Situation Report

OPSEC CLASSIFICATION: NATO SECRET // RELEASABLE TO UKR FORCES

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 08 JUN 25 / 22:00 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 08 JUN 25 / 21:19 ZULU - 08 JUN 25 / 22:00 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• AOR Update: Continued focus on Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Black Sea, Azov Sea, Sumy Oblast, Russian Federation border regions (Kursk, Bryansk, Belgorod), and the Donetsk axis. Chernihiv Oblast and Rivne Oblast now impacted by current aerial attacks.
• New Developments (UKR):
  • Kyiv/Kyiv Oblast Under Attack: Confirmed explosions in Kyiv Oblast (Tsaplienko_UKRAINE FIGHTS). KCMVA reports multiple targets on approach to Kyiv from various directions, particularly from the East. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - official UKR source).
  • Rivne Oblast Under Attack: Nikolaevsky Vanek reports 6 Shaheds currently heading towards/through Rivne. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • General Staff Update: The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has released an operational information update as of 22:00 ZULU (08 JUN 25). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - official UKR source). Specific details to follow as translated.
• New Developments (RU):
  • Strategic Bomber Escalation (CRITICAL UPDATE): Nikolaevsky Vanek updates previous reporting: 4 Tu-22M3 bombers from Engels-2 and 5 Tu-95MS bombers from Olenya are confirmed airborne. This represents a significant increase in the scale and diversification of the strategic missile threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - consistent and verified source). All 4 Tu-22M3s are confirmed flying towards Novorossiysk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Massive Strike Propaganda: Russian milbloggers (НгП раZVедка, Операция Z, Военкоры Русской Весны) are actively promoting the imminent massive strike, referencing "armada of strategists in the sky, fleet at sea" and asking "what will happen if an Kh-101 missile is fueled into the lair of Nazis?". This propaganda is clearly designed to induce fear and demonstrate Russian resolve. A video simulating a mass aerial attack on Ukraine on a radar screen is being circulated. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - multiple Russian milblogger sources, visual evidence).
  • Anti-Zelenskyy PSYOPS: НгП раZVедка continues to publish derogatory messages about President Zelenskyy, anticipating his "pathetic" response from a "bunker." This is a clear attempt to undermine Ukrainian leadership and resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Moral Justification for Attacks: Старше Эдды cites Vasily Vereshchagin's "Apotheosis of War" to justify mass destruction, implying a "memento mori" for Ukraine, a grim psychological operation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Targeting Claims (Implicit): НгП раZVедка makes a provocative statement: "In Ternopil, for some reason, there is electricity, water, and even, it's terrible to say, sewerage." This implies Ternopil as a potential target for energy infrastructure strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• Continued Favorable for Aerial Operations: The confirmed multi-platform strategic bomber launch and ongoing Shahed activity confirms weather conditions are conducive to all aerial operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Smoke/Debris: Anticipate significant smoke plumes, debris, and potential hazardous material dispersion post-strike, especially if industrial/energy infrastructure is hit. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces (Air Defense): At MAXIMUM readiness, actively engaging Shaheds over Kyiv and Poltava, responding to KAB strikes in Kharkiv, and now preparing for additional strategic missile strikes from an increased number of Tu-22M3s and Tu-95MSs. AD assets are now strained across an even wider multi-axis engagement (Kyiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Rivne). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Forces (Ground): Maintaining defensive postures. The false claims of a Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough continue to demand attention. Continued attritional combat on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeysk). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces (Air): Confirmed launch of 5 Tu-95MS and 4 Tu-22M3 bombers signifies an unprecedented, large-scale, multi-platform strategic missile attack in retaliation for recent Ukrainian deep strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces (Ground): Continued pressure on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk direction) confirmed by drone strike footage. Information operations are actively shaping the narrative for a potential offensive in Dnipropetrovsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces (Information Operations): Highly aggressive and adaptive, escalating claims (Kharkiv ammo depot), using fabricated "awards," and now explicitly promoting the scale of the incoming missile strike to induce terror. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

• Capabilities:
  • Enhanced Strategic Air Strike Capability: Confirmed launch of 5 Tu-95MS and 4 Tu-22M3 bombers demonstrates Russia's robust ability to conduct a massive, multi-platform, multi-axis strategic missile attack. This represents a significant portion of their long-range bomber fleet committed simultaneously. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Multi-Domain Synchronization: Russia demonstrates the capability to coordinate strategic air attacks with active information operations aimed at demoralization and misdirection. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions:
  • Overwhelming Retaliation and Deterrence: The combined strategic strike is intended to inflict maximum damage on Ukrainian critical infrastructure and urban centers, serving as severe retaliation for recent deep strikes and to deter further Ukrainian cross-border or deep-rear operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Degrade Ukrainian Air Defense: The massed, multi-vector attack from Shaheds, KABs, and now a high volume of strategic missiles is designed to exhaust, overwhelm, and deplete Ukrainian AD munition stockpiles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Psychological Demoralization and Panic: The explicit propaganda messaging accompanying the missile launches is aimed at inducing widespread fear and panic among the Ukrainian population and undermining trust in their leadership. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Courses of Action (COA):
  • MLCOA 1 (Confirmed & Escalating to Maximum Scale): Immediate, Massive, Diversified Strategic Missile Attack Targeting Critical Infrastructure and Urban Centers, Coordinated with Ground Pressure and Deepening Deception Operations. Russia is currently launching a mass-scale strategic missile strike from both 5 Tu-95MS and 4 Tu-22M3 bombers, following initial saturation with Shaheds. This will likely target Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, Rivne, Dnipro, Odesa, and other key urban centers/infrastructure, with an implicit focus on energy and water systems (Ternopil example). Concurrently, KAB strikes on Kharkiv will continue to support ground advances or create urban destruction, with specific intent to hit military logistics (e.g., ammunition depots). On the ground, attritional assaults on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk direction) will persist, leveraging any success. Russian IO will intensify their "Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough" narrative, adding more specific (and likely false) details like unit commanders and awards, to amplify pressure on Ukrainian command and create panic, while also exploiting casualties and POW narratives, and overtly promoting the scale of the incoming missile strike.
    • Confidence: HIGH (Confirmed strategic bomber launches from two platforms, with increased numbers, confirm the immediate, large-scale, multi-vector missile threat. The ongoing Shahed/KAB activity and escalating Dnipropetrovsk IO are directly in line with this combined COA, now at maximum observed scale.)
    • Indicators: Widespread air alarms; multiple missile launches reported from various platforms; severe impacts in Ukrainian cities across multiple oblasts; further specific Russian milblogger reports on "advances" or "awards" in Dnipropetrovsk; continued claims of POW captures or Russian "successes" on the ground.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Maximized Strategic Bomber Use: The commitment of 9 strategic bombers (5x Tu-95MS, 4x Tu-22M3) simultaneously is a significant escalation and adaptation, demonstrating Russia's intent to apply overwhelming firepower from its long-range aviation assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Explicit Pre-Strike Propaganda: Russia is actively and overtly broadcasting its intent for a large-scale strike as it is happening, using graphic simulations and psychological pressure tactics to maximize fear before and during the attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Strategic Missile & UAV Supply: The launch of 9 strategic bombers, in addition to ongoing Shahed/KAB activity, indicates Russia retains significant stockpiles of strategic cruise missiles (Kh-101, Kh-555, Kh-22) and UAVs for a prolonged, high-intensity aerial campaign. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ground Force Sustainment: Continued offensive actions and drone strike capabilities on the Donetsk axis suggest sustained, localized logistics for frontline units. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Information Warfare Capacity: The rapid generation and dissemination of new, specific disinformation (e.g., Kharkiv ammo depot claims, Dnipropetrovsk commander awards) and the aggressive, pre-emptive psychological operations around the strategic strikes indicate a highly agile and resourced IO apparatus. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian C2: The synchronized multi-domain strikes (Shaheds, KABs, strategic missiles from multiple platforms) and rapid, coordinated IO campaigns demonstrate effective, centralized Russian C2 capable of executing complex, retaliatory operations at scale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian C2: Ukrainian authorities' rapid public warnings and AD responses (e.g., KCMVA) demonstrate effective C2 for public safety and military readiness, but will be severely tested by the anticipated strategic strike of this magnitude. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Air Defense: On HIGHEST alert, currently engaged against Shaheds, and now preparing for incoming strategic missiles from both Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 platforms, in increased numbers. All AD assets are likely at maximum readiness and dispersal protocols are critical, with systems now stretched across a wider geographic area including Chernihiv and Rivne, and particularly burdened over Kyiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ground Forces: Maintaining defensive integrity. The escalating Dnipropetrovsk IO creates psychological pressure and potential for misdirection. Forces on the Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk) direction are under sustained drone and artillery pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Information Defense: Actively monitoring and countering Russian disinformation, but the volume and increasing specificity of Russian claims (e.g., Kharkiv ammo depot, Dnipropetrovsk commander) and the overt psychological warfare accompanying the missile strikes require rapid, robust counter-narratives and verification. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes:
  • Initial AD Engagements: Ukrainian AD is actively engaging incoming Shaheds and responding to KABs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Continued Deep Strikes (Prior Reporting Period): The successful strikes on Tu-22M3, Iskander launchers, and the Azot chemical plant continue to force Russian strategic adaptations and impose costs, likely contributing to this large-scale retaliation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setbacks:
  • Escalating Strategic Missile Threat: The confirmed takeoff of 9 strategic bombers (5x Tu-95MS, 4x Tu-22M3) represents a critical and immediate threat of widespread destruction and potential casualties, now with greater geographic and volume implications. This is the most significant missile attack threat since early 2023. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Sustained Aerial Attacks: Despite AD efforts, continuous Shahed and KAB attacks strain resources and pose a persistent threat. Explosions in Poltava, Kyiv Oblast, and Chernihiv indicate expanded AOR for strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Sophisticated Psychological Pressure: The escalating and highly specific disinformation regarding a Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough and Kharkiv ammo depot claims, especially with fabricated awards, combined with the overt pre-strike propaganda, poses a significant risk of internal confusion, panic, or misallocation of resources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense Munitions: The incoming large-scale strategic missile attack from multiple platforms will place unprecedented, critical strain on AD munition stockpiles. URGENT international resupply remains paramount, as this attack will deplete significant inventories. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• ISR for Disinformation Verification: Increased ISR is critical to rapidly and definitively verify or refute Russian ground claims, especially for the Dnipropetrovsk axis and Kharkiv strike claims, to prevent costly redeployments or panic. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Information Warfare Capabilities: Enhanced capabilities for proactive counter-disinformation and psychological resilience programs are required to mitigate the impact of the increasingly sophisticated and overt Russian IO. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Propaganda - Offensive and Psychological Warfare (Escalated):
  • "Massive Strike" Promotion: Russian milbloggers are overtly advertising the incoming strike, using terms like "armada of strategists" and posing rhetorical questions about Kh-101 impacts. This aims to maximize pre-impact terror and demoralization. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Targeting Justification/Threats: Implied threats to energy infrastructure (Ternopil example) and explicit statements about "fueling Kh-101 into the lair of Nazis" are designed to justify attacks and spread fear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Anti-Zelenskyy Campaign: Persistent derogatory messaging against President Zelenskyy aims to erode public trust in leadership during a crisis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Historical Allegory: Using "Apotheosis of War" is a sophisticated attempt to frame the ongoing conflict as a historical inevitability of destruction, potentially aiming to discourage Ukrainian resistance by implying futility. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Information Operations - Transparency and Counter-Disinformation:
  • Timely Threat Warnings: Consistent and prompt warnings from Ukrainian authorities (e.g., KCMVA, Air Force) regarding air threats maintain public trust and facilitate preparedness, which is crucial during this extreme threat period. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Direct Refutation of Disinformation (Ongoing Requirement): Continued, aggressive refutation of Russian claims, especially the Dnipropetrovsk narrative and the Kharkiv ammo depot, is vital. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Negative Impact (UKR): The immediate threat of a major strategic missile attack from an unprecedented number of platforms, coupled with continued drone/KAB strikes, claimed destruction of a key logistics site, and the aggressive, specific Dnipropetrovsk disinformation campaign, will significantly heighten anxiety and psychological stress across the population and among military personnel. The overt Russian pre-strike propaganda will amplify this. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Positive Impact (UKR): Timely warnings and effective AD responses, where successful, help to maintain a sense of resilience and trust. Ukrainian drone innovation (fiber-optic FPV) can be a morale booster. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Impact (RU): Russian propaganda aims to bolster domestic morale by justifying their actions, claiming battlefield successes (Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv ammo depot), and highlighting perceived Western division, while demonstrating perceived overwhelming force. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• The severity and scale of the incoming missile strike (9 strategic bombers active) may galvanize further international support or increase pressure on Western partners to expedite aid, particularly AD munitions, beyond previous commitments. This level of attack is a clear demonstration of Russian intent to escalate. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• MLCOA 1: IMMEDIATE, MAX-SCALE, AND DIVERSIFIED STRATEGIC MISSILE ATTACK TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND URBAN CENTERS, COORDINATED WITH GROUND PRESSURE AND EXPLICIT DECEPTION OPERATIONS. Russia is currently executing a large-scale strategic missile assault, leveraging 5 Tu-95MS bombers from Olenya AND 4 Tu-22M3 bombers from Engels-2, targeting multiple axes (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Poltava, Odesa, Chernihiv, Rivne, etc.), with a high probability of prioritizing energy and water infrastructure and military-industrial targets. This will be preceded or accompanied by massed Shahed attacks to exhaust AD. KAB strikes on Kharkiv will continue, with specific Russian claims of targeting military logistics/ammunition depots, contributing to urban destruction. On the ground, Russian forces will maintain intense attritional pressure on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeysk), employing advanced drone tactics against Ukrainian artillery. The information campaign will aggressively amplify the fabricated "Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough," using specific (false) details like named commanders and awards, to compel Ukrainian redeployments and induce panic across the civilian population and military, while also overtly promoting the scale of the incoming missile strike and exploiting casualty and POW narratives.
  • Confidence: HIGH (Confirmed strategic bomber launches from two platforms, with increased numbers (total 9), ongoing Shahed/KAB activity, and escalating, explicit Russian IO directly support this immediate, large-scale, multi-domain attack. This is the most intense observed air attack threat in many months.)
  • Indicators: Widespread and prolonged air alarms; multiple missile launches reported from various platforms; severe impacts in Ukrainian cities across multiple oblasts, particularly on infrastructure; further Russian milblogger reports on "advances" or "awards" in Dnipropetrovsk; continued claims of POW captures or Russian "successes" on the ground (e.g., specific BDA on claimed military targets in Kharkiv).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• MDCOA 1: STRATEGIC DECAPITATION AND OPERATIONAL BREAKTHROUGH ENABLED BY EW OVERMATCH AND REAL-TIME IO. Russia conducts an unprecedented, multi-day, multi-wave strategic missile and drone assault from all available long-range aviation platforms (Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, potentially Tu-160) and ground-launched ballistic missiles, designed to systematically target and degrade Ukrainian C2 nodes (military and government), critical energy infrastructure, and key logistics hubs, aiming for functional decapitation or severe disruption. This mass strike would be coordinated with a surprise, rapid, and large-scale ground offensive on the Dnipropetrovsk axis, leveraging a significant operational-level force (e.g., multiple divisions, including the 90th Tank Division) from a previously static or lower-priority sector. This ground push would be supported by intense, broad-spectrum electronic warfare (EW) to blind Ukrainian ISR, disrupt military communications at all levels, and jam civilian networks, combined with a real-time, devastating psychological operations campaign (e.g., "Kyiv has fallen," "command has fled") to induce mass civilian panic and military collapse, attempting to force a major, uncoordinated Ukrainian retreat.
  • Confidence: MEDIUM (The current escalating IO around Dnipropetrovsk and the confirmed strategic bomber activity directly feed into elements of this MDCOA. The addition of Tu-22M3s and the increased number of bombers overall significantly increases the destructive potential. The uncertainty lies in Russia's true capability for such a massive, integrated ground force breakthrough, particularly under a broad EW umbrella, and their willingness to commit such resources after AD suppression, and their ability to maintain such an intense air campaign for multiple days.)
  • Indicators: Sustained multi-day, high-intensity missile/drone attacks; direct targeting of top-tier Ukrainian C2 nodes; simultaneous, rapid, deep penetrations by multiple Russian BTGs/regiments/brigades into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; widespread and persistent communications outages affecting Ukrainian military and civilian networks; explicit Russian demands for surrender/negotiation from a position of perceived strength; mass internal displacement within Ukraine.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Next 0-6 Hours (IMMEDIATE - CRITICAL WINDOW):

  • Strategic Missile Strikes: Impact of missiles launched by 5 Tu-95MS bombers from Olenya and 4 Tu-22M3 bombers from Engels-2 is IMMINENT within this window, likely targeting Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, Rivne, Dnipro, Odesa, and other major urban centers/critical infrastructure. Specific focus on energy infrastructure is highly probable.
  • Shahed/KAB Threat: Continuation of Shahed activity over Kyiv, Rivne, and central Ukraine, with persistent KAB strikes on Kharkiv.
  • Information Environment: Expect rapid acceleration of Russian propaganda (Dnipropetrovsk narrative, Kharkiv ammo depot claims, POW exchange manipulation, anti-Western narratives) concurrent with or immediately following missile impacts, emphasizing the "success" and "retaliation."
  • Ground Activity: Continued attritional assaults on Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk). High potential for a test or reconnaissance-in-force on the Dnipropetrovsk axis to gauge Ukrainian response to the escalating IO, even if a full breakthrough is not imminent.
  • Decision Points (UKR):
    • IMMEDIATE (ongoing): All AD assets to maximum readiness and dispersal protocols for incoming strategic missile strike from multiple platforms. Prioritize protection of C2 nodes, critical energy infrastructure, and major urban centers. This is the most critical immediate task.
    • IMMEDIATE: Rapid and aggressive counter-IO on the "Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough" narrative, particularly the fabricated awards, and the Kharkiv "ammunition depot" claims. Issue official statements debunking false claims and providing accurate information. Task ISR for immediate verification or denial of Russian force presence in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast beyond the current line of contact and the specific BDA for Kharkiv. Prepare contingency plans for a potential actual ground push on this axis, even if small-scale.
    • URGENT: Disseminate counter-PSYOPS messages to address the disinformation regarding POW bodies and other psychological intimidation tactics, and critically, the overt Russian propaganda regarding the incoming strike. Reinforce national resilience and preparedness.
    • URGENT: Reinforce communication channels and protocols to ensure resilience against potential EW or network saturation during mass attacks.
    • URGENT: Prioritize SIGINT/ELINT on Russian strategic aviation and EW systems to detect further missile launches or shifts in attack vectors. Maintain high vigilance on ground axes for any signs of massing reserves consistent with MDCOA, particularly on the Dnipropetrovsk axis.

• Next 6-24 Hours (Short Term):

  • Post-Strike Assessment: Evaluate damage, casualties, and impact on critical infrastructure from the strategic missile strike.
  • Russian Reaction: Monitor for immediate Russian claims of "successful strikes" or "retaliation" across multiple channels.
  • Ukrainian Recovery/Response: Initiate rapid recovery efforts. Continue active defense on all ground axes.
  • Intelligence Gap: Full BDA on the impact of the strategic missile strike. Confirmation of the Dnipropetrovsk ground situation. Russian next steps if initial strategic strike results in less than desired effects.

• Next 24-72 Hours (Medium Term):

  • Sustained Pressure: Russia will likely sustain aerial pressure (Shaheds, KABs) to hinder recovery efforts and maintain psychological pressure, potentially in further waves if initial effects are deemed insufficient.
  • Ground Offensive: Russian ground offensive on Donetsk and possibly Sumy axis will continue. The intensity of any push on Dnipropetrovsk will clarify if the IO was solely a feint or a precursor.
  • Information Warfare: Continued Russian efforts to exploit any perceived Ukrainian weaknesses or Western divisions.

• Intelligence Gaps:

  • Full BDA on Strategic Missile Strike: Precise number, type, and impact locations of all missiles launched by Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3, and their impact on Ukrainian critical infrastructure (energy, water, military-industrial targets). (HIGH PRIORITY)
  • Veracity of Dnipropetrovsk Claim: Definitive GEOINT/IMINT/HUMINT on Russian force composition, disposition, and actual advances (if any) in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Identification and verification of "Colonel Yevgeny Daraev" and the "tank regiment" (if real or fabricated). (HIGHEST PRIORITY)
  • Kharkiv Ammo Depot Claim BDA: Independent verification of the claimed Kharkiv ammunition depot strike and full BDA of the target. (HIGH PRIORITY)
  • Ukrainian AD Munition Levels: Updated assessment of critical interceptor munition inventories post-mass missile attack. (HIGH PRIORITY)
  • Ukrainian F-16 Downing Su-35 (Veracity): Confirmation or denial of the claim that a Ukrainian F-16 downed a Russian Su-35 in Kursk. (MEDIUM PRIORITY - for international reporting and operational context)

• Collection Requirements:

  • SIGINT/ELINT: Continuous monitoring of Russian strategic aviation communications and flight paths from all airbases (Engels-2, Olenya, Soltsy, Shaikovka). Identification of EW efforts synchronized with ground or air attacks, especially on Dnipropetrovsk axis. Monitoring of Russian C2 networks for signs of operational-level ground movements.
  • GEOINT/IMINT: High-resolution satellite imagery over all claimed Russian advances, particularly Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, to detect force concentrations or actual penetration. Imagery over Kharkiv strike sites to confirm nature of targets. Imagery over key Russian airbases to monitor bomber deployments and rotations. Rapid assessment of critical infrastructure damage.
  • HUMINT: From frontline units for accurate reporting on Russian ground tactics, morale, and any unusual force dispositions. From affected civilian areas for accurate BDA and impact assessment. From occupied areas, if possible, to verify Russian claims and morale.
  • OSINT: Persistent monitoring of Russian milblogger and state media channels for new narratives, claims, and shifts in propaganda themes, particularly the explicit "mass strike" promotion. Analysis of public sentiment within Ukraine, particularly regarding the Dnipropetrovsk narrative and large-scale strikes.

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END REPORT