting on Russian ground tactics, morale, and any unusual force dispositions. From affected civilian areas for accurate BDA and impact assessment. From occupied areas, if possible, to verify Russian claims and morale and the impact of social disinformation.
    • OSINT: Persistent monitoring of Russian milblogger and state media channels for new narratives, claims, and shifts in propaganda themes, particularly the explicit "mass strike" promotion (multi-wave claims), the Dnipropetrovsk narrative (now with TASS/Klishas amplification), tactical deception attempts (e.g., "drones ending soon," "Chernihiv not needed," "Rovno getting crooked," "Volyn?", "final solution to Rivne"), the new social disinformation, any new distraction tactics (e.g., Trump/Rubio, Greta Thunberg, Kaspersky cyber claims), and especially attempts to undermine Ukrainian air raid warnings by claiming "imaginary missiles" or "EW game." Analysis of public sentiment within Ukraine, particularly regarding the Dnipropetrovsk narrative and large-scale strikes, and adherence to air raid warnings.

END REPORT

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