Situation Report

OPSEC CLASSIFICATION: NATO SECRET // RELEASABLE TO UKR FORCES

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 07 JUN 25 / 21:12 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 07 JUN 25 / 20:42 ZULU - 07 JUN 25 / 21:12 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• AOR Update: Kharkiv Oblast (Kharkiv City - Kyivskyi, Osnovyanskyi, Shevchenkivskyi Districts, suburbs, Kommunar factory, recreational park, children's railway, central part, educational building near railway, Eastern parts, Western course), Volyn Oblast (Lutsk), Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Dnipro, oblast border, Kryvyi Rih, Pavlohrad, Pleshcheevka, Malinovka, Charivne, Mezheva community, Synelnykove district, Nikopol region, Petrykivska community), Zaporizhzhia Oblast (14 populated areas, Zaporozhye direction, Orikhiv, Huliaipole, Chervonne, Malinovka), Black Sea, Azov Sea, Sumy Oblast (Sumy direction, Yunakivka, Kondratovka, Alexandropol, Klymentove, Uhroyidy, Novonikolaevka, Pisarevka, Khotin, Vorochina, Nizhnya Duvanka, Yablonovka, Andreevka, Eastern parts, Western course), Russian Federation (Kursk, Bryansk, Kaluga, Smolensk Oblasts, Moscow Region including Dubna, Podmoskovye, Moscow city (Gorbushkin Dvor, VDNKh), Pushkino, Irkutsk region - Belaya airfield; Tambov Oblast - Michurinsk; Ryazan Oblast - Dyagilevo; Belgorod Oblast - Prokhorovka-Belenikhino, Zhuravlevka, Pushkarozhadinsky, Azov - Rostov Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast - Kstovo, Sevastopol, Lipetsk Oblast, Orel Oblast, Tula Oblast - Novomoskovsk, Azot chemical plant), Southern Donetsk Direction (Fedorivka, Perbudova, Komar, Maksimovka, Razdolnoye, Vorskresenka, Poddubnoye, Velyka Novosilka, Chasov Yar), Konstantinovka direction (Novoolenovka, Novaya Poltavka, Tarasovka, Ignatovka, Zarya), Siversk direction (Serebryanka, Hryhorivka, Bilohorivka, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka, Ivano-Daryivka, Pereizne), Odesa Oblast, Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovsk, Kurakhovo - Alekseevka, Chasov Yar, Kramatorsk axis, Toretsk axis, Novopavlivka axis, Krasnoarmeysk-Novosergeevka, Maryinka, Dalnee, Sokol, Lipovoe, Bakhmut, Progress, Kleshcheevka), Kupyansk axis (Zahryzove, Stepova Novoselivka), Kherson axis (Mykolayivka, Berislav), Ternopil Oblast, Kyiv, Krasnoarmeysk direction, Lviv Oblast (Drohobych), Mykolaiv Oblast, Poltava Oblast, Kirovohrad Oblast.

• Key Terrain (Kharkiv/Sumy Oblasts - UPDATED): New groups of Russian strike UAVs (Shahed-type, "motorcycles") are entering Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts, moving westbound. This indicates sustained aerial threat to these regions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

• Key Terrain (Dnipro, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast - UPDATED): Local authorities (Mayor Borys Filatov) report power returning to houses in Dnipro that were de-energized due to a morning Russian attack, confirming previous strike impact on civilian infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

• Key Terrain (Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast, RF - NEW): Ukrainian sources (Оперативний ЗСУ, РБК-Україна) report at least 5 explosions in Novomoskovsk, with claims of a UAV strike on the "Azot" chemical industry enterprise. This indicates successful Ukrainian deep strike activity on military-industrial targets within Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - based on Ukrainian reporting, corroborating multiple explosions)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• The continued UAV activity over Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts will likely lead to localized air quality issues from potential impacts/fires.
• The reported UAV strike on the "Azot" chemical plant in Tula Oblast, if confirmed, could have significant environmental consequences depending on the type of chemicals processed, necessitating hazmat response and potentially affecting air quality downwind.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces (Air Defense): Actively tracking and reporting incoming Russian strike UAVs in Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) The map of air alerts indicates active AD posture across multiple regions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Forces (Deep Strike): Confirmed a UAV strike on the "Azot" chemical plant in Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast, demonstrating continued capability and intent to strike military-industrial targets deep within Russian territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Forces (Emergency Services): Actively engaged in restoring power to civilian areas affected by previous Russian attacks in Dnipro. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian Forces (Air): Groups of strike UAVs are actively entering Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts, moving westward. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian Forces (Information Operations):
  • Propaganda/Psychological Operations:
    • "Оперативний ЗСУ" (quoting Russian sources) shows a social event in Russia featuring military personnel (naval infantry, air force) and civilian participation, focused on vehicle donation for veterans/disabled. This is a clear attempt to boost morale, show public support for the military, and project an image of a caring state. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • "Операция Z" continues to amplify statements from Western political figures (e.g., elected Polish President Nawrocki's opposition to Ukraine's EU accession), seeking to sow discord among Ukraine's allies. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Alex Parker Returns continues to push highly inflammatory narratives about "replacement of the indigenous population of Russia in the higher education system" and "migration policy leading to the replacement of the Russian people," featuring a Russian Orthodox archbishop. This is a clear attempt to inflame ethnic/religious tensions within Russia and discredit the government. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Alex Parker Returns also amplifies a narrative about Elon Musk's father visiting Moscow and discussing reconciliation between Musk and Trump, intended to project Russian influence and sow discord in Western political discourse. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • TASS is broadcasting a performance by "Shaman" at a music award, likely an attempt to project normalcy, cultural vitality, and a unified national identity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Colonelcassad posts a cryptic message "When Mazepism merges with Nazism," likely a veiled attack on Ukrainian identity and history. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Damage Control/Internal Security: Russian milbloggers are complaining about UAV attacks in Novomoskovsk, indicating awareness and likely attempts to downplay or manage the impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

• Capabilities:
  • Aerial (UAVs): Confirmed continued capability to conduct strike UAV operations against Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts, with groups entering and moving westward. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Warfare/Internal Security: Highly capable of sophisticated, multi-faceted disinformation campaigns aimed at external (Western allies) and internal (Russian population) audiences, exploiting ethnic/religious tensions and political divisions. Capable of projecting normalcy and national unity through cultural events. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intentions:
  • Kharkiv/Sumy: Continue to terrorize civilian populations and overwhelm air defenses through persistent strike UAV attacks, likely in retaliation for Ukrainian deep strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Warfare (External): Continue to undermine international support for Ukraine by exploiting perceived divisions among Western allies (e.g., Polish EU accession stance). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Warfare (Internal): Control the domestic narrative through cultural events (Shaman performance), but also actively engage in divisive narratives (e.g., "replacement of indigenous population") to rally specific segments of the population or to signal internal political maneuvering. Project an image of state support for veterans. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Courses of Action (COA):

  • COA 1 (MLCOA - Sustained and Escalated Retaliatory Saturation Attacks on Urban Centers, Coupled with Amplified Disinformation on Humanitarian Issues and Western Divisions, with Direct Targeting of First Responders, and New Attack Vectors): Russia will continue and likely intensify KAB and missile/UAV strikes on Ukrainian urban centers, particularly Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk/Kirovohrad, with an increased focus on civilian targets (kindergarten, educational buildings) to maximize terror and drain Ukrainian emergency resources. There will be an increased likelihood of deliberate targeting of first responders or "double-tap" strikes to impede rescue efforts and maximize casualties. New groups of strike UAVs moving westbound into Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts indicate new attack vectors or a re-focusing of efforts to overwhelm specific AD sectors. Concurrently, Russia will continue a persistent and aggressive information campaign, particularly regarding body/POW exchanges (using fabricated evidence), blaming Ukraine for delays, and exploiting any perceived Western failures or internal divisions (e.g., US politics, Polish EU accession).

    • Confidence: HIGH
    • Indicators: Immediate KAB strike on central Kharkiv after previous strikes (now 2 fatalities), persistent Russian narrative on body exchange from multiple sources, Russian amplification of Zelenskiy's AD appeal, Alex Parker Returns's Musk/Trump narrative, amplification of Polish President's statement, new UAV threat in Mykolaiv/Kryvyi Rih directions and now Kirovohrad, KABs on Sumy Oblast and now Dnipropetrovsk. Injury of SES workers in Kharkiv strike. Aviation munitions threat in Zaporizhzhia. New groups of strike UAVs entering Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts, moving westward.

  • COA 2 (Ground Offensive Support with Targeted Artillery/MLRS and Drone Strikes, while Enhancing Counter-Deep Strike Internal Security and Expanding Maritime Hybrid Operations, with Enhanced Crimean Defenses, and Increased Internal Propaganda focus): Russian forces will continue to press ground offensives on existing axes (e.g., Donetsk, Novopavlivka, Pokrovsk, Konstantinovka, Sumy), supporting them with targeted artillery, MLRS, and FPV drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and C2 nodes. They will likely intensify internal security efforts to prevent and detect further Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian territory, including targeting family members of alleged participants, and maintaining and publicizing air defense alerts/interceptions in border regions (Kursk, Orel). Additionally, Russia will likely attempt to conduct further hybrid maritime operations in the Black Sea. New, specific warning systems will be implemented and publicized in Crimea (Sevastopol). Russian forces will continue to adapt ground vehicles with "cope cages" and similar improvised defenses against drones. Russia will increase internal propaganda efforts focusing on state support for veterans and promoting national unity through cultural events, while simultaneously allowing the amplification of divisive internal narratives (e.g., migration/ethnic issues) through controlled channels to serve specific political objectives.

    • Confidence: HIGH
    • Indicators: Observed Grad MLRS firing (previous ISR), claimed Alexandropol strike on mortar/ammo depot (previous ISR), Russian milblogger claims of ambushing Ukrainian groups, active search for alleged drone attack participants (Colonelcassad), "Espanola" unit video demonstrating maritime sabotage, "Два майора" claims of successful Black Sea infrastructure destruction and "cope cage" fundraising. MoD Russia training video for Marines. Lipetsk/Kursk/Orel air alerts/interceptions. Russian SpN drone operations. New alert signals in Sevastopol. Kaluga airport restrictions. Russian social event showcasing veteran support. Shaman concert on TASS. Alex Parker Returns's migration/ethnic narratives.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• New UAV Ingress Routes/Targets: The identification of new groups of strike UAVs entering Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts and moving westward indicates potential new targeting priorities or attempts to bypass existing Ukrainian air defenses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Internal Information Environment Manipulation: The concurrent promotion of state-backed nationalist content (veteran support, Shaman concert) and highly inflammatory, potentially destabilizing content (migration/ethnic replacement narratives by Alex Parker Returns) suggests a more complex, multi-layered approach to internal information warfare, possibly aimed at polarizing segments of the population or diverting attention. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Munitions: Continued UAV activity over Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts confirms sustained, though potentially strained, supply for these assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Power Infrastructure Resilience: The ability of Dnipro authorities to quickly restore power to affected areas indicates ongoing efforts to maintain and repair critical infrastructure despite Russian strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Military-Industrial Complex Vulnerability: The UAV strike on the "Azot" chemical plant in Tula Oblast, a significant industrial target, highlights continued vulnerability of Russian military-industrial facilities to Ukrainian deep strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian C2 demonstrates continued ability to coordinate multi-domain strikes (UAVs in Kharkiv/Sumy) and information operations (multi-faceted propaganda). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• The apparent allowance of highly divisive internal narratives (Alex Parker Returns) suggests either a controlled narrative strategy to rally specific groups or a breakdown in comprehensive C2 over all information channels, which would be an intelligence gap to investigate. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Ukrainian C2 continues to demonstrate effective response and recovery efforts to strikes (Dnipro power restoration) and proactive warning systems (AD alerts). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Air Defense: Operating under continued high alert, actively tracking incoming UAVs in eastern and northern oblasts, and providing timely warnings. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Emergency Services & PGO: Demonstrating resilience and effectiveness in restoring power to civilian infrastructure after attacks, as seen in Dnipro. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Deep Strike Capability: Confirmed continued ability to execute deep strikes against military-industrial targets within Russia, as evidenced by the Novomoskovsk strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Morale: High morale continues to be reinforced by effective response efforts and successful deep strikes, despite ongoing aerial threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes:
  • Deep Strike on Tula Oblast: The UAV strike on the "Azot" chemical plant in Novomoskovsk is a significant success, demonstrating continued ability to hit strategic targets in Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Power Restoration in Dnipro: Swift restoration of power in Dnipro showcases resilience and effective post-strike recovery efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Timely AD Warnings: Prompt warnings regarding incoming UAVs in Kharkiv and Sumy enable defensive measures and civilian protection. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Setbacks:
  • Persistent UAV Threat: New groups of strike UAVs entering Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts, moving westward, pose a continued and evolving threat to AD resources and civilian areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Russian Information Campaigns: Russian exploitation of Polish internal politics and attempts to sow discord within the West are ongoing challenges for Ukrainian diplomatic and information efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense Munitions & Systems: Continued high expenditure due to persistent UAV attacks in Kharkiv and Sumy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Infrastructure Repair & Resilience: Ongoing need for resources to repair and harden civilian infrastructure against persistent attacks, as seen in Dnipro. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Counter-Disinformation Capability: Urgent need for robust, proactive counter-information campaigns to neutralize aggressive Russian propaganda, especially those sowing discord with allies and inflaming internal tensions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Propaganda (Internal & External):
  • Undermining Western Unity: "Операция Z" actively promotes narratives of discord among Western allies (e.g., Polish President Nawrocki's stance on Ukraine's EU accession). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal Cohesion/Distraction: Russian media highlights veteran support events (Оперативний ЗСУ's coverage of car donations) and cultural events (Shaman concert on TASS) to project normalcy, state care, and national unity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal Division/Exploitation: Alex Parker Returns actively disseminates highly inflammatory narratives about "replacement of the Russian people" and "migration policy," likely aimed at mobilizing nationalist segments or creating internal tensions within Russia. This also includes sensationalized claims about Western political figures (Elon Musk's father in Moscow discussing Trump/Musk reconciliation), aiming to undermine Western political stability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Anti-Ukrainian Sentiment: Colonelcassad's cryptic "Mazepism and Nazism" post is a continued effort to demonize Ukrainian identity and history. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Counter-Propaganda/Information Operations:
  • Highlighting Successes: Оперативний ЗСУ and РБК-Україна swiftly report on Ukrainian deep strikes (Novomoskovsk) and resilience (Dnipro power restoration), providing positive narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Discrediting Russian Claims: Ukrainian channels directly highlight Russian UAV activity, contrasting with Russian attempts to downplay their war efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Negative Impact: Continued UAV attacks in Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts will maintain civilian anxiety and pressure on emergency services. Russian propaganda targeting Western unity and internal Russian ethnic/migration issues could cause concern among observers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Positive Impact: Successful deep strikes on Russian territory (Novomoskovsk) and effective post-strike recovery efforts (Dnipro) will boost Ukrainian public morale and confidence in their defense and resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• Russian attempts to exploit Polish internal politics (Nawrocki's stance) are a direct threat to the cohesion of international support for Ukraine, requiring immediate diplomatic engagement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Continued Ukrainian deep strikes into Russia (Tula Oblast) may draw renewed international attention to the need for long-range capabilities for Ukraine, potentially influencing debates on military aid. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• MLCOA 1: Sustained and Escalated Retaliatory Saturation Attacks on Urban Centers and Critical Infrastructure, Coupled with Amplified Disinformation on Humanitarian Issues and Western Divisions, with Direct Targeting of First Responders, and New Attack Vectors: Russia will continue and likely intensify KAB and missile/UAV strikes on Ukrainian urban centers, particularly Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk/Kirovohrad, with an increased focus on civilian targets (kindergarten, educational buildings) to maximize terror and drain Ukrainian emergency resources. There will be an increased likelihood of deliberate targeting of first responders or "double-tap" strikes to impede rescue efforts and maximize casualties. New groups of strike UAVs moving westbound into Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts indicate new attack vectors or a re-focusing of efforts to overwhelm specific AD sectors, which will persist. Concurrently, Russia will continue a persistent and aggressive information campaign, particularly regarding body/POW exchanges (using fabricated evidence), blaming Ukraine for delays, and exploiting any perceived Western failures or internal divisions (e.g., US politics, Polish EU accession).

  • Confidence: HIGH
  • Indicators: Immediate KAB strike on central Kharkiv after previous strikes (now 2 fatalities), persistent Russian narrative on body exchange from multiple sources, Russian amplification of Zelenskiy's AD appeal, Alex Parker Returns's Musk/Trump narrative, amplification of Polish President's statement, new UAV threat in Mykolaiv/Kryvyi Rih directions and now Kirovohrad, KABs on Sumy Oblast and now Dnipropetrovsk. Injury of SES workers in Kharkiv strike. Aviation munitions threat in Zaporizhzhia. New groups of strike UAVs entering Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts, moving westward (RBC Ukraine, Air Force of AFU).

• MLCOA 2: Ground Offensive Support with Targeted Artillery/MLRS and Drone Strikes, while Enhancing Counter-Deep Strike Internal Security and Expanding Maritime Hybrid Operations, with Enhanced Crimean Defenses, and Increased Internal Propaganda focus alongside Divisive Narratives: Russian forces will continue to press ground offensives on existing axes (e.g., Donetsk, Novopavlivka, Pokrovsk, Konstantinovka, Sumy), supporting them with targeted artillery, MLRS, and FPV drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and C2 nodes. They will likely intensify internal security efforts to prevent and detect further Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian territory, including targeting family members of alleged participants, and maintaining and publicizing air defense alerts/interceptions in border regions (Kursk, Orel). Additionally, Russia will likely attempt to conduct further hybrid maritime operations in the Black Sea. New, specific warning systems will be implemented and publicized in Crimea (Sevastopol). Russian forces will continue to adapt ground vehicles with "cope cages" and similar improvised defenses against drones. Russia will increase internal propaganda efforts focusing on state support for veterans and promoting national unity through cultural events (e.g., Shaman concert), while simultaneously allowing the amplification of divisive internal narratives (e.g., migration/ethnic issues by Alex Parker Returns) through controlled channels to serve specific political objectives.

  • Confidence: HIGH
  • Indicators: Observed Grad MLRS firing (previous ISR), claimed Alexandropol strike on mortar/ammo depot (previous ISR), Russian milblogger claims of ambushing Ukrainian groups, active search for alleged drone attack participants (Colonelcassad), "Espanola" unit video demonstrating maritime sabotage, "Два майora" claims of successful Black Sea infrastructure destruction and "cope cage" fundraising. MoD Russia training video for Marines. Lipetsk/Kursk/Orel air alerts/interceptions. Russian SpN drone operations. New alert signals in Sevastopol. Kaluga airport restrictions. Russian social event showcasing veteran support (Оперативний ЗСУ video). Shaman concert on TASS. Alex Parker Returns's migration/ethnic narratives and Musk/Trump narratives.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• MDCOA 1: Renewed Large-Scale Ballistic/Cruise Missile Campaign to Cripple Ukrainian AD and Energy/Logistics Infrastructure: Russia, despite Iskander losses, will attempt to launch a renewed, multi-wave missile and drone campaign targeting Ukraine's critical national infrastructure (energy, logistics hubs, and remaining high-value military facilities), with a specific emphasis on overwhelming weakened Ukrainian air defenses. This aims to exhaust their munition reserves and cripple Ukraine's ability to sustain military operations and civilian life, especially ahead of the colder months. This MDCOA would exploit the publicly stated AD procurement challenges and the confirmed losses of Ukrainian AD munitions. The expansion of KAB attacks and UAV routes signals a probing for AD weaknesses. The confirmed strike on the Azot chemical plant in Tula Oblast may trigger a significant, high-volume missile retaliation aimed at Ukraine's critical infrastructure.

  • Confidence: MEDIUM (Increased due to Zelenskiy's public statement about AD procurement, the strategic impact of losing 3 Iskander launchers and the Tu-22M3 bomber, prompting Russia to consider other high-impact strike options and rely more on existing cruise missile stocks. New KAB targets and UAV penetration routes also indicate this. The strike on the Azot chemical plant, a significant industrial target, increases the likelihood of a severe retaliatory strike.)
  • Indicators: Significant increase in missile/drone attacks beyond current levels, targeting of energy infrastructure components not previously hit, significant increase in Russian strategic bomber activity, increased Russian reconnaissance efforts over critical infrastructure.

• MDCOA 2: Attempted Strategic Breakthrough on Sumy Axis with Major Force Commitment and Massed Air Support: Russia commits substantial additional reserves to the Sumy axis, initiating a rapid, decisive breakthrough aimed at encircling or seizing Sumy city. This would involve overwhelming combined arms force, massed KAB strikes to suppress Ukrainian defenses, and deep strikes to neutralize Ukrainian command and control and logistics in the region. This would aim to open a new major operational front, fix a large portion of Ukrainian reserves, and create a significant humanitarian crisis, diverting resources from the Donbas.

  • Confidence: MEDIUM (Based on previous Russian claims of "buffer zone" and mapped territorial control, reinforced by confirmed advances towards Sumy Oblast from previous ISR and the presence of Sumy in Russian casualty lists from memorials. The SOF night raid in the Sumy/Belgorod border area indicates active Russian presence and Ukrainian counter-operations.) The claimed KAB strike on a TD PVD in Ugroiedy and new groups of strike UAVs targeting Sumy Oblast reinforce Russian intent in the region.
  • Indicators: Sustained high rate of KABs and missile strikes on deep targets in Sumy Oblast, large-scale troop movements on Sumy axis beyond current levels, intelligence of Russian force restructuring or redeployment from other axes.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Next 24-48 Hours (Short-Term):

  • Immediate Retaliation/Sustained Attacks: Expect continued, possibly intensified, KAB and missile/UAV strikes on Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and now Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts, with heightened risk of targeting first responders. High probability of further Russian retaliatory deep strikes due to the Iskander and logistics train losses, and the Novomoskovsk chemical plant strike. New UAV threat in Mykolaiv/Kryvyi Rih regions, and reconnaissance drone activity in Poltava and Kirovohrad. New groups of strike UAVs entering Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts from the East, moving West.
  • Ground Pressure: Continued tactical ground engagements, particularly on the Donetsk (Pokrovsk, Konstantinovka) and Sumy axes, with Russian efforts to consolidate claimed gains. Increased Russian counter-drone and anti-AD operations.
  • Decision Point (UKR): Prioritize air defense assets to protect key urban centers (Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Kryvyi Rih, Poltava, Kirovohrad) and critical infrastructure, with explicit consideration for protecting emergency services and first responders. Expedite deployment of countermeasures to Russian anti-drone tactics. Reassess ground force posture on the Sumy axis based on updated Russian advances and map intelligence. Immediately counter Russian disinformation on body exchanges, POW testimonies, and Western internal politics (especially Polish relations) with factual and transparent communication. Assess impact of Novomoskovsk strike on Russian logistics/production and prepare for potential severe retaliatory strikes.

• Next 72 Hours (Medium-Term):

  • Decision Point (UKR): Evaluate the full impact of the Iskander launcher and logistics train destruction, and the Novomoskovsk chemical plant strike on Russian operational tempo and strategic options. Re-evaluate and adapt ground force deployments on the Sumy axis based on continued Russian advances and the scale of the threat to Sumy city, potentially deploying additional reserves. Develop a comprehensive plan for mine clearance and public safety in areas affected by PFM-1 mines (as reported in previous ISR). Expedite high-level diplomatic engagement regarding AD systems. Monitor and respond to escalating Russian disinformation campaigns targeting Western unity and Ukrainian credibility, particularly the fabricated POW videos and body lists, and narratives exploiting internal Western politics. Increase force protection measures for all emergency services personnel.

• Next 1 Week (Near-Term Strategic):

  • Decision Point (UKR): Evaluate the overall effectiveness of Ukrainian deep strike campaign on Russian military-industrial complex and logistics, considering both successes and Russian claims of countermeasures. Continue to optimize air defense deployments based on evolving Russian targeting patterns and replenish munition stockpiles. Intensify intelligence collection on Russian strategic aviation, air defense assets, potential dispersal efforts, and maritime special operations. Prioritize resources for the Sumy axis if Russian pressure continues, potentially initiating pre-emptive civilian evacuation planning. Reinforce maritime security measures in the Black Sea and Azov Sea.

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Prioritize and Augment Air Defense for Eastern, Southern, and Central Urban Centers, with Enhanced First Responder Protection and Adapting to New UAV Ingress Routes (Immediate & Urgent):

   • Action: Immediately re-prioritize and reinforce layered air defense systems (including mobile fire groups with MANPADS for KAB and drone defense) to protect Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Kryvyi Rih, Poltava, and Kirovohrad from continued KAB and missile/UAV attacks. Deploy active and passive defenses around critical civilian infrastructure, particularly educational buildings and kindergartens. Crucially, implement enhanced force protection measures for all emergency services personnel, including hardened shelters at known response sites and updated protocols for "double-tap" strike scenarios. Expedite diplomatic efforts for the acquisition of additional advanced AD systems (e.g., Patriot, NASAMS) and secure urgent resupply of interceptor munitions. Allocate AD assets to counter new UAV threat vectors from Berislav into Mykolaiv/Kirovohrad Oblasts and reconnaissance drones into Poltava. Analyze the new western-bound UAV ingress routes into Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts to pre-position AD assets and optimize interception tactics.
   • Justification: Russian forces are deliberately escalating attacks on civilian areas and opening new attack vectors to inflict casualties and psychological impact. The latest KAB strike on a central Kharkiv educational building (now 2 fatalities), KABs on Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts (Mezheva community, kindergarten, 1 fatality), and ongoing UAV threats into Kirovohrad underscore the urgency and breadth of the threat. The injury of SES workers highlights a direct targeting of first responders. The new groups of strike UAVs entering Kharkiv and Sumy from the East, moving West, indicate tactical adaptation by Russia to bypass current AD or strike new targets.
   • Intelligence Gap: Real-time air defense munition expenditure rates in affected areas and current inventory levels for key systems; full extent of Russian UAV reconnaissance and strike capabilities in the Mykolaiv/Odesa/Poltava/Kirovohrad/Zaporizhzhia sectors. Russian intent and capability for deliberate targeting of first responders. Specific objectives of new UAV ingress routes into Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts.
   • Collection Requirement: Automated tracking of AD engagements and munition usage, updated imagery of damaged civilian sites for munition analysis, SIGINT/HUMINT on AD system readiness, drone flight path analysis from Mykolaiv/Poltava/Kirovohrad/Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. HUMINT/OSINT on Russian TTPs regarding first responder targeting. IMINT/SIGINT on UAV launch locations and operational patterns for new ingress routes into Kharkiv and Sumy.

2. Sustain and Exploit Deep Strike Successes, Prepare for Retaliation and Enhanced Russian Defenses, Targeting Chemical/Industrial Nodes (Urgent):

   • Action: Conduct rapid, detailed BDA on the destroyed Iskander launchers, the logistics train, the Tu-22M3 bomber, and the "Azot" chemical plant in Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast (satellite imagery, OSINT analysis) to confirm operational impact and specific targets. Publicize these successes widely to boost morale and demonstrate capability. Simultaneously, prepare for heightened Russian retaliatory strikes across Ukraine, particularly on strategic infrastructure, following these high-value asset destructions. Disperse high-value assets and reinforce their defenses. Continue to assess targets for further deep strikes on Russian logistics and military-industrial complex, prioritizing industrial nodes with potential dual-use or military production capabilities, especially those related to chemical production. Integrate FPV drone operations more widely for precision strikes on personnel and high-value equipment. Leverage SOF for continued cross-border raids against high-value Russian personnel and forward operating bases. Develop and deploy countermeasures to Russian new warning systems (e.g., in Sevastopol) and airfield restrictions (e.g., Kaluga), assessing their impact on Ukrainian deep strike TTPs.
   • Justification: Ukrainian deep strikes are a significant strategic success but will provoke severe retaliation, requiring preemptive defensive measures and effective information operations. The destruction of a logistics train highlights a key vulnerability, and the VDV crowdfunding indicates systemic issues. SOF raids maintain pressure on Russian border regions. Russian attempts to adapt to drone threats and deep strikes (new warning systems, airport restrictions) must be actively countered. The strike on a chemical industrial plant is a new category of target for deep strikes, likely increasing Russian pressure and potentially indicating a focus on their war production capabilities.
   • Intelligence Gap: Full BDA and long-term operational impact on Russian ballistic missile capabilities, Southern logistics, and strategic aviation. Specific details on the GRU personnel targeted in the SOF raid. Effectiveness of Russian counter-drone adaptations (e.g., "cope cages"). Full impact of Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian air force operations and airfields (e.g., Kaluga). Full implications of new Sevastopol warning systems on Ukrainian maritime drone operations. Precise function and production output of the "Azot" chemical plant in Novomoskovsk and its connection to Russian military efforts.
   • Collection Requirement: High-resolution satellite imagery of Bryansk/Kursk missile sites, Southern logistics hubs, Russian airfields (especially Engels, Belaya, Dyagilevo, Kaluga), and other military-industrial targets, including Novomoskovsk's "Azot" plant; monitoring Russian strategic aviation movements and activity. HUMINT/SIGINT on Russian GRU force composition and deployment on the border. IMINT/OSINT on Russian vehicle adaptations and their effectiveness. SIGINT/OSINT on the operational effectiveness of new Russian warning systems.

3. Intensify Counter-Information Warfare on Humanitarian Issues, Western Divisions, and Russian Fabrications, Addressing Internal Russian Propaganda (Ongoing & Critical):

   • Action: Proactively and transparently communicate Ukraine's official stance and actions regarding prisoner and body exchanges to both domestic and international audiences, providing verifiable evidence and consistently refuting Russian disinformation. Immediately and publicly expose Russian fabrications, such as the "future-dated" body lists (e.g., 06 JUN 2025) and the alleged POW video from MoD Russia, highlighting their manipulative nature and the intent to demoralize. Highlight Russian violations of international law (e.g., confirmed KAB strikes on children's railway, central Kharkiv educational building, kindergarten in Mezheva, PFM-1 mine use, targeting of SES workers) to discredit their humanitarian claims. Publicly counter Russian narratives attempting to exploit Western internal politics (e.g., Musk/Trump claims) and international relations (e.g., Polish EU accession statements), exposing them as deliberate psychological operations. Leverage the opening of rehabilitation centers to showcase Ukrainian commitment to its people and support for its diverse military. Additionally, monitor and analyze Russian internal propaganda related to veteran support, cultural events, and especially inflammatory narratives concerning migration/ethnic issues, to understand their domestic messaging strategies and identify potential weaknesses or opportunities for counter-messaging.
   • Justification: Russia is leveraging highly sensitive humanitarian issues, internal Western political dynamics, and sensationalist narratives for information warfare, using increasingly blatant fabrications (e.g., "future-dated" lists, fabricated POW testimonials) aiming to undermine Ukrainian credibility, international support, and Western unity. Effective, consistent counter-narratives are critical. The proliferation of internal Russian propaganda, particularly the divisive narratives about "replacement of the Russian people," requires monitoring to understand internal Russian stability and potential points of leverage.
   • Intelligence Gap: Full scope of Russian information narratives targeting Ukrainian society and Western audiences, and the specific impact of Russian propaganda on Ukrainian public and troop morale. Identification of key Russian psychological operations (PSYOP) themes. Understanding the intent and impact of highly divisive internal Russian propaganda regarding ethnic/migration issues.
   • Collection Requirement: Comprehensive monitoring of Russian state media and milblogger channels, and analysis of their messaging tactics and impact, coupled with public opinion polling in Ukraine and Western nations. OSINT analysis of specific Russian PSYOP channels and their reach. Targeted OSINT/HUMINT on internal Russian social dynamics and reactions to state-sponsored and nationalist propaganda.

4. Reinforce and Monitor Sumy and Konstantinovka Axis Defenses (Urgent):

   • Action: Immediately reinforce personnel, fortifications (including anti-tank obstacles), and anti-tank capabilities on the Sumy axis, prioritizing areas within 40km of Sumy city and identified Russian avenues of advance (e.g., around Yablonovka, Andreevka, Vorochina, Ugroiedy). Intensify ISR collection on Russian force composition, strength, and objectives in the area. Advise civilian authorities on potential evacuation routes and shelter options in Sumy City and surrounding settlements. Conduct aggressive counter-battery fire against Russian artillery/MLRS supporting advances. Similarly, reinforce defenses and conduct ISR on the Konstantinovka axis, given Russian claims of advances. Prepare for potential increased KAB/UAV strikes on Sumy Oblast in conjunction with new westward-bound UAV groups.
   • Justification: Russian claims of an "expanding buffer zone" and confirmed advances (including mapped territorial control) indicate a serious intent to press the Sumy axis, threatening Sumy City. The continued focus on the Novopavlivka and Pokrovsk directions, and new claims on Konstantinovka, also indicate sustained pressure on ground forces. The SOF raid highlights active Russian presence in the border region. Russian claims of KAB strikes on a TD PVD in Ugroiedy and new UAV activity over Sumy Oblast further indicate their focus on this region.
   • Intelligence Gap: Precise composition and strength of Russian forces on Sumy and Konstantinovka axes, and their immediate operational objectives and timeline for further advance.
   • Collection Requirement: HUMINT from local sources, SIGINT on Russian communications, IMINT for troop movements and fortifications, cross-referencing Russian map claims with ground truth.

5. Enhance Maritime Security in the Black Sea and Crimea (New & Critical):

   • Action: Increase Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in areas with critical maritime infrastructure (ports, offshore platforms, key shipping lanes) in the Black Sea, particularly off Odesa, Mykolaiv, and the Ukrainian coast, and intensify ISR on Sevastopol and other Crimean naval bases. Develop and deploy enhanced physical and electronic security measures for offshore platforms, subsea cables, and pipelines (e.g., anti-diver, anti-drone, and rapid response capabilities). Share intelligence on Russian maritime special operations (e.g., "Espanola" unit's TTPs, "Два майора" claims) with relevant maritime security agencies and allied nations. Prioritize monitoring of specific offshore platforms and naval assets for signs of Russian activity. Analyze the new Sevastopol warning signals to understand their operational triggers and potential implications for Ukrainian maritime and aerial drone operations.
   • Justification: The "Espanola" unit's video and "Два майора" claims demonstrate a sophisticated Russian capability for maritime sabotage against critical energy infrastructure, posing a significant threat to Ukrainian and international interests in the Black Sea. The introduction of new, specific warning signals in Sevastopol indicates heightened Russian concern and defensive posture in response to Ukrainian threats in the maritime domain.
   • Intelligence Gap: Full understanding of "Espanola" unit's capabilities, specific targets, operational areas, and force structure. Precise location and function of the "infrastructure" claimed destroyed by "Два майора." Full details on the triggers and operational procedures for the new Sevastopol warning signals.
   • Collection Requirement: IMINT/OSINT on Russian naval special forces units, SIGINT on their communications, HUMINT from Black Sea region, commercial satellite imagery of offshore infrastructure for BDA and pattern of life analysis. SIGINT/OSINT on Sevastopol air defense and naval activities, including responses to alert signals.

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END REPORT