Situation Report

OPSEC CLASSIFICATION: NATO SECRET // RELEASABLE TO UKR FORCES

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 08 JUN 25 / 21:19 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 08 JUN 25 / 20:49 ZULU - 08 JUN 25 / 21:19 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• AOR Update: Continued focus on Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Black Sea, Azov Sea, Sumy Oblast, Russian Federation border regions (Kursk, Bryansk, Belgorod), and the Donetsk axis. Chernihiv Oblast now impacted.
• New Developments (UKR):
  • Kyiv/Kyiv Oblast Under Attack: Confirmed explosions in Kyiv Oblast (Tsaplienko_UKRAINE FIGHTS). Shahed activity continues with one UAV heading towards/through Rivne (Nikolaevsky Vanek). Earlier reports of Shaheds over Kyiv and Poltava remain active. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Chernihiv Oblast Under Attack: RBC-Ukraine confirms explosions in Chernihiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Su-35 Downing Claim: Alex Parker Returns, citing German tabloid Bild, claims a Russian Su-35 was downed by a Ukrainian F-16 in Kursk Oblast. This is unconfirmed by official Ukrainian sources. (CONFIDENCE: LOW - Russian milblogger, tabloid source, potentially disinfo)
  • Anti-FPV Drone TTP: A video depicts a Russian soldier attempting to disable a fiber-optic FPV drone by cutting its cable with scissors. This indicates the presence of advanced Ukrainian FPVs and Russian adaptive, albeit unconventional, counter-drone TTPs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - visual evidence).
• New Developments (RU):
  • Kharkiv Escalation - Ammunition Depot Claim: Russian milbloggers (НгП раZVедка, Операция Z, Военкоры Русской Весны) claim a KAB strike hit an ammunition depot in Kharkiv, causing powerful explosions and detonation. Accompanying imagery shows a large fire and smoke. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - consistent Russian claims, visual evidence of large fire/secondary explosions).
  • Strategic Bomber Activity (Updated): Nikolaevsky Vanek reports the takeoff of two Tu-22M3 bombers from "Engels-2" airfield, likely heading towards Novorossiysk. This adds to the previous report of Tu-95MS takeoffs from Olenya. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Persistent Air Threat Messaging: НгП раZVедка warns, "Don't sleep! Another dose of reparations is being prepared," reinforcing the expectation of continuous Russian aerial attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger).
  • Russian AD Claims: Russian MoD claims 24 Ukrainian UAVs destroyed over Voronezh and Belgorod Oblasts in two hours. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian official source, unverified by UKR).
  • Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) Direction Drone Strike: Colonelcassad shares video of a Russian fiber-optic drone strike against Ukrainian artillery on the Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) direction. This confirms continued Russian ground pressure and adapted drone use. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - visual evidence).
  • Information Operations (POW/Morale): TASS cites a military analyst claiming Zelenskyy fears an "image catastrophe" after delivery of deceased Ukrainian soldiers' bodies. This is a continued psychological operation to undermine Ukrainian morale and leadership. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Diplomatic Messaging (Context): TASS reports ongoing contact between Lavrov and Rubio, with potential for an in-person meeting. This is a diplomatic narrative, likely intended for internal consumption or to project an image of active diplomacy, but has no direct military impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian state media).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• Favorable for Aerial Operations: The ongoing multi-vector attacks (Shaheds, KABs, anticipated strategic missiles) confirm weather conditions remain conducive to these operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Smoke Plumes: Large fires, particularly the claimed ammunition depot in Kharkiv, will generate significant smoke plumes affecting local visibility and potentially air quality downwind. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces (Air Defense): At MAXIMUM readiness, actively engaging Shaheds over Kyiv and Poltava, responding to KAB strikes in Kharkiv, and now preparing for additional strategic missile strikes from Tu-22M3s. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). AD assets are now strained across multiple axes (Kyiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Rivne).
• Ukrainian Forces (Ground): Maintaining defensive postures. The false claims of a Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough continue to demand attention. Continued attritional combat on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeysk). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces (Air): Actively conducting Shahed and KAB strikes. The confirmed takeoff of Tu-22M3s (adding to Tu-95MS) indicates an escalation and diversification of the anticipated large-scale missile attack. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces (Ground): Continued pressure on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk direction) confirmed by drone strike footage. Information operations are actively shaping the narrative for a potential offensive in Dnipropetrovsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces (Information Operations): Highly aggressive and adaptive, escalating claims (Kharkiv ammo depot) and using fabricated "awards" to support ground narratives and undermine Ukrainian morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

• Capabilities:
  • Expanded Strategic Air Strike Capability: Confirmed launch of Tu-22M3s from Engels-2 adds to Tu-95MS from Olenya, demonstrating Russia's ability to conduct multi-platform, multi-axis strategic missile attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Precision (claimed) Strike on Military Targets: The claim of hitting an ammunition depot in Kharkiv, if true, indicates Russia's intent to target military infrastructure and may indicate improved targeting capabilities with KABs. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - often exaggerated, but the impact is real).
  • Adaptive Drone Counter-measures (UKR perspective): The Russian attempt to disable a fiber-optic FPV drone with scissors, while rudimentary, indicates immediate adaptation to new threats and a lack of sophisticated EW in that localized area. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - visual evidence).
  • Advanced FPV (UKR capability): The existence of a fiber-optic FPV drone employed by Ukraine highlights an advanced, difficult-to-jam capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions:
  • Immediate Retaliation Escalation: The addition of Tu-22M3s to the strategic strike indicates Russia intends to conduct an even more widespread and destructive retaliatory missile strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Degrade Ukrainian Military Logistics: The claimed strike on a Kharkiv ammunition depot, if accurate, indicates an intention to target Ukrainian military supply lines and sustainment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Overwhelm Ukrainian Air Defense: Massed Shahed, KAB, and strategic missile attacks are intended to degrade and exhaust Ukrainian AD. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Psychological Demoralization: Continued narratives about Ukrainian casualties, fear of POW returns, and claimed destruction of military targets are designed to lower Ukrainian morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Courses of Action (COA):
  • MLCOA 1 (Confirmed & Escalating): Immediate, Massive Multi-Platform Strategic Missile Attack Coordinated with Persistent Ground Pressure and Deepening Deception Operations. Russia is now launching a massive strategic missile strike from both Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 bombers, likely targeting Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, Rivne, Dnipro, Odesa, and other key urban centers/infrastructure, following saturation with Shaheds and KABs. Concurrently, KAB strikes on Kharkiv will continue to support ground advances or create urban destruction, with specific intent to hit military logistics (e.g., ammunition depots). On the ground, attritional assaults on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk direction) will persist, leveraging any success (e.g., drone strikes on artillery). Russian IO will intensify their "Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough" narrative, adding more specific (and likely false) details like unit commanders and awards, to amplify pressure on Ukrainian command and create panic, while also exploiting casualties and POW narratives.
    • Confidence: HIGH (Strategic bomber launches from two platforms confirm the immediate, large-scale, multi-vector missile threat. The ongoing Shahed/KAB activity and escalating Dnipropetrovsk IO are directly in line with this combined COA.)
    • Indicators: Widespread air alarms; multiple missile launches reported from various platforms; severe impacts in Ukrainian cities across multiple oblasts; further specific Russian milblogger reports on "advances" or "awards" in Dnipropetrovsk; continued claims of POW captures or Russian "successes" on the ground.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Diversification of Strategic Bomber Use: The addition of Tu-22M3s from Engels-2 to the strategic strike package (alongside Tu-95MS from Olenya) suggests Russia is leveraging all available long-range aviation assets to maximize impact and potentially overwhelm Ukrainian AD from different vectors. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Targeting Claims: Russian claims of striking a Kharkiv ammunition depot, rather than just "military objects," suggest a more defined targeting strategy for KABs, possibly based on improved ISR or deliberate escalation. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Fiber-optic FPV Drones (UKR TTP): The Russian reaction to a Ukrainian fiber-optic FPV drone highlights Ukraine's continued innovation in drone warfare, deploying systems that bypass traditional EW jamming. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Strategic Missile & UAV Supply: Confirmed Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 launches, and ongoing Shahed/KAB activity, indicate Russia maintains sufficient strategic and tactical air munitions for a large-scale, multi-wave strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ground Force Sustainment: Continued offensive actions and drone strike capabilities on the Donetsk axis suggest sustained, localized logistics for frontline units. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Information Warfare Capacity: The rapid generation and dissemination of new, specific disinformation (e.g., Kharkiv ammo depot claims, Dnipropetrovsk commander awards) indicate a highly agile and resourced IO apparatus. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian C2: The synchronized multi-domain strikes (Shaheds, KABs, strategic missiles from multiple platforms) and rapid, coordinated IO campaigns demonstrate effective, centralized Russian C2 capable of executing complex, retaliatory operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian C2: Ukrainian authorities' rapid public warnings and AD responses demonstrate effective C2 for public safety and military readiness, but will be severely tested by the anticipated strategic strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Air Defense: On HIGHEST alert, currently engaged against Shaheds, and now preparing for incoming strategic missiles from both Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 platforms. All AD assets are likely at maximum readiness and dispersal protocols are critical, with systems now stretched across a wider geographic area including Chernihiv and Rivne. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ground Forces: Maintaining defensive integrity. The escalating Dnipropetrovsk IO creates psychological pressure and potential for misdirection. Forces on the Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk) direction are under sustained drone and artillery pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Information Defense: Actively monitoring and countering Russian disinformation, but the volume and increasing specificity of Russian claims (e.g., Kharkiv ammo depot, Dnipropetrovsk commander) require rapid, robust counter-narratives and verification. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Drone Capabilities: Continued deployment of advanced FPV drones, including fiber-optic variants, provides a critical tactical advantage in surveillance and precision strike that is difficult for Russian EW to counter. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes:
  • Initial AD Engagements: Ukrainian AD is actively engaging incoming Shaheds and responding to KABs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Continued Deep Strikes (Prior Reporting Period): The successful strikes on Tu-22M3, Iskander launchers, and the Azot chemical plant continue to force Russian strategic adaptations and impose costs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Fiber-optic FPV Drone (Tactical): The successful deployment and operation of a fiber-optic FPV drone (as indicated by Russian countermeasures) demonstrates Ukraine's advanced tactical innovation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setbacks:
  • Escalating Strategic Missile Threat: The confirmed takeoff of strategic bombers from two platforms (Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3) represents a critical and immediate threat of widespread destruction and potential casualties, now with greater geographic and volume implications. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Sustained Aerial Attacks: Despite AD efforts, continuous Shahed and KAB attacks strain resources and pose a persistent threat. Explosions in Poltava, Kyiv Oblast, and Chernihiv indicate expanded AOR for strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Sophisticated Psychological Pressure: The escalating and highly specific disinformation regarding a Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough and Kharkiv ammo depot claims, especially with fabricated awards, poses a significant risk of internal confusion, panic, or misallocation of resources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense Munitions: The incoming large-scale strategic missile attack from multiple platforms will place unprecedented strain on AD munition stockpiles. URGENT international resupply remains paramount. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• ISR for Disinformation Verification: Increased ISR is critical to rapidly and definitively verify or refute Russian ground claims, especially for the Dnipropetrovsk axis and Kharkiv strike claims, to prevent costly redeployments or panic. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Information Warfare Capabilities: Enhanced capabilities for proactive counter-disinformation and psychological resilience programs are required to mitigate the impact of the increasingly sophisticated Russian IO. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Propaganda - Offensive and Psychological Warfare:
  • "Kharkiv Ammunition Depot" Claim: This narrative aims to justify the KAB strikes as legitimate military targeting, reinforce the image of successful Russian military operations, and demoralize Ukrainian forces by implying effective destruction of their logistics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • "Dnipropetrovsk Breakthrough" - Now with "Awards": The promotion of a fabricated "Hero of Russia" award for a commander supposedly "advancing" in Dnipropetrovsk is a deliberate attempt to solidify the false narrative, lend it credibility, and potentially pre-condition Russian domestic audience for future (possibly real) operations or simply maintain psychological pressure on Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • POW/Casualty Exploitation: TASS's narrative about Zelenskyy's fear of "image catastrophe" regarding dead soldiers' bodies is a direct psychological attack to erode trust in leadership and demoralize families. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Justification for Retaliation: The continued framing of strikes as "retaliation" or targeting "military objects" (like the Kharkiv ammo depot) is standard Russian attempt to justify indiscriminate attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Undermining Western Support: TASS continues to promote narratives critical of US aid, aiming to fragment international support. The F-16 claim via Bild is likely intended to stir controversy or confusion regarding Western military aid. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Information Operations - Transparency and Counter-Disinformation:
  • Timely Threat Warnings: Consistent and prompt warnings from Ukrainian authorities regarding air threats maintain public trust and facilitate preparedness, which is crucial during this extreme threat period. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Direct Refutation of Disinformation (Ongoing Requirement): Continued, aggressive refutation of Russian claims, especially the Dnipropetrovsk narrative and the Kharkiv ammo depot, is vital. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Negative Impact (UKR): The immediate threat of a major strategic missile attack from multiple platforms, coupled with continued drone/KAB strikes, claimed destruction of a key logistics site, and the aggressive, specific Dnipropetrovsk disinformation campaign, will significantly heighten anxiety and psychological stress across the population and among military personnel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Positive Impact (UKR): Timely warnings and effective AD responses, where successful, help to maintain a sense of resilience and trust. Ukrainian drone innovation (fiber-optic FPV) can be a morale booster. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Impact (RU): Russian propaganda aims to bolster domestic morale by justifying their actions, claiming battlefield successes (Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv ammo depot), and highlighting perceived Western division. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• The severity of the incoming missile strike, potentially intensified by the addition of Tu-22M3s, may galvanize further international support or increase pressure on Western partners to expedite aid, particularly AD munitions. The Russian disinformation targeting Western aid and political figures could potentially influence international perceptions and put pressure on aid discussions. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• MLCOA 1: Immediate, Widespread, and Diversified Strategic Missile Attack Targeting Critical Infrastructure and Urban Centers, Coordinated with Ground Pressure and Deepening Deception Operations. Russia is currently initiating a large-scale strategic missile assault, leveraging activated Tu-95MS bombers from Olenya AND Tu-22M3 bombers from Engels-2, targeting multiple axes (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Poltava, Odesa, Chernihiv, Rivne, etc.). This will be preceded or accompanied by massed Shahed attacks to exhaust AD. KAB strikes on Kharkiv will continue, with specific Russian claims of targeting military logistics/ammunition depots, contributing to urban destruction. On the ground, Russian forces will maintain intense attritional pressure on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeysk), employing advanced drone tactics against Ukrainian artillery. The information campaign will aggressively amplify the fabricated "Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough," using specific (false) details like named commanders and awards, to compel Ukrainian redeployments and induce panic across the civilian population and military, while also exploiting casualty and POW narratives.
  • Confidence: HIGH (Confirmed strategic bomber launches from two platforms, ongoing Shahed/KAB activity, and escalating, specific Russian IO directly support this immediate, large-scale, multi-domain attack. The MLCOA has intensified based on new bomber activity.)
  • Indicators: Widespread air alarms; multiple missile launches reported from various platforms; severe impacts in Ukrainian cities across multiple oblasts; further Russian milblogger reports on "advances" or "awards" in Dnipropetrovsk; continued claims of POW captures or Russian "successes" on the ground (e.g., specific BDA on claimed military targets in Kharkiv).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• MDCOA 1: Strategic Decapitation and Operational Breakthrough Enabled by EW Overmatch. Russia conducts an unprecedented, multi-day, multi-wave strategic missile and drone assault from all available long-range aviation platforms (Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3) and potentially ground-launched ballistic missiles, designed to systematically target and degrade Ukrainian C2 nodes (military and government), critical energy infrastructure, and key logistics hubs, aiming for functional decapitation or severe disruption. This mass strike would be coordinated with a surprise, rapid, and large-scale ground offensive on the Dnipropetrovsk axis, leveraging a significant operational-level force (e.g., multiple divisions, including the 90th Tank Division) from a previously static or lower-priority sector. This ground push would be supported by intense, broad-spectrum electronic warfare (EW) to blind Ukrainian ISR, disrupt military communications at all levels, and jam civilian networks, combined with a real-time, devastating psychological operations campaign (e.g., "Kyiv has fallen," "command has fled") to induce mass civilian panic and military collapse, attempting to force a major, uncoordinated Ukrainian retreat.
  • Confidence: MEDIUM (The current intensifying IO around Dnipropetrovsk and the confirmed strategic bomber activity directly feed into elements of this MDCOA. The addition of Tu-22M3s increases the destructive potential. The uncertainty lies in Russia's true capability for such a massive, integrated ground force breakthrough, particularly under a broad EW umbrella, and their willingness to commit such resources after AD suppression.)
  • Indicators: Sustained multi-day, high-intensity missile/drone attacks; direct targeting of top-tier Ukrainian C2 nodes; simultaneous, rapid, deep penetrations by multiple Russian BTGs/regiments/brigades into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; widespread and persistent communications outages affecting Ukrainian military and civilian networks; explicit Russian demands for surrender/negotiation from a position of perceived strength; mass internal displacement within Ukraine.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Next 0-6 Hours (IMMEDIATE - CRITICAL WINDOW):

  • Strategic Missile Strikes: Impact of missiles launched by Tu-95MS bombers from Olenya and Tu-22M3 bombers from Engels-2 is imminent within this window, likely targeting Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, Rivne, Dnipro, Odesa, and other major urban centers/critical infrastructure.
  • Shahed/KAB Threat: Continuation of Shahed activity over Kyiv and central Ukraine, with persistent KAB strikes on Kharkiv.
  • Information Environment: Expect rapid acceleration of Russian propaganda (Dnipropetrovsk narrative, Kharkiv ammo depot claims, POW exchange manipulation, anti-Western narratives) concurrent with or immediately following missile impacts.
  • Ground Activity: Continued attritional assaults on Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk). High potential for a test or reconnaissance-in-force on the Dnipropetrovsk axis to gauge Ukrainian response to the escalating IO, even if a full breakthrough is not imminent.
  • Decision Points (UKR):
    • IMMEDIATE: All AD assets to maximum readiness and dispersal protocols for incoming strategic missile strike from multiple platforms. Prioritize protection of C2 nodes, critical infrastructure (energy, industrial), and major urban centers.
    • IMMEDIATE: Rapid and aggressive counter-IO on the "Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough" narrative, particularly the fabricated awards, and the Kharkiv "ammunition depot" claims. Issue official statements debunking false claims and providing accurate information. Task ISR for immediate verification or denial of Russian force presence in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast beyond the current line of contact and the specific BDA for Kharkiv. Prepare contingency plans for a potential actual ground push on this axis, even if small-scale.
    • URGENT: Disseminate counter-PSYOPS messages to address the disinformation regarding POW bodies and other psychological intimidation tactics. Provide psychological support to exposed personnel.
    • URGENT: Reinforce communication channels and protocols to ensure resilience against potential EW or network saturation during mass attacks.
    • URGENT: Prioritize SIGINT/ELINT on Russian strategic aviation and EW systems to detect further missile launches or shifts in attack vectors. Maintain high vigilance on ground axes for any signs of massing reserves consistent with MDCOA, particularly on the Dnipropetrovsk axis.

• Next 6-24 Hours (Short Term):

  • Post-Strike Assessment: Evaluate damage, casualties, and impact on critical infrastructure from the strategic missile strike.
  • Russian Reaction: Monitor for immediate Russian claims of "successful strikes" or "retaliation."
  • Ukrainian Recovery/Response: Initiate rapid recovery efforts. Continue active defense on all ground axes.
  • Intelligence Gap: Full BDA on the impact of the strategic missile strike. Confirmation of the Dnipropetrovsk ground situation. Russian next steps if initial strategic strike results in less than desired effects.

• Next 24-72 Hours (Medium Term):

  • Sustained Pressure: Russia will likely sustain aerial pressure (Shaheds, KABs) to hinder recovery efforts and maintain psychological pressure.
  • Ground Offensive: Russian ground offensive on Donetsk and possibly Sumy axis will continue. The intensity of any push on Dnipropetrovsk will clarify if the IO was solely a feint or a precursor.
  • Information Warfare: Continued Russian efforts to exploit any perceived Ukrainian weaknesses or Western divisions.

• Intelligence Gaps:

  • Full BDA on Strategic Missile Strike: Precise number, type, and impact locations of all missiles launched by Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3. (HIGH PRIORITY)
  • Veracity of Dnipropetrovsk Claim: Definitive GEOINT/IMINT/HUMINT on Russian force composition, disposition, and actual advances (if any) in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Identification and verification of "Colonel Yevgeny Daraev" and the "tank regiment" (if real or fabricated). (HIGHEST PRIORITY)
  • Kharkiv Ammo Depot Claim BDA: Independent verification of the claimed Kharkiv ammunition depot strike and full BDA of the target. (HIGH PRIORITY)
  • Ukrainian AD Munition Levels: Updated assessment of critical interceptor munition inventories post-mass missile attack. (HIGH PRIORITY)
  • Ukrainian F-16 Downing Su-35 (Veracity): Confirmation or denial of the claim that a Ukrainian F-16 downed a Russian Su-35 in Kursk. (MEDIUM PRIORITY - for international reporting and operational context)

• Collection Requirements:

  • SIGINT/ELINT: Continuous monitoring of Russian strategic aviation communications and flight paths from all airbases (Engels-2, Olenya, Soltsy, Shaikovka). Identification of EW efforts synchronized with ground or air attacks, especially on Dnipropetrovsk axis. Monitoring of Russian C2 networks for signs of operational-level ground movements.
  • GEOINT/IMINT: High-resolution satellite imagery over all claimed Russian advances, particularly Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, to detect force concentrations or actual penetration. Imagery over Kharkiv strike sites to confirm nature of targets. Imagery over key Russian airbases to monitor bomber deployments and rotations.
  • HUMINT: From frontline units for accurate reporting on Russian ground tactics, morale, and any unusual force dispositions. From affected civilian areas for accurate BDA and impact assessment. From occupied areas, if possible, to verify Russian claims and morale.
  • OSINT: Persistent monitoring of Russian milblogger and state media channels for new narratives, claims, and shifts in propaganda themes. Analysis of public sentiment within Ukraine, particularly regarding the Dnipropetrovsk narrative and large-scale strikes.

---

END REPORT