Archived operational intelligence briefing
OPSEC CLASSIFICATION: NATO SECRET // RELEASABLE TO UKR FORCES
INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 08 JUN 25 / 02:42 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 08 JUN 25 / 02:12 ZULU - 08 JUN 25 / 02:42 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:
AOR Update: Kharkiv Oblast, Volyn Oblast, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (including Synelnykivskyi Raion), Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Black Sea, Azov Sea, Sumy Oblast, Russian Federation (Kursk, Bryansk, Kaluga, Smolensk Oblasts, Moscow Region including Dubna, Podmoskovye, Moscow city, Pushkino, Irkutsk region - Belaya airfield; Tambov Oblast - Michurinsk; Ryazan Oblast - Dyagilevo; Belgorod Oblast - Prokhorovka-Belenikhino, Zhuravlevka, Pushkarozhadinsky, Azov - Rostov Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast - Kstovo, Sevastopol, Lipetsk Oblast, Orel Oblast, Tula Oblast - Novomoskovsk, Azot chemical plant), Southern Donetsk Direction (including Stupochky), Konstantinovka direction, Siversk direction, Odesa Oblast, Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovsk, Kurakhovo - Alekseevka, Chasov Yar, Kramatorsk axis, Toretsk axis, Novopavlivka axis, Krasnoarmeysk-Novosergeevka, Maryinka, Dalnee, Sokol, Lipovoe, Bakhmut, Progress, Kleshcheevka, Vasyutinskoye, south Donetsk region), Kupyansk axis, Kherson axis, Ternopil Oblast, Kyiv, Krasnoarmeysk direction, Lviv Oblast, Mykolaiv Oblast (including Varvarivka, Matviivka, Voskresenske, Konstantinivka), Poltava Oblast, Kirovohrad Oblast, Vinnytsia Oblast, Cherkasy Oblast, Zhytomyr Oblast, Kyiv Oblast.
New Developments (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, UKR): Threat of Russian aviation munition employment in Synelnykivskyi Raion. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - based on Air Force of AFU warning).
New Developments (Mykolaiv Oblast, UKR): Multiple Russian UAVs detected inbound to Mykolaiv. One UAV transited Varvarivka towards Matviivka. Another UAV reported inbound from Voskresenske. Multiple UAVs (total 4) reported heading towards Konstantinivka in Mykolaiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - based on Air Force of AFU and local milblogger reports). Confirmed successful interception of one UAV near Mykolaiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - local milblogger report).
New Developments (Southern Donetsk Direction, RU): TASS reports significant expansion of Russian control around Stupochky in DNR, claiming seizure of territory north of the settlement over the past week. (CONFIDENCE: LOW - Russian claim, unverified by independent sources; MEDIUM - as an indication of Russian intent to highlight battlefield successes).
New Developments (Information Environment - International): Finland's Prime Minister condemns Trump's attempts to weaken Graham's sanctions against Russia. This indicates continued Western concern over internal divisions regarding Russian policy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - as an information operation indication).
New Developments (Imagery/Video - RU): Colonelcassad shares an FPV drone video showing pre-flight preparation, launch, and impact on a target. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - for milblogger sharing; MEDIUM - for precise target identification without BDA).
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:
COA 1 (MLCOA - Sustained and Escalated Retaliatory Saturation Attacks on Urban Centers and Critical Infrastructure, Coupled with Amplified Disinformation on Humanitarian Issues and Western Divisions, with Direct Targeting of First Responders, and New Attack Vectors): Russia will continue and likely intensify KAB and missile/UAV strikes on Ukrainian urban centers. Concurrently, Russia will continue a persistent and aggressive information campaign, exploiting any perceived Western failures or internal divisions (e.g., US politics, Polish EU accession, Musk/Bessent narratives, Trump/Musk conflict, now Finland PM condemnation of Trump on sanctions). The continued targeting of the Azot chemical plant may lead to Russian retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian chemical or industrial facilities. Russia will also escalate false flag operations regarding "Ukrainian atrocities" in Russian border regions to justify retaliatory actions, and continue to propagate false claims of Ukrainian retreats and military losses (e.g., claimed MaxxPro destruction). Russia will continue aviation munition threats in areas like Synelnykivskyi Raion, and persistent UAV attacks on key cities like Mykolaiv and its surrounding areas.
COA 2 (Ground Offensive Support with Targeted Artillery/MLRS and Drone Strikes, while Enhancing Counter-Deep Strike Internal Security and Expanding Maritime Hybrid Operations, with Enhanced Crimean Defenses, and Increased Internal Propaganda focus alongside Divisive Narratives): Russian forces will continue to press ground offensives on existing axes, supporting them with targeted artillery, MLRS, and FPV drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and C2 nodes (e.g., Konstantinovka FPV strike, new FPV video by Colonelcassad). The alleged destruction of a Ukrainian P-18 radar in Sumy Oblast, if verified, indicates an ongoing effort to suppress Ukrainian air defenses. They will likely intensify internal security efforts to prevent and detect further Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian territory. Additionally, Russia will likely attempt to conduct further hybrid maritime operations in the Black Sea. Russia will increase internal propaganda efforts focusing on state support for veterans and promoting national unity, while simultaneously allowing the amplification of divisive internal narratives (e.g., migration/ethnic issues) through controlled channels. Propaganda will also highlight improvements in battlefield medical care and troop welfare, and demonstrate military effectiveness (e.g., claimed Krab SPG destruction, FPV strike on UAV C2, now claimed P-18 destruction, claimed MaxxPro destruction, new FPV video showcasing operational success, TASS claim of expanded control near Stupochky) while portraying Ukrainian military failures and casualties (e.g., "ZONA SVO" video, TASS claims of Ukrainian retreat).
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):
MLCOA 1: Sustained and Escalated Retaliatory Saturation Attacks on Urban Centers and Critical Infrastructure, Coupled with Amplified Disinformation on Humanitarian Issues and Western Divisions, with Direct Targeting of First Responders, and New Attack Vectors (INCLUDING CHEMICAL HAZARDS AND FALSE FLAG ATROCITIES), and Targeted Degradation of Ukrainian AD: Russia will continue and likely intensify KAB and missile/UAV strikes on Ukrainian urban centers. Concurrently, Russia will continue a persistent and aggressive information campaign, particularly regarding body/POW exchanges (using fabricated evidence), blaming Ukraine for delays, and exploiting any perceived Western failures or internal divisions (e.g., US politics, Polish EU accession, Musk/Bessent narratives, Trump/Musk conflict, now Finland PM condemnation of Trump on sanctions). The persistent strike on the Azot chemical plant will lead to Russian retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian chemical or industrial facilities, or an increase in strikes with a focus on creating secondary hazards. Furthermore, Russia will escalate the dissemination of false flag narratives regarding "Ukrainian atrocities" in Russian border regions, and continue to propagate false claims of Ukrainian military retreats and military losses (e.g., claimed MaxxPro destruction). Russia will continue to employ aviation munitions in contested areas (e.g., Synelnykivskyi Raion, Dnipropetrovsk) and persist with multi-UAV attacks on cities like Mykolaiv and its surrounding areas, testing Ukrainian AD response.
MLCOA 2: Ground Offensive Support with Targeted Artillery/MLRS and Drone Strikes, while Enhancing Counter-Deep Strike Internal Security and Expanding Maritime Hybrid Operations, with Enhanced Crimean Defenses, and Increased Internal Propaganda focus alongside Divisive Narratives: Russian forces will continue to press ground offensives on existing axes, supporting them with targeted artillery, MLRS, and FPV drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and C2 nodes (e.g., Konstantinovka FPV strike, new FPV video by Colonelcassad). The alleged destruction of a Ukrainian P-18 radar in Sumy Oblast, if verified, indicates an ongoing effort to suppress Ukrainian air defenses. They will likely intensify internal security efforts to prevent and detect further Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian territory. Additionally, Russia will likely attempt to conduct further hybrid maritime operations in the Black Sea. Russia will increase internal propaganda efforts focusing on state support for veterans and promoting national unity, while simultaneously allowing the amplification of divisive internal narratives. Propaganda will also highlight improvements in battlefield medical care and troop welfare, and demonstrate military effectiveness (e.g., claimed Krab SPG destruction, FPV strike on UAV C2, now claimed P-18 destruction, claimed MaxxPro destruction, new FPV video showcasing operational success, TASS claim of expanded control near Stupochky) while portraying Ukrainian military failures and casualties (e.g., "ZONA SVO" video, TASS claims of Ukrainian retreat).
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):
MDCOA 1: Renewed Large-Scale Ballistic/Cruise Missile Campaign to Cripple Ukrainian AD and Energy/Logistics Infrastructure, with Increased Focus on Chemical/Industrial Targets, and Pre-strike AD Suppression: Russia, despite Iskander losses, will attempt to launch a renewed, multi-wave missile and drone campaign targeting Ukraine's critical national infrastructure, with a specific emphasis on overwhelming weakened Ukrainian air defenses. The persistent targeting of the Azot chemical plant, now confirmed as a source for explosives in artillery shells, may trigger a significant, high-volume missile retaliation aimed at Ukraine's critical infrastructure, potentially including targets with industrial chemical significance, aiming to create secondary hazards and disrupt Ukrainian defense production. Prior to or concurrent with these strikes, Russia may conduct widespread air defense suppression operations, as indicated by the claimed P-18 radar destruction, to improve the effectiveness of their missile and drone attacks. The sustained use of aviation munitions (e.g., Synelnykivskyi Raion) and multi-UAV attacks (e.g., Mykolaiv) could be precursors to a larger, more coordinated aerial assault.
MDCOA 2: Attempted Strategic Breakthrough on Sumy Axis with Major Force Commitment and Massed Air Support (with Chemical Warfare consideration/False Flag Pretext), Enabled by Prior AD Suppression, or Major Breakthrough in Southern Donetsk: Russia commits substantial additional reserves to the Sumy axis, initiating a rapid, decisive breakthrough aimed at encircling or seizing Sumy city. This would involve overwhelming combined arms force, massed KAB strikes to suppress Ukrainian defenses, and deep strikes to neutralize Ukrainian command and control and logistics in the region. This would be significantly facilitated by prior air defense suppression operations, such as the claimed destruction of the P-18 radar. Given the recent persistent strike on the Azot chemical plant (a source for explosives), and Russia's past false flag attempts regarding chemical weapons, there is a low but non-zero risk of Russia preparing to conduct an operation with chemical munitions or a "dirty bomb" in the context of a strategic breakthrough, or blame Ukraine for such an event, potentially fabricating evidence. The recent Russian false flag propaganda concerning "Ukrainian occupation" and mass casualties in Kursk Oblast provides a potential pretext for such an escalation or for justifying a disproportionate response. Alternatively, Russia could concentrate forces for a strategic breakthrough in the Southern Donetsk direction, leveraging claimed gains around Stupochky to expand an offensive aimed at a larger operational objective.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:
Next 24-48 Hours (Short-Term):
Next 72 Hours (Medium-Term):
Next 1 Week (Near-Term Strategic):
Prioritize and Augment Air Defense for Eastern, Southern, Central, and now Western/Northern Urban Centers, with Enhanced First Responder Protection and Adapting to New UAV/Missile Ingress Routes, While Assessing and Mitigating AD Losses (Immediate & Urgent):
Sustain and Exploit Deep Strike Successes, Prepare for Retaliation and Enhanced Russian Defenses, Targeting Chemical/Industrial Nodes Critical to Ammunition Production (Urgent):
Intensify Counter-Information Warfare on Humanitarian Issues, Western Divisions, and Russian Fabrications, Addressing Internal Russian Propaganda, and Debunking False Claims of Success (Ongoing & Critical):
Reinforce and Monitor Sumy and Konstantinovka Axis Defenses, Verify Russian Claims, and Account for Potential AD Degradation (Urgent):
Enhance Maritime Security in the Black Sea and Crimea, and Bolster Air Defense in Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson (New & Critical):
END REPORT
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