Local Nuclear Warhead Storage Sites / "Repair-Technical Bases"
Scope and Executive Summary
The entries reference local nuclear warhead storage sites described as Repair-Technical Bases (RTB) and cite an unspecified association with a “3rd Missile Brigade” equipped with 9K720 Iskander-M systems, as well as the designation “military unit 20336,” with two instances marked “/Be” that likely intend Belarus. Based on publicly available information, RTBs in the Russian system are subordinate to the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (12th GUMO) and provide storage, maintenance, custody, and transport support for nuclear munitions. Such facilities may be positioned to support dual-capable operational units (including Iskander-M brigades) but remain under 12th GUMO control. The specific identification, location, or mission of an RTB tied to “military unit 20336,” and any direct linkage to a “3rd Missile Brigade,” cannot be verified from the information provided. Additional geospatial data, documentary evidence, or authoritative sources would be required for confirmation.
Definitions and Command Authority
Repair-Technical Base (RTB; Russian: Ремонтно-техническая база) is a term used for facilities responsible for the storage, maintenance, and handling of nuclear munitions and associated components. In the Russian system, RTBs are managed by the 12th Main Directorate (12th GUMO), which retains custody of nuclear warheads at all times, including in peacetime and during authorized transfers to operational units for training or contingencies. This separation of custody from operations is a core organizational and safety principle and is consistent with longstanding Soviet/Russian practice.
Role and Functions of Local RTBs
Local RTBs support nearby operational formations by storing and servicing non-strategic nuclear munitions and preparing them for transport when authorized. Functions typically include receipt and dispatch of munitions via rail or secure road convoys, environmental control and technical servicing of warheads in specialized buildings, periodic inspection and testing, and physical security with layered access controls. Although positioned to support specific formations (e.g., missile brigades), RTBs remain administratively and operationally under 12th GUMO, not the host formation.
Iskander-M Operational Context
The 9K720 Iskander-M system is a road-mobile short-range ballistic missile complex for the Russian Ground Forces. The ballistic missile variant (9M723) has a publicly stated range up to approximately 500 km and is assessed by multiple governments as dual-capable (conventional and nuclear). Typical brigade organizations field multiple 9P78-1 transporter-erector-launchers with associated reload and support vehicles. If nuclear warheads are assigned in a crisis or exercise, custody remains with 12th GUMO and would involve transfer procedures between a 12th GUMO unit (often an RTB detachment) and the operational brigade under strict authorization and security protocols. Specific warhead models and yields for Iskander-M remain classified and are not publicly disclosed.
Physical and Security Signatures of RTBs (OSINT Indicators)
RTBs often exhibit distinctive infrastructure features visible in open-source imagery: double-fenced perimeters with cleared security zones; multiple guard posts/towers and vehicle barriers; earth-covered storage bunkers (igloo-style or elongated bunkers) with blast doors; a technical/maintenance zone with one or more high-bay buildings for warhead inspection and handling; secure internal road networks; limited but robust utilities and communications; and, where feasible, a rail spur or a dedicated transshipment area for secure rail-to-road transfer. RTBs are usually separated from, but within practicable distance to, supported units to facilitate logistics while maintaining custody segregation.
Documented Precedents and Publicly Noted Sites
Open-source research and satellite imagery have documented upgrades at suspected non-strategic nuclear storage facilities in Russia, including a well-reported complex in Kaliningrad Oblast where refurbishment activity was observed in the 2016–2018 period. Analysts have assessed that such sites are likely associated with 12th GUMO support for dual-capable forces in the region; however, Russian authorities have not publicly confirmed the presence or absence of nuclear warheads at specific sites. Beyond such examples, the distribution, capacities, and detailed inventories of RTBs remain classified and are not disclosed in official sources.
Belarus Dimension (2023–2024 Developments)
On 25 March 2023, the Russian leadership publicly announced the intention to deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory under Russian custody, citing the preparation of aircraft and the transfer of an Iskander-M system to Belarus. On 25 May 2023, Russia and Belarus signed documents outlining the deployment arrangements, and official statements during 2023 asserted that weapons and infrastructure had been established. In 2024, Russia announced non-strategic nuclear exercises and a subsequent phase involving Belarusian participation; official communications referenced Iskander and aircraft as delivery systems. Specific storage locations, facility designations, or the presence of warheads in Belarus have not been disclosed in verifiable public documentation. If an RTB exists in Belarus for this mission, it would be operated by Russian 12th GUMO personnel and remain under Russian custody, consistent with Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations as interpreted by states engaged in such arrangements.
Assessment of the Provided Entries
The entries list “n/a Repair-Technical Base” and “/Be n/a Repair-Technical Base” (twice) associated with “military unit 20336” and a note that a site is “most likely serving the nearby 3rd Missile Brigade on 9K720 Iskander-M systems.” There is insufficient information to confirm the identity, location, organizational subordination, or mission of an RTB tied to “military unit 20336,” and no locational data were provided to validate an association with any specific Iskander-M brigade. The designation “/Be” appears to imply Belarus; however, Belarus’ missile formation equipped with Iskander-M is publicly identified as the 465th Missile Brigade at Asipovichy, not a “3rd Missile Brigade.” Open-source confirmation linking “military unit 20336” to a 12th GUMO RTB, or to a particular Russian or Belarusian formation, was not found in the provided material.
Infrastructure Capabilities Typically Present at Local Nuclear Warhead Storage Sites
Capabilities commonly observed at RTBs include environmentally controlled storage for nuclear munitions; specialized handling and inspection equipment housed in high-bay facilities; explosive safety distances and earth barricades around bunkers; redundant power supply and communications; perimeter intrusion detection and hardened guard facilities; secure rail and/or convoy transshipment areas; and dedicated vehicle fleets for 12th GUMO security and logistics. The number of bunkers and the scale of the technical area can suggest potential throughput or readiness levels, but precise storage capacities and inventories are classified and cannot be inferred with certainty from imagery alone.
Indicators and Warning for Warhead Movement/Activation
Potential observable indicators of elevated activity at an RTB may include: unusual frequency of rail activity with specialized guarded trains; increased convoy movements with heavy security elements; heightened activity around high-bay technical buildings; temporary road closures or expanded security cordons; and concurrent readiness measures at nearby dual-capable units (e.g., Iskander brigades). These indicators are not definitive and require correlation with reliable sources, as many can be associated with non-nuclear logistics or routine maintenance cycles.
Arms Control and Legal Context
Nonstrategic nuclear weapons are not covered by the New START Treaty or any current bilateral arms control regime. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty ceased to be in force in 2019. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear-weapon states assert that forward-deployment or hosting arrangements remain compliant when the nuclear-weapon state retains custody and control; Russia and Belarus have publicly stated that custody remains with Russian forces in any Belarus-based arrangement. Specific site details, warhead numbers, and deployment statuses are not publicly disclosed.
Information Gaps and Priority Collection Requirements
To validate or refute the entries provided, the following would materially improve attribution: precise geographic coordinates and recent satellite imagery of the alleged sites; corroborating documentary evidence linking “military unit 20336” to a 12th GUMO formation (e.g., official procurement records, court filings, or MoD publications); on-the-ground photography indicating unit signage or 12th GUMO identifiers; evidence of rail spurs and transshipment infrastructure; and consistent multi-source reporting tying the site to a specific Iskander-M brigade. Absent such data, the association of the listed entries with RTBs or a “3rd Missile Brigade” remains unverified.
Confidence and Caveats
Details of Russia’s nuclear warhead storage network, including RTB locations, capacities, and unit designations, are tightly held and largely classified. Open-source indicators can suggest the function of a facility but do not independently confirm the presence of nuclear warheads. The entries “/Be n/a Repair-Technical Base” and “military unit 20336” lack sufficient corroborating information for definitive identification. Any precise site characterization would require additional, verifiable evidence. Where public statements by Russian and Belarusian officials exist (e.g., 2023–2024 announcements), they establish intent and general posture but do not disclose verifiable site-level specifics.