Situation Report

OPSEC CLASSIFICATION: NATO SECRET // RELEASABLE TO UKR FORCES

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 07 JUN 25 / 23:42 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 07 JUN 25 / 23:12 ZULU - 07 JUN 25 / 23:42 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• AOR Update: Kharkiv Oblast (southeast Kharkiv region, Kamenka, Stroyevka), Volyn Oblast (Lutsk), Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Dnipro, oblast border, Kryvyi Rih, Pavlohrad, Pleshcheevka, Malinovka, Charivne, Mezheva community, Synelnykove district, Nikopol region, Petrykivska community), Zaporizhzhia Oblast (14 populated areas, Zaporozhye direction, Orikhiv, Huliaipole, Chervonne, Malinovka), Black Sea, Azov Sea, Sumy Oblast (Sumy direction, Yunakivka, Kondratovka, Alexandropol, Klymentove, Uhroyidy, Novonikolaevka, Pisarevka, Khotin, Vorochina, Nizhnya Duvanka, Yablonovka, Andreevka, Eastern parts, Western course, Tiotkino), Russian Federation (Kursk, Bryansk, Kaluga, Smolensk Oblasts, Moscow Region including Dubna, Podmoskovye, Moscow city (Gorbushkin Dvor, VDNKh), Pushkino, Irkutsk region - Belaya airfield; Tambov Oblast - Michurinsk; Ryazan Oblast - Dyagilevo; Belgorod Oblast - Prokhorovka-Belenikhino, Zhuravlevka, Pushkarozhadinsky, Azov - Rostov Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast - Kstovo, Sevastopol, Lipetsk Oblast, Orel Oblast, Tula Oblast - Novomoskovsk, Azot chemical plant), Southern Donetsk Direction (Fedorivka, Perbudova, Komar, Maksimovka, Razdolnoye, Vorskresenka, Poddubnoye, Velyka Novosilka, Chasov Yar), Konstantinovka direction (Novoolenovka, Novaya Poltavka, Tarasovka, Ignatovka, Zarya), Siversk direction (Serebryanka, Hryhorivka, Bilohorivka, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka, Ivano-Daryivka, Pereizne), Odesa Oblast, Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovsk, Kurakhovo - Alekseevka, Chasov Yar, Kramatorsk axis, Toretsk axis, Novopavlivka axis, Krasnoarmeysk-Novosergeevka, Maryinka, Dalnee, Sokol, Lipovoe, Bakhmut, Progress, Kleshcheevka, Vasyutinskoye, south Donetsk region), Kupyansk axis (Zahryzove, Stepova Novoselivka), Kherson axis (Mykolayivka, Berislav), Ternopil Oblast, Kyiv, Krasnoarmeysk direction, Lviv Oblast (Drohobych), Mykolaiv Oblast, Poltava Oblast, Kirovohrad Oblast, Vinnytsia Oblast (southeast Vinnytsia region, east Vinnytsia region, Vinnytsia city, western outskirts), Cherkasy Oblast, Zhytomyr Oblast, Kyiv Oblast.

• Key Terrain (Zhytomyr Oblast - UAV THREAT CONFIRMED): Ukrainian Air Force reports enemy strike UAVs in southern Zhytomyr Oblast, currently heading north/northeast. A direct threat to Zhytomyr City/Ozerne is now reported. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - based on official Ukrainian Air Force reporting)

• Key Terrain (Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast, RF - BDA UPDATE): Governor of Tula Oblast confirms fire at "Azot" plant due to UAV impact has been extinguished. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - based on official Russian reporting)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• The confirmed extinguishing of the fire at the "Azot" chemical plant reduces the immediate environmental contamination risk, but long-term assessment of structural integrity and potential residual hazards remains crucial. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ongoing night-time UAV operations in Zhytomyr Oblast (including towards Zhytomyr City/Ozerne) suggest continued favorable conditions for drone flight, likely clear skies and calm winds. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces (Air Defense): Actively tracking and reporting incoming Russian UAVs in southern Zhytomyr Oblast, demonstrating continued vigilance and responsiveness. Direct alerts to Zhytomyr City/Ozerne indicate precise tracking and threat assessment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian Forces (Air): Continuing multi-directional attack UAV operations, with a significant vector now pushing into Zhytomyr Oblast from the south, heading north/northeast, and posing a direct threat to Zhytomyr City/Ozerne. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian Forces (Information Operations): Russian milbloggers continue to attempt to influence the information environment regarding Ukrainian cities (e.g., "НгП раZVедка" poll about Zhytomyr), potentially to gauge public sentiment or lay groundwork for future operations/propaganda concerning these areas. TASS reports on the extinguished fire at "Azot" are likely damage control aimed at domestic audiences. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - as IO tactics)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

• Capabilities:
  • Aerial (UAVs): Confirmed continued capability to conduct widespread, multi-directional attack UAV operations, now specifically demonstrating persistent and direct threats to Zhytomyr City/Ozerne. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Warfare/Hybrid Warfare: Highly capable of rapid damage control for deep strikes (e.g., TASS report on Azot fire extinguished). Capable of subtle psychological operations through social media (e.g., "НгП раZVедка" poll on Zhytomyr). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intentions:
  • Retaliation/Overwhelm AD: Continue and likely intensify strike UAV attacks across Ukraine, expanding geographic reach further west, aiming to exhaust Ukrainian AD munitions and personnel. The direct threat to Zhytomyr City/Ozerne supports this. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Control Domestic Narrative: Actively manage information regarding deep strikes on Russian territory to prevent panic and maintain public support for the war, as seen with the prompt report on the "Azot" fire being extinguished. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Collection/Shaping: Conduct subtle information operations (e.g., Zhytomyr poll) to gather intelligence on sentiment or prepare the ground for future narratives or kinetic action. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - based on the nature of the poll)
• Courses of Action (COA):

  • COA 1 (MLCOA - Sustained and Escalated Retaliatory Saturation Attacks on Urban Centers and Critical Infrastructure, Coupled with Amplified Disinformation on Humanitarian Issues and Western Divisions, with Direct Targeting of First Responders, and New Attack Vectors): Russia will continue and likely intensify KAB and missile/UAV strikes on Ukrainian urban centers, particularly Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr, with an increased focus on civilian targets (kindergarten, educational buildings) to maximize terror and drain Ukrainian emergency resources. There will be an increased likelihood of deliberate targeting of first responders or "double-tap" strikes to impede rescue efforts and maximize casualties. New groups of strike UAVs moving westward into Kharkiv, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr Oblasts indicate new attack vectors or a re-focusing of efforts to overwhelm specific AD sectors, which will persist and likely broaden. Concurrently, Russia will continue a persistent and aggressive information campaign, particularly regarding body/POW exchanges (using fabricated evidence), blaming Ukraine for delays, and exploiting any perceived Western failures or internal divisions (e.g., US politics, Polish EU accession, Musk/Bessent narratives). The continued targeting of the Azot chemical plant may lead to Russian retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian chemical or industrial facilities, or an increase in strikes with a focus on creating secondary hazards. Russia will also escalate false flag operations regarding "Ukrainian atrocities" in Russian border regions to justify retaliatory actions, and continue to propagate false claims of Ukrainian retreats.

    • Confidence: HIGH
    • Indicators: Immediate KAB strike on central Kharkiv after previous strikes (now 2 fatalities), persistent Russian narrative on body exchange from multiple sources, Russian amplification of Zelenskiy's AD appeal, Alex Parker Returns's Musk/Trump narrative, amplification of Polish President's statement, new UAV threat in Mykolaiv/Kryvyi Rih directions and now Kirovohrad, KABs on Sumy Oblast and now Dnipropetrovsk. Injury of SES workers in Kharkiv strike. Aviation munitions threat in Zaporizhzhia. New groups of strike UAVs entering Kharkiv, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr Oblasts, moving westward (Air Force of AFU, RBC-Ukraine). Confirmed strike on Azot chemical plant, Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast (second time reported, new video, confirmed strategic target). Missile inbound to Odesa/Black Sea. TASS reporting on Musk/Bessent altercation. Russian attack on Mezheva community, Dnipropetrovsk (1 killed, kindergarten damaged). Attack UAVs in southeast Kharkiv region, south Donetsk region, southeast Vinnytsia region (towards Cherkasy/northwest), and east Vinnytsia region (towards Vinnytsia city), now Kyiv and Zhytomyr Oblasts. Colonelcassad's "no one survived" video from Kursk Oblast. "ZONA SVO" video on Ukrainian assault deaths. TASS claiming Ukrainian retreat near Kamenka/Stroyevka. New direct threat to Zhytomyr City/Ozerne. "НгП раZVедка" poll on Zhytomyr.

  • COA 2 (Ground Offensive Support with Targeted Artillery/MLRS and Drone Strikes, while Enhancing Counter-Deep Strike Internal Security and Expanding Maritime Hybrid Operations, with Enhanced Crimean Defenses, and Increased Internal Propaganda focus alongside Divisive Narratives, with a renewed focus on medic support and portrayal of Ukrainian failures): Russian forces will continue to press ground offensives on existing axes (e.g., Donetsk, Novopavlivka, Pokrovsk, Konstantinovka, Sumy), supporting them with targeted artillery, MLRS, and FPV drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and C2 nodes (e.g., Konstantinovka FPV strike). They will likely intensify internal security efforts to prevent and detect further Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian territory, including targeting family members of alleged participants, and maintaining and publicizing air defense alerts/interceptions in border regions (Kursk, Orel). Additionally, Russia will likely attempt to conduct further hybrid maritime operations in the Black Sea. New, specific warning systems will be implemented and publicized in Crimea (Sevastopol). Russian forces will continue to adapt ground vehicles with "cope cages" and similar improvised defenses against drones. Russia will increase internal propaganda efforts focusing on state support for veterans and promoting national unity through cultural events (e.g., Shaman concert), while simultaneously allowing the amplification of divisive internal narratives (e.g., migration/ethnic issues) through controlled channels to serve specific political objectives. Propaganda will also highlight improvements in battlefield medical care and troop welfare to bolster morale and recruitment, and demonstrate military effectiveness (e.g., claimed Krab SPG destruction, FPV strike on UAV C2) while portraying Ukrainian military failures and casualties (e.g., "ZONA SVO" video, TASS claims of Ukrainian retreat).

    • Confidence: HIGH
    • Indicators: Observed Grad MLRS firing (previous ISR), claimed Alexandropol strike on mortar/ammo depot (previous ISR), Russian milblogger claims of ambushing Ukrainian groups, active search for alleged drone attack participants (Colonelcassad), "Espanola" unit video demonstrating maritime sabotage, "Два майора" claims of successful Black Sea infrastructure destruction and "cope cage" fundraising. MoD Russia training video for Marines. Lipetsk/Kursk/Orel air alerts/interceptions. Russian SpN drone operations. New alert signals in Sevastopol. Kaluga airport restrictions. Russian social event showcasing veteran support. Shaman concert on TASS. Alex Parker Returns's migration/ethnic narratives. Colonelcassad's video showcasing "74th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade Reconnaissance Battalion" medics. Colonelcassad's claim of Krab SPG destruction via UAV. "ZONA SVO" video claiming Ukrainian assault deaths and capturing equipment. TASS report on public holidays to boost domestic morale. Colonelcassad FPV strike video on UAV C2 in Konstantinovka. TASS claiming Ukrainian retreat near Kamenka/Stroyevka.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Deepening UAV Penetration (RU): The confirmed presence of strike UAVs in southern Zhytomyr Oblast moving north/northeast, and specifically threatening Zhytomyr City/Ozerne, represents a further deepening of Russian UAV reach into Ukrainian territory and a continued effort to probe and overwhelm western/northwestern AD. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Rapid Damage Control (RU IO): The swift confirmation from the Tula governor that the "Azot" plant fire was extinguished demonstrates Russian capability for rapid damage control and narrative management following Ukrainian deep strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Munitions: Continued widespread UAV attacks, now impacting Zhytomyr Oblast, confirm Russia's ability to sustain production or procurement of these munitions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Strategic Impact of Deep Strikes (Azot): The immediate extinguishment of the fire at "Azot" reduces the short-term impact, but the underlying strategic significance of the plant (producing hexogen/octogen for artillery shells) means persistent targeting will continue to impact Russian ammunition sustainment long-term. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian C2 demonstrates continued ability to coordinate multi-domain strikes (widespread UAV activity across Ukraine, including deep into Zhytomyr) and rapidly respond to deep strikes with information management (TASS report on Azot fire). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian C2 maintains active air defense posture and provides timely alerts for civilian populations, as demonstrated by the Zhytomyr Oblast UAV warnings. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Air Defense: Maintaining a high state of readiness, actively tracking and warning of incoming UAVs in Zhytomyr Oblast, including direct threats to Zhytomyr City/Ozerne. This indicates a responsive and distributed AD network extending further west. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• ISR/Threat Monitoring: Effective in identifying and reporting incoming UAV threats across numerous oblasts, allowing for dynamic AD response and civilian alerts, now extending to Zhytomyr. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes:
  • Persistent Threat Monitoring: Successful identification of multiple UAV groups across various oblasts, now including Zhytomyr, allows for timely AD alerts and civilian protection. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Confirmed Deep Strike on Azot (Damage Control): While Russia claims the fire is extinguished, the initial successful strike on the Azot plant (confirmed a critical node for Russian artillery ammunition production) remains a significant success. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Setbacks:
  • Sustained UAV Threat: The widespread UAV activity, particularly the direct threat to Zhytomyr City/Ozerne, highlights the ongoing and potent threat from Russian aerial assets, which continues to challenge Ukrainian AD. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense Munitions & Systems: Continued high expenditure due to persistent and broadening missile/UAV attacks, now reaching deep into Zhytomyr Oblast. Urgent need for replenishment and additional layered AD systems for defending central and western regions against newly established UAV vectors. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Counter-Disinformation Capability: Urgent need for robust, proactive counter-information campaigns to neutralize aggressive Russian propaganda, especially escalating false flag narratives and false claims of Ukrainian retreat, and highlight Ukrainian successes effectively. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Propaganda (Internal & External):
  • Damage Control: TASS quickly reported that the fire at the "Azot" plant was extinguished, attempting to minimize the perceived impact of the Ukrainian deep strike for domestic audiences. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Psychological Operations/Information Gathering: The "НгП раZVедка" poll asking about "liking Zhytomyr" is a subtle but noteworthy attempt to engage with the Ukrainian population in a targeted area, potentially gathering sentiment or pre-positioning for future narratives if kinetic action is taken. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - as a specific IO tactic)
  • Strategic Messaging: TASS reporting on US advising UK regarding Chinese embassy location near London-City is an attempt to sow discord within NATO/Western alliances by highlighting internal disagreements or strategic tensions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Counter-Propaganda/Information Operations:
  • Threat Awareness: Ukrainian Air Force and RBC-Ukraine continue to promptly disseminate warnings about incoming UAVs, building public awareness and trust. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Negative Impact: The continued UAV attacks, now reaching Zhytomyr Oblast, will sustain civilian anxiety and pressure on emergency services in central and western Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Neutral/Positive Impact: The rapid extinguishment of the "Azot" plant fire, as reported by Russia, may reduce immediate public alarm in Russia, but the underlying vulnerability to deep strikes remains a morale concern. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - for Russian public)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• Russian disinformation attempting to sow discord in Western politics (TASS report on US/UK/China embassy) underscores Russia's ongoing efforts to weaken international support for Ukraine and shape global narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• MLCOA 1: Sustained and Escalated Retaliatory Saturation Attacks on Urban Centers and Critical Infrastructure, Coupled with Amplified Disinformation on Humanitarian Issues and Western Divisions, with Direct Targeting of First Responders, and New Attack Vectors (INCLUDING CHEMICAL HAZARDS AND FALSE FLAG ATROCITIES): Russia will continue and likely intensify KAB and missile/UAV strikes on Ukrainian urban centers, particularly Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr, with an increased focus on civilian targets (kindergarten, educational buildings) to maximize terror and drain Ukrainian emergency resources. There will be an increased likelihood of deliberate targeting of first responders or "double-tap" strikes to impede rescue efforts and maximize casualties. New groups of strike UAVs moving westward into Kharkiv, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr Oblasts indicate new attack vectors or a re-focusing of efforts to overwhelm specific AD sectors, which will persist and likely broaden in geographical scope. Concurrently, Russia will continue a persistent and aggressive information campaign, particularly regarding body/POW exchanges (using fabricated evidence), blaming Ukraine for delays, and exploiting any perceived Western failures or internal divisions (e.g., US politics, Polish EU accession, Musk/Bessent narratives). The persistent strike on the Azot chemical plant will lead to Russian retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian chemical or industrial facilities, or an increase in strikes with a focus on creating secondary hazards. Furthermore, Russia will escalate the dissemination of false flag narratives regarding "Ukrainian atrocities" in Russian border regions (e.g., Russkoye Porechnoye, Kursk Oblast) to justify its retaliatory actions and demonize Ukraine globally, and continue to propagate false claims of Ukrainian military retreats (e.g., Kamenka/Stroyevka).

  • Confidence: HIGH
  • Indicators: Immediate KAB strike on central Kharkiv after previous strikes (now 2 fatalities), persistent Russian narrative on body exchange from multiple sources, Russian amplification of Zelenskiy's AD appeal, Alex Parker Returns's Musk/Trump narrative, amplification of Polish President's statement, new UAV threat in Mykolaiv/Kryvyi Rih directions and now Kirovohrad, KABs on Sumy Oblast and now Dnipropetrovsk. Injury of SES workers in Kharkiv strike. Aviation munitions threat in Zaporizhzhia. New groups of strike UAVs entering Kharkiv, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr Oblasts, moving westward (RBC Ukraine, Air Force of AFU). Confirmed second strike on Azot chemical plant, Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast, will provoke severe retaliation (new video evidence, confirmed strategic target). Missile inbound to Odesa/Black Sea. TASS reporting on Musk/Bessent altercation as part of broader IO. Russian attack on Mezheva community, Dnipropetrovsk (1 killed, kindergarten damaged). Attack UAVs in southeast Kharkiv region, south Donetsk region, southeast Vinnytsia region (towards Cherkasy/northwest), east Vinnytsia region (towards Vinnytsia city), now Kyiv and Zhytomyr Oblasts. Colonelcassad's "no one survived" video from Kursk Oblast. "ZONA SVO" video on Ukrainian assault deaths. TASS claiming Ukrainian retreat near Kamenka/Stroyevka. New direct threat to Zhytomyr City/Ozerne. "НгП раZVедка" poll on Zhytomyr.

• MLCOA 2: Ground Offensive Support with Targeted Artillery/MLRS and Drone Strikes, while Enhancing Counter-Deep Strike Internal Security and Expanding Maritime Hybrid Operations, with Enhanced Crimean Defenses, and Increased Internal Propaganda focus alongside Divisive Narratives, with a renewed focus on medic support and portrayal of Ukrainian failures: Russian forces will continue to press ground offensives on existing axes (e.g., Donetsk, Novopavlivka, Pokrovsk, Konstantinovka, Sumy), supporting them with targeted artillery, MLRS, and FPV drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and C2 nodes (e.g., Konstantinovka FPV strike). They will likely intensify internal security efforts to prevent and detect further Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian territory, including targeting family members of alleged participants, and maintaining and publicizing air defense alerts/interceptions in border regions (Kursk, Orel). Additionally, Russia will likely attempt to conduct further hybrid maritime operations in the Black Sea. New, specific warning systems will be implemented and publicized in Crimea (Sevastopol). Russian forces will continue to adapt ground vehicles with "cope cages" and similar improvised defenses against drones. Russia will increase internal propaganda efforts focusing on state support for veterans and promoting national unity through cultural events (e.g., Shaman concert), while simultaneously allowing the amplification of divisive internal narratives (e.g., migration/ethnic issues by Alex Parker Returns) through controlled channels to serve specific political objectives. Propaganda will also highlight improvements in battlefield medical care and troop welfare to bolster morale and recruitment, and demonstrate military effectiveness (e.g., claimed Krab SPG destruction, FPV strike on UAV C2) while portraying Ukrainian military failures and casualties (e.g., "ZONA SVO" video, TASS claims of Ukrainian retreat).

  • Confidence: HIGH
  • Indicators: Observed Grad MLRS firing (previous ISR), claimed Alexandropol strike on mortar/ammo depot (previous ISR), Russian milblogger claims of ambushing Ukrainian groups, active search for alleged drone attack participants (Colonelcassad), "Espanola" unit video demonstrating maritime sabotage, "Два майора" claims of successful Black Sea infrastructure destruction and "cope cage" fundraising. MoD Russia training video for Marines. Lipetsk/Kursk/Orel air alerts/interceptions. Russian SpN drone operations. New alert signals in Sevastopol. Kaluga airport restrictions. Russian social event showcasing veteran support. Shaman concert on TASS. Alex Parker Returns's migration/ethnic narratives. Colonelcassad's video showcasing "74th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade Reconnaissance Battalion" medics. Colonelcassad's claim of Krab SPG destruction via UAV. "ZONA SVO" video claiming Ukrainian assault deaths and capturing equipment. TASS report on public holidays to boost domestic morale. Colonelcassad FPV strike video on UAV C2 in Konstantinovka. TASS claiming Ukrainian retreat near Kamenka/Stroyevka.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• MDCOA 1: Renewed Large-Scale Ballistic/Cruise Missile Campaign to Cripple Ukrainian AD and Energy/Logistics Infrastructure, with Increased Focus on Chemical/Industrial Targets: Russia, despite Iskander losses, will attempt to launch a renewed, multi-wave missile and drone campaign targeting Ukraine's critical national infrastructure (energy, logistics hubs, and remaining high-value military facilities), with a specific emphasis on overwhelming weakened Ukrainian air defenses. This aims to exhaust their munition reserves and cripple Ukraine's ability to sustain military operations and civilian life, especially ahead of the colder months. This MDCOA would exploit the publicly stated AD procurement challenges and the confirmed losses of Ukrainian AD munitions. The expansion of KAB attacks and UAV/missile routes (now to Kyiv/Zhytomyr) signals a probing for AD weaknesses. The persistent targeting of the Azot chemical plant in Tula Oblast, now confirmed as a source for explosives in artillery shells, may trigger a significant, high-volume missile retaliation aimed at Ukraine's critical infrastructure, potentially including targets with industrial chemical significance, aiming to create secondary hazards and disrupt Ukrainian defense production.

  • Confidence: MEDIUM (Increased due to Zelenskiy's public statement about AD procurement, the strategic impact of losing 3 Iskander launchers and the Tu-22M3 bomber, prompting Russia to consider other high-impact strike options and rely more on existing cruise missile stocks. New KAB targets and UAV/missile penetration routes (Odesa, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, Zhytomyr) also indicate this. The persistent strike on the Azot chemical plant, a significant industrial target directly linked to ammunition production, significantly increases the likelihood of a severe retaliatory strike, potentially involving chemical or industrial targets. The current widespread UAV activity, particularly deep into Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr, suggests a probing for AD weaknesses ahead of larger strikes.)
  • Indicators: Significant increase in missile/drone attacks beyond current levels, targeting of energy infrastructure components not previously hit, significant increase in Russian strategic bomber activity, increased Russian reconnaissance efforts over critical infrastructure.

• MDCOA 2: Attempted Strategic Breakthrough on Sumy Axis with Major Force Commitment and Massed Air Support (with Chemical Warfare consideration/False Flag Pretext): Russia commits substantial additional reserves to the Sumy axis, initiating a rapid, decisive breakthrough aimed at encircling or seizing Sumy city. This would involve overwhelming combined arms force, massed KAB strikes to suppress Ukrainian defenses, and deep strikes to neutralize Ukrainian command and control and logistics in the region. This would aim to open a new major operational front, fix a large portion of Ukrainian reserves, and create a significant humanitarian crisis, diverting resources from the Donbas. Given the recent persistent strike on the Azot chemical plant (a source for explosives), and Russia's past false flag attempts regarding chemical weapons, there is a low but non-zero risk of Russia preparing to conduct an operation with chemical munitions or a "dirty bomb" in the context of a strategic breakthrough, or blame Ukraine for such an event, potentially fabricating evidence. The recent Russian false flag propaganda concerning "Ukrainian occupation" and mass casualties in Kursk Oblast, and claims of Ukrainian retreat near Kamenka/Stroyevka, provides a potential pretext for such an escalation or for justifying a disproportionate response.

  • Confidence: MEDIUM (Based on previous Russian claims of "buffer zone" and mapped territorial control, reinforced by confirmed advances towards Sumy Oblast from previous ISR and the presence of Sumy in Russian casualty lists from memorials. The SOF night raid in the Sumy/Belgorod border area indicates active Russian presence and Ukrainian counter-operations.) The claimed KAB strike on a TD PVD in Ugroiedy and new groups of strike UAVs targeting Sumy Oblast reinforce Russian intent in the region. The "chemical warfare" aspect is LOW confidence but must be considered in MDCOA given the persistent Azot strike and Russia's history of false flags. The new false flag narrative from Kursk Oblast directly supports this MDCOA by creating a justification for severe action, as do the claims of Ukrainian retreat near Kamenka/Stroyevka, which could be spun as a "liberation" effort.
  • Indicators: Sustained high rate of KABs and missile strikes on deep targets in Sumy Oblast, large-scale troop movements on Sumy axis beyond current levels, intelligence of Russian force restructuring or redeployment from other axes. Propaganda narratives pushing false flag chemical attack warnings; detection of chemical munitions or CBRN deployment signs.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Next 24-48 Hours (Short-Term):

  • Immediate Retaliation/Sustained Attacks: Expect continued, possibly intensified, KAB and missile/UAV strikes on Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr Oblasts, with heightened risk of targeting first responders and civilian infrastructure (e.g., kindergartens). High probability of further Russian retaliatory deep strikes due to the Iskander and logistics train losses, and the Novomoskovsk chemical plant strikes. New UAV threat in Mykolaiv/Kryvyi Rih regions, and reconnaissance drone activity in Poltava and Kirovohrad. New groups of strike UAVs entering Kharkiv, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr Oblasts from the East/South, moving West/Northwest, with a direct threat to Vinnytsia city, and threats to Kyiv and Zhytomyr Oblasts, and now specifically Zhytomyr City/Ozerne. Expect continued Russian propaganda amplifying Western divisions (e.g., TASS Musk/Bessent story, TASS US/UK/China embassy story) and escalating false flag narratives regarding Ukrainian "atrocities" in Russian border regions (e.g., Kursk), alongside false claims of Ukrainian retreats (Kamenka/Stroyevka).
  • Ground Pressure: Continued tactical ground engagements, particularly on the Donetsk (Pokrovsk, Konstantinovka) and Sumy axes, with Russian efforts to consolidate claimed gains and integrate drone/artillery strikes (e.g., claimed Krab destruction, FPV strike on UAV C2). Increased Russian counter-drone and anti-AD operations.
  • Decision Point (UKR): Prioritize air defense assets to protect key urban centers (Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Kryvyi Rih, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, specifically Zhytomyr City/Ozerne) and critical infrastructure, with explicit consideration for protecting emergency services and first responders. Expedite deployment of countermeasures to Russian anti-drone tactics. Reassess ground force posture on the Sumy axis based on updated Russian advances and map intelligence. Immediately counter Russian disinformation on body exchanges, POW testimonies, and Western internal politics (especially Polish relations, and new narratives like Musk/Bessent) with factual and transparent communication. Assess immediate impact of Novomoskovsk strike on Russian logistics/production and prepare for potential severe retaliatory strikes, including those targeting industrial or chemical facilities. Verify Russian claims of Krab SPG destruction, FPV strike on UAV C2, and alleged Ukrainian retreats (Kamenka/Stroyevka), and adapt counter-drone/counter-battery TTPs. Proactively counter Russian false flag narratives (e.g., Kursk Oblast) with independent verification and factual information. Analyze the "НгП раZVедка" poll on Zhytomyr for any operational implications.

• Next 72 Hours (Medium-Term):

  • Decision Point (UKR): Evaluate the full impact of the Iskander launcher and logistics train destruction, and the persistent Novomoskovsk chemical plant strikes (now confirmed as strategic for ammunition production) on Russian operational tempo and strategic options. Re-evaluate and adapt ground force deployments on the Sumy axis based on continued Russian advances and the scale of the threat to Sumy city, potentially deploying additional reserves. Develop a comprehensive plan for mine clearance and public safety in areas affected by PFM-1 mines (as reported in previous ISR). Expedite high-level diplomatic engagement regarding AD systems. Monitor and respond to escalating Russian disinformation campaigns targeting Western unity and Ukrainian credibility, particularly the fabricated POW videos and body lists, and narratives exploiting internal Western politics. Increase force protection measures for all emergency services personnel. Initiate contingency planning for potential chemical or biological contamination scenarios, both from Russian strikes on Ukrainian targets or Russian false flag operations. Prepare a robust information operations response to potential Russian false flag events alleging Ukrainian atrocities on Russian territory, and to sustained Russian false claims of Ukrainian retreats.

• Next 1 Week (Near-Term Strategic):

  • Decision Point (UKR): Evaluate the overall effectiveness of Ukrainian deep strike campaign on Russian military-industrial complex and logistics, considering both successes and Russian claims of countermeasures. Continue to optimize air defense deployments based on evolving Russian targeting patterns (including newly observed western/northwestern UAV/missile trajectories) and replenish munition stockpiles. Intensify intelligence collection on Russian strategic aviation, air defense assets, potential dispersal efforts, and maritime special operations. Prioritize resources for the Sumy axis if Russian pressure continues, potentially initiating pre-emptive civilian evacuation planning. Reinforce maritime security measures in the Black Sea and Azov Sea. Conduct a comprehensive review of all critical Ukrainian industrial facilities, particularly chemical plants, for vulnerability assessment and hardening measures against potential Russian retaliatory strikes. Develop long-term strategies to counter Russian information warfare, including a framework for debunking false flag operations and proactively shaping international narratives regarding Russian war crimes and disinformation.

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Prioritize and Augment Air Defense for Eastern, Southern, Central, and now Western/Northern Urban Centers, with Enhanced First Responder Protection and Adapting to New UAV/Missile Ingress Routes (Immediate & Urgent):

   • Action: Immediately re-prioritize and reinforce layered air defense systems (including mobile fire groups with MANPADS for KAB and drone defense) to protect Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Kryvyi Rih, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr, specifically Zhytomyr City and Ozerne, from continued KAB and missile/UAV attacks. Deploy active and passive defenses around critical civilian infrastructure, particularly educational buildings and kindergartens. Crucially, implement enhanced force protection measures for all emergency services personnel, including hardened shelters at known response sites and updated protocols for "double-tap" strike scenarios, given the Mezheva community strike. Expedite diplomatic efforts for the acquisition of additional advanced AD systems (e.g., Patriot, NASAMS) and secure urgent resupply of interceptor munitions. Allocate AD assets to counter new UAV threat vectors from Berislav into Mykolaiv/Kirovohrad Oblasts and reconnaissance drones into Poltava. Analyze the new western/northwestern-bound UAV ingress routes into Kharkiv, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr Oblasts, and new missile trajectories (e.g., Odesa) to pre-position AD assets and optimize interception tactics. Prioritize defense of Vinnytsia city, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr against the direct UAV threat.
   • Justification: Russian forces are deliberately escalating attacks on civilian areas and opening new attack vectors to inflict casualties and psychological impact. The latest KAB strike on a central Kharkiv educational building (now 2 fatalities), KABs on Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts (Mezheva community, kindergarten, 1 fatality), ongoing UAV threats into Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia (with a direct threat to Vinnytsia city), Kyiv, and Zhytomyr, and missiles now towards Odesa, underscore the urgency and breadth of the threat. The injury of SES workers highlights a direct targeting of first responders. The new groups of strike UAVs entering Kharkiv, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr from the East/South, moving West/Northwest, indicate tactical adaptation by Russia to bypass current AD or strike new targets. The direct threat now posed to Zhytomyr City/Ozerne extends the critical AD requirement further west.
   • Intelligence Gap: Real-time air defense munition expenditure rates in affected areas and current inventory levels for key systems; full extent of Russian UAV reconnaissance and strike capabilities in the Mykolaiv/Odesa/Poltava/Kirovohrad/Zaporizhzhia/Vinnytsia/Kyiv/Zhytomyr sectors. Russian intent and capability for deliberate targeting of first responders. Specific objectives of new UAV ingress routes into Kharkiv, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr Oblasts and missile targeting in the South.
   • Collection Requirement: Automated tracking of AD engagements and munition usage, updated imagery of damaged civilian sites for munition analysis, SIGINT/HUMINT on AD system readiness, drone flight path analysis from Mykolaiv/Poltava/Kirovohrad/Zaporizhzhia/Vinnytsia/Kyiv/Zhytomyr Oblasts. HUMINT/OSINT on Russian TTPs regarding first responder targeting. IMINT/SIGINT on UAV launch locations and operational patterns for new ingress routes. SIGINT on missile launch locations and targets. SIGINT/IMINT of UAV trajectories, especially into Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr, to identify likely launch areas and staging points. Detailed analysis of UAV flight paths into Zhytomyr Oblast and their specific targets.

2. Sustain and Exploit Deep Strike Successes, Prepare for Retaliation and Enhanced Russian Defenses, Targeting Chemical/Industrial Nodes Critical to Ammunition Production (Urgent):

   • Action: Conduct rapid, detailed BDA on the destroyed Iskander launchers, the logistics train, the Tu-22M3 bomber, and the "Azot" chemical plant in Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast (satellite imagery, OSINT analysis, video analysis) to confirm operational impact and specific targets. Specifically, assess the confirmed disruption to octogen/hexogen production and its long-term impact on Russian artillery shell manufacturing. Publicize these successes widely to boost morale and demonstrate capability. Simultaneously, prepare for heightened Russian retaliatory strikes across Ukraine, particularly on strategic infrastructure. Disperse high-value assets and reinforce their defenses. Continue to assess targets for further deep strikes on Russian logistics and military-industrial complex, prioritizing industrial nodes with confirmed or high-probability links to military production, especially those providing raw materials or components for ammunition. Integrate FPV drone operations more widely for precision strikes on personnel and high-value equipment. Leverage SOF for continued cross-border raids against high-value Russian personnel and forward operating bases. Develop and deploy countermeasures to Russian new warning systems (e.g., in Sevastopol) and airfield restrictions (e.g., Kaluga), assessing their impact on Ukrainian deep strike TTPs.
   • Justification: Ukrainian deep strikes are a significant strategic success but will provoke severe retaliation, requiring preemptive defensive measures and effective information operations. The destruction of a logistics train highlights a key vulnerability, and the VDV crowdfunding indicates systemic issues. SOF raids maintain pressure on Russian border regions. Russian attempts to adapt to drone threats and deep strikes (new warning systems, airport restrictions) must be actively countered. The persistent strike on a chemical industrial plant, now confirmed as a source for explosives in artillery shells, is a critical new category of target for deep strikes, directly impacting their war production capabilities. The prompt Russian report on extinguishing the "Azot" fire highlights the need for continued, persistent targeting to maximize disruption, as initial damage control efforts may mask underlying long-term impact.
   • Intelligence Gap: Full BDA and long-term operational impact on Russian ballistic missile capabilities, Southern logistics, and strategic aviation. Specific details on the GRU personnel targeted in the SOF raid. Effectiveness of Russian counter-drone adaptations (e.g., "cope cages"). Full impact of Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian air force operations and airfields (e.g., Kaluga). Full implications of new Sevastopol warning systems on Ukrainian maritime drone operations. Detailed analysis of Russian chemical industrial production facilities and their specific role in military supply chains, particularly for ammunition.
   • Collection Requirement: High-resolution satellite imagery of Bryansk/Kursk missile sites, Southern logistics hubs, Russian airfields (especially Engels, Belaya, Dyagilevo, Kaluga), and other military-industrial targets, including Novomoskovsk's "Azot" plant; monitoring Russian strategic aviation movements and activity. HUMINT/SIGINT on Russian GRU force composition and deployment on the border. IMINT/OSINT on Russian vehicle adaptations and their effectiveness. SIGINT/OSINT on the operational effectiveness of new Russian warning systems. Targeted intelligence on Russian chemical industrial production and its direct link to military output, specifically explosives and propellant components for artillery.

3. Intensify Counter-Information Warfare on Humanitarian Issues, Western Divisions, and Russian Fabrications, Addressing Internal Russian Propaganda (Ongoing & Critical):

   • Action: Proactively and transparently communicate Ukraine's official stance and actions regarding prisoner and body exchanges to both domestic and international audiences, providing verifiable evidence and consistently refuting Russian disinformation. Immediately and publicly expose Russian fabrications, such as the "future-dated" body lists (e.g., 06 JUN 2025) and the alleged POW video from MoD Russia, highlighting their manipulative nature and the intent to demoralize. Highlight Russian violations of international law (e.g., confirmed KAB strikes on children's railway, central Kharkiv educational building, kindergarten in Mezheva, PFM-1 mine use, targeting of SES workers) to discredit their humanitarian claims. Publicly counter Russian narratives attempting to exploit Western internal politics (e.g., Musk/Trump claims, Musk/Bessent altercation, Rubio's peace talk statements, TASS US/UK/China embassy story) and international relations (e.g., Polish EU accession statements), exposing them as deliberate psychological operations. Leverage the opening of rehabilitation centers to showcase Ukrainian commitment to its people and support for its diverse military. Additionally, monitor and analyze Russian internal propaganda related to veteran support, cultural events, and especially inflammatory narratives concerning migration/ethnic issues, to understand their domestic messaging strategies and identify potential weaknesses or opportunities for counter-messaging. Specifically analyze Russian military propaganda, such as the Colonelcassad medics video, the claimed Krab SPG destruction video, the new "ZONA SVO" video on Ukrainian assault deaths, and the FPV strike video from Konstantinovka, to identify their key messaging (e.g., professionalism, care for soldiers, resilience, efficiency, Ukrainian failure, tactical superiority) and counter it by highlighting actual Russian deficiencies or by providing superior, authentic Ukrainian narratives on similar themes. Crucially, actively counter the escalating Russian false flag narrative from Kursk Oblast, providing evidence of its fabrication and exposing it as a cynical attempt to justify further aggression. Immediately refute and expose false claims of Ukrainian retreat near Kamenka/Stroyevka. Monitor and analyze Russian milblogger polls, such as the "НгП раZVедка" poll on Zhytomyr, to understand their IO objectives and potential pre-positioning for future narratives or kinetic operations in targeted areas.
   • Justification: Russia is leveraging highly sensitive humanitarian issues, internal Western political dynamics, and sensationalist narratives for information warfare, using increasingly blatant fabrications (e.g., "future-dated" lists, fabricated POW testimonials, false flag atrocities, false claims of retreats) aiming to undermine Ukrainian credibility, international support, and Western unity. Effective, consistent counter-narratives are critical. The proliferation of internal Russian propaganda, particularly the divisive narratives about "replacement of the Russian people," requires monitoring to understand internal Russian stability and potential points of leverage. The specific focus on medical care and claimed tactical successes/Ukrainian failures in Russian propaganda indicates a recognized vulnerability or area for morale boosting that Ukraine can counter with its own successes or expose Russian deficiencies. The subtle use of polls in specific Ukrainian cities indicates an evolving, more nuanced Russian IO tactic that requires specific attention.
   • Intelligence Gap: Full scope of Russian information narratives targeting Ukrainian society and Western audiences, and the specific impact of Russian propaganda on Ukrainian public and troop morale. Identification of key Russian psychological operations (PSYOP) themes. Understanding the intent and impact of highly divisive internal Russian propaganda regarding ethnic/migration issues. Effectiveness of Russian military propaganda on internal and external audiences, and specific vulnerabilities of Russian messaging. Full details on the alleged "occupation" in Russkoye Porechnoye, Kursk Oblast, for detailed debunking. Verification of Russian claims near Kamenka/Stroyevka. Detailed analysis of Russian milblogger polling data and its implications for future Russian operations or information campaigns.
   • Collection Requirement: Comprehensive monitoring of Russian state media and milblogger channels, and analysis of their messaging tactics and impact, coupled with public opinion polling in Ukraine and Western nations. OSINT analysis of specific Russian PSYOP channels and their reach. Targeted OSINT/HUMINT on internal Russian social dynamics and reactions to state-sponsored and nationalist propaganda. Detailed content analysis of Russian military propaganda videos to identify subtle and overt messaging, and comparison with verifiable ground truth. Immediate OSINT/HUMINT/IMINT of Russkoye Porechnoye, Kursk Oblast, to verify or refute Russian claims of "Ukrainian occupation" and casualties, focusing on independent corroboration. Immediate IMINT/HUMINT of Kamenka/Stroyevka area to verify or refute Russian claims of Ukrainian retreat. Systematic collection and analysis of Russian milblogger polls, especially those targeting Ukrainian cities or regions, to understand their intent and predict future operations.

4. Reinforce and Monitor Sumy and Konstantinovka Axis Defenses, Verify Russian Claims (Urgent):

   • Action: Immediately reinforce personnel, fortifications (including anti-tank obstacles), and anti-tank capabilities on the Sumy axis, prioritizing areas within 40km of Sumy city and identified Russian avenues of advance (e.g., around Yablonovka, Andreevka, Vorochina, Ugroiedy, Tiotkino). Intensify ISR collection on Russian force composition, strength, and objectives in the area. Advise civilian authorities on potential evacuation routes and shelter options in Sumy City and surrounding settlements. Conduct aggressive counter-battery fire against Russian artillery/MLRS supporting advances. Similarly, reinforce defenses and conduct ISR on the Konstantinovka axis, given Russian claims of advances and confirmed FPV drone strikes. Prepare for potential increased KAB/UAV/missile strikes on Sumy Oblast in conjunction with new westward-bound UAV groups. Immediately verify the Russian claim of a Krab SPG destruction near Vasyutinskoye and the FPV strike on a UAV C2/dugout in Konstantinovka through IMINT/SIGINT/HUMINT, and if confirmed, analyze lessons learned to improve camouflage, dispersal, and counter-drone measures for artillery and C2 nodes. Analyze the "ZONA SVO" video claiming Ukrainian assault deaths and captured GoPro footage for any actionable intelligence on Russian TTPs or equipment.
   • Justification: Russian claims of an "expanding buffer zone" and confirmed advances (including mapped territorial control) indicate a serious intent to press the Sumy axis, threatening Sumy City. The continued focus on the Novopavlivka and Pokrovsk directions, and new claims on Konstantinovka, also indicate sustained pressure on ground forces. The SOF raid highlights active Russian presence in the border region. Russian claims of KAB strikes on a TD PVD in Ugroiedy and new UAV activity over Sumy Oblast further indicate their focus on this region. The claimed Krab SPG destruction highlights the persistent threat to high-value Ukrainian artillery from Russian drones and artillery. The confirmed FPV strike on a UAV C2 node in Konstantinovka highlights a significant Russian tactical adaptation and capability to target C2. Russian propaganda videos purporting to show Ukrainian casualties are designed to demoralize and require verification to prevent miscalculation.
   • Intelligence Gap: Precise composition and strength of Russian forces on Sumy and Konstantinovka axes, and their immediate operational objectives and timeline for further advance. Independent BDA on Russian claim of Krab SPG destruction and FPV strike on UAV C2. Full details on the incident depicted in the "ZONA SVO" video, including unit identification and precise location.
   • Collection Requirement: HUMINT from local sources, SIGINT on Russian communications, IMINT for troop movements and fortifications, cross-referencing Russian map claims with ground truth. Immediate IMINT of Vasyutinskoye area for BDA, SIGINT on Russian drone activity in Donetsk Oblast. Detailed frame-by-frame analysis of "ZONA SVO" video for unit patches, equipment, terrain features, and timestamps to corroborate or refute claims. IMINT/SIGINT of Konstantinovka to verify the FPV strike and BDA.

5. Enhance Maritime Security in the Black Sea and Crimea, and Bolster Air Defense in Odesa (New & Critical):

   • Action: Increase Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in areas with critical maritime infrastructure (ports, offshore platforms, key shipping lanes) in the Black Sea, particularly off Odesa, Mykolaiv, and the Ukrainian coast, and intensify ISR on Sevastopol and other Crimean naval bases. Develop and deploy enhanced physical and electronic security measures for offshore platforms, subsea cables, and pipelines (e.g., anti-diver, anti-drone, and rapid response capabilities). Share intelligence on Russian maritime special operations (e.g., "Espanola" unit's TTPs, "Два майора" claims) with relevant maritime security agencies and allied nations. Prioritize monitoring of specific offshore platforms and naval assets for signs of Russian activity. Analyze the new Sevastopol warning signals to understand their operational triggers and potential implications for Ukrainian maritime and aerial drone operations. Increase AD readiness in Odesa for incoming missile threats, and integrate maritime and air defense efforts to counter coordinated attacks, specifically for missiles launched from the Black Sea towards Odesa.
   • Justification: The "Espanola" unit's video and "Два майора" claims demonstrate a sophisticated Russian capability for maritime sabotage against critical energy infrastructure, posing a significant threat to Ukrainian and international interests in the Black Sea. The introduction of new, specific warning signals in Sevastopol indicates heightened Russian concern and defensive posture in response to Ukrainian threats in the maritime domain. The confirmed missile threat towards Odesa highlights the continued aerial threat to this vital port city, requiring integrated defensive measures.
   • Intelligence Gap: Full understanding of "Espanola" unit's capabilities, specific targets, operational areas, and force structure. Precise location and function of the "infrastructure" claimed destroyed by "Два майора." Full details on the triggers and operational procedures for the new Sevastopol warning signals. Precise launch location and intended target of missile towards Odesa.
   • Collection Requirement: IMINT/OSINT on Russian naval special forces units, SIGINT on their communications, HUMINT from Black Sea region, commercial satellite imagery of offshore infrastructure for BDA and pattern of life analysis. SIGINT/OSINT on Sevastopol air defense and naval activities, including responses to alert signals. SIGINT on missile launch origin and trajectory analysis for Odesa.

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END REPORT