Strategic Missile Forces
Organizational Overview and Headquarters
The Strategic Missile Forces (Raketnye voyska strategicheskogo naznacheniya, RVSN) constitute the branch of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation responsible for ground-based intercontinental ballistic missile forces. The main headquarters is located in the closed administrative-territorial formation of Vlasikha in Moscow Oblast (historically referenced in open sources as Odintsovo-10). The Main Headquarters of the Strategic Missile Forces is identified in open sources as military unit 25516. As of 2024, the commander of the RVSN is Colonel General Sergey Viktorovich Karakaev, who has held this position since his appointment on 22 June 2010.
Central Command Infrastructure (CCP and Reserve CCP)
The Strategic Missile Forces operate a Central Command Post (military unit 33925) that directs peacetime and wartime command-and-control of missile armies and subordinate formations. This facility is co-located within the Vlasikha headquarters complex and is built with hardening and redundancy to maintain continuity of control under severe stress, including nuclear-contested conditions. A Reserve Central Command Post (military unit 69792) provides alternate command capability to assure continuity of governance over strategic assets if the primary node is degraded or destroyed. The detailed locations, internal configurations, and technical specifications of these command posts are not publicly disclosed.
1231st Command and Control Center and the "Perimeter" Automated System
The 1231st Command and Control Center of the Strategic Missile Forces (military unit 20003) is responsible for operating key automated control networks that transmit directives and execute higher-command orders to missile formations. Open-source reporting associates this center with the automated control complex widely known as "Perimeter"—a system intended to ensure the transmission of launch orders under extreme decapitation scenarios. In December 2011, the RVSN commander publicly stated that the system exists and is on combat duty; technical architecture, operating conditions, and deployment arrangements remain classified. The 1231st Center interfaces with the national-level nuclear command-and-control framework to ensure directive flow across multiple, redundant channels.
Alternate Command Post: Kosvinsky Kamen Complex
Kosvinsky Kamen is a granite massif in the northern Ural Mountains (Sverdlovsk Oblast), with an elevation reported at approximately 1,519 meters. Open-source assessments describe a deep underground facility at this site functioning as an alternate or backup strategic command post for nuclear command-and-control. Reporting has long characterized the complex as highly hardened for survivability against nuclear attack and as interfacing with very-low-frequency (VLF) communications networks designed to penetrate severe electromagnetic interference and atmospheric disturbances. Publicly released, verifiable technical details on its internal layout, construction, and exact mission assignments are limited; classified aspects have not been disclosed by Russian authorities.
Missile Armament Management and Oversight
The Main Missile Armament Directorate (military unit 25453) oversees the life-cycle management of RVSN missile armament and associated equipment, including procurement support, acceptance, maintenance policy, modernization guidance, and technical standardization across arsenals and field units. The 27th Missile Weapons Exploitation Directorate (military unit 26180) provides specialized oversight of operation and maintenance practices, ensuring compliance with technical documentation and safety regulations for in-service systems. These directorates support the sustainment of current RVSN systems—such as silo- and road-mobile RS-24 "Yars" and silo-based 15Zh65 "Topol-M"—and legacy or specialized assets (for example, limited numbers of UR-100N UTTKh used as boosters for the Avangard glide vehicle), while accommodating transitions associated with newer systems as they are introduced. Specific internal structures, staffing, and facilities of these directorates are not publicly detailed.
Arsenals and Technical–Logistics Base
The RVSN maintains dedicated arsenals to store, service, and repair missile-related equipment and support materiel. Open sources identify the 21st Strategic Missile Forces Arsenal (military unit 56653), the 27th Arsenal (military unit 32193), and the 29th Arsenal (military unit 25850) as core elements of this technical-logistics base. These arsenals provide depot-level maintenance for missile airframes, transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and associated vehicles, guidance and control components, and ground support equipment; they also perform inspections, calibration, and refurbishment to sustain readiness. Storage, transportation, and custody of nuclear warheads are the responsibility of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, not the RVSN arsenals. Exact locations, storage capacities, and internal layouts of the arsenals are not publicly disclosed.
Interspecific Regional Training Center
The Interspecific Regional Training Center of the Strategic Missile Forces (military unit 74306) conducts training for RVSN personnel in tasks that require coordination across services and specialties. Its functions include training on operation and maintenance of missile-support equipment, communications procedures within automated control systems, safety and survivability measures, and standardized technical processes for handling and servicing missile materiel. The center complements professional military education institutions by providing applied, unit-level readiness training. Specific course catalogs, student throughput, and training range layouts have not been publicly released.
105th Separate Mixed Aviation Squadron
The 105th Separate Mixed Aviation Squadron (military unit 77126) provides aviation support to the Strategic Missile Forces. Typical missions include liaison and transport flights for headquarters elements, movement of technical specialists and small consignments of high-priority equipment to remote missile garrisons, and support to inspection and maintenance teams. The squadron’s detailed basing, aircraft inventory, and sortie rates are not published in official sources; platform assignments and basing arrangements are subject to change and are not openly documented.
Main Headquarters, Central Command Post, and Supporting Nodes
The Main Headquarters (military unit 25516) in Vlasikha directs strategic planning, force development, and operational control of missile armies. The Central Command Post (military unit 33925) executes continuous command-and-control and is configured for hardened, redundant operations. The Reserve Central Command Post (military unit 69792) provides assured alternate control. These nodes are integrated with national-level nuclear command networks to ensure the rapid transmission of validated orders under peacetime, crisis, and wartime conditions. Physical configurations, communications routing, and security measures are classified and not publicly described.
Communications Architecture and Survivability
RVSN command-and-control uses layered, redundant communications—hardened terrestrial lines, radio systems across multiple bands, and military satellite links—integrated via automated control systems (ASBU) that interface with national nuclear command networks. Very-low-frequency (VLF) broadcast capability is part of the wider strategic communications architecture to ensure message delivery in environments degraded by nuclear effects; command nodes coordinate with national transmitter networks rather than publicly hosting large VLF antennas at command sites. The architecture is engineered for continuity under electromagnetic disturbance, physical attack, and infrastructure disruption. Frequencies, routing, encryption, and network topologies are classified.
Legal Status and Access Control
Vlasikha is a closed administrative-territorial formation (ZATO) under Russian law, with restricted access and special security and administrative regimes. Entry is controlled by pass systems, and movement, construction, and information disclosure within the perimeter are regulated by federal statutes and Ministry of Defense regulations. Comparable restrictions apply to other sensitive RVSN sites, including command posts, arsenals, and communications nodes. Site perimeters, guard arrangements, and internal security protocols are not publicly disclosed.
Summary of Provided Military Unit Designations
Open-source designations referenced here align as follows: Main Headquarters of the Strategic Missile Forces — military unit 25516; Central Command Post of the Strategic Missile Forces — military unit 33925; Reserve Central Command Post — military unit 69792; Interspecific Regional Training Center — military unit 74306; 21st Strategic Missile Forces Arsenal — military unit 56653; 27th Strategic Missile Forces Arsenal — military unit 32193; 29th Strategic Missile Forces Arsenal — military unit 25850; 1231st Command and Control Center (associated in open sources with the automated retaliatory control complex "Perimeter") — military unit 20003; Main Missile Armament Directorate — military unit 25453; 27th Missile Weapons Exploitation Directorate — military unit 26180; 105th Separate Mixed Aviation Squadron — military unit 77126. For the Kosvinsky Kamen Complex, open sources describe an underground alternate command post; precise military unit designations and technical details are not publicly released.
Information Availability and Classification Considerations
Russian authorities do not publicly disclose exact locations, internal configurations, communications parameters, or operating procedures for nuclear command-and-control sites, arsenals, or specialized directorates. Where official confirmation is absent, identifications cited above reflect consistent open-source reporting but remain subject to change due to reorganization or re-designation. Technical specifics of the "Perimeter" system, the Central and Reserve Command Posts, the 1231st C2 Center, and the Kosvinsky Kamen complex are classified and cannot be provided.