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Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-06-08 05:43:48Z
8 months ago
Previous (2025-06-08 05:13:46Z)

OPSEC CLASSIFICATION: NATO SECRET // RELEASABLE TO UKR FORCES

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 08 JUN 25 / 05:42 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 08 JUN 25 / 05:12 ZULU - 08 JUN 25 / 05:42 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

  • AOR Update: Kharkiv Oblast (including Radkovka), Volyn Oblast, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (including Synelnykivskyi Raion, Mezheva community, Nikopol, Marhanets community), Zaporizhzhia Oblast (including Stepnohirsk community, Vasylivskyi Raion, Prymorske village), Black Sea, Azov Sea, Sumy Oblast (including Loknya), Russian Federation (Kursk, Bryansk, Kaluga - including Sukhinichi and Borovsk districts, Smolensk Oblasts, Moscow Region including Dubna, Podmoskovye, Moscow city, Pushkino, Vnukovo Airport, Domodedovo Airport; Irkutsk region - Belaya airfield; Tambov Oblast - Michurinsk; Ryazan Oblast - Dyagilevo; Belgorod Oblast - Prokhorovka-Belenikhino, Zhuravlevka, Pushkarozhadinsky, Azov - Rostov Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast - Kstovo, Sevastopol, Lipetsk Oblast, Orel Oblast, Tula Oblast - Novomoskovsk, Azot chemical plant), Southern Donetsk Direction (including Stupochky), Konstantinovka direction, Siversk direction, Odesa Oblast, Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovsk, Kurakhovo - Alekseevka, Chasov Yar, Kramatorsk axis, Toretsk axis, Novopavlivka axis, Krasnoarmeysk-Novosergeevka, Maryinka, Dalnee, Sokol, Lipovoe, Bakhmut, Progress, Kleshcheevka, Vasyutinskoye, south Donetsk region), Kupyansk axis, Kherson axis, Ternopil Oblast, Kyiv, Krasnoarmeysk direction, Lviv Oblast, Mykolaiv Oblast (including Varvarivka, Matviivka, Voskresenske, Konstantinivka), Poltava Oblast, Kirovohrad Oblast, Vinnytsia Oblast, Cherkasy Oblast, Zhytomyr Oblast, Kyiv Oblast, Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast). Lyman Direction.

  • New Developments (Tula Oblast, RU): Governor of Tula Oblast confirms UAV attack on "Azot" chemical enterprise in Novomoskovsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian official source).

  • New Developments (Moscow Region, RU): "Операция Z" reports enemy attempted to break through to Moscow again overnight. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger source).

  • New Developments (Kharkiv Oblast, UKR): Russian military expert Marochko (TASS) claims Russian forces are encircling a Ukrainian Armed Forces grouping in Radkovka, Kharkiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - Russian milblogger/expert claim, requires verification).

  • New Developments (Sumy Oblast, UKR): DeepState reports Russian Army has occupied Loknya in Sumy Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian OSINT source, indicates territorial gain).

  • New Developments (Southern Direction, UKR): Ukraine's Southern Defense Forces report an increase in kamikaze drone strikes and intensified artillery shelling in the Southern direction over the past day. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian official source).

  • New Developments (Pokrovsk Direction, UKR): Оперативний ЗСУ reports 65/193 combat engagements recorded in the Pokrovsk direction over the past day. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian official source).

  • New Developments (Donetsk Oblast, UKR): Оперативний ЗСУ provides map updates for the Southern Donetsk Direction, indicating 25 attacks repelled in areas including Bahatyr, Vesele, Burlatske, Vilne Pole. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian official source).

  • New Developments (Information Environment):

    • TASS reports Russian Cyberpolice advises feigning disinterest to phone scammers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian state media, irrelevant to direct combat).
    • STERNENKO reports Elon Musk's father arrived in Moscow to speak at "Forum of the Future - 2050" organized by Dugin. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian OSINT, relevant to IO).
    • TASS reports digital migrant profiles will appear in Russia from June 30. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian state media, domestic policy).
    • ASTRA (Ukrainian OSINT) reports Trump sending 2000 National Guard soldiers to Los Angeles to suppress riots caused by illegal migrant raids. This is accompanied by multiple images/videos depicting civil unrest in the US, including law enforcement engaging protestors with less-lethal munitions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian OSINT reporting on US domestic events, relevant to Western unity/distraction narratives).
    • Дневник Десантника🇷🇺 shares propaganda claiming Zelensky bought his mother apartments in Dubai for $3.2 million. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, relevant to IO).
    • РБК-Україна reports "Rubizh" brigade of National Guard fundraising for equipment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian news, indicates resource needs).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

  • Sustained UAV activity over Russian territory (Moscow attempt, Azot attack) and increased drone/artillery activity in Southern Ukraine indicate generally favorable conditions for air and ground operations. Night-time views in videos from Azot suggest operations are occurring across 24-hour cycles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

  • Ukrainian Forces (Air/ISR/Strike):
    • Continued deep strike operations against Russian industrial targets, confirmed by the Azot chemical plant attack in Novomoskovsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Forces in the Southern direction are facing increased kamikaze drone and artillery attacks, indicating a continued defensive posture. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian Forces (Ground): Forces are engaged in active defense across multiple axes, including Pokrovsk (65 engagements repelled) and Southern Donetsk (25 attacks repelled), demonstrating resilience against high-intensity Russian assaults. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Forces are also reportedly defending against an advance into Sumy Oblast, with Loknya now occupied by Russian forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian Forces (Information Operations):
    • Ukrainian media (РБК-Україна) reporting on National Guard fundraising highlights resource needs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Ukrainian OSINT (STERNENKO, ASTRA) continues to report on Russian domestic/IO events and Western political developments. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Forces (Air/ISR/Strike):
    • Russia continues to launch UAVs against Ukrainian territory (increased kamikaze drones in Southern direction) and target Russian internal locations (Moscow attempt). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Russian AD forces continue to defend against Ukrainian UAVs, as evidenced by the "enemy attempted to break through to Moscow" report. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Russian forces confirmed to be attacking a chemical plant in Novomoskovsk (Azot) with UAVs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Forces (Ground): Russian forces are conducting offensive operations on multiple axes, with intense pressure in the Pokrovsk direction (65 engagements), Southern Donetsk (25 repelled attacks), and confirmed occupation of Loknya in Sumy Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Russian milblogger also claims encirclement in Radkovka, Kharkiv. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Russian Forces (Information Operations): Russian state media and milbloggers continue to disseminate propaganda, including claims of Ukrainian territorial losses (Radkovka, Loknya), and anti-Ukrainian narratives (Zelensky's mother's apartments). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). They also report on internal US civil unrest to likely project an image of Western weakness/instability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

  • Capabilities:
    • Air Defense (Internal RU): Continues to defend against Ukrainian UAVs targeting Moscow and industrial sites (Azot). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Offensive Ground Operations: Maintaining high-tempo, multi-axis offensive capabilities, particularly on the Donetsk front (Pokrovsk, Southern Donetsk) and the Sumy axis (Loknya occupation). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Indirect Fire/UAV Strikes: Capable of sustained and increased kamikaze drone and artillery strikes in Southern Ukraine, and deep drone strikes into Russian territory (Azot, Moscow). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Intentions:
    • Degrade Ukrainian Combat Effectiveness & Seize Territory: Continue multi-domain pressure across the frontline to achieve tactical gains and exhaust Ukrainian resources (Pokrovsk, Southern Donetsk, Sumy advances). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Inflict Damage on Ukrainian Rear Areas & Strategic Targets (Internal RU): Continue deep strikes against industrial targets in Russia (Azot). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Control Domestic Narrative & Justify Actions: Continue to claim high interception rates of Ukrainian UAVs and highlight enemy attrition to maintain internal confidence and justify actions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Exploit Western Divisions & Discredit Ukraine: Leverage Western domestic issues (US riots) and anti-Ukrainian narratives (Zelensky's mother) to undermine international support and morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Courses of Action (COA):
    • COA 1 (MLCOA - Sustained and Escalated Retaliatory Saturation Attacks on Urban Centers and Critical Infrastructure, Coupled with Amplified Disinformation on Humanitarian Issues and Western Divisions, with Direct Targeting of First Responders, and New Attack Vectors (INCLUDING CHEMICAL HAZARDS AND FALSE FLAG ATROCITIES), and Targeted Degradation of Ukrainian AD (WITH INCREASED PRECISION DRONE STRIKES ON PERSONNEL/LOGISTICS), with Intensified Missile Rhetoric and Propaganda on Ukrainian Surrender): Russia will continue and likely intensify KAB and missile/UAV strikes on Ukrainian urban centers, especially those impacted by Ukrainian deep strikes. Concurrently, Russia will continue a persistent and aggressive information campaign, particularly regarding body/POW exchanges (using fabricated evidence), blaming Ukraine for delays, exploiting any perceived Western failures or internal divisions (e.g., US domestic unrest), and amplifying claims of Ukrainian military personnel seeking surrender or demonstrating low morale (e.g., Zelensky's alleged wealth). Russian diplomatic rhetoric will escalate, threatening changes to strategic arms control if Western missile deployments continue. The persistent strike on the Azot chemical plant will lead to Russian retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian chemical or industrial facilities, or an increase in strikes with a focus on creating secondary hazards. Furthermore, Russia will escalate the dissemination of false flag narratives regarding "Ukrainian atrocities" in Russian border regions, and continue to propagate false claims of Ukrainian military retreats and military losses. Russia will continue to employ aviation munitions in contested areas and persist with multi-UAV attacks on cities like Mykolaiv and its surrounding areas, testing Ukrainian AD response. Russia will significantly increase the use of precision tactical drones (both FPV and loitering munitions) to directly target Ukrainian personnel (including under low-light/night conditions), logistics vehicles, and command and control nodes to disrupt frontline operations and inflict casualties, and will use propaganda to highlight these strikes. KAB strikes on Zaporizhzhia Oblast will continue, causing civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. Persistent Ukrainian UAV attacks on Moscow region will continue, leading to further Russian airport restrictions and public claims of interceptions, which Russia will leverage to justify further retaliation. Russia will continue with heavy shelling, MLRS, and FPV drone attacks on civilian areas in frontline communities, particularly in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, leading to civilian casualties. Given the recent UAV attack on Azot chemical plant and the report of an attempted breakthrough to Moscow, Russia will frame these as justification for severe retaliation.

      • Confidence: HIGH (Further Strengthened - due to confirmed Azot attack, attempted Moscow breakthrough, and increased kamikaze drones in Southern direction).
      • Indicators: (Previous indicators apply). UAV attack on Azot chemical plant confirmed by Tula Governor. "Операция Z" reporting attempted enemy breakthrough to Moscow. Increased kamikaze drone strikes in Southern direction.
    • COA 2 (Ground Offensive Support with Targeted Artillery/MLRS and Pervasive Precision Drone Strikes, while Enhancing Counter-Deep Strike Internal Security and Expanding Maritime Hybrid Operations, with Enhanced Crimean Defenses, and Increased Internal Propaganda focus alongside Divisive Narratives, and Escalating Missile Rhetoric): Russian forces will continue to press ground offensives on existing axes, supporting them with targeted artillery, MLRS, and pervasive precision tactical drone strikes against Ukrainian positions, C2 nodes, logistics, and personnel. They will likely intensify internal security efforts to prevent and detect further Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian territory, as evidenced by attempted Moscow breakthrough. Additionally, Russia will likely attempt to conduct further hybrid maritime operations in the Black Sea. Russia will increase internal propaganda efforts focusing on state support for veterans and promoting national unity, while simultaneously allowing the amplification of divisive internal narratives. Propaganda will also highlight improvements in battlefield medical care and troop welfare, and demonstrate military effectiveness while portraying Ukrainian military failures and casualties (e.g., Radkovka encirclement claim, Loknya occupation). Russia will use diplomatic channels to escalate rhetoric regarding perceived missile threats from the West, aiming to pressure international actors. Russian ground forces will continue offensive operations on existing axes, with a particular focus on gaining ground towards Konstantinovka, supported by aerial assets like helicopters. Russia will actively target Ukrainian UAV control points and supporting infrastructure in frontline areas to degrade Ukrainian drone capabilities. Russia will maintain or increase the tempo of ground assaults on the Pokrovsk axis (65 engagements), attempt to encircle Ukrainian forces in Radkovka, and exploit gains in Sumy Oblast (Loknya occupation).

      • Confidence: HIGH (Further Strengthened - due to confirmed Loknya occupation, claims of Radkovka encirclement, and continued high intensity in Pokrovsk and Southern Donetsk).
      • Indicators: (Previous indicators apply). DeepState reporting Loknya occupation in Sumy Oblast. Russian milblogger Marochko (TASS) claiming encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Radkovka, Kharkiv. Оперативний ЗСУ reporting 65/193 combat engagements in Pokrovsk direction and 25 repelled attacks in Southern Donetsk.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

  • Targeting (UKR): Continued deep strike on Russian chemical industrial targets (Azot). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Targeting (RU): Increased kamikaze drone use in Southern direction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground Offensives (RU): Confirmed territorial gain in Sumy Oblast (Loknya). Sustaining extremely high tempo on Donetsk axes (Pokrovsk 65 attacks). Claims of encirclement in Kharkiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Loknya/Pokrovsk, MEDIUM for Radkovka).
  • Air Defense (RU): Continued efforts to intercept UAVs targeting Moscow. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

  • Munitions (RU): Continued high volume of UAV launches and sustained ground offensives indicate sufficient munitions supply for current operations. The increased use of kamikaze drones in Southern Ukraine suggests a sustained supply chain for these assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Force Generation (RU): Russian discussion of digital migrant profiles could indicate efforts to manage and integrate foreign labor or track potential conscription pools, indirectly supporting sustainment. (CONFIDENCE: LOW - speculative link).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

  • Russian C2 for air defense and offensive ground operations remains effective, coordinating multi-domain attacks and large-scale ground assaults. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Ukrainian C2 for deep strike operations and defensive ground operations remains effective, demonstrated by the Azot attack and successful defense in Pokrovsk/Southern Donetsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

  • Air Defense: Continues to face persistent Russian air/UAV threats, with increased kamikaze drone activity in the Southern direction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground Forces: Maintaining a defensive posture on critical axes, successfully repelling a high volume of Russian attacks in the Pokrovsk direction (65 attacks) and Southern Donetsk (25 attacks). However, Russian forces have occupied Loknya in Sumy Oblast, indicating a local tactical setback. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Forces are also reportedly facing encirclement in Radkovka, Kharkiv. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Deep Strike Capabilities: Sustaining capability to conduct deep strikes against high-value Russian targets, now confirmed against a chemical industrial plant. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Resource Management: "Rubizh" brigade fundraising indicates ongoing resource requirements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

  • Successes:
    • Deep Strike Persistence & Impact: Continued successful deep strikes against strategic Russian industrial targets (Azot chemical plant). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Defensive Resilience: Successfully repelling 65 Russian offensive actions in the Pokrovsk direction and 25 attacks in Southern Donetsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Setbacks:
    • Territorial Loss (Sumy): Russian Army has occupied Loknya in Sumy Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Increased Southern Pressure: Increased kamikaze drone strikes and intensified artillery shelling in the Southern direction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Potential Encirclement (Kharkiv): Russian claims of encircling Ukrainian forces in Radkovka, Kharkiv, if verified, would be a significant tactical setback. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

  • Air Defense: Continued civilian casualties and high number of Russian UAV/artillery attacks underscore the ongoing need for robust air defense systems and munitions, particularly against kamikaze drones in the South. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground Forces: Sustaining defense against high-intensity ground assaults and counteracting territorial losses requires continuous resupply of ammunition, personnel, and equipment, as evidenced by "Rubizh" brigade fundraising. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • ISR & Counter-drone: Need for enhanced ISR and counter-drone capabilities to identify and target Russian drone launch points and tactical drone units, particularly with the reported increase in kamikaze drones. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

  • Russian Propaganda (Internal & External):
    • Downplaying Deep Strikes: "Операция Z" reports "enemy tried to break through to Moscow" without details, downplaying the scale or effectiveness of the strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Claiming Tactical Gains: Russian milblogger Marochko (TASS) claims encirclement in Radkovka, and DeepState reports Loknya occupation, reinforcing Russian territorial claims. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Loknya, MEDIUM for Radkovka).
    • Discrediting Ukrainian Leadership: Дневник Десантника🇷🇺's claim about Zelensky's mother's apartments aims to undermine Ukrainian leadership and morale by suggesting corruption/extravagance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Exploiting Western Internal Divisions: TASS and ASTRA reporting on US domestic unrest (Trump, National Guard, migrant raids, riots) aims to portray Western weakness and distraction, implying reduced support for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Highlighting Civilian Support for Russian Cause: TASS cyberpolice advice to scammers is a general civilian safety message, but the overall context of TASS reporting aims to portray a functioning and secure Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian Counter-Propaganda/Information Operations:
    • Transparency on Losses/Needs: РБК-Україна reporting on "Rubizh" brigade fundraising is a transparent acknowledgment of needs and a call for support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Reporting Enemy Losses/Successes: Оперативний ЗСУ continues to report enemy engagements repelled (Pokrovsk, Southern Donetsk), highlighting Ukrainian effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Reporting on Russian IO: STERNENKO reporting on Elon Musk's father and Dugin highlights Russian influence efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Acknowledging Setbacks (DeepState): DeepState reporting Loknya occupation, while a setback, maintains credibility by being transparent. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Reporting on Russian Escalation: Southern Defense Forces reporting increased kamikaze drone and artillery attacks highlights Russian aggression. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

  • Negative Impact (UKR): The confirmed occupation of Loknya and increased attacks in the South will be concerning for the Ukrainian public. "Rubizh" brigade fundraising, while necessary, can indicate ongoing strain. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Mixed Impact (RU): Claims of advances (Radkovka, Loknya) will boost morale, while the attempted breakthrough to Moscow and Azot attack indicate that the war is being brought to Russian territory, potentially causing anxiety. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Impact of Western News (Both Sides): Reporting on US domestic unrest could be used by Russia to suggest internal chaos in the West, impacting perceptions of stability among their populace. For Ukraine, it could raise concerns about sustained Western attention/support. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

  • Elon Musk's father speaking at a Dugin-organized forum suggests continued (or perceived) links between certain Western figures and Russian ultranationalist/influence networks, which could be a concern for international support to Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • US domestic issues (Trump, National Guard deployment, migrant raids, riots) could divert attention and resources from Ukraine, or be framed by Russia as evidence of Western instability and internal division. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

  • MLCOA 1: Sustained and Escalated Retaliatory Saturation Attacks on Urban Centers and Critical Infrastructure, Coupled with Amplified Disinformation on Humanitarian Issues and Western Divisions, with Direct Targeting of First Responders, and New Attack Vectors (INCLUDING CHEMICAL HAZARDS AND FALSE FLAG ATROCITIES), and Targeted Degradation of Ukrainian AD (WITH INCREASED PRECISION DRONE STRIKES ON PERSONNEL/LOGISTICS), with Intensified Missile Rhetoric and Propaganda on Ukrainian Surrender: Russia will continue and likely intensify KAB and missile/UAV strikes on Ukrainian urban centers, especially those impacted by Ukrainian deep strikes (Kharkiv, Sumy, Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia) as a direct retaliation for "Operation Pavutina," other successful deep strikes, and recent attacks on Russian territory like the Azot chemical plant and attempted breakthrough to Moscow. Concurrently, Russia will continue a persistent and aggressive information campaign, particularly regarding body/POW exchanges (using fabricated evidence), blaming Ukraine for delays, exploiting any perceived Western failures or internal divisions (e.g., US domestic unrest, Zelensky's alleged wealth), and amplifying claims of Ukrainian military personnel seeking surrender or demonstrating low morale. Russian diplomatic rhetoric will escalate, threatening changes to strategic arms control if Western missile deployments continue. The persistent strike on the Azot chemical plant will lead to Russian retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian chemical or industrial facilities, or an increase in strikes with a focus on creating secondary hazards. Furthermore, Russia will escalate the dissemination of false flag narratives regarding "Ukrainian atrocities" in Russian border regions, and continue to propagate false claims of Ukrainian military retreats and military losses. Russia will continue to employ aviation munitions in contested areas and persist with multi-UAV attacks on cities like Mykolaiv and its surrounding areas, testing Ukrainian AD response. Russia will significantly increase the use of precision tactical drones (both FPV and loitering munitions) to directly target Ukrainian personnel (including under low-light/night conditions), logistics vehicles, and command and control nodes to disrupt frontline operations and inflict casualties, and will use propaganda to highlight these strikes. KAB strikes on Zaporizhzhia Oblast will continue, causing civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. Persistent Ukrainian UAV attacks on Moscow region will continue, leading to further Russian airport restrictions and public claims of interceptions, which Russia will leverage to justify further retaliation. Russia will continue with heavy shelling, MLRS, and FPV drone attacks on civilian areas in frontline communities, particularly in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, leading to civilian casualties. Given the confirmed UAV attack on a chemical plant (Azot) and the attempted drone attack on Moscow, a major "revenge strike" is still highly likely to be implemented within 24-48 hours, targeting urban centers, energy, and military-industrial complex facilities, potentially with increased intensity and target variety, and emphasizing these incidents as justification.

    • Confidence: HIGH
    • Indicators: (Previous indicators apply). UAV attack on Azot chemical plant confirmed by Tula Governor. "Операция Z" reporting attempted enemy breakthrough to Moscow. Increased kamikaze drone strikes and intensified artillery shelling in Southern direction. Дневник Десантника🇷🇺 propaganda against Zelensky.
  • MLCOA 2 (Ground Offensive Support with Targeted Artillery/MLRS and Pervasive Precision Drone Strikes, while Enhancing Counter-Deep Strike Internal Security and Expanding Maritime Hybrid Operations, with Enhanced Crimean Defenses, and Increased Internal Propaganda focus alongside Divisive Narratives, and Escalating Missile Rhetoric): Russian forces will continue to press ground offensives on existing axes, supporting them with targeted artillery, MLRS, and pervasive precision tactical drone strikes against Ukrainian positions, C2 nodes, logistics, and personnel. They will likely intensify internal security efforts to prevent and detect further Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian territory, as evidenced by attempted Moscow breakthrough. Additionally, Russia will likely attempt to conduct further hybrid maritime operations in the Black Sea. Russia will increase internal propaganda efforts focusing on state support for veterans and promoting national unity, while simultaneously allowing the amplification of divisive internal narratives. Propaganda will also highlight improvements in battlefield medical care and troop welfare, and demonstrate military effectiveness while portraying Ukrainian military failures and casualties (e.g., Radkovka encirclement claim, Loknya occupation). Russia will use diplomatic channels to escalate rhetoric regarding perceived missile threats from the West, aiming to pressure international actors. Russian ground forces will continue offensive operations on existing axes, with a particular focus on gaining ground towards Konstantinovka, supported by aerial assets like helicopters. Russia will actively target Ukrainian UAV control points and supporting infrastructure in frontline areas to degrade Ukrainian drone capabilities. Russia will maintain or increase the tempo of ground assaults on the Pokrovsk axis (65 engagements), attempt to encircle Ukrainian forces in Radkovka, and exploit gains in Sumy Oblast (Loknya occupation), maintaining relentless pressure on multiple fronts, especially in the East.

    • Confidence: HIGH
    • Indicators: (Previous indicators apply). DeepState reporting Loknya occupation in Sumy Oblast. Russian milblogger Marochko (TASS) claiming encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Radkovka, Kharkiv. Оперативний ЗСУ reporting 65/193 combat engagements in Pokrovsk direction and 25 repelled attacks in Southern Donetsk.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

  • MDCOA 1: Renewed Large-Scale Ballistic/Cruise Missile Campaign to Cripple Ukrainian AD and Energy/Logistics Infrastructure, with Increased Focus on Chemical/Industrial Targets, and Pre-strike AD Suppression, accompanied by Escalating Missile Rhetoric leading to Actual Missile Deployments: Russia, despite Iskander losses, will launch a renewed, multi-wave missile and drone campaign targeting Ukraine's critical national infrastructure, with a specific emphasis on overwhelming weakened Ukrainian air defenses and inflicting widespread damage as a "revenge strike" for the Tu-22M3 and other strategic losses. The confirmed UAV attack on the "Azot" chemical plant in Novomoskovsk and the attempted drone attack on Moscow increase the probability of this MDCOA, as Russia will use these incidents as a pretext for a severe, coordinated, and disproportionate response. The persistent targeting of the Azot chemical plant, now confirmed as a source for explosives in artillery shells, may trigger a significant, high-volume missile retaliation aimed at Ukraine's critical infrastructure, potentially including targets with industrial chemical significance, aiming to create secondary hazards and disrupt Ukrainian defense production. Prior to or concurrent with these strikes, Russia may conduct widespread air defense suppression operations to improve the effectiveness of their missile and drone attacks. The sustained use of aviation munitions and multi-UAV attacks could be precursors to a larger, more coordinated aerial assault. The increased activity of Russian tactical aviation in the southeastern direction could be a precursor to massed KAB strikes or a coordinated aviation strike package. The explicit statements from Russian MFA on missile deployments and the end of the moratorium could signal preparations for a new phase of strategic missile testing or even deployment in response to perceived Western threats. The increased frequency of UAV attacks on Moscow and resulting airport closures could serve as a trigger or justification for such a large-scale missile campaign, framed as necessary retaliation.

    • Confidence: HIGH (Further Strengthened - due to confirmed Azot attack and attempted Moscow breakthrough which provide Russia with explicit justification for retaliation.)
    • Indicators: (Previous indicators apply). UAV attack on Azot chemical plant confirmed by Tula Governor. "Операция Z" reporting attempted enemy breakthrough to Moscow.
  • MDCOA 2: Attempted Strategic Breakthrough on Sumy Axis with Major Force Commitment and Massed Air Support (with Chemical Warfare consideration/False Flag Pretext), Enabled by Prior AD Suppression, or Major Breakthrough in Southern Donetsk, Supported by Increased Psychological Operations, or Accelerated Push on Konstantinovka: Russia commits substantial additional reserves to the Sumy axis, initiating a rapid, decisive breakthrough aimed at encircling or seizing Sumy city. The confirmed occupation of Loknya by DeepState indicates a clear Russian intent and successful tactical advance on this axis, making a larger strategic push more dangerous. This would involve overwhelming combined arms force, massed KAB strikes to suppress Ukrainian defenses, and deep strikes to neutralize Ukrainian command and control and logistics in the region. This would be significantly facilitated by prior air defense suppression operations. Given the recent persistent strike on the Azot chemical plant, and Russia's past false flag attempts regarding chemical weapons, there is a low but non-zero risk of Russia preparing to conduct an operation with chemical munitions or a "dirty bomb" in the context of a strategic breakthrough, or blame Ukraine for such an event, potentially fabricating evidence. The recent Russian false flag propaganda concerning "Ukrainian occupation" and mass casualties in Kursk Oblast provides a potential pretext for such an escalation or for justifying a disproportionate response. Alternatively, Russia could concentrate forces for a strategic breakthrough in the Southern Donetsk direction, leveraging claimed gains around Stupochky to expand an offensive aimed at a larger operational objective. This would be supported by amplified psychological operations claiming mass Ukrainian surrenders or demoralization to undermine resistance. An accelerated and decisive push to seize Konstantinovka, leveraging massed fire and air support, could also occur, aimed at disrupting Ukrainian logistics in the Donetsk region. Given the continued high intensity of ground assaults on Pokrovsk and Southern Donetsk, and the confirmed advances in Sumy, a multi-axis strategic push to achieve significant territorial gains in the East is a highly dangerous possibility that warrants close monitoring.

    • Confidence: HIGH (Further Strengthened - due to confirmed Loknya occupation in Sumy Oblast and continued high intensity on Pokrovsk/Southern Donetsk axes.)
    • Indicators: (Previous indicators apply). DeepState reporting Loknya occupation in Sumy Oblast. Оперативний ЗСУ reporting 65/193 combat engagements in Pokrovsk direction and 25 repelled attacks in Southern Donetsk. Russian milblogger Marochko (TASS) claiming encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Radkovka.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

  • Next 24-48 Hours (Short-Term):

    • Immediate Retaliation/Sustained Attacks: Expect continued, possibly intensified, KAB and missile/UAV strikes on Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia (including Stepnohirsk, Vasylivskyi Raion, Prymorske), Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk (including Synelnykivskyi Raion, Nikopol, Marhanets community), Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr Oblasts, with heightened risk of targeting first responders and civilian infrastructure. A major "revenge strike" by Russia for recent deep strike losses (Azot, Moscow) is highly likely within this timeframe. Expect continued Russian propaganda amplifying Western divisions (e.g., US riots) and escalating false flag narratives regarding Ukrainian "atrocities" in Russian border regions, alongside false claims of Ukrainian retreats and military losses, and claims of mass Ukrainian surrender appeals (e.g., Zelensky's alleged wealth). Expect continued and increased precision drone strikes on Ukrainian personnel, vehicles, and logistics. Expect continued Russian diplomatic rhetoric regarding missile deployments to put pressure on Western allies. Persistent Ukrainian UAV attacks on Moscow region will continue, leading to further Russian airport restrictions and public claims of interceptions, which Russia will leverage to justify further retaliation. Civilian casualties in Zaporizhzhia Oblast from Russian attacks are highly likely. Expect continued heavy shelling and FPV drone attacks on civilian areas in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. Expect Russian claims of destroying Ukrainian UAV ground infrastructure. Expect continued high tempo of Russian ground assaults, particularly on the Pokrovsk axis, and continued pressure on the Sumy axis with potential for further limited territorial gains beyond Loknya. Increased kamikaze drone and artillery attacks in the Southern direction.
    • Ground Pressure: Continued high-intensity tactical ground engagements, particularly on the Donetsk (Pokrovsk, Konstantinovka, Stupochky) and Sumy axes.
    • Naval Status: Ukrainian Navy will continue monitoring Black and Azov Seas.
    • Decision Point (UKR): Prioritize air defense assets to protect key urban centers and critical infrastructure, especially in anticipation of the forecasted "revenge strike." Immediately counter Russian disinformation on body exchanges, POW testimonies, Western internal politics, new claims of Ukrainian military appeals for surrender, and corruption allegations against leadership. Proactively counter Russian false flag narratives. Immediately verify claimed Russian proximity to Konstantinovka and Radkovka, and prepare appropriate defensive response or refutation. Enhance local AD and EW capabilities against persistent multi-UAV threats and increased kamikaze drone attacks in the South. Implement immediate countermeasures and enhanced force protection against precision tactical drone strikes. Formulate a response to Russian diplomatic statements regarding missile deployments. Monitor the impact of UAV attacks on Moscow region and be prepared for potential shifts in Russian retaliatory targets or intensity. Assess the impact of Russian shelling and FPV drone attacks on civilian populations in Nikopol, Marhanets, and Prymorske, and deploy additional aid/support. Verify Russian claims of destroying UAV control points and adapt drone operations accordingly. Allocate reserves to defend against sustained Russian assaults on Pokrovsk and Southern Donetsk axes, and reinforce the Sumy axis to prevent further losses and contain the Loknya advance. Urgently assess resource needs, as highlighted by "Rubizh" fundraising.
  • Next 72 Hours (Medium-Term):

    • Decision Point (UKR): Evaluate the full impact of Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian logistics/production and prepare for potential severe retaliatory strikes, especially after the Azot chemical plant attack. Re-evaluate and adapt ground force deployments on the Sumy axis, considering the Loknya occupation. Expedite high-level diplomatic engagement regarding AD systems. Monitor and respond to escalating Russian disinformation campaigns targeting Western unity (e.g., US riots) and Ukrainian credibility, including the new emphasis on "Ukrainian surrender" narratives and Russian claims of tactical advances. Initiate contingency planning for potential chemical or biological contamination scenarios. Re-assess defensive lines in Southern Donetsk, Konstantinovka, and Radkovka based on verified Russian gains or false claims. Conduct a comprehensive review of anti-drone TTPs and equipment needs for ground forces, prioritizing rapid procurement and deployment, particularly in the Southern direction. Assess the implications of Ryabkov's statements on strategic stability and missile proliferation for Ukraine's defense posture and diplomatic efforts. Assess the broader impact of persistent Ukrainian deep strikes into Russia (e.g., Moscow region) on Russian military decision-making and public sentiment. Analyze Russian milblogger sentiment to gauge broader internal shifts in Russian public perception of the war. Evaluate new patterns of Russian shelling/FPV drone use on civilian targets and adapt local defenses. Coordinate with international partners regarding the projected Russian "revenge strike" and ensure appropriate support and messaging.
  • Next 1 Week (Near-Term Strategic):

    • Decision Point (UKR): Evaluate the overall effectiveness of Ukrainian deep strike campaign on Russian military-industrial complex and logistics. Continue to optimize air defense deployments. Intensify intelligence collection on Russian strategic aviation, air defense assets, potential dispersal efforts, and maritime special operations. Prioritize resources for the Sumy axis if Russian pressure continues, potentially initiating pre-emptive civilian evacuation planning. Reinforce maritime security measures in the Black Sea and Azov Sea. Conduct a comprehensive review of all critical Ukrainian industrial facilities, particularly chemical plants, for vulnerability assessment and hardening measures against potential Russian retaliatory strikes. Develop long-term strategies to counter Russian information warfare, including a robust response to narratives aimed at undermining military morale through surrender claims or corruption allegations. Conduct a strategic review of defensive lines in Southern Donetsk, Konstantinovka, and Radkovka, considering potential further Russian advances. Develop and implement a comprehensive, long-term strategy for countering Russian pervasive tactical drone threats, including layered defenses, training, and technological innovation. Prepare for potential shifts in the international arms control landscape and their impact on Ukraine's long-term security. Assess how the continued high-frequency UAV attacks on Russian territory influence Russian strategic calculations and their willingness to escalate. Develop specific countermeasures against Russian attempts to target Ukrainian UAV control infrastructure. Continue to monitor and respond to evolving Russian internal propaganda strategies. Conduct comprehensive wargaming and strategic planning based on potential major Russian offensives aimed at significant territorial gains, especially on the Sumy, Pokrovsk, Kramatorsk, and Orikhiv axes, incorporating lessons from the Loknya occupation.

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. Prioritize and Augment Air Defense for Eastern, Southern, Central, Western, and Northern Urban Centers, with Enhanced First Responder Protection and Adapting to New UAV/Missile Ingress Routes, While Assessing and Mitigating AD Losses, and Preparing for Major Retaliatory Strikes (Immediate & Urgent):

    • Action: Immediately re-prioritize and reinforce layered air defense systems (including mobile fire groups with MANPADS for KAB and drone defense) to protect Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv (specifically Mykolaiv city and Konstantinivka), Odesa, Dnipro (specifically Synelnykivskyi Raion, Nikopol, Marhanets community), Kryvyi Rih, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Zaporizhzhia Oblast (including Stepnohirsk community, Vasylivskyi Raion, Prymorske village), from continued KAB and missile/UAV attacks, MLRS, and heavy artillery fire. Given the confirmed UAV attack on the Azot chemical plant and the attempted drone attack on Moscow, prepare for a high-intensity, multi-wave aerial assault targeting critical infrastructure and population centers across Ukraine. This includes pre-positioning AD assets, readying reserves of interceptors, and activating all early warning systems. Implement enhanced force protection measures for all emergency services personnel. Expedite diplomatic efforts for the acquisition of additional advanced AD systems and secure urgent resupply of interceptor munitions. Allocate AD assets to counter new UAV threat vectors. Analyze new western/northwestern-bound UAV ingress routes and new missile trajectories to pre-position AD assets and optimize interception tactics. Prioritize defense of Vinnytsia city, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr against the direct UAV threat. Monitor tactical aviation activity in the Eastern and Southeastern directions. Immediately verify the claimed destruction of the P-18 radar in Sumy Oblast and rapidly assess any resulting gaps in air situational awareness. Account for new UAV and missile threats in Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblasts, and develop specific tactics and deploy additional short-range AD systems (e.g., mobile fire groups with MANPADS, anti-drone guns) to counter multiple incoming UAVs in areas like Konstantinivka, Mykolaiv Oblast. Monitor Russian AD responses to Ukrainian deep strikes into Russia (e.g., Moscow region) to identify areas of vulnerability and assess the impact of Ukrainian operations on Russian civilian infrastructure and daily life. For Nikopol, Marhanets, and Prymorske, prioritize local, mobile anti-drone systems (e.g., electronic warfare jammers, anti-drone guns, heavy machine guns) and hardened shelters. Respond to the increased kamikaze drone and artillery attacks in the Southern direction with enhanced localized AD and counter-battery fire.
    • Justification: Russian forces are deliberately escalating attacks on civilian areas and opening new attack vectors to inflict casualties and psychological impact. The persistent KAB strikes, ongoing UAV threats, missile activity, MLRS, and heavy artillery underscore the urgency and breadth of the threat. The confirmed Azot chemical plant attack and attempted Moscow drone attack provide Russia with significant justification for severe retaliation. The injury of SES workers and new civilian casualty in Vasylivskyi Raion and Prymorske highlights a direct targeting of first responders and civilians. The Russian claim of destroying a P-18 radar indicates an active Russian effort to suppress Ukrainian AD. New UAV activity and missile launches in Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblasts demonstrate a further broadening of Russian aerial threats. The warning of aviation munition use in Synelnykivskyi Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and the simultaneous multi-UAV threat on Mykolaiv (specifically Konstantinivka) indicate a continued and evolving Russian aerial threat pattern. The persistent Ukrainian UAV attacks on Moscow region, leading to repeated airport closures and multiple interceptions, confirm the effectiveness of Ukrainian deep strike operations in disrupting Russian civilian and military operations. This, in turn, may provoke further Russian retaliatory strikes. The confirmed MLRS, heavy artillery, and FPV drone attacks on Nikopol and Marhanets demonstrate a consistent, multi-faceted threat requiring localized, adaptable defenses. The recent deep strikes into Russian territory, including on a chemical plant and near Moscow, strongly indicate a major retaliatory strike is imminent. The increased kamikaze drone and artillery attacks in the Southern direction confirm a rising threat there.
    • Intelligence Gap: Real-time air defense munition expenditure rates in affected areas and current inventory levels for key systems; full extent of Russian UAV reconnaissance and strike capabilities. Russian intent and capability for deliberate targeting of first responders. Specific objectives of new UAV ingress routes and missile targeting. Full analysis of Russian tactical aviation activity and KAB targeting priorities. Independent BDA on the claimed P-18 radar destruction and its impact. Precise flight paths, launch locations, and targets of new UAVs and missiles in Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblasts. Precise type of aviation munition in Synelnykivskyi Raion. Precise flight paths and intended targets of the multiple UAVs inbound to Mykolaiv and Konstantinivka. Precise BDA on KAB strike in Stepnohirsk and Vasylivskyi Raion. Full analysis of Russian AD response times and effectiveness to UAVs over Moscow region, and the specific impact on Russian air traffic and civilian life. Specific caliber and type of heavy artillery used in Nikopol/Marhanets; exact impact locations of MLRS; specific types of FPV drones used in these attacks; independent BDA on damage in Prymorske village. Specific intelligence on the timing, scale, and primary targets of the anticipated Russian "revenge strike." Specifics on the increased kamikaze drone types, launch locations, and targets in the Southern direction.
    • Collection Requirement: Automated tracking of AD engagements and munition usage, updated imagery of damaged civilian sites for munition analysis, SIGINT/HUMINT on AD system readiness, drone flight path analysis. HUMINT/OSINT on Russian TTPs regarding first responder targeting. IMINT/SIGINT on UAV launch locations and operational patterns. SIGINT on missile launch locations and targets. SIGINT/IMINT of UAV trajectories to identify likely launch areas and staging points. SIGINT/IMINT on Russian tactical aviation movements and KAB targets. IMINT/SIGINT/OSINT on the location of the claimed P-18 strike. IMINT/OSINT/HUMINT on KAB strike locations and damage. SIGINT/IMINT/OSINT on UAV flight paths and missile trajectories. Real-time tracking and SIGINT of UAVs entering Mykolaiv Oblast. Full analysis of Russian AD response times and effectiveness to UAVs over Moscow region, and the specific impact on Russian air traffic and civilian life. Detailed IMINT/OSINT/HUMINT on damage in Nikopol, Marhanets, and Prymorske for BDA and munition analysis. SIGINT/HUMINT on Russian artillery and FPV drone units targeting these areas. Prioritize ISR (SIGINT, IMINT) on Russian strategic bomber bases, missile launch areas, and large-scale UAV staging sites for indicators of imminent mass launch preparations. HUMINT on Russian strategic decision-making regarding retaliation. SIGINT/IMINT on kamikaze drone launch sites and artillery positions in the Southern direction.
  2. Sustain and Exploit Deep Strike Successes, Prepare for Retaliation and Enhanced Russian Defenses, Targeting Chemical/Industrial Nodes Critical to Ammunition Production, While Assessing Russian Internal Security Adaptations and Countering Russian UAV C2 (Urgent):

    • Action: Conduct rapid, detailed BDA on the destroyed Iskander launchers, the logistics train, the Tu-22M3 bomber, and the "Azot" chemical plant in Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast to confirm operational impact. Publicize these successes widely. Simultaneously, prepare for heightened Russian retaliatory strikes across Ukraine, particularly on strategic infrastructure, as predicted by Reuters. Disperse high-value assets and reinforce their defenses. Continue to assess targets for further deep strikes on Russian logistics and military-industrial complex, prioritizing industrial nodes with confirmed or high-probability links to military production, especially those providing raw materials or components for ammunition. Integrate FPV drone operations more widely for precision strikes on personnel and high-value equipment. Leverage SOF for continued cross-border raids against high-value Russian personnel and forward operating bases. Develop and deploy countermeasures to Russian new warning systems (e.g., in Sevastopol) and airfield restrictions (e.g., Kaluga, Vnukovo, Domodedovo), assessing their impact on Ukrainian deep strike TTPs. Analyze the TASS report on the "Voskresensky Plant 'Mashinostroitel'" and new FPV drone footage from Colonelcassad and TASS/MoD drone video to identify typical Russian FPV targets and improve Ukrainian countermeasures. Assess the effectiveness of Russian air defense in Kaluga Oblast against the 7 downed UAVs. Monitor reports on the eliminated fire at the Pushkino fuel/lubricants warehouse to determine the effectiveness of the initial Ukrainian strike and the speed of Russian damage control and recovery. Analyze the repeated successful UAV attacks on Moscow region and subsequent airport closures as a key deep strike impact, and seek opportunities to replicate or escalate this disruption. Monitor the lifting of "yellow level" alerts in Lipetsk and Vnukovo airport restrictions to understand the speed of Russian recovery and their internal threat assessment. Analyze the effectiveness of the recent Ukrainian air strike on a Russian UAV control point in Kherson Oblast and seek to replicate such strikes against similar Russian C2 nodes. Increase efforts to counter Russian cyber-security threats, as implied by TASS's cyberpolice advice.
    • Justification: Ukrainian deep strikes are a significant strategic success but will provoke severe retaliation. The destruction of a logistics train highlights a key vulnerability. Russian attempts to adapt to drone threats and deep strikes (new warning systems, airport restrictions) must be actively countered. The persistent strike on a chemical industrial plant is a critical new category of target. The successful extinguishing of the fire in Pushkino and interceptions in Kaluga indicate Russia's efforts to mitigate deep strike effects. The new FPV drone video from Colonelcassad and TASS/MoD video provide insight into Russian tactical operations. The repeated successful UAV attacks on Moscow, leading to airport closures, directly impact Russian civilian life and critical infrastructure, demonstrating Ukraine's capability to bring the war to Russian territory. Reuters' prediction highlights the continued threat of significant retaliation. The lifting of alerts/restrictions indicates Russian adaptive defense and damage control. The successful strike on the Russian UAV C2 in Kherson demonstrates a critical capability to degrade Russian drone operations. TASS's mention of cyberpolice suggests a broader Russian concern for information security.
    • Intelligence Gap: Full BDA and long-term operational impact on Russian ballistic missile capabilities, Southern logistics, and strategic aviation. Specific details on the GRU personnel targeted in the SOF raid. Effectiveness of Russian counter-drone adaptations. Full impact of Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian air force operations. Full implications of new Sevastopol warning systems on Ukrainian maritime drone operations. Detailed analysis of Russian chemical industrial production facilities. Nature of the dispute with "Mashinostroitel". Full analysis of target in Colonelcassad's FPV video and TASS/MoD video. Specific type and capabilities of UAVs downed over Kaluga. Detailed BDA of the Pushkino strike. Specific BDA on Moscow region UAV strikes and the extent of their impact on airports and air traffic; the specific types of UAVs used in these attacks. Detailed analysis of Russian internal security response protocols following UAV incidents (e.g., how quickly are airport restrictions lifted, what criteria are used for "yellow level" alerts). Full BDA on the targeted Russian UAV control point in Kherson and identification of its operational impact on Russian drone activities in the area. Assessment of Russian cyber police effectiveness and the scope of their targets.
    • Collection Requirement: High-resolution satellite imagery of Bryansk/Kursk missile sites, Southern logistics hubs, Russian airfields (especially Engels, Belaya, Dyagilevo, Kaluga, Vnukovo, Domodedovo), and other military-industrial targets, including Novomoskovsk's "Azot" plant. Monitoring Russian strategic aviation movements. HUMINT/SIGINT on Russian GRU force composition. IMINT/OSINT on Russian vehicle adaptations. SIGINT/OSINT on new Russian warning systems. Targeted intelligence on Russian chemical industrial production. OSINT/HUMINT on the "Voskresensky Plant 'Mashinostroitel'" dispute. IMINT/OSINT of the target from Colonelcassad's FPV video and TASS/MoD video. IMINT/SIGINT/OSINT on UAV characteristics downed in Kaluga. SIGINT/IMINT of the Pushkino fuel/lubricants warehouse. Real-time IMINT/SIGINT/OSINT on Moscow region airports (Vnukovo, Domodedovo) during and after UAV incidents for BDA and operational impact assessment; technical analysis of recovered UAV debris from Moscow attacks. OSINT/HUMINT on Russian public announcements and official statements regarding security alerts and airport operations, especially regarding the timing and content of their lifting. IMINT/SIGINT/OSINT on the Kherson UAV control point strike location to assess damage, and SIGINT/HUMINT on changes in Russian UAV operations in the Kherson sector. OSINT/HUMINT on Russian cyber threats and counter-measures.
  3. Intensify Counter-Information Warfare on Humanitarian Issues, Western Divisions, and Russian Fabrications, Addressing Internal Russian Propaganda, and Debunking False Claims of Success, including New "Surrender" Narratives and Strategic Missile Rhetoric (Ongoing & Critical):

    • Action: Proactively and transparently communicate Ukraine's official stance and actions regarding prisoner and body exchanges, consistently refuting Russian disinformation. Immediately and publicly expose Russian fabrications, such as the "future-dated" body lists and the alleged POW video. Immediately and aggressively counter Russian claims of "relatives of Ukrainian military" appealing for surrender, providing context on forced recruitment, psychological pressure, or outright fabrication. Highlight Russian violations of international law to discredit their humanitarian claims. Publicly counter Russian narratives attempting to exploit Western internal politics and international relations, including US domestic unrest (Trump/National Guard, migrant raids, riots) and alleged corruption among Ukrainian leadership (Zelensky's mother's apartments). Formulate a clear and firm public response to Russian diplomatic statements (e.g., Ryabkov's comments on missile deployments), emphasizing Ukraine's sovereign right to defense. Leverage the opening of rehabilitation centers to showcase Ukrainian commitment. Monitor and analyze Russian internal propaganda related to veteran support, cultural events, and especially inflammatory narratives concerning migration/ethnic issues. Specifically analyze Russian military propaganda videos to identify key messaging and counter it. Crucially, actively counter the escalating Russian false flag narrative from Kursk Oblast. Immediately refute and expose false claims of Ukrainian retreat. Monitor and analyze Russian milblogger polls. Immediately and aggressively counter the new Russian narrative regarding civilian casualties at the Azot plant, emphasizing its legitimate military target status, and expose the "Goncharovka" civilian account as part of a broader false flag campaign. Immediately and publicly refute Russian claims of destroying Ukrainian military assets if independent BDA indicates otherwise. Publicly acknowledge successful AD interceptions of UAVs over Russia, framing them as defensive measures and highlighting Russian aggression. Immediately refute TASS claims of significant Russian expansion near Stupochky if found false. Immediately and publicly refute Russian claims of advances towards Konstantinovka if not verifiable by independent sources, or provide context if limited tactical gains are made. Proactively highlight civilian casualties and damage from Russian MLRS, heavy artillery, and FPV drone attacks in Nikopol, Marhanets, and Prymorske, linking them to indiscriminate targeting. Analyze and counter Russian milblogger content that attempts to internalize anxieties or justify aggression through narratives of "endurance" or "sacrifice." Publicly verify or refute Russian claims of destroying Ukrainian UAV control points. Proactively address the implications of the hypothetical General Staff "Map of Combat Operations" dated 07.06.2025 by framing it as a potential long-term scenario for which Ukraine is preparing, or as a tool for strategic planning, rather than a definitive forecast of future defeat. Emphasize Ukrainian resilience and continued resistance despite such hypothetical challenges. Use the civilian casualty figures from Kyiv (18 injured from June 6th attack) to highlight Russian brutality. Counter Russian claims of Ukrainian encirclement in Radkovka, Kharkiv.
    • Justification: Russia is leveraging highly sensitive humanitarian issues, internal Western political dynamics, and sensationalist narratives for information warfare, using increasingly blatant fabrications. Russian diplomatic statements are explicitly trying to set conditions for further escalation. The confirmed Azot attack and Moscow drone incident will be used by Russia to justify retaliation. Effective, consistent counter-narratives are critical. The proliferation of internal Russian propaganda, particularly the divisive narratives about "replacement of the Russian people," requires monitoring. The specific focus on medical care and claimed tactical successes/Ukrainian failures in Russian propaganda indicates a recognized vulnerability or area for morale boosting. The subtle use of polls in specific Ukrainian cities indicates an evolving, more nuanced Russian IO tactic. The rapid reporting of Azot casualties and the Goncharovka video clearly demonstrate Russia's intent to exploit any civilian impact for propaganda. Russian claims of destroying high-value Ukrainian military assets are designed to demoralize. Ukrainian deep strikes into Russia, including UAVs over Moscow, provide opportunities to demonstrate capability and shift narratives. The repeated successful interceptions of UAVs over Moscow, publicly reported by Russia, create an opportunity to highlight Ukraine's deep strike capabilities. The TASS report on Trump/Musk conflict and Finland PM's condemnation of Trump are clear attempts to sow discord. The KAB strike on Stepnohirsk and civilian injury in Vasylivskyi Raion offer Russia another opportunity to deflect blame. The new Russian claim of proximity to Konstantinovka is a direct IO attempt to undermine Ukrainian morale and requires immediate, factual counter-messaging. New reports of civilian casualties in Prymorske and sustained shelling in Nikopol/Marhanets underscore the indiscriminate nature of Russian attacks. The introspective milblogger posts indicate an evolving Russian IO approach that needs to be understood and potentially leveraged. Russian claims of destroying UAV C2 points are a direct attempt to undermine Ukrainian drone operations. The General Staff's hypothetical future map, if misinterpreted, could be demoralizing, necessitating careful framing. Civilian casualties in Kyiv provide strong evidence for Russian war crimes. Russian claims of encirclement (Radkovka) require rapid, factual response.
    • Intelligence Gap: Full scope of Russian information narratives targeting Ukrainian society and Western audiences. Identification of key Russian PSYOP themes. Understanding the intent and impact of highly divisive internal Russian propaganda. Effectiveness of Russian military propaganda. Full details on the alleged "occupation" in Russkoye Porechnoye, Kursk Oblast. Verification of Russian claims near Kamenka/Stroyevka. Detailed analysis of Russian milblogger polling data. Independent verification of Goncharovka incident. Impact and reach of Russian milblogger claims of P-18 radar destruction. Independent BDA on Konstantinovka FPV strike. Full analysis of Russian messaging related to AD interceptions over Moscow. Verification of TASS reporting on Trump/Musk. Independent BDA on claimed MaxxPro destruction. Independent BDA on Colonelcassad's new FPV video. Independent verification of TASS claims of Russian expansion near Stupochky. Full analysis of Russian messaging related to AD interceptions over Mykolaiv. Full BDA on targets in TASS/MoD drone video and Colonelcassad thermal footage. Impact of WSJ/Pentagon UFO story. Specific data supporting Russian claims of 3,500 appeals from Ukrainian military relatives. Impact of Ryabkov's statements on international diplomatic efforts. Independent verification of TASS claim of Russian forces being 6.5 km from Konstantinovka; impact of Colonelcassad's "necrophilia" posts on Ukrainian military recruitment; the specific reach and effectiveness of the "Normandie-Neman" unit narrative. Analysis of the underlying sentiment and potential strategic intent behind introspective Russian milblogger posts. Independent BDA on claimed UAV control point destruction. Analysis of the specific messaging intent and potential impact of the General Staff's hypothetical future map. Detailed demographic and psychological impact assessment of civilian casualties in Kyiv. Independent verification of Radkovka encirclement claim.
    • Collection Requirement: Comprehensive monitoring of Russian state media and milblogger channels. OSINT analysis of specific Russian PSYOP channels. Targeted OSINT/HUMINT on internal Russian social dynamics. Detailed content analysis of Russian military propaganda videos. Immediate OSINT/HUMINT/IMINT of Russkoye Porechnoye. Immediate IMINT/HUMINT of Kamenka/Stroyevka. Systematic collection and analysis of Russian milblogger polls. Immediate OSINT/HUMINT/IMINT of Goncharovka. OSINT monitoring of Russian milblogger channels for further claims of Ukrainian AD system destruction. IMINT/SIGINT/HUMINT for BDA on Konstantinovka FPV strike. OSINT monitoring of Russian state and milblogger media for messaging regarding UAV interceptions over Moscow. OSINT on TASS and Rolling Stone regarding Trump/Musk. IMINT/SIGINT/OSINT on claimed MaxxPro destruction. IMINT/OSINT of Colonelcassad's FPV video. IMINT/HUMINT/OSINT on Stupochky area. OSINT monitoring of local Mykolaiv channels. IMINT/SIGINT/OSINT for BDA on TASS/MoD drone video targets and Colonelcassad thermal footage. Content analysis of Russian information channels for mention of the WSJ/Pentagon UFO story. SIGINT/HUMINT on Russian MFA communications. OSINT on Russian state media and milblogger channels for further claims of Ukrainian military appeals for surrender. IMINT/OSINT on the Konstantinovka axis to verify Russian claims of advance; OSINT on Colonelcassad's "necrophilia" posts to gauge their reach and engagement; OSINT on the TASS "Normandie-Neman" report to assess its amplification and target audience reaction. OSINT/HUMINT/IMINT on impact of shelling/FPV drones in Nikopol, Marhanets, and Prymorske. Detailed content analysis of the "НгП раZVедка" message and similar posts. IMINT/SIGINT/OSINT to verify claims of UAV control point destruction. OSINT analysis of the General Staff's hypothetical map's reception both domestically and internationally. HUMINT/OSINT on the psychological impact of recent attacks on Kyiv's population. IMINT/HUMINT/OSINT on Radkovka to verify Russian claims.
  4. Reinforce and Monitor Sumy and Donetsk Axes Defenses, Verify Russian Claims, and Account for Potential AD Degradation, while Adapting to New Precision Drone Threats and Countering Russian Ground Offensives (Urgent):

    • Action: Immediately reinforce personnel, fortifications, and anti-tank capabilities on the Sumy axis. Intensify ISR collection on Russian force composition, strength, and objectives. Advise civilian authorities on potential evacuation routes. Conduct aggressive counter-battery fire. Given the confirmed occupation of Loknya, assess the next likely Russian objectives and prepare layered defenses. Similarly, reinforce defenses and conduct ISR on the Konstantinovka, Pokrovsk, Kramatorsk, Orikhiv, Novopavlivka, and Huliaipole axes. Prepare for potential increased KAB/UAV/missile strikes on Sumy Oblast. Immediately verify the Russian claim of a Krab SPG destruction and the FPV strike on a UAV C2/dugout in Konstantinovka. Analyze the "ZONA SVO" video claiming Ukrainian assault deaths. Allocate additional AD/EW assets to these fronts where feasible. If the P-18 radar destruction in Sumy Oblast is confirmed, adjust ground force defensive planning. Immediately verify TASS claims of Ukrainian retreat. Improve force protection measures for drone crews. Immediately verify the Russian MoD claim of a MaxxPro loss. Immediately verify TASS claims of significant Russian expansion near Stupochky. Implement enhanced camouflage, dispersal, and active/passive counter-drone measures for all personnel and vehicles operating in frontline areas. Update training protocols for personnel on drone threat identification. Monitor for any shifts in Russian ground force deployments or tactics in Zaporizhzhia Oblast following the KAB strike on Stepnohirsk and the attack on Vasylivskyi Raion. Immediately verify TASS claims of Russian forces being 6.5 km from Konstantinovka via IMINT/HUMINT/OSINT and adjust defensive planning accordingly. Prioritize the development and deployment of countermeasures against Russian capabilities to target Ukrainian UAV control points and operators, based on the "Voin DV" claim. Analyze the General Staff's hypothetical future map, particularly the depictions of significant Russian territorial gains and advances towards key Ukrainian cities (Kramatorsk, Orikhiv, Kupiansk), to identify potential future Russian strategic objectives and prepare layered defenses accordingly. Immediately verify Russian claims of encirclement in Radkovka, Kharkiv, and provide emergency support or planning if confirmed.
    • Justification: Russian claims of an "expanding buffer zone" and confirmed advances (Loknya) indicate a serious intent to press the Sumy axis. The continued focus on the Novopavlivka and Pokrovsk directions, and new claims on Konstantinovka and Stupochky, also indicate sustained pressure on ground forces. The SOF raid highlights active Russian presence. Russian claims of KAB strikes and new UAV activity further indicate their focus. The claimed Krab SPG destruction and FPV strike on a UAV C2 node highlight Russian tactical adaptation. The claimed FPV strike on "Baba-Yaga" and drone crews demonstrates a serious threat to Ukrainian drone assets and personnel. Russian propaganda videos purporting to show Ukrainian casualties are designed to demoralize. The continuing KAB launches underscore the aerial component of Russian ground pressure. The claimed P-18 radar destruction, if confirmed, represents a direct attempt to degrade Ukrainian defenses. TASS claims of Ukrainian retreat require immediate military response. The claimed MaxxPro loss, if verified, represents a tangible loss. TASS claims of expanding control near Stupochky represent a potential tactical setback. New Russian drone videos confirm a highly effective threat from precision tactical drones. The KAB strike on Stepnohirsk and the attack on Vasylivskyi Raion, while aerial, could be a precursor to increased ground activity in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The specific claim of proximity to Konstantinovka indicates a renewed or intensified focus on this axis. The Russian claim of destroying a UAV control point indicates their active efforts to disrupt Ukrainian drone operations, necessitating countermeasures. The General Staff's hypothetical map, while not a prediction, provides a worst-case scenario framework that should inform long-term defensive preparations and resource allocation, particularly for key axes like Pokrovsk, Kramatorsk, and Orikhiv, where significant Russian pressure is already evident. Russian claims of encirclement in Radkovka, if true, indicate a developing crisis.
    • Intelligence Gap: Precise composition and strength of Russian forces on Sumy, Konstantinovka/Southern Donetsk/Pokrovsk/Orikhiv, and Kharkiv (Radkovka) axes. Independent BDA on Russian claim of Krab SPG destruction and FPV strike on UAV C2. Full details on the incident depicted in the "ZONA SVO" video. Detailed assessment of Russian KAB targeting accuracy. Operational impact of potential P-18 radar loss. Independent verification of TASS claim of Ukrainian retreat. Full BDA on Konstantinovka FPV strike. Independent BDA on claimed MaxxPro destruction. Independent BDA on TASS claims of Russian expansion near Stupochky. Full BDA on targets in TASS/MoD drone video and Colonelcassad thermal footage. Assessment of Russian drone capabilities for night operations. Any changes in Russian ground force massing or movement in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Independent verification of TASS claim regarding proximity to Konstantinovka; specific Russian units and their strength operating on the Konstantinovka axis. Independent BDA on the claimed UAV control point destruction; identification of Russian TTPs for targeting UAV ground infrastructure. Detailed analysis of Russian strategic objectives and unit composition on all axes depicted in the hypothetical General Staff map, particularly for areas indicating major Russian advances (e.g., Kramatorsk, Orikhiv, Kupiansk). Independent verification of Radkovka encirclement and specific unit identification.
    • Collection Requirement: HUMINT from local sources, SIGINT on Russian communications, IMINT for troop movements and fortifications, cross-referencing Russian map claims with ground truth. Immediate IMINT of Vasyutinskoye area for BDA, SIGINT on Russian drone activity. Detailed frame-by-frame analysis of "ZONA SVO" video. IMINT/SIGINT of Konstantinovka to verify the FPV strike and BDA. IMINT/SIGINT/OSINT on KAB strike locations. IMINT/SIGINT on Russian reconnaissance and strike activity in Sumy Oblast. IMINT/HUMINT of Kamenka/Stroyevka area. IMINT/SIGINT on Konstantinovka to verify the FPV strike. IMINT/SIGINT/OSINT on claimed MaxxPro destruction. IMINT/SIGINT/OSINT on Stupochky area. IMINT/SIGINT/OSINT for BDA on TASS/MoD drone video targets and Colonelcassad thermal footage. IMINT/SIGINT on Konstantinovka axis for Russian force disposition, movements, and claimed advances. HUMINT from local sources near Konstantinovka. IMINT/SIGINT on Russian counter-drone operations and targeting of Ukrainian UAV ground assets, including analysis of the "Voin DV" video. Aggressive ISR (IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT) on all axes, especially Pokrovsk, Kramatorsk, Orikhiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv (Radkovka), to monitor Russian force buildup, logistics, and any signs of preparatory movements for large-scale offensives. Cross-reference actual Russian activities with the hypothetical scenarios presented in the General Staff map to refine intelligence assessments.
  5. Enhance Maritime Security in the Black Sea and Crimea, and Bolster Air Defense in Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson, while maintaining vigilance on Russian naval operations (New & Critical):

    • Action: Increase Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in areas with critical maritime infrastructure (ports, offshore platforms, key shipping lanes) in the Black Sea, particularly off Odesa, Mykolaiv, and the Ukrainian coast, and intensify ISR on Sevastopol and other Crimean naval bases. Develop and deploy enhanced physical and electronic security measures for offshore platforms, subsea cables, and pipelines. Share intelligence on Russian maritime special operations (e.g., "Espanola" unit's TTPs, "Два майора" claims) with relevant maritime security agencies and allied nations. Prioritize monitoring of specific offshore platforms and naval assets for signs of Russian activity. Analyze the new Sevastopol warning signals to understand their operational triggers. Increase AD readiness in Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson for incoming missile and UAV threats, and integrate maritime and air defense efforts to counter coordinated attacks. Maintain continuous monitoring of Russian naval vessels, including missile carriers, in both the Black and Azov Seas, despite their current reported absence. Analyze the Ukrainian Navy's situation report to identify any emerging threats or shifts in Russian naval posture. Monitor Kryvyi Rih and other central Ukrainian urban centers for shifts in Russian targeting, given the current "controlled situation" reported by local authorities. Review the "Prydniprovskyi Direction" on the General Staff's hypothetical map, which depicts Russian control of the eastern bank of the Dnipro River and ongoing shelling of the right bank, to understand potential long-term Russian objectives and prepare defenses along the riverine frontier. Implement specific countermeasures against increased kamikaze drone attacks in the Southern direction.
    • Justification: The "Espanola" unit's video and "Два майора" claims demonstrate a sophisticated Russian capability for maritime sabotage. The introduction of new, specific warning signals in Sevastopol indicates heightened Russian concern. The confirmed missile threat towards Odesa, and new UAV and missile activity in Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblasts, highlight the continued aerial threat to these vital port cities and regions. The continued multi-UAV threat on Mykolaiv underscores the need for robust and adaptable local air defense. The Ukrainian Navy's report provides valuable real-time insight into the maritime domain. The calm situation reported in Kryvyi Rih, while positive, means Russian forces may shift their focus there if other areas become too heavily defended. The hypothetical map's depiction of a stable Russian presence on the eastern Dnipro bank and continued fire on the western bank suggests a persistent riverine threat that needs to be factored into long-term defensive planning. The reported increase in kamikaze drones in the Southern direction indicates a heightened and specific threat vector.
    • Intelligence Gap: Full understanding of "Espanola" unit's capabilities. Precise location and function of the "infrastructure" claimed destroyed by "Два майора." Full details on the triggers and operational procedures for the new Sevastopol warning signals. Precise launch location and intended target of missile towards Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Voznesensk, and UAV activity in Mykolaiv and Kherson. Precise flight paths and intended targets of the multiple UAVs inbound to Mykolaiv and Konstantinivka. Reason for current absence of Russian missile carriers. Any specific intelligence from the Ukrainian Navy's report indicating new Russian naval movements or capabilities. Any intelligence indicating changes in Russian targeting priorities for central Ukrainian cities like Kryvyi Rih. Specific Russian units deployed along the eastern bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, and their capabilities for offensive river crossing operations or sustained indirect fire. Specific types, launch methods, and targeting patterns of the increased kamikaze drone attacks in the Southern direction.
    • Collection Requirement: IMINT/OSINT on Russian naval special forces units, SIGINT on their communications, HUMINT from Black Sea region. Commercial satellite imagery of offshore infrastructure. SIGINT/OSINT on Sevastopol air defense and naval activities. SIGINT on missile launch origin and trajectory analysis. SIGINT/IMINT on UAV launch locations and flight paths. Real-time tracking and SIGINT of UAVs entering Mykolaiv Oblast. Continuous IMINT/SIGINT/OSINT on Russian naval movements. Detailed analysis of the Ukrainian Navy's situation report for any anomalies or new data points. OSINT/HUMINT on local sentiment and potential Russian reconnaissance/targeting activities in Kryvyi Rih and surrounding areas. IMINT/SIGINT/HUMINT on Russian forces, fortifications, and equipment deployed along the eastern bank of the Dnipro in Kherson, particularly for signs of bridging equipment or preparations for amphibious operations. SIGINT/IMINT/OSINT on kamikaze drone operational patterns, wreckage analysis, and ground team detection/neutralization efforts in the Southern direction.

END REPORT

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