Strategic Missile Forces
Identity
This record aligns with the Strategic Missile Forces’ main command complex at Vlasikha, Moscow Oblast. Russian reporting describes Vlasikha as the RVSN’s main garrison and places the service headquarters there; the military investigative directorate for the RVSN is also based in Vlasikha. As of January 3, 2026, Russian Ministry of Defense reporting still identified Colonel General Sergey Karakaev as commander. ([ria.ru](https://ria.ru/20260103/komandovanie-2066147725.html?utm_source=openai))
Command role
Vlasikha is not just an administrative address. In December 2014, RVSN headquarters stated that the service’s Central Command Post would keep its functions despite activation of Russia’s National Defense Management Center, supporting an assessment that the Vlasikha complex remains an operational strategic command-and-control node. Earlier reporting on RVSN military council activity in Vlasikha also emphasized stable control of troops and weapons as a core task. ([ria.ru](https://ria.ru/20141203/1036325909.html?utm_source=openai))
Force posture
From this headquarters, the RVSN oversees Russia’s land-based ICBM force. Independent estimates published in 2025-2026 assess the service at three missile armies, about 12 divisions, and roughly 310 operational missile systems carrying around 930 warheads; Karakaev stated in December 2023 that the force deliberately retains a two-component structure of silo-based and mobile systems. ([thebulletin.org](https://thebulletin.org/premium/2025-05/russian-nuclear-weapons-2025/?utm_source=openai))
Associated network
The broader support and education network tied to this command includes the Peter the Great Military Academy of the Strategic Missile Forces and its branch, which Russian MoD reporting referenced in January 2025. Older MoD reporting also identified RVSN training centers for junior specialists in Pereslavl-Zalessky, Ostrov, Kapustin Yar, and Plesetsk, which is broadly consistent with the distributed footprint reflected in the supplied metadata. ([ria.ru](https://ria.ru/20250106/minoborony-1992628024.html?utm_source=openai))
Alternate C2
One supplied placemark, Kosvinsky Kamen, matches long-running open-source reporting on a hardened alternate strategic command facility in the northern Urals. GlobalSecurity and other analytical literature describe the site as an alternate or backup command post and sometimes associate it with the “Perimeter” retaliatory command system, but Russian authorities do not publicly confirm the exact role; that linkage should be treated as plausible open-source assessment rather than settled official fact. ([globalsecurity.org](https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/kosvinsky.htm?utm_source=openai))