Archived operational intelligence briefing
OPSEC CLASSIFICATION: NATO SECRET // RELEASABLE TO UKR FORCES
INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 07 JUN 25 / 23:12 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 07 JUN 25 / 22:42 ZULU - 07 JUN 25 / 23:12 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:
AOR Update: Kharkiv Oblast (southeast Kharkiv region, Kamenka, Stroyevka), Volyn Oblast (Lutsk), Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Dnipro, oblast border, Kryvyi Rih, Pavlohrad, Pleshcheevka, Malinovka, Charivne, Mezheva community, Synelnykove district, Nikopol region, Petrykivska community), Zaporizhzhia Oblast (14 populated areas, Zaporozhye direction, Orikhiv, Huliaipole, Chervonne, Malinovka), Black Sea, Azov Sea, Sumy Oblast (Sumy direction, Yunakivka, Kondratovka, Alexandropol, Klymentove, Uhroyidy, Novonikolaevka, Pisarevka, Khotin, Vorochina, Nizhnya Duvanka, Yablonovka, Andreevka, Eastern parts, Western course, Tiotkino), Russian Federation (Kursk, Bryansk, Kaluga, Smolensk Oblasts, Moscow Region including Dubna, Podmoskovye, Moscow city (Gorbushkin Dvor, VDNKh), Pushkino, Irkutsk region - Belaya airfield; Tambov Oblast - Michurinsk; Ryazan Oblast - Dyagilevo; Belgorod Oblast - Prokhorovka-Belenikhino, Zhuravlevka, Pushkarozhadinsky, Azov - Rostov Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast - Kstovo, Sevastopol, Lipetsk Oblast, Orel Oblast, Tula Oblast - Novomoskovsk, Azot chemical plant), Southern Donetsk Direction (Fedorivka, Perbudova, Komar, Maksimovka, Razdolnoye, Vorskresenka, Poddubnoye, Velyka Novosilka, Chasov Yar), Konstantinovka direction (Novoolenovka, Novaya Poltavka, Tarasovka, Ignatovka, Zarya), Siversk direction (Serebryanka, Hryhorivka, Bilohorivka, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka, Ivano-Daryivka, Pereizne), Odesa Oblast, Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovsk, Kurakhovo - Alekseevka, Chasov Yar, Kramatorsk axis, Toretsk axis, Novopavlivka axis, Krasnoarmeysk-Novosergeevka, Maryinka, Dalnee, Sokol, Lipovoe, Bakhmut, Progress, Kleshcheevka, Vasyutinskoye, south Donetsk region), Kupyansk axis (Zahryzove, Stepova Novoselivka), Kherson axis (Mykolayivka, Berislav), Ternopil Oblast, Kyiv, Krasnoarmeysk direction, Lviv Oblast (Drohobych), Mykolaiv Oblast, Poltava Oblast, Kirovohrad Oblast, Vinnytsia Oblast (southeast Vinnytsia region, east Vinnytsia region, Vinnytsia city, western outskirts), Cherkasy Oblast, Zhytomyr Oblast, Kyiv Oblast.
Key Terrain (Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast, RF - SIGNIFICANT STRIKE IMPLICATIONS): ASTRA reports that the "Azot" chemical plant in Novomoskovsk, previously confirmed as struck, supplies nitric acid to the Sverdlov Plant in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast for the production of octogen and hexogen, which are used in artillery shells. This confirms the strategic military significance of the target. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - based on reputable OSINT source citing Reuters, corroborating previous BDA assessments)
Key Terrain (Odesa Oblast / Black Sea - MISSILE THREAT): Ukrainian Air Force reports missiles in the Black Sea moving north/northwest, then specifically towards Odesa Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - based on official Ukrainian Air Force reporting)
Key Terrain (Vinnytsia Oblast / Vinnytsia City - UAV THREAT): Ukrainian Air Force reports a drone on the western outskirts of Vinnytsia, changing direction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - based on official Ukrainian Air Force reporting)
Key Terrain (Kyiv Oblast - UAV THREAT): Ukrainian Air Force reports threat of strike UAVs from the southwest. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - based on official Ukrainian Air Force reporting)
Key Terrain (Zhytomyr Oblast - UAV THREAT): Ukrainian Air Force reports threat of strike UAVs from the south. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - based on official Ukrainian Air Force reporting)
Key Terrain (Konstantinovka - CONFIRMED RUSSIAN FPV STRIKE): Colonelcassad publishes video claiming a detected UAV command post in Konstantinovka was struck by an FPV drone. Video shows dugout, FPV impact, and post-strike BDA. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - based on video evidence from a Russian milblogger, corroborating their TTPs)
Key Terrain (Kharkiv Oblast - RUSSIAN IO CLAIM): TASS, citing Marochko, claims Ukrainian forces are abandoning positions near Kamenka and Stroyevka, retreating to second and third lines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - as a Russian IO claim, likely false or exaggerated)
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:
COA 1 (MLCOA - Sustained and Escalated Retaliatory Saturation Attacks on Urban Centers and Critical Infrastructure, Coupled with Amplified Disinformation on Humanitarian Issues and Western Divisions, with Direct Targeting of First Responders, and New Attack Vectors): Russia will continue and likely intensify KAB and missile/UAV strikes on Ukrainian urban centers, particularly Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr, with an increased focus on civilian targets (kindergarten, educational buildings) to maximize terror and drain Ukrainian emergency resources. There will be an increased likelihood of deliberate targeting of first responders or "double-tap" strikes to impede rescue efforts and maximize casualties. New groups of strike UAVs moving westward into Kharkiv, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr Oblasts indicate new attack vectors or a re-focusing of efforts to overwhelm specific AD sectors, which will persist and likely broaden. Concurrently, Russia will continue a persistent and aggressive information campaign, particularly regarding body/POW exchanges (using fabricated evidence), blaming Ukraine for delays, and exploiting any perceived Western failures or internal divisions (e.g., US politics, Polish EU accession, Musk/Bessent narratives). The continued targeting of the Azot chemical plant may lead to Russian retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian chemical or industrial facilities, or an increase in strikes with a focus on creating secondary hazards. Russia will also escalate false flag operations regarding "Ukrainian atrocities" in Russian border regions to justify retaliatory actions, and continue to propagate false claims of Ukrainian retreats.
COA 2 (Ground Offensive Support with Targeted Artillery/MLRS and Drone Strikes, while Enhancing Counter-Deep Strike Internal Security and Expanding Maritime Hybrid Operations, with Enhanced Crimean Defenses, and Increased Internal Propaganda focus alongside Divisive Narratives, with a renewed focus on medic support and portrayal of Ukrainian failures): Russian forces will continue to press ground offensives on existing axes (e.g., Donetsk, Novopavlivka, Pokrovsk, Konstantinovka, Sumy), supporting them with targeted artillery, MLRS, and FPV drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and C2 nodes (e.g., Konstantinovka FPV strike). They will likely intensify internal security efforts to prevent and detect further Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian territory, including targeting family members of alleged participants, and maintaining and publicizing air defense alerts/interceptions in border regions (Kursk, Orel). Additionally, Russia will likely attempt to conduct further hybrid maritime operations in the Black Sea. New, specific warning systems will be implemented and publicized in Crimea (Sevastopol). Russian forces will continue to adapt ground vehicles with "cope cages" and similar improvised defenses against drones. Russia will increase internal propaganda efforts focusing on state support for veterans and promoting national unity through cultural events (e.g., Shaman concert), while simultaneously allowing the amplification of divisive internal narratives (e.g., migration/ethnic issues) through controlled channels to serve specific political objectives. Propaganda will also highlight improvements in battlefield medical care and troop welfare to bolster morale and recruitment, and demonstrate military effectiveness (e.g., claimed Krab SPG destruction, FPV strike on UAV C2) while portraying Ukrainian military failures and casualties (e.g., "ZONA SVO" video, TASS claims of Ukrainian retreat).
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):
MLCOA 1: Sustained and Escalated Retaliatory Saturation Attacks on Urban Centers and Critical Infrastructure, Coupled with Amplified Disinformation on Humanitarian Issues and Western Divisions, with Direct Targeting of First Responders, and New Attack Vectors (INCLUDING CHEMICAL HAZARDS AND FALSE FLAG ATROCITIES): Russia will continue and likely intensify KAB and missile/UAV strikes on Ukrainian urban centers, particularly Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr, with an increased focus on civilian targets (kindergarten, educational buildings) to maximize terror and drain Ukrainian emergency resources. There will be an increased likelihood of deliberate targeting of first responders or "double-tap" strikes to impede rescue efforts and maximize casualties. New groups of strike UAVs moving westward into Kharkiv, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr Oblasts indicate new attack vectors or a re-focusing of efforts to overwhelm specific AD sectors, which will persist and likely broaden in geographical scope. Concurrently, Russia will continue a persistent and aggressive information campaign, particularly regarding body/POW exchanges (using fabricated evidence), blaming Ukraine for delays, and exploiting any perceived Western failures or internal divisions (e.g., US politics, Polish EU accession, Musk/Bessent narratives). The persistent strike on the Azot chemical plant will lead to Russian retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian chemical or industrial facilities, or an increase in strikes with a focus on creating secondary hazards. Furthermore, Russia will escalate the dissemination of false flag narratives regarding "Ukrainian atrocities" in Russian border regions (e.g., Russkoye Porechnoye, Kursk Oblast) to justify its retaliatory actions and demonize Ukraine globally, and continue to propagate false claims of Ukrainian military retreats (e.g., Kamenka/Stroyevka).
MLCOA 2: Ground Offensive Support with Targeted Artillery/MLRS and Drone Strikes, while Enhancing Counter-Deep Strike Internal Security and Expanding Maritime Hybrid Operations, with Enhanced Crimean Defenses, and Increased Internal Propaganda focus alongside Divisive Narratives, with a renewed focus on medic support and portrayal of Ukrainian failures: Russian forces will continue to press ground offensives on existing axes (e.g., Donetsk, Novopavlivka, Pokrovsk, Konstantinovka, Sumy), supporting them with targeted artillery, MLRS, and FPV drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and C2 nodes (e.g., Konstantinovka FPV strike). They will likely intensify internal security efforts to prevent and detect further Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian territory, including targeting family members of alleged participants, and maintaining and publicizing air defense alerts/interceptions in border regions (Kursk, Orel). Additionally, Russia will likely attempt to conduct further hybrid maritime operations in the Black Sea. New, specific warning systems will be implemented and publicized in Crimea (Sevastopol). Russian forces will continue to adapt ground vehicles with "cope cages" and similar improvised defenses against drones. Russia will increase internal propaganda efforts focusing on state support for veterans and promoting national unity through cultural events (e.g., Shaman concert), while simultaneously allowing the amplification of divisive internal narratives (e.g., migration/ethnic issues by Alex Parker Returns) through controlled channels to serve specific political objectives. Propaganda will also highlight improvements in battlefield medical care and troop welfare to bolster morale and recruitment, and demonstrate military effectiveness (e.g., claimed Krab SPG destruction, FPV strike on UAV C2) while portraying Ukrainian military failures and casualties (e.g., "ZONA SVO" video, TASS claims of Ukrainian retreat).
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):
MDCOA 1: Renewed Large-Scale Ballistic/Cruise Missile Campaign to Cripple Ukrainian AD and Energy/Logistics Infrastructure, with Increased Focus on Chemical/Industrial Targets: Russia, despite Iskander losses, will attempt to launch a renewed, multi-wave missile and drone campaign targeting Ukraine's critical national infrastructure (energy, logistics hubs, and remaining high-value military facilities), with a specific emphasis on overwhelming weakened Ukrainian air defenses. This aims to exhaust their munition reserves and cripple Ukraine's ability to sustain military operations and civilian life, especially ahead of the colder months. This MDCOA would exploit the publicly stated AD procurement challenges and the confirmed losses of Ukrainian AD munitions. The expansion of KAB attacks and UAV/missile routes (now to Kyiv/Zhytomyr) signals a probing for AD weaknesses. The persistent targeting of the Azot chemical plant in Tula Oblast, now confirmed as a source for explosives in artillery shells, may trigger a significant, high-volume missile retaliation aimed at Ukraine's critical infrastructure, potentially including targets with industrial chemical significance, aiming to create secondary hazards and disrupt Ukrainian defense production.
MDCOA 2: Attempted Strategic Breakthrough on Sumy Axis with Major Force Commitment and Massed Air Support (with Chemical Warfare consideration/False Flag Pretext): Russia commits substantial additional reserves to the Sumy axis, initiating a rapid, decisive breakthrough aimed at encircling or seizing Sumy city. This would involve overwhelming combined arms force, massed KAB strikes to suppress Ukrainian defenses, and deep strikes to neutralize Ukrainian command and control and logistics in the region. This would aim to open a new major operational front, fix a large portion of Ukrainian reserves, and create a significant humanitarian crisis, diverting resources from the Donbas. Given the recent persistent strike on the Azot chemical plant (a source for explosives), and Russia's past false flag attempts regarding chemical weapons, there is a low but non-zero risk of Russia preparing to conduct an operation with chemical munitions or a "dirty bomb" in the context of a strategic breakthrough, or blame Ukraine for such an event, potentially fabricating evidence. The recent Russian false flag propaganda concerning "Ukrainian occupation" and mass casualties in Kursk Oblast, and claims of Ukrainian retreat near Kamenka/Stroyevka, provides a potential pretext for such an escalation or for justifying a disproportionate response.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:
Next 24-48 Hours (Short-Term):
Next 72 Hours (Medium-Term):
Next 1 Week (Near-Term Strategic):
Prioritize and Augment Air Defense for Eastern, Southern, Central, and now Western/Northern Urban Centers, with Enhanced First Responder Protection and Adapting to New UAV/Missile Ingress Routes (Immediate & Urgent):
Sustain and Exploit Deep Strike Successes, Prepare for Retaliation and Enhanced Russian Defenses, Targeting Chemical/Industrial Nodes Critical to Ammunition Production (Urgent):
Intensify Counter-Information Warfare on Humanitarian Issues, Western Divisions, and Russian Fabrications, Addressing Internal Russian Propaganda (Ongoing & Critical):
Reinforce and Monitor Sumy and Konstantinovka Axis Defenses, Verify Russian Claims (Urgent):
Enhance Maritime Security in the Black Sea and Crimea, and Bolster Air Defense in Odesa (New & Critical):
END REPORT
We only use optional analytics cookies if you allow them. Necessary cookies stay on for sign-in and site security.
Learn more in our Privacy Policy.
