Archived operational intelligence briefing
OPSEC CLASSIFICATION: NATO SECRET // RELEASABLE TO UKR FORCES
INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 08 JUN 25 / 02:12 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 08 JUN 25 / 01:42 ZULU - 08 JUN 25 / 02:12 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:
AOR Update: Kharkiv Oblast, Volyn Oblast, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Black Sea, Azov Sea, Sumy Oblast, Russian Federation (Kursk, Bryansk, Kaluga, Smolensk Oblasts, Moscow Region including Dubna, Podmoskovye, Moscow city, Pushkino, Irkutsk region - Belaya airfield; Tambov Oblast - Michurinsk; Ryazan Oblast - Dyagilevo; Belgorod Oblast - Prokhorovka-Belenikhino, Zhuravlevka, Pushkarozhadinsky, Azov - Rostov Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast - Kstovo, Sevastopol, Lipetsk Oblast, Orel Oblast, Tula Oblast - Novomoskovsk, Azot chemical plant), Southern Donetsk Direction, Konstantinovka direction, Siversk direction, Odesa Oblast, Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovsk, Kurakhovo - Alekseevka, Chasov Yar, Kramatorsk axis, Toretsk axis, Novopavlivka axis, Krasnoarmeysk-Novosergeevka, Maryinka, Dalnee, Sokol, Lipovoe, Bakhmut, Progress, Kleshcheevka, Vasyutinskoye, south Donetsk region), Kupyansk axis, Kherson axis, Ternopil Oblast, Kyiv, Krasnoarmeysk direction, Lviv Oblast, Mykolaiv Oblast, Poltava Oblast, Kirovohrad Oblast, Vinnytsia Oblast, Cherkasy Oblast, Zhytomyr Oblast, Kyiv Oblast.
New Developments (Southern Donetsk Direction, UKR): Russian MoD claims the destruction of a Ukrainian MaxxPro armored vehicle in the Southern Donetsk direction. (CONFIDENCE: LOW - Russian claim, unverified by independent sources; MEDIUM - as an indication of Russian intent to highlight battlefield successes).
New Developments (International - US/RF): TASS reports that the Trump administration is increasing pressure on Elon Musk following a public conflict, citing Rolling Stone. This indicates continued Russian amplification of perceived Western internal divisions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - as an information operation).
New Developments (Imagery - China): Colonelcassad shares a new photo of a Chinese J-36 fighter jet. This is likely unrelated to the direct conflict but may be part of broader geopolitical messaging or general interest content from the milblogger. The image quality is questionable (photo of a screen/render). (CONFIDENCE: LOW - for image authenticity; HIGH - for milblogger sharing).
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:
COA 1 (MLCOA - Sustained and Escalated Retaliatory Saturation Attacks on Urban Centers and Critical Infrastructure, Coupled with Amplified Disinformation on Humanitarian Issues and Western Divisions, with Direct Targeting of First Responders, and New Attack Vectors): Russia will continue and likely intensify KAB and missile/UAV strikes on Ukrainian urban centers. Concurrently, Russia will continue a persistent and aggressive information campaign, exploiting any perceived Western failures or internal divisions (e.g., US politics, Polish EU accession, Musk/Bessent narratives, now Trump/Musk conflict). The continued targeting of the Azot chemical plant may lead to Russian retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian chemical or industrial facilities. Russia will also escalate false flag operations regarding "Ukrainian atrocities" in Russian border regions to justify retaliatory actions, and continue to propagate false claims of Ukrainian retreats and military losses (e.g., claimed MaxxPro destruction).
COA 2 (Ground Offensive Support with Targeted Artillery/MLRS and Drone Strikes, while Enhancing Counter-Deep Strike Internal Security and Expanding Maritime Hybrid Operations, with Enhanced Crimean Defenses, and Increased Internal Propaganda focus alongside Divisive Narratives): Russian forces will continue to press ground offensives on existing axes, supporting them with targeted artillery, MLRS, and FPV drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and C2 nodes (e.g., Konstantinovka FPV strike). The alleged destruction of a Ukrainian P-18 radar in Sumy Oblast, if verified, indicates an ongoing effort to suppress Ukrainian air defenses. They will likely intensify internal security efforts to prevent and detect further Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian territory. Additionally, Russia will likely attempt to conduct further hybrid maritime operations in the Black Sea. Russia will increase internal propaganda efforts focusing on state support for veterans and promoting national unity, while simultaneously allowing the amplification of divisive internal narratives (e.g., migration/ethnic issues) through controlled channels. Propaganda will also highlight improvements in battlefield medical care and troop welfare, and demonstrate military effectiveness (e.g., claimed Krab SPG destruction, FPV strike on UAV C2, now claimed P-18 destruction, and now claimed MaxxPro destruction) while portraying Ukrainian military failures and casualties (e.g., "ZONA SVO" video, TASS claims of Ukrainian retreat).
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):
MLCOA 1: Sustained and Escalated Retaliatory Saturation Attacks on Urban Centers and Critical Infrastructure, Coupled with Amplified Disinformation on Humanitarian Issues and Western Divisions, with Direct Targeting of First Responders, and New Attack Vectors (INCLUDING CHEMICAL HAZARDS AND FALSE FLAG ATROCITIES), and Targeted Degradation of Ukrainian AD: Russia will continue and likely intensify KAB and missile/UAV strikes on Ukrainian urban centers. Concurrently, Russia will continue a persistent and aggressive information campaign, particularly regarding body/POW exchanges (using fabricated evidence), blaming Ukraine for delays, and exploiting any perceived Western failures or internal divisions (e.g., US politics, Polish EU accession, Musk/Bessent narratives, now Trump/Musk conflict). The persistent strike on the Azot chemical plant will lead to Russian retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian chemical or industrial facilities, or an increase in strikes with a focus on creating secondary hazards. Furthermore, Russia will escalate the dissemination of false flag narratives regarding "Ukrainian atrocities" in Russian border regions, and continue to propagate false claims of Ukrainian military retreats and military losses (e.g., claimed MaxxPro destruction).
MLCOA 2: Ground Offensive Support with Targeted Artillery/MLRS and Drone Strikes, while Enhancing Counter-Deep Strike Internal Security and Expanding Maritime Hybrid Operations, with Enhanced Crimean Defenses, and Increased Internal Propaganda focus alongside Divisive Narratives: Russian forces will continue to press ground offensives on existing axes, supporting them with targeted artillery, MLRS, and FPV drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and C2 nodes. They will likely intensify internal security efforts to prevent and detect further Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian territory. Additionally, Russia will likely attempt to conduct further hybrid maritime operations in the Black Sea. Russia will increase internal propaganda efforts focusing on state support for veterans and promoting national unity, while simultaneously allowing the amplification of divisive internal narratives. Propaganda will also highlight improvements in battlefield medical care and troop welfare, and demonstrate military effectiveness (e.g., claimed Krab SPG destruction, FPV strike on UAV C2, now claimed P-18 destruction, and now claimed MaxxPro destruction) while portraying Ukrainian military failures and casualties (e.g., "ZONA SVO" video, TASS claims of Ukrainian retreat).
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):
MDCOA 1: Renewed Large-Scale Ballistic/Cruise Missile Campaign to Cripple Ukrainian AD and Energy/Logistics Infrastructure, with Increased Focus on Chemical/Industrial Targets, and Pre-strike AD Suppression: Russia, despite Iskander losses, will attempt to launch a renewed, multi-wave missile and drone campaign targeting Ukraine's critical national infrastructure, with a specific emphasis on overwhelming weakened Ukrainian air defenses. The persistent targeting of the Azot chemical plant, now confirmed as a source for explosives in artillery shells, may trigger a significant, high-volume missile retaliation aimed at Ukraine's critical infrastructure, potentially including targets with industrial chemical significance, aiming to create secondary hazards and disrupt Ukrainian defense production. Prior to or concurrent with these strikes, Russia may conduct widespread air defense suppression operations, as indicated by the claimed P-18 radar destruction, to improve the effectiveness of their missile and drone attacks.
MDCOA 2: Attempted Strategic Breakthrough on Sumy Axis with Major Force Commitment and Massed Air Support (with Chemical Warfare consideration/False Flag Pretext), Enabled by Prior AD Suppression: Russia commits substantial additional reserves to the Sumy axis, initiating a rapid, decisive breakthrough aimed at encircling or seizing Sumy city. This would involve overwhelming combined arms force, massed KAB strikes to suppress Ukrainian defenses, and deep strikes to neutralize Ukrainian command and control and logistics in the region. This would be significantly facilitated by prior air defense suppression operations, such as the claimed destruction of the P-18 radar. Given the recent persistent strike on the Azot chemical plant (a source for explosives), and Russia's past false flag attempts regarding chemical weapons, there is a low but non-zero risk of Russia preparing to conduct an operation with chemical munitions or a "dirty bomb" in the context of a strategic breakthrough, or blame Ukraine for such an event, potentially fabricating evidence. The recent Russian false flag propaganda concerning "Ukrainian occupation" and mass casualties in Kursk Oblast provides a potential pretext for such an escalation or for justifying a disproportionate response.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:
Next 24-48 Hours (Short-Term):
Next 72 Hours (Medium-Term):
Next 1 Week (Near-Term Strategic):
Prioritize and Augment Air Defense for Eastern, Southern, Central, and now Western/Northern Urban Centers, with Enhanced First Responder Protection and Adapting to New UAV/Missile Ingress Routes, While Assessing and Mitigating AD Losses (Immediate & Urgent):
Sustain and Exploit Deep Strike Successes, Prepare for Retaliation and Enhanced Russian Defenses, Targeting Chemical/Industrial Nodes Critical to Ammunition Production (Urgent):
Intensify Counter-Information Warfare on Humanitarian Issues, Western Divisions, and Russian Fabrications, Addressing Internal Russian Propaganda, and Debunking False Claims of Success (Ongoing & Critical):
Reinforce and Monitor Sumy and Konstantinovka Axis Defenses, Verify Russian Claims, and Account for Potential AD Degradation (Urgent):
Enhance Maritime Security in the Black Sea and Crimea, and Bolster Air Defense in Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson (New & Critical):
END REPORT
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